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Introduction
There are currently three regional human rights courts in the world: 
the European, the inter-American and the African one. The first 
court to be established was the European Court of Human Rights 
in 1959, followed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
1979, and finally the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in 2006, which is to be combined in the near future w ith the African 
Court of Justice to form a new African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights.1 Only the Inter-American and the European Court have is­
sued executable judgments as of yet.
The European Convention on Human Rights2 -  the second re­
gional human rights instrument after the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man of 19483 - ,  adopted soon after the Sec­
ond World War, was the first hum an rights convention to provide a 
dedicated protection system. It became the prototype for other re­
gional human rights protection systems, in the first case the inter- 
American one under the ACHR.4 Each posterior system took inspi­
ration from earlier systems, but also introduced modifications in ar­
eas that had proven to be unsatisfactory or adaptations required by 
different organizational or political circumstances. Therefore, com­
parison of the solutions adopted for similar problems -  in our case 
reparation orders and their execution -  is an appropriate tool to 
assess the effectivity of the human rights protection systems and to
1Article 1 of the Protocol on the Statute o f the African Court o f Justice and H um an 
Rights, 2012.
2European Convention for the Protection of H um an Rights and Fundam ental Free­
doms (hereinafter “ECHR”), 4 November 1950 (entry into force: 3 September 1953), 
CETS no. 005.
3American Declaration of the Rights and Duties o f Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted 
by the N inth International Conference o f American States, 1948, reprinted in: Basic 
D ocum ents Pertaining to H um an Rights in the Inter-American System, pp. 19-27.
4American Convention on H um an Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (hereinafter 
“ACHR”), 22 November 1969 (entry into force: 18 July 1978), 1144 UNTS 123.
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ideally filter the positive aspects of each system, which may become 
the basis for proposals of improvement.
This undertaking shall also serve the aim to raise awareness 
w ithin the courts of each other’s jurisprudence and procedures.5 
While there is a notable increase in mutual interest, e.g. expressed in 
visits by judges at the respective other Court, at least at the ECtHR 
one can still hear that the IACtHR was ineffective and published all 
its acts in Spanish only, making them inaccessible to most European 
readers. While this fails to recognize that nowadays all IACtHR de­
cisions are translated into English, though not always free of even 
grave errors,6 the m yth of the IACtHR’s lack of effectiveness shall 
be re-evaluated in this thesis.
Reparation and execution of judgments has been of limited inter­
est to legal scholars until now. In Europe, this may be due to several 
factors: until the beginning of the 2000s, reparation was not men­
tioned in ECtHR judgments, which only found w hether there had 
been a violation and eventually awarded monetary compensation. 
The Committee of Ministers, which is responsible for supervision 
of the execution of judgments, held sessions on compliance behind 
closed doors and did not publish information on its activities. Fur­
thermore, it was a frequent assumption that compliance w ith ECtHR 
judgments was perfect anyways.7
The issue of reparation and their execution in Europe, however, 
contains a set of open questions that have become virulent, in par­
ticular since the accession of the new member states from East­
ern Europe. Several of these states are still young democracies w ith 
sometimes severe shortcomings in their public administrations and 
suffering also from economic constraints. Repression remains a fre­
quent instrument of their domestic policy, and in some states in­
stitutions such as the police or the judiciary commit grave and 
widespread violations of the ECHR’s most fundamental rights. As
5It was only in 2012 that the ECtHR and the IACtHR formally established coopera­
tion: ECtHR, Annual Report 2012, pp. 5, 14.
6Paül, “Translation Challenges o f the Inter-Am erican Court o f H um an Rights and 
Cost-Effective Proposals for Im provem ent”, 1-2 IAEHRJ 5 (2012). This also affects 
the denom ination o f judgm ents or the type o f decision, w hich is not consistent in 
English. In this w ork w e will m aintain the denom inations as they appear in the 
official translation o f each decision.
7E.g.: Committee of Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2007, pp. 9f.
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a consequence, not only did the number of cases that reached the 
Court skyrocket, but also the quality of violations became more se­
vere. This put the issue of effective reparation, in particular on the 
general level to prevent repetitive violations, on the Court’s and 
the Committee’s agenda. Also, the way in which the Committee of 
Ministers dealt w ith the Court’s judgments in relation to the states 
started to be observed w ith growing interest.8
The inter-American system, on the contrary, is generally believed 
to be ineffective. While the IACtHR maintains a broad reparation 
practice, most of its judgments have not been fully complied with. 
Historical experience has furthermore shown that little support for 
the IACtHR’s work can be expected from the OAS organs, so pro­
posals to improve compliance mainly focus on domestic remedies.9
Nevertheless, the assumption of perfect compliance w ith the EC- 
tHR’s judgments and that of the IACtHR’s notorious ineffectiveness 
seem difficult to maintain. The Committee of Ministers itself has 
acknowledged that there is an issue at least of slow execution.10 
But also situations such as the UK’s opposition to adopt the legal 
measures required after the ECtHR in 2005 had declared the gen­
eral ban on voting rights for prisoners a violation of the Convention 
gives reason to worry. On the other hand, the first impression of the 
IACtHR’s work may be truly grim, w ith only 15 cases closed out of 
around 150 that were decided until the end of 2012.11 This perspec­
tive however appears insufficient to evaluate the Court’s results. 
The IACtHR maintains a very detailed reparation practice, handing 
down catalogues of specific orders to the states. Thus, even if most 
or at least the more fundamental of these orders have been fulfilled,
8See, among others, the w orks by Lambert, Les effets des arrets and Lambert Abdel- 
gawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, and von Staden, Shaping human rights pol­
icy in liberal democracies. Also, since 2008, the Committee publishes annual reports 
on its m onitoring activities, w hich are available from its website at www.coe.int/cm.
9See, e.g.: ADC, Efectividad del SIDH, pp. 29f.; Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts”, 
3 CILJ 44 (2011); CEJIL, Implementacion; Cavallaro and Brewer, “Reevaluating Re­
gional H um an Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case o fth e  Inter- 
American C ourt”, 4 AJIL 102 (2008), p. 770; Baluarte, “Strategizing for Compliance”, 
2 Am. U. In t’l L. Rev. 27 (2012), p. 282.
10Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, p. 11.
11See the updated list in Annex 1.
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a case is generally not closed by the IACtHR and remains on its list 
of unfinished issues.
Comparing both systems may also prove to be fruitful for the dif­
ferent political settings the courts are acting in. Unlike the ECtHR, 
which began its work among a group of like-minded liberal democ­
racies marked by the atrocious experience of the Second World War, 
the IACtHR had to deal w ith a set of states that were either plagued 
by internal conflicts or had just overcome dictatorial regimes, which 
generally implied gross human rights violations. While the Euro­
pean Court, and in the beginning also the Commission, thus prin­
cipally had to decide civil rights cases, the case of Ireland v. United 
Kingdom and The Greek Case being notorious exceptions,12 a sig­
nificant number of cases before the IACtHR stemmed from these 
gross violations, forced disappearances, mass murder by security 
or paramilitary forces, torture and other grave human rights viola­
tions.
Today, this situation is diametrically changing. While the IACtHR 
is increasingly occupied w ith civil rights cases,13 the ECtHR is re­
ceiving more cases in particular from Eastern European states that 
concern massacres, forced disappearances, and impunity of state of­
ficials committing human rights violations.14 Also, while effective 
implementation of judgments becomes more of a problem in some 
European states, several American states have set up special mecha­
nisms to improve implementation of IACtHR judgments, which now 
require less intervention by the Court or OAS organs.
The level of integration of the states in each region is another 
factor that may influence the execution of judgments. The Euro­
pean states are integrated on many different levels, comprising not 
only the member states’ governments but also their parliaments.
12Ireland v. United Kingdom  (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 5310/71,18 Jan­
uary  1978, Series A no. 25; The Greek Case (Report), ECommHR, nos. 3321/67 et al., 
5 November 1969, YB 11, Vol. II, 690 and 730.
13Tanner, “Interview  w ith Judge Antonio A. Cangado Trindade, Inter-American 
C ourt ofH um an Rights”, 4 HRQ 31 (2009), pp. 988ff.; ParraVera, Lucha contra la im- 
punidad, independencia judicial y  derechos de los pueblos indigenas. Algunos avances 
y  debates en torno a la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos H u­
manos (2004-2009), pp. 33f.
14Cf. the ECtHR statistics on its caseload and the violated rights in each annual report, 
e.g. ECtHR, Annual Report 2012, pp. 152ff.
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Half of the CoE’s members are furthermore participating in the Eu­
ropean Union, which ensures even stronger integration on all levels 
of state administration.15 Compliance w ith ECtHR judgments can 
thus be controlled on many levels. The American states, on the other 
hand, are much less integrated. States are represented in the OAS by 
their governments only; an integration of the legislative or judicial 
branches does not take place. Also, not all OAS members have ra t­
ified the ACHR or accepted the IACtHR’s compulsory jurisdiction. 
This has led to accusations by several Latin American states that the 
IACommHR and the IACtHR were organs controlled by the United 
States of America, an argument put forward expressly by Venezuela 
when denouncing the ACHR in 2012.16
Implementation of the hum an rights courts’ judgments depends 
on national and international actors. The following investigation 
will concentrate on the implementation of reparation judgments on 
the international level in the framework of the respective underly­
ing regional organizations. It spares out domestic implementation 
mechanisms out of two reasons. First, it would be unrealistic to com­
pare the domestic law and organization of 47 European states and 
23 states parties to the ACHR. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
states’ obligation to comply with the courts’ judgments under Arti­
cle 46(1) of the ECHR and Article 67 of the ACHR does not discrim­
inate among the member states’ domestic circumstances. All states 
are under the same obligation to comply w ith the respective court’s 
decisions, no matter how their domestic legal and administrative or­
der has been conceived. Also, the supranational supervisory mech­
anisms of both the OAS and the CoE apply indiscriminately to all 
states. It is therefore possible to compare these mechanisms without 
dealing w ith the differences in the member states’ domestic laws. 
However, effective implementation requires that w ithin the proce­
dures we are going to describe, national particularities are being
15The European Union is set to become a m ember o f the ECHR. CoE, Press Release 
- DC041(2013), 5 April 2013, u r l : w w w .coe.in t. See an example for the potential 
of stronger integration o f the Council o f Europe and the EU for the execution of 
judgm ents infra in section 9.1.1.2.2.
16M inister o f Popular Power for Foreign Affairs o f the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Letter to the Secretary General o f  the OAS, 6 September 2012, u r l : http: 
//w w w .oas.org/D IL/N ota_R ep% C 3% B A blica_B olivariana_V enezuela_to_SG . 
English.pdf.
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taken into account, e.g. concerning the selection of domestic con­
versational partners. But, as these questions are of a practical na­
ture, they have to be decided by the competent organs on a case 
to case basis. They will therefore only be touched upon in passing 
when describing particular cases.
The constitutional differences of the OAS and the Council of Eu­
rope, and in particular the place of human rights protection in their 
work, depend in part on the historical circumstances in which both 
organizations were established. The first part of this work will there­
fore briefly describe the historical background of both courts. It will 
also present the organs involved in the execution of judgments. Fi­
nally, the procedures before both courts will be exposed as far as 
they may result in executable state obligations.
The next part will retrace the courts’ reparation practice in the 
light of international law of state responsibility. These rules and 
orders set out the states’ obligations, whose compliance has to be 
supervised by the respective organs of both organizations. The EC- 
tHR’s reparation orders are marked by the principle of subsidiarity, 
underlined again by the states in the 2012 Brighton Declaration and 
codified in Article 34 of the ECHR.17 Reparation measures are in 
principle to be determined by the states under supervision of the 
Committee of Ministers. To counter repetitive cases and in single 
other situations the Court has, however, begun to develop a more 
detailed reparation practice that goes beyond the mere awarding 
of monetary compensation and limits the principle of subsidiarity. 
The IACtHR’s reparation powers are, on the contrary, almost unre­
stricted. It hands down very broad reparation orders that have even 
been criticized for sometimes being practically impossible to com­
ply with.
Execution of judgments will be dealt w ith in part 3. After devel­
oping the binding force of the courts’ judgments under public in­
ternational law, the work of the diverse organs that influence the
17Council of Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  
Human Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : https://hub .coe.in t/20120419-brigh ton-decla  
ration, no. 12. The principle o f subsidiarity will be included into the pream ble of 
the ECHR, once the draft Protocol 15 enters into force: Article 1 o f Protocol No. 15 
am ending the Convention for the Protection o f H um an Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (hereinafter “Protocol no. 15”), 24 June 2013, CETS no. 213.
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execution of judgments will be presented in detail. In Europe these 
are first and foremost the Committee of Ministers, but also the EC- 
tHR and the Parliamentary Assembly, among others. In the Ameri­
cas, the procedure is less complex, as responsibility is shared among 
the General Assembly and its sub-organs, and the IACtHR. Based on 
these findings, an assessment of both procedures and an overview 
of already planned and possible future reform measures will be pre­
sented. The last part contains the conclusions of the investigation.
7
Part I
Regional Hum an Rights Protection 
in the Am ericas and in Europe
Overview
It is a general rule of international law that individuals cannot de­
nounce violations of international treaties before international tri­
bunals. Only states or international organizations may do so, and 
even they only upon previous agreement. Therefore, individual 
claims usually require support by a state that can claim to have suf­
fered damage.1 Modern human rights treaties however directly con­
fer rights on individuals. The violation of these rights gives rise to 
claims for reparation directly between the victim and the responsi­
ble state. Thus, objective obligations among the states become sub­
jective rights of individuals.2 The creation of subjective rights for 
individuals marks the particularity of human rights treaties such as 
the ACHR, the ECHR, and recently also the ACHPR.3 States play a 
double role in this constellation. On the one hand they are the only 
institutions that can possibly violate Convention rights, but at the 
same time they are the born guarantors of these very rights, the 
institutional framework called upon to safeguard the existence, the 
freedom, and the property of the individual citizen.4
However, hum an rights cases, even among an individual and a 
foreign state, usually do not coincide w ith the political interests of 
the individual’s state of nationality so that no support by the na­
tional state is to be expected. The general rule of international law
1Cf. U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, at 1533.
2The dispute about w hether all hum an rights are subjective rights, independent from 
the possibility of enforcem ent by the bearers, does not require further discussion in 
the scope of this thesis, as both the ECHR and the ACHR procure enforceability. See 
on the issue Seegers, Das Individualrecht a u f  Wiedergutmachung, pp. 53ff.
3See Article 1 o f the ECHR and Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Kommentar 2006, Einleitung 
no. 28; Article 1 o f the ACHR and Shelton, “Im plementation Procedures of the Amer­
ican Convention on Hum an Rights”, GYIL 26 (1983), p. 243 and Effect o f  Reservations, 
IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 Septem ber 1982, Series A no. 2, para. 29; Ar­
ticle 1 o f the African Charter on Hum an and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter “ACHPR”), 
27 June 1981 (entry into force: 21 October 1986), 1520 UNTS 217 and Bortfeld, Der 
Afrikanische Gerichtshof fü r  Menschenrechte, pp. 39ff.
4Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, p. 8.
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according to which states represent their citizens in all questions 
relating to international law before international organs (known 
as the right of diplomatic protection) would hence render human 
rights protection absurd and cannot apply to these cases.5 It is there­
fore essential for human rights treaties to provide individual com­
plaints procedures and the ability for individual claimants to defend 
their claims directly or through another neutral body such as a hu­
man rights commission. Out of the same consideration, reparation 
for damages suffered by individuals due to human rights violations 
may not be granted to the state, as would be the case under general 
international law, but must be granted to the victim.6 The ECHR and 
ACHR comply w ith these requirements, establishing an individual 
complaints procedure,7 and providing for reparation to be made di­
rectly to the victim.8 Even in inter-state cases, where the affected 
individuals are not directly represented, the ECtHR has held that 
just satisfaction is afforded “for the benefit of individual victims”, as 
long as the proceedings were not instituted to maintain European 
public order.9
The complaints systems are not restricted to the human rights 
courts solely but rely on different Charter organs of the CoE and 
the OAS. Therefore, before assessing the effectivity of the repara­
tion process, it is necessary to have a brief look at the human rights 
protection systems as a whole. While the inter-American human 
rights protection system had largely been inspired by the European 
one, there are some significant differences that have historically 
evolved and mainly affect the execution of judgments. Section 1 will 
briefly show the origins of human rights protection in Europe and 
the Americas. The human rights protection systems under inves­
tigation were installed through human rights conventions adopted 
w ithin the OAS and the CoE. The purpose of both organizations is
5Shaw, International Law, pp. 258f.
6Enrich Mas, “Right to Com pensation under Article 50”, p. 776, w ith further refer­
ences for the ECHR. For further reasons w hy hum an rights cases cannot be resolved 
as cases o f international state responsibility, refer to Shelton, Remedies in Interna­
tional Human Rights Law, ed. 1, pp. 47ff.
7Article 34 o f the ECHR and Article 44 of the ACHR.
8Article 41 o f the ECHR and Article 63 of the ACHR.
9Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, 
paras. 46 and 58f.
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not limited to human rights protection. Their tasks range from cul­
ture and economy to political stabilization and the consolidation of 
representative democracy.10 Consequently, the organizations have 
a number of organs that are not directly involved in the protection 
of human rights. Nonetheless, some of these organs, like the Com­
mittee of Ministers in the CoE or the General Assembly and the 
Permanent Council in the OAS, play significant roles in the pro­
cess of hum an rights protection, particularly when enforcing Court 
judgments. Out of these considerations a short overview of the re­
spective organizations that play a role in the protection process will 
be provided in section 2. Finally, in section 3, the procedures before 
the courts and, in the Americas, the Commission leading to the es­
tablishment of state responsibility for human rights violations will 
be described to the necessary extent, placing an emphasis on the 
reparation procedures before the courts.
10 Article 1 o f the Statute o f the Council o f Europe (hereinafter “Statute o f the CoE”),
5 May 1949 (entry into force: 3 August 1949), ETS no. 001 and Article 1 of the 
C harter of the Organization o f American States (hereinafter “C harter of the OAS”), 
30 April 1948 (entry into force: 13 December 1951), 119 UNTS 48.
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The CoE and the OAS were created w ith different historical needs, 
which is reflected in their aims. The OAS aims at the promotion 
of solidarity, the strengthening of collaboration, and the defence of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence ofits members.1 
Consequently, it is directed much more strongly towards the inter­
ests of its member states than towards those of their citizens. Apart 
from the eradication of extreme poverty, mentioned in Article 2(g) 
of the Charter of the OAS, and the proclamation of fundamental 
rights in Article 3(l), none of the rights mentioned directly affects 
the people.
The aim of the CoE, child of the devastating Second World War 
and germ of European reconciliation and reconstruction, is “to 
achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safe­
guarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their com­
mon heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”2 
These aims shall be achieved by means of discussions, agreements, 
and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and 
fundamental freedoms, and through the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.3 Although 
these aims are directed at the member states only, all of them di­
rectly affect the live of the citizens.
These differences influence the way in which human rights pro­
tection is organized in the Americas (1.1) and in Europe (1.2).
1.1 The Am erican  C onvention  on H um an  R igh ts
Human rights questions were a concern to the states of the Ameri­
cas since the very beginning of inter-American cooperation. In the 
Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation of Panama
1 Article 1 of the Charter o f the OAS.
2Article 1(a) o f the Statute of the CoE.
3Article 1(b) o f the Statute of the CoE.
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(1826), the signatory states already recognized the principle of ju ­
ridical equality of nationals of a state and foreigners, and also as­
sured to cooperate in the abolition of slave trade. Later, they dealt 
w ith questions of nationality and asylum, rights of women and 
labour conditions.4 After the Second World War, the American 
states became pioneers in the codification of hum an rights. At the 
Inter-American Conference of Mexico City in 1945 they declared 
their conviction of the principles of international public law on hu­
man rights and ordered the American Juridical Committee to draft 
a declaration on the rights and duties of m an.5 The resulting Amer­
ican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted at 
the Inter-American Conference in Bogota of 1948 as a simple, non­
binding conference declaration, seven months before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.6 The Declaration lists civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. Proposals to set up a juridical 
protection system for human rights brought up by the Uruguayan 
delegate to the Conference of Bogota were rejected as interferences 
w ith the sovereignty of the states and were not even voted upon as 
the majority of states had already voted against giving the Declara­
tion legally binding force.7 Today, though, it is argued that the Dec­
laration had obtained binding force at least for a part of the states 
parties. One author argues that, while the Declaration itself is not 
binding, its contents have become (regional) international custom­
ary law and reflect fundamental principles recognized by the Amer­
ican States.8 Others hold that it has certain moral value, because it
4All examples from  Buergenthal and Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Am eri­
cas: Cases and Materials, p. 38.
5Resolution XL “Protection  Internacional de los Derechos Esenciales del Hom bre” 
(hereinafter “Resolution XL”), adopted by the Inter-Am erican Conference on Pro­
blems of W ar and Peace, Mexico City, 21 February to 8 March 1945, 7 March 1945, 
Conferencias In ternationales Americanas: Segundo Suplemento 1945-1954, pp. 52­
53.
6The states at the Conference of Mexico had originally intended the Declaration to 
take the form  of a  Convention; see Preamble of Resolution XL. See also Buergenthal 
and Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials, pp. 39f. 
and Gillich, Konsens und evolutive Vertragsauslegung, p. 20.
7Medina Quiroga, The Battle o f  Human Rights, pp. 37f. and Cassel, “Inter-American 
H um an Rights Law, Soft and H ard”, pp. 399f.
8Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 28.
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lays out the “civilized behaviour” of the states.9 In a detailed anal­
ysis of the question, Gillich reaches the conclusion that, by way of 
evolutive interpretation, the Declaration has obtained binding force 
for all states parties except the US, which adopted the role of a per­
sistent objector, and Cuba, to which the progressive interpretation 
does not apply due to its suspension from the OAS.10 The IACtHR 
went even one step further and sustained the opinion that the Dec­
laration had become binding for all OAS member states.11 W hen 
adopting the Declaration, the OAS member states at least declared 
w hat they considered at that time to be the human rights w orth to 
be protected. The Declaration is therefore an important means to 
interpret human rights in the Americas, in particular the notion of 
“human rights” as it appears in the Charter of the OAS.12 No other 
human rights document was ever adopted by all American states, 
making the Declaration the only truly pan-American human rights 
document.
Another important resolution was adopted at the Conference of 
Bogota in 1948. In Resolution XXXI the states recommended that 
the Inter-American Juridical Committee elaborate the Statute for 
an Inter-American Court for the protection of human rights, argu­
ing that these rights were internationally recognized and could only 
be protected by a tribunal.13 But the project never grew out of the 
planning state. It reappeared in Resolution XXIX of the Tenth Inter- 
American Conference in Caracas in 1954,14 where many delegations 
abstained from voting and thus did not let the resolution pass.15
9Grossman, “Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-Am erican System of Protection of 
H um an Rights”, GYIL 32 (1989), p. 266.
10Gillich, Konsens und evolutive Vertragsauslegung, pp. 284ff.
11 Interpretation Art. 64 ACHR, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 14 July 1989, 
Series A no. 10, para. 45.
12Articles 3(l), 17, 45, 106 and 145 of the Charter of the OAS refer to hum an rights.
13Resolution XXXI “Corte Interam ericana para Proteger los Derechos del Hom bre” 
(hereinafter “Resolution XXXI”), adopted by the N inth International Conference of 
American States, Bogota, 30 March to 2 May 1948, Conferencias Internacionales 
Americanas: Segundo Suplemento 1945-1954, p. 210.
14Resolution XXIX “Corte Interam ericana Para Proteger Los Derechos H um anos” 
(hereinafter “Resolution XXIX”), adopted by the Tenth International Conference of 
American States, Caracas, 1 to 28 March 1954, Conferencias Internacionales Ame- 
ricanas: Segundo Suplemento 1945-1954, pp. 311-312.
15M edina Quiroga, The Battle o fH um an Rights, p. 54.
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The fact that the plans for an inter-American court of human 
rights had been tacitly buried by the states did not mean standstill in 
the development of human rights protection in the Americas. At the 
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in San­
tiago de Chile in 1959, Resolution VIII was adopted, establishing the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.16 It is noteworthy 
that the Commission was not established by a treaty but by a simple 
conference resolution. The changing attitude of the American states 
towards human rights protection mechanisms can be explained by 
the changing political circumstances in the region. On 1 January 
1959, Cuban dictator Batista was overthrown and the masses mobi­
lized in other Latin-American states, hoping to get rid of unwanted 
Governments, too.17 This is reflected directly in the Resolution: “It 
has been considered essential, as a fundamental corollary to this 
rule, that such rights be protected by a juridical system, so that 
men will not be driven to the extreme expedient of revolt against 
tyranny and oppression [ . . .]”. Nevertheless, as the region’s only 
human rights document up to this date, the American Declaration 
of Rights and Duties of Man, was at that time undisputedly non­
binding, the first Statute of the Commission of 1960 did not provide 
for the guarantee of human rights but only for their prom otion.18 
The role of the Commission was to serve as an advisory body to 
the OAS in hum an rights questions (Article 9(e) of the Statute).19 
It was not conceived as an OAS body or organ but merely as an 
“autonomous entity”, w ithout defining w hat that should mean.20 
The second important decision taken in Resolution VIII was that 
the Inter-American Council of Jurists should proceed to prepare a
“ Resolution VIII, adopted by the Fifth M eeting o f Consultation of Ministers o f For­
eign Affairs o f the OAS, Santiago de Chile, 1959, u r l : http://w ww.oas.org/consejo/ 
MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta%205.pdf.
17Kokott, Das interamerikanische System zum  Schutz der Menschenrechte, p. 16.
18 Article 2 of the Commission Statute o f 1960 defined the rights of the American Dec­
laration as the rights to be prom oted. Buergenthal and Shelton, Protecting Human 
Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials, pp. 48f.
19Ruiz Miguel, “La Funcion Consultiva en el Sistema Interam ericano de Derechos 
Humanos: ^Crisalida de una Jurisdiction Supra-Constitucional?”, p. 1357.
20Scheman, “The Inter-Am erican Commission on H um an Rights”, 2 AJIL 59 (1965), 
p. 337.
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draft Convention on Human Rights and on the creation of an “Inter- 
American Court for the Protection of Human Rights”.
Profiting from its unclear status, the Commission soon began 
to enlarge its own competence.21 Thus, in 1965, the Commission 
Statute was changed for the first time by Resolution XXII of the 
Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, giving 
the Commission the possibility to receive individual complaints and 
to investigate in loco. Still, a power to satisfy for or repair identified 
human rights violations was not contemplated. The Commission fi­
nally received constitutional backing at the Buenos Aires Confer­
ence in 1967, where it was made one of the OAS’s main organs in 
Article 51(e) of the Charter of the OAS. Furthermore, its existence 
was required in Article 112, making an amendment of the Conven­
tion a requirement for its abolition.22 This reform entered into force 
in 1970.
On 22 June 1969 the American Convention on Human Rights was 
signed in Costa Rica after 10 years of preparation. It entered into 
force nineteen years later on 18 July 1978 after the 11th ratification. 
In 1988, the First Protocol to the ACHR was adopted by the OAS in 
the area of economic, social and cultural rights, also known as the 
Protocol of San Salvador.23 The Second Protocol to the ACHR was 
signed in 1990 in Asuncion dealing w ith the abolition of the death 
penalty, prohibiting its use under any circumstances in peacetime, 
allowing reservations to be made for the use in wartim e.24
21Cangado Trindade, “The Evolution o f the Organisation o f American States (OAS) 
System of H um an Rights Protection: an Appraisal”, GYIL 25 (1982), p. 500.
22For a  detailed description of this reform see Buergenthal, “The Revised OAS Charter 
and the Protection o f H um an Rights”, 4 AJIL 69 (October 1975), pp. 828ff.
23Additional Protocol to the American Convention on H um an Rights in the Area 
o f Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol o f San Salvador” (hereinafter 
“First Protocol to the ACHR”), 17 November 1988 (entry  into force: 16 November 
1999), OAS Treaty Series no. 69. For more inform ation see: Steiner and Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, pp. 870f.
24Protocol to the American Convention on H um an Rights to Abolish the Death 
Penalty (hereinafter “Second Protocol to the ACHR”), 8 June 1990, OAS Treaty Se­
ries no. 73.
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1.2 The European C onvention  on H um an  R igh ts
In the still war-torn Europe, the CoE was founded on 5 May 1949. 
Moves to ensure the protection of human rights on the Conti­
nent had however been undertaken already before this day. At 
the Congress of the European Movement in The Hague in May 
1948, proposals for a European Charter of Human Rights were pre- 
sented.25 These proposals were cast into more tangible forms in the 
“Teitgen Report”, named after former French Minister ofJustice P.H. 
Teitgen. This report was accepted at the Consultative Assembly of 
the CoE on 9 September 1949.26 In June 1950 the Committee of Min­
isters installed a Committee of Experts and convened a Conference 
of Senior Officials which annexed a draft convention to the report.27 
After further revision by the Consultative Assembly and the Com­
mittee of Ministers, the Convention was finally signed on 4 Novem­
ber 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953 after the tenth 
instrument of ratification was deposited w ith the Secretary General 
of the CoE. The European Commission on Human Rights was es­
tablished on 18 May 1954 and the Court on 21 January 1959. Today, 
the signature of the ECHR is quasi-obligatory for all members of the
CoE.28
The states’ intention when adopting the ECHR was not to con­
cede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance 
of their national interests, but to realize the aims and ideals of 
the CoE,29 particularly the “maintenance and realization of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”.30 This is one of the major differ­
ences to the development of the hum an rights protection system in 
the Americas. Although European cooperation in general, and in the
25Frowein, “European Convention on H um an Rights (1950)”, p. 189.
26Haß, Die Urteile, p. 35.
27Frowein, “European Convention on H um an Rights (1950)”, p. 189.
28See for example concerning the application o f Poland: Opinion No. 154, adopted by 
the Parliam entary Assembly, 2 October 1990, u r l : http://assem bly.coe.int/M ainf. 
asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta90/EOPI154.htm in relation w ith Resolution 
1031, adopted by the Parliam entary Assembly, 14 April 1994, u r l : http://assembly. 
coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta94/ERES1031.htm, nos. 2-7.
29Carrillo Salcedo, “The Place of the European Convention in International Law”, 
p. 15.
30 Article 1(b) o f the ECHR.
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field of human rights in particular, is more recent than in the Ameri­
cas, it was established at a much faster speed and a higher intensity. 
Whereas in the 1950s the well-meant intentions of the American 
States stopped short of realizing an effective protection system after 
more than one hundred years of cooperative tradition and codifica­
tion of inter-American relations, the Europeans, driven by the hor­
rors of two devastating world wars w ithin only 30 years, took sev­
eral steps in one and established their hum an rights protection sys­
tem in the record time of only five years. Unlike the inter-American 
system that was originally based on the non-binding American Dec­
laration, the member states of the CoE had given themselves not 
only a legally binding hum an rights convention, but also an effective 
protection system that could monitor and punish human rights vi­
olations and even provided a mechanism for individual complaints, 
initially before the European Commission of Human Rights, which 
is still today unique in the world for its effectiveness. Worries about 
the sovereignty of the states and interventions into domestic affairs 
were put aside.31 The European human rights system could thus be­
come the model for other regional human rights protection systems 
in the world.
Since its entry into force, the European system for the protec­
tion of human rights has undergone various major reforms. The 
Convention was amended by 14 protocols, expanding the scope of 
rights protected or introducing procedural changes. The most im­
portant protocol w ith respect to the human rights protection system 
is Protocol no. 11, which brought fundamental changes in the or­
ganizational structure of the European human rights organs when 
it entered into force on 1 November 1998.32 Most importantly, the
31Cassel identifies three elem ents that influenced the intervention fears as one rea­
son w hy Latin American states were reluctant to binding hum an rights obligations: 
a  “history o f U.S. interventions” and the US policy to support dictatorial regimes 
as long as they w ere anti-com m unist during the Cold War, the predom inance of 
repressive regimes in the region, and more or less active US opposition to hu ­
m an rights treaties in general. Cassel, “Inter-American H um an Rights Law, Soft 
and H ard”, pp. 402ff.
32Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection o f H um an Rights and Funda­
m ental Freedoms, restructuring the control m achinery established thereby (here­
inafter “Protocol no. 11”), 11 May 1994 (entry into force: 1 November 1998), 
CETS no. 155.
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European Commission of Human Rights was abolished and the in­
dividual complaints procedure to the Court established.33
The next important procedural modification was brought by the 
entry into force of Protocol no. 14 on 1 June 2010.34 This protocol 
aims in the first place at enhancing the effectiveness of the Court’s 
proceedings, enabling it in particular to better cope w ith its exten­
sive workload.35 It also introduced new facilities for the Committee 
of Ministers and the ECtHR on the stage of execution of judgment. 
While Russia was postponing the ratification of Protocol no. 14, 
adopted already on 13 May 2004, the other member states followed 
two different ways to alleviate the pressing situation of the Court’s 
ever rising caseload.36 Some states signed a Protocol no. 14bis of 27 
May 20 0 9.37 Another number of states opted for the Agreement of 
Madrid of 12 May 2009 which declared parts of Protocol 14 imme­
diately applicable.38 Both solutions envisaged to facilitate the ad­
missions procedure of individual complaints and the striking out of
33 The current structure of the European H um an Rights Protection System will be 
explained infra in section 2.1. See also Merrills and Robertson, Human rights in 
Europe: A  study o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 297ff.
34Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection o f H um an Rights and Fun­
dam ental Freedoms, am ending the control system of the Convention (hereinafter 
“Protocol no. 14”), 13 May 2004 (entry into force: 1 June 2010), CETS no. 194. In 
detail hereon: D irectorate General o f H um an Rights, Guaranteeing the effective­
ness; “The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ 26 (2005); Egli, “Zur Reform des Rechtss­
chutzsystem s der Europäischen M enschenrechtskonvention”, ZaöRV  64 (2004). 
The procedure under this Protocol will be described in chapter 3.
35By 31 December 2011 there w ere 151 600 cases pending before the Court, an in­
crease o f 9% compared to 2010. 64 500 new  cases w ere filed, w hereat only 52 188 
cases were disposed of, 1 511 by judgm ent (-41%) and 50 677 by decision o f inad­
missibility or by being struck out of the list (+31%). See ECtHR, Annual Report 2011, 
p. 151. By 31 December 2012, the Court could reduce the num ber of pending cases 
to 128 100, m ainly due to the measures explained infra, ECtHR, Annual Report 2012, 
p. 149.
36Hereon: Bowring, “The Russian Federation, Protocol No. 14 (and 14bis), and the 
Battle for the Soul o f the ECHR”, 2 GoJIL 2 (2010).
37Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection o f H um an Rights and 
Fundam ental Freedoms (hereinafter “Protocol no. 14bis”), 27 May 2009 (entry into 
force: 1 October 2009), CETS no. 204.
38Agreem ent on the Provisional Application o f Certain Provisions o f Protocol no.
14 Pending its Entry into Force (hereinafter “Agreem ent o f M adrid”), 12 May 2009 
(entry into force: 1 June 2009), u r l : http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/ 
H tm l/194-1.htm.
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applications, allowing the Court to sit in a single-judge formation 
in order to decide these issues.39 The new competence on the exe­
cution stage were not activated yet. Both solutions ended with the 
entry into force of Protocol no. 14 on 1 June 2010.
39See section 3.2.1 for more details on the modifications introduced by Protocol no. 
14.
20
2 Structure of the Human Rights 
Protection Systems
The internal organization of the OAS and the CoE differs not only 
w ith respect to their aims but also their organs and the distribution 
of competence. Nevertheless, it is common to both systems that hu­
man rights protection in general and the execution of judgments in 
particular are processes that rely on multiple organs beyond those 
forming the hum an rights protection system in the strict sense. Be­
fore regarding the juridical processes in which violations are estab­
lished, we therefore have to explain the participating organs’ po­
sition w ithin the structure of the organizations, their composition 
and their tasks.
Both the IACtHR and the ECtHR were established later than the 
OAS and the CoE and are not Charter organs but instruments under 
the human rights Conventions. The courts are the main organs for 
the protection of human rights, supported in Europe by the Commit­
tee of Ministers and in the Americas by the Inter-American Com­
mission. These organs will be the centre of this investigation and 
shall therefore be presented in the first section of this chapter (2.1).
There is are a number of other organs of minor importance for the 
procedure of assessing hum an rights violations that play a role on 
the stage of execution of decisions. In Europe, these are in particu­
lar the Parliamentary Assembly,1 the Secretariat of the CoE and the 
Human Rights Commissioner. The OAS has eight Charter organs: 
the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, the Councils, the Inter-American Juridical Commit­
tee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the General 
Secretariat, the Specialized Conferences, and the Specialized Orga­
1The Charter speaks o f the “Consultative Assembly”, but in 1974 the Assembly de­
cided to call itself “Parliam entary Assembly”.
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nizations.2 Besides the IACommHR, the General Assembly and the 
Permanent Council are occupied with questions relating to human 
rights protection and will be briefly presented (2.2).
At the time of writing, since 9 April 2012, the Permanent Coun­
cil had launched debates on reforms of the inter-American human 
rights protection system to make it more efficient. This process con­
tains several public hearings under participation of civil society and 
frequent exchanges between the member states on the Permanent 
Council and the IACommHR.3 No decision that concerns the execu­
tion of judgments is though envisaged as of yet.
2.1 Central H um an  R igh ts O rgan s
Today, all member states to the CoE have ratified the ECHR and 
no state can become a member of the CoE without doing so. Rati­
fication of the Convention entails recognition of the ECtHR’s com­
petence. On the contrary, not all OAS member states have ratified 
the ACHR and ratification does not entail automatic recognition of 
the IACtHR’s jurisprudence. Its jurisprudence has to be recognized 
according to Article 62(1) of the ACHR, so that the IACommHR or 
other states may only submit cases to the IACtHR regarding states 
that have made the corresponding declaration. The Commission has 
different competences, too, depending on w hether it acts under Arti­
cle 106 of the Charter of the OAS or Articles 34ff. of the ACHR.4 Due 
to the provisions in Articles 44 and 45 of the ACHR there is further 
division even among the states parties to the Convention. Article 44 
of the ACHR establishes the right of individuals or NGOs to report 
violations of the Convention to the IACommHR w ithout any pre­
vious act of recognition by the accused state. Inter-state denuncia­
tions to the Commission according to Article 45 of the ACHR how­
2Article 53 o f the C harter of the OAS. An organigram  of the OAS can be found at 
Buergenthal and Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Mate­
rials, p. 45.
3Inform ation on the process is available at https://w w w .oas.org/en/iachr/m andate/ 
strengthening.asp.
4The IACommHR’s task under the OAS Charter are not an issue for this w ork and 
will therefore not be dealt with. They are of a  purely political nature, while it has 
significant judicial pow ers under the ACHR. See Santoscoy, La Commission inter­
americaine, pp. 31ff.
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ever require the previous recognition of this competence by both 
the sending and the accused state.5 As of 2013, 25 states have rati­
fied the ACHR, two of which, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, 
have subsequently denounced it .6 Of these states, 20 (taking into ac­
count the two denunciations) have recognized the Court’s compe­
tence and nine (taking into account Venezuela’s denunciation) the 
Commission’s competence to receive inter-state complaints.
The ACHR, in particular its Chapter VIII dealing with the human 
rights court, has been inspired by the ECHR.7 Consequently, the 
two courts resemble each other. The IACommHR on the contrary 
no longer has a European counterpart, since the European Com­
mission of Human Rights was abolished in 1998 w ith the entry into 
force of Protocol no. 11. Both the IACommHR and the Committee 
of Ministers in Europe are integral parts of the respective human 
rights systems and their participation is essential at different stages 
of the procedures. Following the moment of intervention in the pro­
cedure, the IACommHR will be presented first in section 2.1.1. The 
two courts will then be presented together in section 2.1.2, closing 
with the Committee of Ministers, which supervises the execution of 
the ECtHR’s judgments, in section 2.1.3.
2.1.1 The Inter-Am erican C om m ission  on H um an R ights
The IACommHR was established in 1960 as the organ for the pro­
tection of human rights under the Charter of the OAS. It is domi­
ciled at the seat of the OAS in Washington, D.C. and is composed 
of seven members who are elected by the General Assembly of the 
OAS from a list of candidates proposed by the member states for a
5 H ereon section 3.1 infra.
6Venezuela denounced the ACHR on 10 Septem ber 2012, the denunciation becoming 
effective one year later according to Article 78 o f the ACHR: M inister o f Popular 
Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic o f Venezuela, Letter to the Sec­
retary General o f  the OAS, 6 September 2012, u r l : http://w w w .oas.org/D IL/N ota_ 
Rep%C3%BAblica_Bolivariana_Venezuela_to_SG.English.pdf.
7Gros Espiell, “La Cour interam ericaine et la Cour europeenne des droits de 
l’hom m e”, p. 235.
23
I  Regional H um an R ights Protection
period of four years, reelection being allowed once.8 W hen the Com­
mission treats cases involving the native country of one of its mem­
bers or countries where one or more of the members have served 
as diplomatic agents, they may, according to Article 17 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the IACommHR,9 not participate in discussions, in­
vestigations, deliberations or decisions. The Commission shall, ac­
cording to Article 2(2) of the Statute of the IACommHR,10 repre­
sent all member states of the OAS.11 Decisions by the IACommHR 
are never legally binding, no matter if taken under the Convention 
or under the Declaration.12 The Commission should originally be a 
consulting organ, mainly making recommendations to the member 
states concerning the domestic human rights situation and prepar­
ing studies or reports. According to Article 2 of the Charter of the 
OAS, human rights were defined as those laid down in the American 
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission never­
theless quickly construed its powers widely and assumed the power 
to investigate human rights situations in one or all member states 
and to publish reports and other documents.13 In 1965 the powers of 
the Commission were amended for the first time so that it could now
8Articles 34-37 of the ACHR. The composition o f the IACommHR is different from 
the form er European Commission of H um an Rights, w hich was governed by the 
principle o f equality o f states, assuring every state a  seat on the Commission: cf. 
Article 20 o f the ECHR in the version before the entry  into force o f Protocol no. 11. 
See Hansungule, “Protection of H um an Rights Under the Inter-American System: 
An O utsider’s Reflection”, p. 690.
9Rules of Procedure o f the Inter-American Commission on H um an Rights (here­
inafter “Rules o f Procedure of the IACommHR”), adopted by the IACommHR, Au­
gust 2013, u r l : http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/m andate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp.
10Statute o f the Inter-American Commission on H um an Rights (hereinafter “Statute 
o f the IACommHR”), adopted by the General Assembly o f the OAS at its ninth 
session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 1979, reprinted in: Basic Docum ents Per­
taining to H um an Rights in the Inter-American System, pp. 137-146.
11See in detail on the organization o f the Commission: Cerna, “The Inter-American 
Commission on H um an Rights: its Organization and Exam inations ofPetitions and 
Com m unications”, pp. 69ff.
12Kokott, Das interamerikanische System zum  Schutz der Menschenrechte, pp. 27f. See 
in detail on the developm ent of the Commission’s powers: Medina Quiroga, The 
Battle o f  Human Rights, pp. 67ff.
13Buergenthal, “The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Hum an Rights”, 4 
AJIL  69 (October 1975), pp. 830f.
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also act upon individual complaints.14 Two years later the Commis­
sion became an official OAS organ prescribed in Articles 53(e) and 
106 of the Charter of the OAS.
The Commission’s tasks were widely expanded with the entry 
into force of the ACHR in 1978. While the Commission retained its 
functions under the Charter of the OAS, it gained broader new func­
tions w ith respect to the ACHR member states when invoked under 
the terms of the Convention. The Convention established a two-step 
human rights protection system, whose first step is the IACommHR. 
The Commission’s composition does though not change depend­
ing on whether it applies the Convention or the Charter.15 Also, 
when acting as a Convention organ it represents all OAS member 
states, independently from w hether they are members of the Con­
vention or not.16 Consequently, also members on the Commission 
from states that are not party to the Convention decide Convention- 
based complaints.17
Article 19 of the Statute of the IACommHR resumes the Commis­
sion’s additional powers w ith respect to the ACHR member states 
as follows:
(a) to act on petitions and other communications, pur­
suant to the provisions of Articles 44 to 51 of the Con­
vention;
(b) to appear before the Inter-American Court of Hu­
man Rights in cases provided for in the Convention;
(c) to request the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights to take such provisional measures as it consid­
ers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have 
not yet been submitted to it for consideration, w hen­
ever this becomes necessary to prevent irreparable in-
14Resolution XXII, adopted by the Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio 
de Janeiro, 17 to 30 November 1965, reprinted in: “Second Special Inter-American 
Conference”, 2 The American Journal o f  International Law  60 (1966), pp. 458ff.
15 M edina Quiroga, The Battle o f  Human Rights, pp. 116f.
16 Article 35 o f the ACHR.
17This argum ent was used to justify Venezuela’s denunciation o f the ACHR, see: Min­
ister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs o f the Bolivarian Republic o f Venezuela, 
Letter to the Secretary General o f  the OAS, 6 September 2012, u r l : http://w w w .oas. 
org/D IL/N ota_R ep% C 3% B A blica_B olivariana_V enezuela_to_SG .English.pdf, 
pp. 20f.
25
I  Regional H um an R ights Protection
jury  to persons;
(d) to consult the Court on the interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights or of other 
treaties concerning the protection of human rights in 
the American states;
(e) to submit additional draft protocols to the American 
Convention on Human Rights to the General Assembly, 
in order to progressively include other rights and free­
doms under the system of protection of the Convention, 
and
(f) to submit to the General Assembly, through the Sec­
retary General, proposed amendments to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, for such action as the 
General Assembly deems appropriate.
The Commission’s role in the protection of human rights under 
the ACHR is thus manifold. It is not only the preliminary filter for 
any application concerning violations of the rights established in 
the Convention and investigative body concerning these cases, but 
also fulfils more basic tasks like the preparation of studies and re­
ports on the human rights situation in the Convention states and 
generally promotes human rights, including efforts to secure wider 
ratification of the Convention, preparation of studies and reports 
on general issues related to human rights, the preparation of the 
annual report, the organization of seminars and the publication of 
the Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights.18
2.1.2 The Human Rights Courts
The ECtHR and the IACtHR, seated in Strasbourg and San Jose, are 
the final -  and in Europe the only -  instances in the human rights 
protection procedure under both human rights Conventions. The 
ECtHR, as has been mentioned above, is the oldest human rights 
court in the world. Having been taken as an example for the creation 
of the IACtHR, it is convenient to present both courts side by side, 
in order to show their similarities and differences.
18See in detail on country reports Medina, “The Role of C ountry Reports in the Inter- 
American System of H um an Rights”, and on the other tasks Farer, “Inter-American 
Commission on H um an Rights”, p. 1005.
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Before pointing out the differences in terms of organization and 
procedure, it must be underlined that the workload of the ECtHR 
was about 4 700 times that of the IACtHR, taking into account con­
tentious cases pending before the courts at the end of 2013.19 Count­
ing the cases in which the IACtHR is monitoring compliance -  a new 
task for the ECtHR in particular cases - ,20 the workload of the EC- 
tHR remains about 590 times that of the IACtHR.21 This enormous 
difference can, in part, be explained by the fact that direct applica­
tions to the Court are admitted only in Europe, whereat in the Amer­
icas the IACommHR examines the cases first and then decides which 
to submit to the Court. But taking into account the cases pending 
before the IACommHR, the number of cases being dealt w ith in the 
inter-American system is still significantly lower than the number 
of cases in the European system.22
The ECtHR is composed of one judge per member state, i.e. of 
currently 47 judges.23 Nevertheless, there may be several judges 
of the same nationality, as member states are not bound to nomi­
nate nationals of their countries.24 Judges are assigned full-time and 
the Court sits year round.25 The election of judges takes place by 
majority vote in the Parliamentary Assembly for a period of nine 
years w ithout the possibility of re-election.26 Judges may not hear 
cases concerning the state on behalf of which they were elected to 
the Court only when sitting as a single judge.27 Nevertheless, Ar-
19By 31 December 2013, there were 99 900 applications pending before the ECtHR 
(see: ECtHR, Annual Report 2013, p. 190). A t the same moment, only 21 cases were 
pending before the IACtHR (see: IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court 
ofH um an Rights 2013, p. 68).
20 Cases on the stage of supervision o f execution by the Council o f M inisters may be 
referred to the ECtHR w ith questions relating to the interpretation o fth e  judgm ent 
or to decide w hether the party  has failed to fulfil its obligations. See infra section 
9.1.1.3.2.
21There w ere 158 cases at the stage of m onitoring compliance by the IACtHR in 2014.
See IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, p. 72.
22The IACommHR received 2 061 new  complaints in 2013 (see: IACommHR, Annual 
Report 2013, p. 40), compared to 65 900 received by the ECtHR in the same year 
(see: ECtHR, Annual Report2013, p. 190).
23 Article 20 o f the ECHR.
24Erdal and Bakirci, Article 3 o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 42f.
25 Article 21(3) of the ECHR and Article 19 o f the ECHR.
26 Articles 22(1) and 23(1) o f the ECHR.
27 Article 27(3) of the ECHR.
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ticle 27(4) of the ECHR ensures the presence of the judge elected 
in respect of the State Party concerned. If there is no such judge 
the President of the Court elects a person from a list that has been 
previously submitted by the state.
The IACtHR was created in 1979 at the Ninth Regular Session of 
the General Assembly of the OAS in La Paz, Bolivia.28 The Court was 
not established as an OAS organ, but as an “autonomous judicial in­
stitution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights”.29 The number of judges 
of the Court is limited to seven, elected for a term of six years, w ith 
one re-election allowed.30 They are elected by the states parties to 
the ACHR w ithin the General Assembly of the OAS.31 Consequently, 
not every state party is permanently represented by a judge. While 
the Court only hears cases from the states parties to the ACHR, its 
members, according to Article 52(1) of the ACHR, may be nationals 
of any member state of the OAS. Although Article 55(1) of the ACHR 
states that a judge is not hindered from hearing a case because he 
is a national of one of the states involved, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
same rule make sure that the state parties concerned always have 
the possibility to appoint ad hoc judges for cases in which no judge 
of their nationality is present.
The IACtHR does not function on a perm anent basis. It holds reg­
ular sessions as often as is needed for the exercise of its functions.32
28Statute o f the Inter-Am erican Court o f H um an Rights (hereinafter “Statute o f the 
IACtHR”), adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS, Resolution 448, adopted at 
the N inth Regular Session, held in La Paz Bolivia, October 1979, reprinted in: Basic 
Docum ents Pertaining to H um an Rights in the Inter-American System, pp. 181-191.
29Article 1 o f the Statute o f the IACtHR. The Court is an organ of the ACHR. There 
w ere efforts to include it into the Charter of the OAS w hen the C harter was 
am ended by the Protocol of C artagena de Indias in 1985, but “the Court was not in­
cluded, through to an apparent misunderstanding, in the Protocol that was opened 
for signature o f the Member States” (IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American 
Court o f  Human Rights 1986, pp. 8f.).
30Articles 52(1) and 54(1) of the ACHR.
31 Article 53(1) o f the ACHR.
32 Article 22 o f the Statute of the IACtHR and Article 11 o f the Rules of Procedure 
o f the Inter-American Court o f H um an Rights (hereinafter “Rules o f Procedure of 
the IACtHR”), adopted by the Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of Sessions, 
held from November 16 to 28, 2009 (entry into force: 1 January 2010), u r l : http: 
//www.corteidh.or.cr/reglam ento.cfm.
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The date for the next session is scheduled in the previous one. Cur­
rently, the Court holds around four regular sessions a year.33 In ad­
dition, it can hold special sessions at the request of a majority of 
judges or on the President’s own initiative.34 These sessions can take 
place at the Court’s seat or, according to Article 13 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the IACtHR, in any member state w ith the consent 
of the state concerned. Unlike the ECtHR, which can hold sessions 
out of Strasbourg too,35 the Inter-American Court actually makes 
use of this possibility and conducts hearings or investigates abroad, 
particularly in order to facilitate access for victims of human rights 
violations to the Court and to improve its presence throughout Latin 
America.
Due to its limited number of judges, the Court only sits in plenary 
formation, although certain decisions may be taken by the Presi­
dent or the Permanent Commission, composed of the President, the 
Vice-President and any other judges named by the President.36 This 
competence namely comprises decisions on provisional measures 
in periods when the Court is not in session.37 For the same reason 
there are no chambers, sections or the like.38
The ECtHR, on the contrary, hardly ever sits as a plenary court.39 
Instead, there are single-judge formations, committees of three 
judges, chambers of seven judges, and a Grand Chamber of seven­
33Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 202.
34 Article 22(2) of the S tatute o f the IACtHR and Article 12 o f the Rules of Procedure 
of the IACtHR.
35Rule 19 of the Rules o f Court (hereinafter “Rules of the ECtHR”), adopted by the 
European Court ofH um an Rights, 1 Septem ber 2012.
36 Article 6 o f the Rules of Procedure o f the IACtHR.
37 Article 26(5) of the Rules o f Procedure of the IACtHR.
38Kokott, Das interamerikanische System zum  Schutz der Menschenrechte, p. 121.
39The p lenary court sits to take fundam ental organizational decisions, like the elec­
tion o f the President and Vice-President, the setting up of sections, the election of 
Presidents o f the sections, the adoption o f the Rules of the Court and the election 
of the registrar, but does not decide cases. See Article 25 o f the ECHR. W hile the 
Convention speaks of “cham bers” both in 25 and 26 of the ECHR, the Rules 25 and
26 of the Rules o f the ECtHR define that under Article 25 o f the ECHR sections 
are to be built as adm inistrative entities. There are to be at least four sections (cur­
rently there are five). Chambers are then constituted from w ithin each section. Cf. 
Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 43.
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teen judges.40 The single-judge formations, introduced by Protocol 
no. 14, replace the committees as the principal filter for the admis­
sibility of cases to the ECtHR, thus reducing the number of judges 
required for this task. These formations may declare inadmissible or 
strike out individual applications brought before the Court if such 
decision can be taken without further examination.41 The merits 
of repetitive cases however remain to be decided by committees of 
three judges according to Article 28 of the ECHR. These may equally 
declare applications inadmissible. The seven judge chambers decide 
on the admissibility of all applications that have not been dealt w ith 
by either of the aforementioned formations, i.e. all cases raising dif­
ficult or new questions under the Convention, and take decisions 
on the merits. They are also the entry point for inter-state cases.42 
Cases raising serious questions of interpretation of the Convention 
or cases in which a chamber wants to deviate from a former Court 
decision may, according to Article 30 of the ECHR, be submitted to 
the Grand Chamber, if no party objects.43 The Grand Chamber also 
serves as the appellate body for cases decided by the chambers.44 
It will also decide cases referred to the Court by the Committee of 
Ministers during the process of supervision of execution under the 
new Article 46(4) of the ECHR.
40Article 26 of the ECHR and Rules 24ff. of the Rules of the ECtHR.
41Article 27 of the ECHR. An application can be stricken out if a) the applicant does 
not intend to pursue his application; or b) the m atter has been resolved; or c) for 
any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the 
exam ination o f the application.
42Article 29 of the ECHR.
43On the Brighton Conference in 2012 the mem ber states adopted a  proposal to elim­
inate the possibility for parties to object to the relinquishm ent of jurisdiction to 
the Grand Chamber. Article 30 o f the ECHR will be am ended correspondingly. See 
Council o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  H u­
man Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : https://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declaration, 
no. 25(d).
44Article 43 o f the ECHR. Decisions by the single-judge form ation or a  committee 
become final w ithout the possibility o f appellation according to Articles 27(2) and 
28(2) o f the ECHR.
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2.1.3 The Comm ittee of M inisters
The Committee of Ministers is the Council’s decision making 
body.45 It consists of the ministers of foreign affairs of all member 
states or their representatives, which in general are the country’s 
perm anent representatives to the Council. In addition to the Coun­
cil members, there are four external states w ith observer status, 
Canada, USA, Japan and the Holy See. The Committee is governed 
by Articles 13-21 of the Statute of the CoE and its Rules of Proce­
dure.46 It is not a jurisdictional but a political body. Meetings at the 
ministerial level are held once a year.47 The m inisters’ deputies or 
perm anent representatives hold three meetings per m onth and four 
human rights meetings per year.48 The Committee’s chairperson, 
whose state represents the CoE, changes every six months accord­
ing to the English alphabetical order of member states.49 Actions of 
the Committee are taken according to the aims ofthe Council, either 
on its own behalf or on recommendation by the Parliamentary As- 
sembly.50 It can also decide to adopt proper recommendations to the 
member states on certain points. The states must then inform the 
Committee of any action taken w ith regard to such recommenda- 
tions.51 The Committee’s tasks include the admittance of new mem­
ber states, the monitoring of the member states’ commitments, the 
conclusion of conventions or agreements, and the adoption of com­
mon policies by the governments w ith regard to particular matters. 
In the latter field the Committee may issue non-binding recommen­
dations to the member states. Before Protocol no. 11 came into force 
on 1 November 1998 the Committee was also competent to rule on 
alleged violations of the ECHR. But as all member states had already
45See in detail de Vel, The Committee o f  Ministers o f  the Council o f  Europe.
46 Rules o f Procedure o f the Committee o f Ministers (hereinafter “CM Rules o f Pro­
cedure”), adopted by the Committee o f Ministers, 2005, u r l : h t tp s : / /w c d .c o e .  
int / ViewDoc . jsp ? id = 814763 & Site = CM & BackColorInternet = C3C3C3 & 
BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383.
47CM/Del/Dec(2003)831/1.5
48https://www.coe.int/t/cm/iGuide/iGuide_IIB_en.asp.
49 Article 6 o f the CM Rules o f Procedure.
50 Article 15(a) o f the Statute o f the CoE.
51 Article 15(b) o f the Statute o f the CoE.
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accepted the m andatory jurisdiction of the ECtHR at that moment, 
this disposition had become unnecessary and was abolished.52
One of the Committee’s major tasks is the supervision of the ex­
ecution of ECtHR judgm ents.53 Protocol no. 14 has extended the 
Committee’s supervisory powers to the fulfilment of friendly set­
tlement agreements, which could not be supervised before. Nev­
ertheless, already before the ECtHR tried to remedy this loophole 
by giving decisions on friendly settlement agreements the form of 
judgments. But this practice was problematic for many states be­
cause a judgment against a state is commonly seen in a negative 
way by press and public. Consequently, states were generally reluc­
tant to accept such agreements.54 This is supposed to change under 
Protocol no. 14.
Under Article 46(3) and (4) of the ECHR, the Committee’s powers 
have been broadened even further, enabling it to ask the ECtHR to 
interpret its judgments if doubts about its meaning impede the exe­
cution and to launch infringement proceedings before the Court in 
case a state refuses to abide by the terms of a judgment.
The Committee accomplishes its duties under the ECHR usually 
in four special human rights meetings (DH/HR) per year. During 
these two to three days long meetings, the Committee sits in the 
composition of perm anent representatives. The meetings and the 
process of supervision are governed by a special set of rules, which 
will be explained in detail in section 9.1.1.
2.2 O ther Human Rights Related Organs
Several other organs of the CoE and the OAS interfere in the process 
of human rights protection. These organs will be briefly presented, 
whilst their competence when it comes to the execution of judg­
ments will be detailed in Chapter 9.
52Renucci, Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights: The rights guar­
anteed and the protection mechanism , p. 124.
53Article 46(2) o f the ECHR.
54Eaton and Schokkenbroek, “Reforming the H um an Rights Protection System”, 
HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 15.
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2.2.1 The Secretariat o f the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe’s executive organ is the Secretariat General. 
It serves, under the terms of Article 10 of the Statute of the CoE, 
both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly. 
The Secretariat consists of several Directorates and two Directorate 
Generals. Of these, Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of 
Law (DG I) houses the Department for the Execution of Judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights, which assists the Commit­
tee of Ministers in its task to supervise the execution of judgments. 
The Department for Execution receives the correspondence by all 
parties to a case that may submit information to the Committee ac­
cording to its Rules on the Execution of Judgments and prepares the 
Committee’s DH/HR meetings.
2.2.2 The Parliam entary Assembly of the Council of Europe
In the Parliamentary Assembly delegations from the member states’ 
national parliaments meet in yearly sessions, which are subdivided 
into four sub-sessions. Each sub-session takes place at the end of 
January, April and June, and at the beginning of October, each last­
ing for a week. The president of the Assembly is elected each year 
and may remain in office for a period of one to three years. The na­
tional delegations must equally represent the political parties within 
the national parliament. Today, there are five parliamentary groups 
in the Assembly.55 The Assembly consists of 636 representatives and 
18 observers.56 Unlike the Committee of Ministers, the Assembly is 
not reigned by the principle of “one state one vote”, but instead the 
number of votes depends on the population of the state. The Assem­
bly is the main deliberative body w ithin the CoE. The scope of its de­
liberations may comprise any matter mentioned as lying w ithin the 
aim and scope of the Council according to Chapter I of the Statute 
of the CoE. It prepares reports which are transm itted to the Com­
55These groups are the European People’s Party  (EPP/CD), the Socialist Group (SOC), 
the European Dem ocrat Group (EDG), the Alliance of Liberals and Dem ocrats in 
Europe (ALDE) and the Unified European Left Group (UEL).
56 The observers come from the non-European states of Israel, Canada and Mexico, 
and in deliberations on the Middle East from the Palestinian Legislative Council, 
and, if the island is concerned, from N orthern Cyprus.
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mittee, which may then take actions on the issue.57 The Committee 
regularly requests the opinion of the Assembly in certain matters, 
e.g. on draft conventions.58 The Assembly itself cannot take bind­
ing decisions, except for the election of the judges of the European 
Court of Human Rights.59
Among other tasks, the Assembly maintains a monitoring pro­
cess assessing how the member states fulfil their obligations under 
the Council conventions. This monitoring process can also apply to 
cases of disregard for decisions of the Court. The Assembly may, 
as the most severe penalty for not complying w ith the obligations, 
recommend the Committee to exclude an offending state from the
Council.60
The Assembly has several committees, among them the Com­
mittee for Legal Affairs and Human Rights (AS/Jur) w ith its sub­
committee on human rights and on the election of judges to the 
European Court of Human Rights. This Committee is endowed 
w ith monitoring implementation of judgments and has since 2000 
assigned special rapporteurs to this task. Furthermore, the sub­
committee on human rights regularly examines the implementation 
of the decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, issues re­
ports and conducts in situ visits to urge states to comply w ith the 
Court’s decisions.61
57Making use of this competence, the Parliam entary Assembly has from time to time 
taken the initiative to recom m end to the Committee o f M inisters actions related to 
the im provement o f the functioning and the procedures o f the ECtHR. See for ex­
ample Recommendation 1535(2001): Structures, procedures and means of the Euro­
pean Court o f H um an Rights, adopted by the Parliam entary Assembly, 26 January 
2009, u r l : http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/ta01/EREC1535.htm.
58Kleijssen, “The M onitoring Procedure of the Council of Europe’s Parliam entary 
Assembly”, p. 623.
59Article 22(1) o f the ECHR.
60On that subject, see: Kleijssen, “The M onitoring Procedure of the Council o f Eu­
rope’s Parliam entary Assembly”; Drzemczewski, “Decision on the Merits: By the 
Committee o f M inisters”; and Ravaud, “The Committee of M inisters”.
61See Parliam entary Assembly, Implementation o f  judgm ents o f  the European Court 
o f  Human Rights: Introductory memorandum , Introductory m em orandum  AS/Jur 
(2008) 24, Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, 28 May 2008, u r l : http://assem bly.coe. 
int/CommitteeDocs/2008/20080526_ajdoc24_2008.pdf, pp. 1ff.
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2.2.3 The Council o f Europe’s Comm issioner for Human 
Rights
The CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights was established in 1999 
by the Committee of Ministers in CM Resolution (99) 50. While this 
resolution makes clear that the Commissioner shall not interfere 
w ith the work of the other supervisory bodies, one of his tasks is 
to “contribute to the promotion of the effective observance and full 
enjoyment of hum an rights in the member States”.62 His focal con­
tact point in the member states are the national hum an rights in- 
stitutions.63 Among his instruments are visits to the member states 
to dialogue w ith national authorities and civil society, thematic re­
porting and awareness-raising activities.
The Group of Wise Persons, in its interim report to the Commit­
tee of Ministers in 2006 on the effectiveness of the ECHR control 
mechanisms, proposed a more active role in the Convention’s con­
trol system for the Commissioner, specifically through close coop­
eration w ith national ombudsmen in order to reduce the Court’s 
caseload. He might also act as a coordinator for the activities of the 
COE’s organs.64 As a consequence, he partakes in annual tripartite 
meetings w ith the Committee of Ministers and PACE on the issues.
2.2.4 The General Assembly o f the OAS
The OAS does not have an organ comparable to the Council’s Par­
liamentary Assembly that ensures the participation of the member 
states’ parliaments in the decision-making w ithin the organization. 
All cooperation w ithin the organization is realized through the gov­
ernments.
The supreme organ ofthe OAS is the General Assembly.65 It meets 
annually in one of the member states or at the OAS headquarters in
62Nos. 1(2) and 3(b) of CM Resolution (99) 50, adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
at its 104th Session, 7 May 1999.
63No. 3(c) o f CM Resolution (99) 50.
64Group of W ise Persons, Interim report o f  the Group o f  Wise Persons to the Committee 
o f  Ministers, Committee of Ministers at its 116th Session, 18 May 2006, nos. 43 and 
48.
65 Articles 54ff. o f the Charter o f the OAS. Before the reforms o f the Protocol o f Buenos 
Aires o f 1967, the main organ was the Inter-Am erican Conference.
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Washington, D.C. and consists of the representatives of each mem­
ber state.66 The General Assembly is governed by the “one state one 
vote” principle. Decisions are adopted by an absolute majority, ex­
cept in specific areas such as budgetary questions.67 It decides the 
general policy and actions of the OAS, the structure and functions 
of its organs, and considers any matter relating to the friendly rela­
tions among the American States.68 It furthermore determines the 
budget and the quotas of the member states and thus also decides on 
the IACourtHR’s and the IACommHR’s funding.69 Among its tasks 
also figures the consideration of reports submitted by the Meeting 
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the observations 
and recommendations made by the Permanent Council or reports 
of any other organ the Assembly may require. The consideration of 
the annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which are 
presented according to Articles 41(g) and 65 of the ACHR, is its most 
important activity in the field of human rights protection.70 The res­
olution on these reports however is usually only one among around 
60 resolutions the General Assembly adopts during its three-day an­
nual sessions. Consequently, there is hardly any time to discuss mat­
ters raised in the reports.
2.2.5 The Perm anent Council of the OAS
In order to assure the day-to-day business in periods when the Gen­
eral Assembly is not in session and to prepare the Assembly’s ses­
sions, the Charter of the OAS has instituted the Permanent Council. 
Its task consists in maintaining the OAS at work and in taking de­
cisions that cannot be postponed until the next General Assembly 
session. It is the organ of immediate reaction to threats to peace in 
the region, keeping vigilance over the maintenance of friendly rela­
tions among the Member States and assisting them in the peaceful
66These are usually the M inisters for Foreign Affairs.
67Article 59 of the Charter o f the OAS.
68Article 54 of the Charter o f the OAS.
69Article 55 of the Charter o f the OAS.
70These reports and the corresponding OAS resolutions will be examined in detail in 
section 9.2.1.
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settlement of their disputes.71 It may take decisions on the resolu­
tion of conflicts by a vote of two thirds of its members, excluding 
the parties to the dispute. The Government of each member state 
appoints one representative in the rank of an ambassador to the 
Council.
According to Article 91(f) of the Charter of the OAS, the Council 
also considers the reports of the other OAS organs and presents ob­
servations and recommendations to the General Assembly. Among 
them are the annual reports of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.72 
It also fills vacancies on the Commission and the Court occurring 
outside the normal termination of mandates.73 These tasks are be­
ing taken care of in the Committee of Juridical and Political Affairs 
(CJPA), which also treats other questions in relation to the Inter- 
American Human Rights System like amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Statutes of the Commission and Court and the bud­
getary needs of these organs. It equally consists of one represen­
tative per member state.74 The Presidents of the IACtHR and the 
IACommHR make an oral presentation of their respective report 
each year in spring before the CJPA. Decisions on the CJPA and the 
Permanent Council are adopted by an absolute majority of its mem-
bers.75
71 Article 84 o f the Charter o f the OAS.
72 Article 41(g) and Article 65 o f the ACHR.
73 Article 11(3) of the Statute o f the IACommHR and Article 19(4) o f the S tatute of the 
IACtHR.
74Article 23 o f the Rules o f Procedure of the Perm anent Council, adopted by the 
Perm anent Council o f the OAS, 2003, u r l : http://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLIS 
H/HIST_03/CP11732E07.DOC.
75 Article 57 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the Perm anent Council.
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The obligations of states that have violated convention rights are 
determined in judicial procedures.
Enforceability of human rights, when having been vi­
olated, is an essential -  but on no accounts the only 
-  component of human rights protection. The possi­
bility of individual applications in international human 
rights protection is a substantial condition for the suc­
cessful realization of the human rights. It is this quality 
of enforceability that distinguishes rights from moral 
demands.1
Enforceability is provided, in the first place, by domestic laws and 
courts.2 The procedures prescribed in the human rights Conven­
tions and the specific procedural documents set up by the courts 
and, in the Americas, the Commission, can only be activated when 
the domestic remedies do not repair the damage caused by a viola- 
tion.3 The regional human rights systems can therefore be compared 
to a safety net in case national procedures do not comply effectively 
w ith their function to provide individual justice. They are subsidiary 
to domestic protection systems.
Both systems know three types of procedures: the individual ap­
plication4, the inter-state case5 and the advisory opinion6. Only the 
first two types of procedures can result in enforceable decisions and 
obligations to repair victims.
The major difference in the applications procedures is that in the 
European system all cases, individual and inter-state, are directly
1Fritsche, Menschenrechte, p. 70, our translation.
2Article 13 o f the ECHR and Article 25 of the ACHR.
3The “local remedies rule”. Article 35(1) of the ECHR and Article 46(1)(a) o f the ACHR.
4Article 34 o f the ECHR and Article 44 of the ACHR.
5Article 33 o f the ECHR and Articles 45 and 61 o f the ACHR.
6Article 47 o f the ECHR and Article 64 of the ACHR.
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submitted to the ECtHR, since Protocol no. 11 entered into force 
in 1998 and the European Commission on Human Rights was abol­
ished. In the inter-American system, on the contrary, all applications 
must be filed w ith the IACommHR, even if they are submitted by a 
state party. The IACtHR decided in Viviana Gallardo et al. v. Costa 
Rica that the procedures before the IACommHR cannot be waived, 
even if the accused state party is interested in doing so in order to 
obtain a quick judgm ent.7
3.1 Inter-State Cases
Inter-state cases form the far smaller part of the courts’ workload. 
As of 2014, only 17 such cases have been filed before the ECtHR, 
while none has hitherto occupied the IACtHR.8 They can be mo­
tivated either to protect the citizens of a state from hum an rights 
violations, as has been the case in D enm ark v. Turkey.9 Inter-state 
cases may also serve as a public motion in the case of human rights 
violations in other states to uphold the public order of Europe, as 
was the case for example in The Greek Case.10
The procedure triggered by state communications alleging hu­
man rights violations by another state is different in the European 
and the inter-American systems. First, in the inter-American sys­
tem, it is obligatory that the IACommHR examines all cases before 
submitting them to the IACtHR. Secondly, state communications 
are not automatically receivable, unlike in the European system, 
but require the previous recognition by the responding state of the 
Commission’s competence to deal w ith inter-state cases presented 
against it according to Article 45 of the ACHR. Therefore, the IA- 
CommHR must, in a first step, verify that both the responding and 
the submitting state party have made the corresponding declara­
tion. As there is the possibility to recognize the Commission’s com­
7 Viviana Gallardo et al. v. Costa Rica (Decision), IACtHR, 13 November 1981, Series 
A no. 10181, para. 25.
8http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG.pdf.
9Denmark v. Turkey (Striking out), ECtHR, no. 34382/97, 5 April 2000, 2000-IV.
10 The Greek Case (Report), ECommHR, nos. 3321/67 et al., 5 November 1969, YB 11, 
Vol. II, 690 and 730; see also: Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, 
no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, para. 44.
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petence on a case to case basis, all state communications are sent 
to the states concerned, so that they can eventually make a declara­
tion according to Article 45(3) of the ACHR.11 If such a declaration 
has already been made or is being made for the specific case, the 
Commission continues w ith its investigations in the same way as it 
would in the case of individual complaints.
In the European system, the competence for inter-state com­
plaints does not have to be specifically recognized. Therefore, inter­
state cases can be submitted by any member state or group of mem­
ber states against any other member state according to Article 33 
of the ECHR. The procedure does not differ from that of individual 
complaints.
Inter-state cases that are not aimed at systemic problems in the 
defending state but vindicate individuals’ rights may also result in 
reparation orders. In the Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) deci­
sion, the ECtHR, making reference in particular to the ICJ’s A h- 
madou Sadio Diallo (Compensation) judgm ent,12 held that just satis­
faction under Article 41 of the ECHR was to be paid to the applicant 
state, which then had to distribute the sums awarded to the individ­
ual victims. The applicant government was under the obligation to 
establish, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, an 
effective mechanism to this end.13
3.2 Individual Applications
The vast majority of cases submitted under either system are indi­
vidual applications. In Europe these applications must be filed w ith 
the ECtHR directly, whereat in the Americas the IACommHR has to 
examine the complaint first and will then eventually decide to sub­
mit it to the Court after having drafted its own report. Therefore, 
by far not all individual complaints submitted to the Commission 
finally reach the IACtHR. The Commission’s role is however not
11Faundez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
pp. 222f.
12Ahm adou Sadio Diallo (Republic o f  Guinea v. Democratic Republic o f  the Congo) 
(Compensation), ICJ, 19 June 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 324, p. 344.
13Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, 
paras. 58f.
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limited to the mere decision on admissibility of a petition. It carries 
out a proper contradictory process and investigation of the situa­
tion.14
3.2.1 Pre lim inary Procedures
The individual complaints procedure can be launched in Europe ex­
clusively by the person, NGO or group of individuals claiming to 
be victims of a human rights violations.15 In the Americas, on the 
contrary, the circle of persons or entities permitted to submit de­
nunciations is not limited to the victims of hum an rights violations. 
According to Article 44 of the ACHR, any person, group of persons 
or NGO may lodge complaints about human rights violations by any 
state party, independent from its status as a victim. Consequently, 
petitions containing denunciations of human rights violations can 
be submitted on behalf of, or even completely independent from the 
victim of the denounced violation.16
After a petition has been lodged w ith the IACommHR or the EC- 
tHR, each organ assesses its admissibility. The first action of the EC- 
tHR, since 2009, is to classify the case by its urgency, according to 
Rule 41 of the Rules of the ECtHR. This deviation from the hitherto 
applied chronological order was adopted as a way to cope w ith the 
serious crisis caused by the Court’s caseload. The chronological or­
der had cases from states w ith a particularly high number of pend­
ing cases to be dealt w ith only slowly, resulting in an unbearable 
delay of justice in grave cases. In response to this, the ECtHR estab­
lished seven categories of cases, from urgent applications, applica­
tions concerning the effectiveness of the Convention system such 
as pilot judgment cases, applications under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5(1) 
of the ECHR, other potentially well-founded applications, repeti­
tive cases, cases raising a problem of admissibility, to applications 
that are manifestly inadmissible. However, each chamber or cham­
14Articles 48 and 50(1) o f the ACHR.
15Article 34 o f the ECHR.
16Faundez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 221.
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ber president may decide to treat an individual case differently.17 In 
order to decide on the admissibility, the IACommHR sits as a ple­
nary, whereat the ECtHR sits in the formations described supra.18
Grounds for inadmissibility are similar in both systems. First, the 
ECtHR and the IACommHR have to establish their jurisdiction, i.e. 
they have to establish w hether the denounced violation has been 
committed by a member state under its jurisdiction.19 Then they 
have to assess the quality of the person or entity lodging the appli­
cation to comply w ith the prerequisites of Article 34 of the ECHR 
or Article 44 of the ACHR. In Europe it is of particular importance 
that the person or entity denouncing a violation claims to be a vic­
tim. Both entities then verify that the local remedies rule has been 
observed. Petitions are only receivable if all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted or are ineffective. The application must furthermore 
not be similar to another case already decided by the Court or be 
pending before another international organ. Also, anonymous ap­
plications are not permitted in either system and there is a term of 
six months for the application to be submitted after the final do­
mestic judgm ent.20 Unlike in the European system, a declaration of 
inadmissibility can only be taken by the IACommHR when the peti­
tioner and the state party have had the opportunity to expose their 
positions concerning the application in accordance w ith Article 30 
of the Rules of Procedure of the IACommHR.21 The ECtHR may de­
clare applications inadmissible according to Article 35 of the ECHR 
w ithout prior participation of the state party concerned, although,
17European C ourt of H um an Rights, The Court’s Priority Policy, undated, u r l : http: 
//www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DB6EDF5E-6661-4EF6-992E-F8C4ACC62F31/ 
0/Priority_policyPublic_communication_EN.pdf.
18Supra section 2.1.2. In the European system, 90% of all applications are clearly inad­
missible. See Eaton and Schokkenbroek, “Reforming the H um an Rights Protection 
System ”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 5. The IACommHR, on the other hand, has em itted 59 
reports on admissibility in 2008, o f w hich only 10 resulted in the inadmissibility of 
the petition, i.e. a  mere 17% of cases. See IACommHR, Annual Report 2008, Chapter 
III., C., 3a.
19Articles 1 o f the Conventions.
20Article 35 o f the ECHR and Article 46 o f the ACHR. This term  shall be reduced to 
four m onths under the ECtHR: Article 4 o f Protocol no. 15.
21 Article 37 of the Rules of Procedure o f the IACommHR.
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if deemed necessary, it may ask the state party to submit its obser- 
vations.22
Having been declared admissible, the procedure continues with 
the examination of the case, according to Article 38(1)(a) of the 
ECHR and Article 48(1)(d) of the ACHR, w ith the ECtHR and the 
IACommHR eventually conducting an investigation, for which the 
states concerned must furnish all necessary facilities. At the same 
time, both organs shall, at any moment of the procedure, be at the 
disposal of the parties to reach a friendly settlement of the case.23 If 
this happens, the Commission draws up a report in accordance with 
Article 49 of the ACHR, which is then transmitted to the petitioner, 
the State Parties and the Secretary General of the OAS for publi­
cation. The ECtHR, in the same situation, proceeds to the striking 
out of the case from its lists, handing down a decision that con­
tains a brief statement of the facts and the solution reached.24 Un­
der the ACHR friendly settlements can also be reached at any stage 
of the proceedings. If a case has reached the IACtHR, it will rule 
on the admissibility and the judicial effects of such a settlement.25 
Nevertheless, if required by the nature of the case and the viola­
tion denounced, the ECtHR continues the investigation even if the 
case should be stricken out from its list.26 The decision or judg­
ment to strike out a case is forwarded to the Committee of Min­
isters, which supervises its execution according to its general pro- 
cedures.27 Friendly settlement agreements are usually in the interest 
of the state, as neither the report of the IACommHR nor the decision 
to strike out the case by the ECtHR contain a juridical evaluation of
22Rule 54 of the Rules o f the ECtHR.
23 Article 38(1)(b) o f the ECHR and Article 48(1)(f) o f the ACHR.
24Article 39 o f the ECHR.
25 Article 63 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
26Article 37(1) o f the ECHR. See hereon: Sur v. Turkey (Striking out), ECtHR, 
no. 21592/93, 3 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI, para. 31.
27Rule 43(3) o f the Rules o f Court (hereinafter “Rules o f the ECtHR”), adopted by the 
European Court o f H um an Rights, 1 July 2014.
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the facts presented. The state can thus prevent the formal statement 
of a human rights violation.28
If a friendly settlement is not reached, the IACommHR contin­
ues its investigations into the case w ith the support of the states 
concerned. During the investigations the Commission may, accord­
ing to Article 48(1)(e) of the ACHR, “request the states concerned 
to furnish any pertinent information and, if so required, [...] hear 
oral statements or receive written statements from the parties con­
cerned”. At the end of the investigations, it writes a report that con­
tains the facts and its conclusions. This report is transmitted to the 
states concerned but remains unpublished. It is of a preliminary 
nature and contains recommendations that are obligatory but not 
legally binding to the states concerned, so that their disrespect does 
not cause state responsibility.29 The state then has a period of three 
months to adopt the necessary measures to settle the matter. The 
case may also, w ithin the same period of time, be submitted by the 
Commission or the state party to the IACtHR. If this does not hap­
pen, the Commission may, but is not obliged to, write a second re­
port, setting forth its opinion and conclusions concerning the ques­
tion submitted. In this report the Commission also makes, when ap­
propriate, the pertinent recommendations. Unlike the first report, 
this report is legally binding and contains a term in which the state 
must take the measures incumbent to remedy the situation.30 Oth­
erwise cases that were not submitted to the Court would be dis­
regarded in comparison to the cases presented to the Court to the 
effect that no binding decision could be taken.31 The quality of the 
recommendations the Commission may give in the second report 
is broad, reaching from re-establishing and ensuring the enjoyment 
of the violated human right, the adoption of legislative and other
28Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 79. See in general on 
friendly settlem ents before the ECtHR: Berger, “FS W iarda”, and before the IAC­
tHR and IACommHR: Beristain, Diâlogo sobre la reparacion, Vol. 1, pp. 307-381 and 
Salgado Pesantes, “La solucion am istosa y  la Corte Interam ericana de Derechos 
H um anos”.
29Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 2 February 
2001, Series C no. 72, paras. 191f.
30Article 51(3) o f the ACHR.
31Cerna, “The Inter-American Commission on H um an Rights: its Organization and 
Examinations o f Petitions and Com m unications”, pp. 105f.
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measures indispensable for the guarantee of the right, to the vari­
ous forms of reparation, like effective investigation of the situation 
underlying the human rights violation, payment of compensation, 
etc.32 It is hence, as will be seen, of comparable scope to the deci­
sions on reparation issued by the IACtHR. At the end of the pre­
scribed period, the Commission votes w ith the absolute majority of 
its members whether the state has taken the adequate measures and 
w hether to publish the report.33 The outcome of the case can also be 
included in the country report the Commission prepares.34 Further­
more, the Commission follows the outcome ofthe recommendations 
made to the state party and may adopt follow-up measures.35
The three months following the transmission of the first prelim­
inary report to the state party concerned are therefore crucial for 
the decision whether a case is submitted to the IACtHR.36 Petition­
ers must be notified of the fact that the Commission has found hu­
man rights violations in the case and of the fact that a preliminary 
report has been sent to the state party concerned. If the respond­
ing state has accepted the IACtHR’s contradictory jurisdiction, they 
must also be given a term of one m onth to present their position 
on whether the case shall be submitted to the Court.37 As a general 
rule, the Commission shall submit the case to the Court if it consid­
ers that the state did not comply with the recommendations of the 
preliminary report. The decision not to submit the case to the Court 
must be taken by an absolute majority of its members in a reasoned 
decision.38 Independent from that, the state concerned may decide 
at any moment within the three months period following the trans­
mission of the preliminary report to submit the case to the Court
32 Bicudo, “Cumplimiento de las sentencias de la Corte Interam ericana de Derechos 
H um anos y  de las recomendaciones de la Comision Interam ericana de Derechos 
H um anos”, p. 230.
33 Article 51 o f the ACHR. The interpretation of Articles 50 and 51 o f the ACHR is dis­
puted. See in detail: Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection 
ofH um an Rights, pp. 442ff.
34Article 41(3) o f the ACHR and Article 56 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IA- 
CommHR. See in detail on country reports: Medina, “The Role of C ountry Reports 
in the Inter-American System of H um an Rights”.
35 Article 46 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACommHR.
36 Article 50(1) of the ACHR.
37 Article 43(3) of the Rules o f Procedure of the IACommHR.
38 Article 44 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACommHR.
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itself.39 Except in the Viviana Gallardo et al. v. Costa Rica case, in 
which Costa Rica wanted to present a case to the Court waiving the 
Commission procedure, no state has yet decided to present a case to 
the Court. While the Commission was reluctant to submit cases to 
the Court at the beginning, in 2011 a new record number of 23 new 
cases reached the Court.40
3.2.2 Procedure on the M erits before the courts
Once a case has been submitted to the IACtHR or has been declared 
admissible by the ECtHR, both courts continue w ith the hearing. 
The hearing is undertaken by at least five judges of the IACtHR 
and by committees or chambers of the ECtHR.41 In cases that raise 
a serious question concerning the interpretation of the ECHR, or 
cases in which a chamber wants to divert from the case law of pre­
vious cases, the chamber may relinquish jurisdiction in favour of 
the grand chamber of seventeen judges.42
The state party accused of a human rights violation and the vic­
tim or NGO having suffered human rights violations that has filed 
the application before the Court, are the only parties allowed be­
fore the ECtHR. In addition to that, the state party whose national 
has filed a case before the Court may intervene in the hearing and 
submit written observations.43 The parties are invited by the Pres­
ident of the chamber to submit further evidence and observations 
and eventually an oral hearing is held.44 In inter-state cases the par­
ties are also invited to produce further evidence, but there is room 
for the decision that a written procedure be dispensed w ith .45 To­
gether w ith their observations on the merits, applicants have to file 
their claims for just satisfaction together w ith supporting documen­
tation under Article 41 of the ECHR. If no such claim is submitted or 
is submitted but fails to comply w ith the requirements mentioned,
39Articles 51 and 61 o f the ACHR.
40IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, p. 22.
41Article 56 of the ACHR and Articles 28 and 29 of the ECHR.
42Article 30 of the ECHR.
43Article 36 of the ECHR.
44Rule 59 of the Rules of the ECtHR.
45Rule 58 of the Rules of the ECtHR.
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it may be rejected in whole or in part. Accepted claims will be for­
warded to the responding government for comment.46
Locus standi before the IACtHR is granted to the IACommHR, the 
states parties accused of human rights violations and, since 1 June 
2001, the alleged victims or their representatives.47 After an applica­
tion has been submitted to the IACtHR, notification has to be sent to 
the President and the judges of the Court, the respondent state, the 
IACommHR, in case it has not filed the application, and the alleged 
victim.48 The alleged victim shall then have the possibility, within 
a non-renewable term of two months, to submit autonomously a 
brief containing pleadings, motions and evidence.49 During the oral 
proceedings, the alleged victim shall have the right to make declara- 
tions.50 Similar to the proceedings before the ECtHR, the application 
of Article 63(1) of the ACHR concerning the awarding of just satis­
faction for the human rights violation suffered must be particularly 
invoked, w ith the difference that no term is fixed for such invoca- 
tion.51
The ECtHR and IACtHR hand down three different types of judg­
ments. Declaratory judgments, in which they find if the respective 
Convention has been violated (Article 41 of the ECHR and Arti­
cle 63(1) of the ACHR), judgments granting just satisfaction (Arti­
cle 41 of the ECHR and Rule 75 of the Rules of the ECtHR), or com­
pensation and reparation (Article 63(1) of the ACHR and Article 60 
of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR), and judgments concern­
ing the interpretation of former judgments (Rule 79 of the Rules of 
the ECtHR and Article 67 of the ACHR and Article 62 of the Rules
46Rule 60 o f the Rules o f the ECtHR.
47Article 57 o f the ACHR and Articles 21, 22 and 23(1) of the Rules o f Procedure 
o f the IACtHR. See on the participation o f victims Rhenan Segura, “P resentation 
de casos ante la Corte Interam ericana de Derechos H um anos”, p. 634; Seifert, Das 
interamerikanische System zum  Schutz der Menschenrechte und seine Reformierung, 
pp. 211ff. and Tanner, “Interview  w ith Judge Antonio A. Cangado Trindade, Inter- 
American Court o f H um an Rights”, 4 HRQ 31 (2009), p. 991. More details of an 
envisaged reform of the ACHR in this respect can be found in Cangado Trindade, 
“Informe: Bases para un Proyecto de Protocolo a  la Concenvion Am ericana sobre 
Derechos Humanos, para  Fortalecer su Mecanismo de P ro tection”, pp. 3-64.
48 Article 36 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
49 Article 37 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
50 Article 43(2) of the Rules o f Procedure of the IACtHR.
51 Article 31 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
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of Procedure of the IACtHR).52 If no further requests are made, only 
a judgment declaring w hether the Convention has been violated or 
not is being pronounced.53 Otherwise, judgments on reparation or 
just satisfaction claims can be rendered together w ith the judgment 
on the merits or at a later stage. Interpretative judgments can be re­
quested w ith respect to the declaratory judgment as well as w ith re­
spect to the judgment on reparation or just satisfaction. Judgments 
rendered by the IACtHR must be communicated not only to the par­
ties to the case, but also to all other states parties to the ACHR.54 In 
addition, the Court submits an annual report to the General Assem­
bly of the OAS on its work in the previous year wherein the cases it 
has dealt w ith are listed again and do thus come to the knowledge 
of all member states of the OAS.55 Publication of the judgments of 
the IACtHR is not obligatory, whereat the ECtHR has to publish all 
of its judgm ents.56
3.2.3 The Reparation Phase
It is common to both courts that at the beginning reparation was not 
decided together w ith the merits, either because the parties to the 
case should try  to reach a friendly settlement of the question of repa­
ration or because there was not enough evidence submitted in order 
to establish the damages suffered.57 In its initial cases, the IACtHR 
in particular used to give the parties, then still only the state and 
the IACommHR, a term of six months to reach an agreement on the 
question of reparation. It determined reparation itself only if such 
an agreement was not reached, as was almost always the case, or
52See for the ECtHR: Haß, Die Urteile, pp. 55f. Protocol no. 14 introduced proceed­
ings to interpret a  judgm ent and infringem ent proceedings that can be triggered 
by the Com m ittee o f Ministers while supervising execution o f judgm ents. These 
proceedings will be explained infra in section 9.1.1.3.2.
53Seeon declaratory judgm ents Shelton, Remedies inInternationalHumanRightsLaw, 
ed. 2, pp. 255ff.
54Article 69 of the ACHR.
55Article 65 of the ACHR.
56 Article 44(3) o f the ECHR and Rule 78 o f the Rules o f the ECtHR.
57For the ECtHR see Enrich Mas, “Right to Com pensation under Article 50”, pp. 779f.; 
and for the IACtHR: Cangado Trindade, “The Operation o f the Inter-American 
C ourt o f H um an Rights, 1979-1996”, p. 137.
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found to be unfair by the Court.58 The Court had to postpone the 
decision on reparation in many cases even if it did not consider that 
there was room for an agreement on this point between the state 
and the Commission because the required evidence had not been 
submitted.59 Situations in which the IACtHR does not take a deci­
sion on reparation immediately can consequently be subdivided into 
two categories: either the Court decides to leave the parties room to 
reach a friendly settlement and, in case this does not succeed, de­
cides itself on reparation, even if the parties resist to furthering the 
reparation process.60 In other cases it decides to determine repa­
ration at a later stage and to either open the reparation phase or 
to maintain the corresponding proceedings open.61 Nevertheless, it 
does not always strictly distinguish between the procedure on the 
merits and on reparation: in certain cases the IACtHR has ordered 
measures to repair the human rights violations already in the deci­
sion on the merits and authorized the President of the Court to open 
the reparation phase in the same judgm ent.62
The ECtHR started treating questions of just satisfaction under 
the Convention in a similar way. At the beginning of its jurisdiction 
it did not take decisions on just satisfaction together w ith the deci­
sion on the merits, but only upon requests by the European Com­
mission on Human Rights, at that time the only organ enabled to 
provide individual applicants a voice before the Court, after the de­
cision on the merits had been rendered. It used to separate the de­
cision on just satisfaction from that on the merits for four reasons.
58See e.g. VelâsquezRodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), IACtHR, 29 July 1988, Series C no. 
4, paras. 191f. and Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IAC- 
tHR, 21 July 1989, Series C no. 7.
59See e.g.: Godinez Cruz v. Honduras (Merits), IACtHR, 20 january  1989, Series C no. 5, 
paras. 200f. and Godinez Cruz v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 
1989, Series C no. 8.
60Garcia Ramirez, “Las Reparaciones en el sistema interam ericano de p ro tection  de 
losderechoshum anos”, p. 135.See, e.g.: GodinezCruzv.Honduras (Merits), IACtHR, 
2 0 january  1989, Series C no. 5, para. 201 or Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR,
14 M arch 2001, Series C no. 75, para. 50.
61 Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Merits), IACtHR, 8 December 1995, Series C no. 22, 
oper. para. 6 or Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 17 Septem ber 1997, Series 
C no. 33, para. 85.
62E.g. Bâmaca-Velâsquez v. Guatemala (Merits), IACtHR, 25 November 2000, Series 
C no. 70, oper. paras. 8 and 9.
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Either, the parties should have the time to find a friendly settlement, 
or the facts concerning the damages caused by the violation had not 
been determined yet, or because the victim could achieve satisfac­
tion from local authorities through local proceedings, or because 
the national proceeding that violates the convention had not yet 
been term inated.63 In the first case the Court found that Conven­
tion rights had been violated, the question of satisfaction was not 
even mentioned.64 But already in the second such case the Court 
held, besides the violation of the Convention, that it “reserves for 
the Applicants concerned the right, should the occasion arise, to 
apply for just satisfaction in regard to this particular point”, a re­
curring formula for future cases.65 The first pronunciation of the 
Court on just satisfaction under the former Article 50 of the ECHR 
dates from the 1972 Vagrancy case.66 In this case the Court held that 
Belgium had violated Article 5(4) of the ECHR by detaining four 
vagrants w ithout offering them a remedy and had repeated its for­
mula w ith respect to the eventual proceedings for just satisfaction. 
After the judgment had been rendered, the applicants’ counsel had 
claimed from the Belgian government payment of just satisfaction 
for the violation of the ECHR suffered by the applicants. As the Gov­
ernment declined this claim, the case was brought before the Court 
again by the Commission upon request of the counsel. In its judg­
ment of 10 March 1972 the Court declared the demands admissible 
but not well-founded and consequently rejected them .67 The first 
satisfaction claim was granted by the Court in the Ringeisen v. Aus­
tria case in 1972.68
Today, the courts generally decide on the merits and reparation 
in one judgment. This change in practice could be noted in Europe 
after the Court had changed its rules in 1991 to render its proce­
dures quicker. According to the new Rule 53(1), the ECtHR should
63See in detail on these reasons: Dannem ann, Schadensersatz bei Verletzung der Eu­
ropäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, pp. 48ff.
64See Neumeister v. Austria  (Merits), ECtHR, no. 1936/63, 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8.
65Belgium Linguistics Case (Merits), ECtHR, nos. 1474/62 et al., 23 July 1968, Se­
ries A no. 6, oper. para. 1. See also Stögmüller v. Austria, ECtHR, no. 1602/62,
10 November 1969, Series A no. 9.
66 Vagrancy (Merits), ECtHR, nos. 2832/66 et al., 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12.
67 Vagrancy (Article 50), ECtHR, nos. 2832/66 et al., 10 March 1972, Series A no. 14.
68Ringeisen v. Austria  (Article 50), ECtHR, no. 2614/65, 22 June 1972, Series A no. 15.
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generally decide on the merits and the just satisfaction claim in the 
same judgm ent.69 In the Americas, although there is no similar rule, 
the IACtHR seems to have changed its practice from 2001 on, when 
the new Rules of Procedure granted the applicant a locus standi in 
the proceeding before the Court and required the application also 
to contain the claims related to reparation and costs.70 Although it 
has been argued that there is no general change in the IACtHR’s 
practice and that the Court would generally take decisions on the 
merits and on reparation in separate judgments, the Court’s practice 
during the last years indicates the contrary.71
It may be supposed that these changes were caused by the desire 
to facilitate and accelerate proceedings before the courts and to save 
the applicants from having to travel more than the strictly necessary 
to Strasbourg or San Jose. In addition, the courts may have realized 
that the parties hardly ever reached a friendly settlement agreement 
on the question of reparation w ithin the term set. Nevertheless, in 
cases where the assessment of the question of reparation or satisfac­
tion is difficult or there is room for a friendly settlement, particularly 
when the State Party has assumed responsibility for the violation, 
the courts still split their judgm ents.72
If the ECtHR cannot take the decision on just satisfaction together 
w ith the decision on the merits, the same chamber, if possible in 
the same composition, decides the question at a later moment.73 For 
the IACtHR there is a similar rule in the ACHR and the Rules of 
Court.74 Nevertheless, the IACtHR has, in an order of 9 September 
1995, decided that the decision on preliminary objections, merits 
and reparation are each separate stages of the procedure, and that
69Today Rule 75 of the Rules o f the ECtHR. Zwach, Die Leistungsurteile des Europäis­
chen Gerichtshofs fü r  Menschenrechte, pp. 53f. and Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen 
der Staaten, pp. 101f.
70Today Article 35(1)(g) of the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
71Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 818. See on the contrary the com prehensive list o f decisions taken by the IACtHR 
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm.
72See, e.g.: Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy  (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 58858/00,
8 December 2005; or Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador (Preliminary Objections and 
Merits), IACtHR, 6 May 2008, Series C no. 179.
73Rule 75(2) of the Rules o f the ECtHR.
74 Article 54(3) o f the ACHR and Article 17(2) o f the Rules o f Procedure of the IACtHR.
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consequently the decision on reparation need not be taken by the 
judges that had heard the case from the preliminary objections on, 
but by the judges that compose the Court at the moment the respec­
tive stage begins. An exception is made for cases in which a public 
hearing has been held insofar as the judges present at the hearing 
must also decide the pertinent questions.75
Following from the principle of subsidiarity that governs the 
ECHR, the states are generally obliged to determine the amount 
of just satisfaction for the human rights violation under the ECHR 
themselves. Only if they fail to do so or if their internal law does 
not provide for full satisfaction can the ECtHR be summoned to de­
termine the corresponding am ounts.76 Unlike in Europe, consider­
ations of subsidiarity do not apply to the process as soon as the 
IACtHR has recognized its competence to hear a case. It may imme­
diately determine the reparation for violations, although, depend­
ing on the circumstances of the case, it sometimes sets the parties a 
term in which they can try  to reach an agreement on the question 
of reparation.77
The ECtHR requires a specific request for just satisfaction or repa­
ration.78 This request can be filed by any of the parties to the pro­
cess. Rule 60(2) of the Rules of the ECtHR similarly states that the 
applicants have to submit their observations on the question of sat­
isfaction in the same time limit set for the observations on the m er­
its. As the ECtHR today usually applies the “joint procedure”, i.e. it 
simultaneously decides on the admissibility and the merits of the 
case, the applicants have to file their claim for satisfaction at the 
same time as they are submitting observations in reply to those of 
the State party to the case. Notwithstanding, untimely claims may 
be allowed by the chamber.79 In the rare case that the admissibility 
and the merits are decided in separate judgments, the claim has to 
be filed after the admissibility procedure. The Court will in any case
75 Order o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights, 19 September 1995, reprinted in 
IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1995, p. 129.
76Article 41 o f the ECHR and Ringeisen v. Austria  (Article 50), ECtHR, no. 2614/65,
22 June 1972, Series A no. 15.
77Article 63(1) o f the ACHR, reading “if appropriate”, and Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Hon­
duras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Series C no. 7.
78Rule 60 of the Rules of the ECtHR.
79Rule 60(3) o f the Rules of the ECtHR.
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let the applicants know when they have to file their claim.80 The 
Court adjourns the decision on satisfaction or grants a longer term 
to submit the documents for the satisfaction phase of the decision 
only in unusual cases, e.g. when there is room for a friendly settle­
ment between the parties.81 If the applicant fails to file the brief on 
just satisfaction in the term established, the Court generally does 
not grant satisfaction.82
The ECtHR has determined that just satisfaction claims must be 
specific and submitted w ith any supporting documents.83 Appli­
cants may claim just satisfaction for three types of damages: pecu­
niary or non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses incurred 
for the procedure.84 They have to show a casual link between the 
denounced violation and the damages claimed.85 W hen claiming pe­
cuniary damages and costs and expenses, the applicants must there­
fore show all financial losses incurred as a direct consequence of the 
alleged violation. These losses may, w ith respect to pecuniary dam­
ages, include damages already suffered (dam num  emergens) as well 
as future losses (lucrum cessans).86 Any claim for pecuniary dam­
ages and costs and expenses must be sustained by evidence, such as 
hospital bills, salary statements, etc. As non-pecuniary damages are 
usually not calculable in money, the Court invites the parties to in­
dicate a sum they deem appropriate to compensate such damages.87 
The claim is then submitted to the responding government accord­
ing to Rule 60(4) of the Rules of the ECtHR, which has the possi­
bility to comment. Nowadays, as the decision on just satisfaction is 
usually taken together w ith the decision on the merits, hearings on 
claims under Article 41 of the ECHR are performed together with 
those on the merits. In the case of separate procedures, the ECtHR 
initially performed separate Article 50 (today Article 41) hearings, a 
practice that was not continued in later cases, except for particularly
80Erdal and Bakirci, Article 3 o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 183.
81Zwach, Die Leistungsurteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs fü r  Menschenrechte, p. 54.
82Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, p. 88.
83Rule 60 o f the Rules o f the ECtHR.
84President o f the ECtHR, Practice Direction: Just Satisfaction Claims, no. 6.
85Ibid., no. 7.
86Ibid., no. 10.
87Ibid., no. 6.
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important cases before the Grand Chamber.88 The grand majority 
of just satisfaction claims are today decided in w ritten procedures. 
Having assessed the arguments of the parties, the Court determines 
the amount of just satisfaction in form of a judgment.
The IACtHR, on the contrary, may take decisions on reparation ex 
oficio according to Article 63(1) of the ACHR. Nevertheless, the Pres­
ident of the IACtHR usually initiates the reparation phase asking the 
alleged victim’s representative, the Commission and the state party 
to submit briefs on reparation that indicate the evidence they will 
produce in order to sustain their claims.89 Nowadays such claims 
shall be contained already in the initial plea so that the Court can 
ideally combine the decision on the merits and that on reparation in 
one judgm ent.90 These claims m aybe introduced by theIACommHR 
and by the alleged victim under Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
of the IACtHR, which gives the alleged victim a general right to 
proper motions besides the IACommHR that originally conducted 
the process autonomously. These motions may be modified during 
the process as long as the state has the possibility to respond to such 
modifications.91 They serve as a guiding line for the Court when de­
termining the scope, type and amount of reparation due. The Court 
is therefore not limited by these claims.92 Reparation claims may be 
supported by all means of evidence, i.e. witnesses, expert witnesses, 
factual evidence, documents, etc. Apart from that, the Court may 
initiate any studies or name any expert that may be convenient.93 
The Court does not necessarily conduct public hearings on the repa­
ration stage. If the question of reparation is resolved together w ith 
the question on the merits, testimony on reparation is heard to­
ssVagrancy (Article 50), ECtHR, nos. 2832/66 et al., 10 March 1972, Series A no. 14; 
Ringeisen v. Austria  (Article 50), ECtHR, no. 2614/65, 22 June 1972, Series A no. 15; 
and The Former King ofGreece and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, 
no. 25701/94, 28 November 2002.
89Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, p. 286.
90Article 35(1)(g) o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR; Pasqualucci, The Practice 
and Procedure o fth e  IACtHR, p. 285.
91Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 81.
92See e.g. Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, para. 128, w here the Court ordered an appeals 
procedure to be enabled although neither Commission nor victim  had required this.
93 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 4.
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gether w ith that on the merits. If a separate reparation phase is or­
dered, testimonial evidence can be ordered to be submitted in the 
form of affidavits, whilst testimony given before the Court is heard 
during the hearings on the merits or during the reparation stage.94 
The Court, after having deliberated in private, terminates the repa­
ration phase issuing a judgment that determines the amount and 
type of reparation to be awarded. If the parties reach an agreement 
on the question of reparation, the Court nevertheless issues a judg­
ment, accepting or rejecting the terms of the agreement, according 
to its fairness.95
94 “White Van” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 25 May 2001, Series 
C no. 76, para. 67.
95Barrios Altos v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 30 November 2001, Series 
C no. 87, paras. 46ff.
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Part II
Reparation under the Conventions
Overview
The complexity of implementation procedures for international 
judgments depends in the first place on the quality of the measures 
that have to be executed by the responding states, i.e. the courts’ 
reparation orders.
Despite their overall similarity, reparation is a major point of di­
vergence between the European and the American human rights 
protection systems. This is mainly due to the European system’s 
strict orientation by the principle of subsidiarity on all procedural 
stages, according to which the ECtHR’s task should be limited to 
recognizing violations of the ECHR while the domestic authorities 
then take the corresponding reparation measures. This is reflected 
in Article 41 of the ECHR, which determines that
[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of 
the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the in­
ternal law of the High Contracting Party concerned al­
lows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, 
if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
The ECtHR, at the beginning of its activity, interpreted this arti­
cle in such a way that there always had to be a domestic repara­
tion phase before it awarded just satisfaction itself. This, however, 
quickly turned out to be an additional formality for the applicant 
that produced no effect. Therefore, the Court stopped to require 
this step and nowadays immediately awards just satisfaction in the 
judgment on the merits. Facing an enormous number of pending 
applications and domestic systems that are sometimes slow and un­
willing to award individual and general reparation, the Court, based 
on Article 46 of the ECHR, has in the past years started to extend its 
reparation orders beyond mere financial reparation.
The inter-American system, on the other hand, does not limit the 
IACtHR’s reparation practice by the principle of subsidiarity. Arti-
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cle 63(1) of the ACHR contains a much broader competence, stating 
that
[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of 
a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the 
Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It 
shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of 
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of 
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair com­
pensation be paid to the injured party.
Under this norm the IACtHR has developed a very wide practice of 
general and individual reparation measures.
The Conventions themselves however do not further detail the 
content of reparation. On the international level though, efforts 
have been undertaken to codify the legal obligation to repair for 
state inflicted damage, particularly in the area of human rights vi­
olations. As will be seen, both hum an rights courts recur to these 
international standards to determine state obligations for human 
rights violations.
In a first step, state responsibility in case of human rights vio­
lations under general public international law will be defined (4), 
before presenting the reparation practice of both courts (5 and 6).
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Reparation for state inflicted damages to other states are governed 
by the customary rules of state responsibility. They have recently 
been codified in the draft articles on state responsibility, adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations. These draft articles 
contain the basic principles of state responsibility that also apply to 
human rights violations (4.1). In 2006, another set of more specific 
rules on damages resulting from gross violations of human rights 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly, containing reparation 
for the specific situation of damages inflicted on individuals (4.2).
4.1 The ILC  Draft A rticles
State responsibility for breaches of international obligations nowa­
days is an established rule of customary international law.1 It was 
recognized for the first time in the PCIJ’s Factory at Chorzow  deci­
sion:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of 
an engagement involves an obligation to make repara­
tion in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a con­
1See e.g. Factory at Chorzow (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, 26 July 1927, Series A no. 9, p. 21, 
confirmed by Reparation fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations 
(Advisory Opinion), ICJ, 11 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, p. 186; Legal Con­
sequences o f  the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Ad­
visory Opinion), ICJ, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, p. 198; Shaw, Interna­
tional Law, pp. 778ff.; Aust, Handbook o f  International Law, pp. 407ff.; Report o f the 
Secretary-General to the General Assembly: “Responsibility of States for interna­
tionally wrongful acts”, A/62/62, 1 February 2007, supplemented by Addendum to 
Report o f the Secretary-General, A/62/62/Add. 1, 17 April 2007.
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vention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in 
the convention itself.2
According to the general principles of state responsibility, as de­
termined by the PCIJ, reparation shall “wipe out [as far as possible] 
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed”. It shall take the form of reparation in kind or, if this 
should not be possible, in money.3
Since the end of World War II, the International Law Commission 
has, in a long process, codified the rules on state responsibility.4 At 
its 53rd session in 2001, it adopted the ILC Draft Articles.5
However, opinions differed among the ILC’s members about what 
to recommend to the UN General Assembly in respect of the Draft 
Articles. Article 23 of the Statute of the International Law Commis­
sion prescribes that the ILC may recommend the General Assem­
bly to (1) take no action, (2) take note or adopt as a resolution, (3) 
recommend the draft to members w ith the view to the conclusion 
of a convention, or (4) to convoke a conference to conclude a con- 
vention.6 Some members advocated to propose that the ILC Draft 
Articles be adopted as a convention, given the fundamental impor­
tance of its subject and the fact that the ILC’s task was to promote 
codification of international law. The opposing view was that the 
rules did not require implementation in domestic laws and feared 
that a convention that remained unratified could result in “reverse 
codification” and would leave the effects on states parties and non­
parties unclear. Furthermore, the ILC Draft Articles would be bound 
to be influential because they were widely cited and relied on by the 
ICJ and other tribunals. A unanimous declaration of the General As­
sembly could have a stronger effect than a convention that was only 
ratified by a small number of states.7 It was finally agreed to present 
the ILC Draft Articles to the General Assembly together w ith the
2Factory a t Chorzow (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, 26 July 1927, Series A no. 9, p. 21.
3Factory a t Chorzow (Merits), PCIJ, 13 September 1928, Series A no. 17, p. 47.
4ILC, Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission 2001, pp. 20f.
5Ibid., p. 25.
6 Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by the International Law 
Commission, 18 November 1981.
7ILC, Yearbook o f  the International Law Commission 2001, pp. 24f.
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recommendation to take note of them and to possibly convene, at a 
later stage, an international conference on the issue and adopt them 
as a convention.8
The General Assembly adopted the ILC Draft Articles during its 
56th regular session in 2001 and commended them to the states.9 
It came back to the issue at its 59th, 62nd, 65th and 68th sessions 
again.10 Since its 59th session, it requested the Secretary General of 
the UN to prepare and update a compilation of decisions of inter­
national courts, tribunals and other bodies referring to the articles 
and invited Governments to submit information on their practice in 
this regard. It further constantly examines, in a working group, the 
question of a convention on state responsibility.11
The Secretary General’s compilation of decisions referring the 
ILC Draft Articles shows their wide and constant application as a 
source of law by international jurisprudence. Also in literature, the 
ILC Draft Articles are widely seen as a codification of valid cus­
tomary international law.12 The ILC’s assumption that the articles 
would be influential even w ithout being adopted as a convention has 
thus proven to be true. This fact is also evidenced by the fact that all 
aforementioned resolutions were adopted by consensus w ithin the 
General Assembly. This way of voting, while not prescribed nei­
ther in the Charter of the UN nor in the General Assembly’s Rules 
of Procedure, means that the text of a resolution was negotiated in 
advance. While not all member states are necessarily in favour of 
adoption, at least no state objects.13
The ILC Draft Articles are subdivided into four parts, covering the 
definition and attribution of an internationally wrongful act, its con­
sequences, implementation of state responsibility, and some general 
provisions. Article 12 of the ILC Draft Articles defines that “[t]here
8Ibid., pp. 25f.
9D raft Articles on “Responsibility of States for Internationally W rongful Acts” (here­
inafter “ILC D raft Articles”), adopted by the General Assembly o f the UN at the 56th
session 2001, A/Res/56/83, 12 December 2001.
10A/Res/59/35; A/Res/62/61; A/Res/65/19; A/Res/68/104.
11No. 5 o f, A/Res/68/104, 16 December 2013.
12Karl, “Der Vollzug von EGMR-Urteilen in Ö sterreich”, p. 42; Shelton, “Righting 
W rongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, 4 AJIL 96 (2002), 
p. 833.
13S im m aet al., The Charter o f  the United Nations, Article 18, no. 31ff.
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is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of 
that State is not in conformity w ith what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character”. The consequences 
of internationally wrongful acts are enumerated in Articles 30 and 
31 of the ILC Draft Articles. They are subdivided into three cate­
gories: the responsible state must cease the act, offer “appropriate 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so re­
quire” and “make full reparation for the injury caused”. Special Rap­
porteur Arangio-Ruiz further defined reparation as “restitution in 
kind [...], reparation by equivalent or compensation in its various 
elements of reparation in a narrow sense and satisfaction in vari­
ous forms”. According to this, reparation in kind and by equivalent 
are intended to make good the material injury, while satisfaction 
is directed at the reparation for moral injury. Arangio-Ruiz further 
noted that guarantees of non-repetition are a distinct form of repa- 
ration.14
Initially, the obligation to cease an ongoing wrongful act was con­
sidered a form of satisfactory relief.15 But, according to Arangio- 
Ruiz, it is not a kind of reparation in the strict sense, because
[i]t would serve to prevent, by ensuring the formerly 
wrongdoing party’s undertaking or resumed compli­
ance w ith the original obligation, the very coming 
into play, for the portion of wrongful conduct avoided 
thanks to cessation, of the duty to make reparation de­
riving from the so-called “secondary” rule establishing 
responsibility.16
The obligation to cease the wrongdoing hence results from the 
states’ general obligation to act in conformity w ith international 
law.17 Being an obligation that exists vis-a-vis the international 
community as a whole it has to be complied w ith even if cessation
14Arangio-Ruiz, Preliminary report on State Responsibility, no. 21.
15Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, 4 
AJIL 96 (2002), p. 839.
16Arangio-Ruiz, Preliminary report on State Responsibility, no. 22.
17Buyse, “Lost and Regained? Restitution as a  Remedy for H um an Rights Violations 
in the Context o f International Law”, 1 ZaöRV  68 (2008), p. 130; Colandrea, “On the 
Power o f the European Court o f H um an Rights to Order Specific N on-m onetary 
M easures”, 2 HRLR 7 (2007), p. 401.
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was not particularly demanded by the injured state.18 It targets the 
violation per se and not its remedies. Although cessation is not a 
means of reparation in itself, its consequences may be similar, e.g. 
if the violation consists in the irregular detention of a person.19 The 
consequences of the violation however have to be remedied in other 
ways.
On the other hand, the obligation to give assurances or guaran­
tees of non-repetition, “when circumstances so require”, is a real 
form of reparation. Although such assurances do not make good 
the harm caused by an illegal act, they may help to re-establish con­
fidence in international relations after a breach has occurred. They 
are consequently not directed at the past but the future. Assurances 
are usually given orally, while guarantees may require the imple­
mentation of practical measures to prevent further breaches of the 
international obligation in question.20
Reparation in the strict sense, i.e. the making good of injuries 
caused, can be conceived in three different forms: restitution, com­
pensation and satisfaction.21 It shall comprise material and moral 
damages caused by the unlawful act.22 The paramount objective of 
reparation being the re-establishment of the situation prior to the 
violation, restitution is the first means the injured state may request 
of the responsible state. Full reparation may nonetheless require a 
combination of all three means.23
Restitution in the terms of Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles, 
though, may only be requested within the limits of possibility and 
proportionality of “the benefit deriving from restitution instead of 
compensation”. The authors of the Draft Articles further adopted a 
narrow notion of restitution that requires to establish the situation 
as it was before the violation occurred but does not cover losses suf­
fered due to the situation, i.e. the injured state may not demand to
18ILC, “Text o f the draft articles w ith com m entaries thereto”, p. 89; Shelton, “Right­
ing W rongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, 4 AJIL 96 (2002), 
p. 840.
19ILC, “Text o f the draft articles w ith com m entaries thereto”, p. 89.
20Ibid., p. 90.
21Article 34 o f the ILC Draft Articles.
22ILC, “Text o f the draft articles w ith com m entaries thereto”, p. 92.
23Ibid., p. 95.
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be returned to the situation as if the violation had not occurred.24 
The ILC enumerates factual as well as legal measures as examples 
for restitution, stating that also legal reforms may be required as 
a form of reparation. Restitutionary orders by international courts 
may even determine a legal situation for the parties, declaring cer­
tain acts of a state illegal or ordering specific behaviour such as the 
withdrawal of troops.25
If restitution is impossible, excluded for reasons of proportion­
ality or does not cover the damage caused by the breach of an in­
ternational obligation, the injuring state, according to Article 36 of 
the ILC Draft Articles, has to compensate in money for the remain­
ing damage. Compensation fills in the gaps left by restitution. It is 
nonetheless different from satisfaction in so far as satisfaction is 
intended to make good moral damages, while compensation is di­
rected at material ones.26 Considerations of proportionality cannot 
limit the obligation to compensate. Compensation is of particular 
importance for the right of diplomatic protection in case of per­
sonal injuries or damages suffered by citizens of another state. The 
amount of compensation must be established separately for each 
specific case.
The third form of reparation a state eventually has to offer is 
satisfaction. Satisfaction, as conceived in the ILC Draft Articles, 
nonetheless is exceptional for those cases where, despite restitution 
and compensation, damages have not been fully equalled. In human 
rights cases this is typically the case for psychological or moral con­
sequences of a violation, satisfaction for corporal damages suffered 
by a victim or for grievances for the loss of a family member. Ar­
ticle 37(2) of the ILC Draft Articles gives examples for ways of sat­
isfaction, namely “acknowledgement of the breach, an expression 
of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality”. The 
appropriate form of satisfaction may though depend on the circum­
stances of the particular case.27 Like restitutive measures, satisfac­
tion, in the terms of Article 37(3) of the ILC Draft Articles, only has
24ILC, “Text o f the draft articles w ith com m entaries thereto”, p. 96.
25Ibid., p. 97.
26Ibid., p. 99.
27Ibid., p. 106.
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to be paid in the limits of proportionality and “may not be humili­
ating to the responsible State”.
In conclusion, the ILC favours a purely restitutive approach to 
reparation, opting against preventive functions such as punitive 
damages or reconciliation to deter future violations. Human rights 
cases though require a particular form of reparation, in the first case 
because the victim is a human being and not a state, which possesses 
other means ofself-defence against violations. Thus, the role ofnon- 
repetition in human rights cases is much more important than under 
general international law, given that hum an existences depend on 
the evasion of further violations. Guarantees of non-repetition also 
fulfil a direct function of reparation to the victim in the specific case 
because the knowledge that the same violation might occur to oth­
ers is a continuing aggravation of the victim’s situation.28 Human 
rights victims often also request excuses by states and other more 
symbolic acts of reparation, such as public recognition of the harm 
suffered, acts of remembrance, restitution of their personal honour 
and reputation, etc.
The ILC Draft Articles can therefore only serve as general guide­
lines in hum an rights cases.29 The international community has rec­
ognized this particularity in specific sets of rules dealing w ith repa­
ration for human rights cases.
4.2 The Specific Case of Human Rights V io lations
Human rights treaties are particular in so far as they do not only 
affect the inter-state level but introduce a new level of international 
relations: the relation between the individual and the state.30 Vi­
olations of human rights treaties not only cause international re­
sponsibility of one state towards another but, according to several 
of these treaties, the violating state owes reparation directly to the
28Beristain, Diălogo sobre la reparacion, Vol. 2, p. 462.
29Cf. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, pp. 97ff.
30 Effect o f  Reservations, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 Septem ber 1982, Se­
ries A no. 2, paras. 29ff.
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individual.31 This is a significant amplification of the object of pro­
tection compared to more traditional approaches in public interna­
tional law.32
The extension of protection to individuals though requires other 
protection mechanisms and reparation rules. State and individual 
are not nominally equal subjects under international law but act 
on different levels. There is no synallagmatic relation, no do ut des, 
and, most importantly, there is nothing the individual could offer 
or w ithdraw from the table of negotiations in order to make a state 
comply w ith its obligation to repair a damage caused.33 Further­
more, under the general rules of state responsibility, retaliation is 
an important defence by the injured state, a measure that would 
make no sense in human rights law. But also in terms of repara­
tion, states whose rights have been violated require other measures 
than human beings do. In particular the field of symbolic reparation, 
the erection of memorials, public excuses etc., but also guarantees 
of non-repetition are of paramount importance to hum an victims, 
while they are far less so in inter-state cases.
This particular constellation is reflected in the work of the Sub­
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi­
norities, a subsidiary body of the UN Human Rights Commission, 
which since the end of the 1980s is occupied w ith the problem of 
reparation for victims of human rights violations. As a first result 
of its work, Special-Rapporteur Theo van Boven presented a report 
that should serve as a basis for the adoption of a set of standards on
31See Mazzeschi, “Reparation Claims by Individuals for State Breaches o f H um anitar­
ian Law and H um an Rights”, JICJ 1 (2003), pp. 340f. and no. 5 o f the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a  Remedy and Reparation for Victims ofG ross Vio­
lations o f International H um an Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
H um anitarian Law (hereinafter “GA Basic Principles on Reparation”), adopted by 
the General Assembly o f the UN at the 60th session 2005, A/Res/60/147, 21 March
2006.
32In the same sense: Nash Rojas, Las Reparaciones ante la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos (1988-2007), p. 15.
33In the dispute settlem ent system of the WTO, for example, a  state can be autho­
rized to in terrupt compliance w ith  certain obligations towards another state that 
does not comply w ith  a  ruling o f the Dispute Settlem ent Body. See Article 22 of 
the U nderstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlem ent o f Disputes 
(hereinafter “DSU”), 15 December 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112.
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reparation for gross hum an rights violations.34 The Study concerning 
the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation fo r  victims o f  
gross violations o f  hum an rights and fundam enta l freedoms was re­
vised in 2000 by M. Cherif Bassiouni35 and in 2002 again by Ale­
jandro Salinas.36 The UN General Assembly finally adopted the GA 
Basic Principles on Reparation in 2005 w ithout a vote. They “iden­
tify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the imple­
mentation of existing legal obligations under international human 
rights law and international hum anitarian law”.37
The scope of application of the GA Basic Principles on Repara­
tion however remains unclear as they contain only a very vague 
definition of the notion of “gross violations of hum an rights law 
or serious violations of international hum anitarian law”, compre­
hending them as acts “which, by their very grave nature, constitute 
an affront to human dignity”.38 According to former reports, “gross 
violations” shall include at least genocide, slavery and slavery-like 
practices, summary or arbitrary executions, torture and cruel, in­
human or degrading treatment or punishment, enforced disappear­
ance, prolonged arbitrary detention, deportations or forcible trans­
fer of population, and systematic discrimination, in particular based 
on race or gender.39
But the principles can find application even beyond these crimes, 
as they contain at least the germ of international human rights law 
in terms of justice, remedy and reparation.40 However, it must be un-
34Van Boven, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation 
fo r  victims o f  gross violations o f  human rights and fundam ental freedoms, no. 4.
35Bassiouni, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
fo r  Victims ofViolations ofInternational Human Rights andH um anitarian Law .
36Salinas, Report o f  the consultative meeting on the draft Basic principles and guide­
lines on the right to a remedy and reparation fo r victims o f  violations o f  international 
human rights and humanitarian law .
37 Preamble of the GA Basic Principles on Reparation.
38Preamble o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation. See hereon d’Argent, “Le droit 
de la responsabilite internationale complete ?”, AFDI 51 (2005), pp. 38ff.
39Van Boven, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation 
fo r  victims o f  gross violations o f  human rights and fundam ental freedoms, no. 13.
40 Buyse, “Lost and Regained? Restitution as a Remedy for H um an Rights Violations 
in the Context o f International Law”, 1 ZaöRV  68 (2008), p. 140. Some authors even 
consider them  a sum m ary o f current custom ary law  on the subject: Ramcharan, 
Contemporary human rights ideas, p. 147.
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derlined that the GA Basic Principles on Reparation are mere guide­
lines and do not have binding force.41 They do not create new legal 
obligations or grant new rights to individuals. On the other hand, 
they do not limit the scope of obligations under general interna­
tional law for reparation for lesser forms of violations either.42 De­
spite their lack of binding force they may function as guidelines for 
national legislative bodies and international courts and other bodies 
concerned with the adjudication of human rights violations.
According to no. 11 of the GA Basic Principles on Reparation, 
remedies for victims of gross violations include equal and effective 
access to justice, adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered, and access to relevant information concerning violations 
and reparation mechanisms. Chapter IX defines five types of repara­
tion: the four already established by the ILC Draft Articles -  restitu­
tion, compensation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition - , 
and the obligation to rehabilitate the victim, which, in human rights 
cases, is of more importance to the victims than in inter-state cases.
Although claimants are free to choose the type of reparation that 
best fits their needs, there is a theoretical hierarchy of modes of 
reparation.43 A state that has grossly violated human rights must in 
the first place, as far as possible, restore the victim to the situation 
before the violation, procuring, as appropriate, restoration of liberty, 
enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, re­
turn  to the place of living, work, and restoration of property (also 
referred to as restitutio in integrum).44 The State must furthermore 
compensate for economically assessable damages such as physical 
and mental harms, lost opportunities, material and moral damages, 
and costs related to legal, medical and technical assistance.45 It is in
41Binding force w as at issue during the debates on the GA Basic Principles on Repa­
ration but turned down due to objections by several states. See Buyse, “Lost and 
Regained? Restitution as a  Remedy for H um an Rights Violations in the Context of 
International Law”, 1 ZaöRV  68 (2008), p. 139.
42Preamble o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation.
43Buyse, “Lost and Regained? Restitution as a  Remedy for H um an Rights Violations 
in the Context of International Law”, 1 ZaöRV  68 (2008), pp. 132f.
44No. 19 o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation; Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles.
45No. 20 o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation; Article 36 of the ILC Draft Articles. 
See on the question of how  damages are calculated under international law  Seegers, 
Das Individualrecht a u f Wiedergutmachung, pp. 71ff.
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dispute if compensation in international law may also serve punitive 
functions, but until today neither the IACtHR nor the ECtHR have 
applied punitive reparation.46 Rehabilitation or satisfaction has to 
be effected through medical and psychological care and social ser-
47vices.
Apart from these measures directed at restituting the victim to 
the situation before the violation and, as far as possible, eliminating 
its consequences, the state must also take satisfactory measures and 
measures to guarantee non-repetition. Satisfaction comprises effec­
tive measures to procure the cessation of continuing violations, ver­
ification of facts and disclosure of the truth, search for disappeared 
persons and identification of dead bodies, declarations that restore 
dignity, reputation and rights of the victim, public apologies, sanc­
tioning of those responsible, commemorations, and human rights 
and humanitarian law training and education taking into account 
the specific case.48 As guarantees of non-repetition the state, when 
appropriate, has to ensure civilian control of the military and secu­
rity forces, ensure due process, fairness and impartiality in all ju ­
dicial proceedings, strengthen the independence of justice, protect 
particularly vulnerable persons in legal, medical and other related 
professions and human rights defenders, and review and reform the 
laws that contribute or allow gross violations of human rights or 
humanitarian law.49
In conclusion, the responsible state’s obligation under interna­
tional law reaches far beyond mere monetary compensation. Its
46 Against: Shaw, International Law, pp. 804f.; Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Repa­
rations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Series C no. 7, para. 38. Punitive dam­
ages w ere also excluded from the ILC D raft Articles due to objections by m any 
states: Crawford, “The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
W rongful Acts: A Retrospect”, 4 AJIL 96 (2002), p. 875; Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: 
Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility”, 4 AJIL 96 (2002), p. 844. In 
favour o f their inclusion: Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 
2, p. 54. See also Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, no. 25781/94, 
12 May 2014, concurring opinion o fjudge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by judge 
Vucinic.
47No. 21 o fth eG A  Basic Principles on Reparation; Article 37 of the ILC Draft Articles.
48No. 22 o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation.
49No. 23 o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation.
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foremost duty is to procure the victim w ith restitutio in integrum .50 
Although particularly grave or large scale hum an rights violations 
are by their nature irreparable, it is essential that the state remedy 
the victim to the fullest extent possible.51 Reparation must be pro- 
portional52 and must take into account the particular impact human 
rights violations usually cause due to the fact that they are commit­
ted by the state from which the victims should expect protection.53
The fact that the obligation to repair is an inevitable consequence 
of a violation of international law has another important implica­
tion: an international court that is competent to decide w hether a 
violation has occurred may also decide about reparation w ithout be­
ing expressively empowered to do so by an underlying treaty.54 This 
fact is relevant for the assessment of the ECtHR’s powers in terms 
of reparation, because the ECHR does not contain a clear reparation 
power for the Court except Article 46 of the ECHR dealing w ith just 
satisfaction in case domestic measures and laws do not fully repair 
the damage caused.
50Factory at Chorzow (Merits), PCIJ, 13 September 1928, Series A no. 17, p. 47; Seegers, 
Das Individualrecht a u f Wiedergutmachung, p. 70.
51Van Boven, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation 
fo r  victims o f  gross violations o f  human rights and fundam ental freedoms, no. 131.
52No. 15 o f the GA Basic Principles on Reparation.
53See Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 1, p. 50.
54LaGrand (Germany v. United States o f  America) (Judgment), ICJ, 27 June 2001, ICJ 
Reports 2001, p. 466, p. 485.
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Most rulings by the ECtHR may at a first view be surprising to the 
unacquainted reader because the Court usually does not indicate 
reparation measures even after having found grave human rights 
violations. In most cases its judgments are limited to awarding m on­
etary satisfaction, but in general there is not a word to be found on 
the states’ obligation to take further measures to repair the harm 
caused, prevent repetition, or rehabilitate the victim -  in short to 
take any of the actions defined under international law in case of 
human rights violations. This apparent lack of consequence is re­
markable in particular in comparison to IACtHR rulings. This is all 
the more so bearing in mind that there is no international practice to 
restrict the notion of “just satisfaction” to monetary compensation 
(5.1).1
Nevertheless, the perception that the organs in the European hu­
man rights protection system would not care about full reparation 
is not ascertained. There is the Committee of Ministers to which 
every decision by the Court is transferred and which supervises its 
execution and may indicate specific reparation measures to be ef­
fectuated by the state. On the other hand the ECtHR has begun to 
give indications to states on how to deal w ith certain problems un­
der the still rather new pilot judgment procedure, and in some cases 
even introduced them into the operative part of the judgment. And 
in isolated recent cases, the Court has even set out in its reasoning 
or in the operative part punctual reparation measures itself (5.2). 
W hen the ECtHR orders reparation measures, it sets time limits for 
their fulfilment by the state (5.3).
1Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, pp. 280f.
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5.1 The Princip le of Subsid iarity
Judgments of the ECtHR are in general of a declaratory nature, and 
this is the prim ary relief the Court can afford.2 The Court finds if 
certain obligations emanating from the ECHR have been violated in 
a specific case but, unlike the IACtHR, it usually does not indicate 
measures to repair the violation.
This though does not mean that the obligation to provide com­
plete restitution to the victim would not exist under the ECHR. It 
is nevertheless derived only indirectly from the Convention. Arti­
cle 41 of the ECHR indicates the extent of the obligation to repair, 
stating that the Court may order just satisfaction if the respond­
ing state’s internal law “allows only partial reparation to be made”. 
Read together w ith Article 46 of the ECHR, which orders the mem­
ber states to comply w ith the judgments of the Court and provides 
that the judgments be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, 
which shall supervise their execution, the Court concludes that, be­
sides eventual orders to pay monetary satisfaction, there is a gen­
eral obligation for the states to provide restitutio in integrum  in cases 
where violations of the Convention have been found.3 It has further­
more acknowledged the independent obligation to cease an ongoing 
violation, but does not explicitly mention it in most cases either.4
There is no definition of “full reparation” in the ECHR. The ab­
sence of a clear authorization to order specific and general repara­
tion measures led the Court to the conclusion that the states are 
generally free to choose the means that are necessary to obtain full 
reparation for the victims. This freedom, according to the Court, is 
a reflection of the obligation in Article 1(1) of the ECHR to secure 
the rights and freedoms of the Convention. This obligation does not 
prescribe any particular means of protection or any competence for
2Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, para. 58.
3Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 14556/89, 
31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, para. 34; Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, ECtHR, 
nos. 39221/98 et al., 3 July 2000, Reports 2000-VIII, paras. 249f.; Broniowski v. Poland 
[GC], ECtHR, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, 2004-V, concurring opinion of Judge Zu- 
pancic; VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 32772/02,30 June 2009, paras. 85f.
4See Norris v. Ireland, ECtHR, no. 10581/83, 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, para. 50.
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the Court to indicate particular reparation measures to the states.5 
The states’ freedom to choose how to discharge their obligation to 
repair consequently derives from the principle of subsidiarity that 
governs the European protection system.6 A typical judgment thus 
creates an obligation for the state to achieve a result (full repara­
tion), but does not prescribe the means.7
Until a few years ago, and still today in the majority of cases, the 
Court did not give indications in its judgments on what a state had 
to do to repair for the violation found,8 nor did it, in those cases 
in which it took the decision on just satisfaction separately from 
the decision on the merits, indicate what it would have expected 
from the state as restitutio in integrum .9 In Ireland v. United King­
dom  the Court turned down as being beyond its competence a spe­
cific request by Ireland to order the United Kingdom to investigate 
and punish those who had committed the acts found in violation 
of the ECHR.10 In M arckx v. Belgium  it again held that it would re­
frain from making specific indications to the states. Nonetheless the 
Court indicated that the decision which had found that a breach of 
the Convention stemmed directly from certain provisions of a Bel­
gian law had “effects extending beyond the confines of this partic­
ular case”. This was generally seen as an invitation to Belgium to 
amend its legislation.11 In later cases the Court, referring to the de­
cision in M arckx v. Belgium, rejected claims to order specific means
5M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], ECtHR, no. 30696/09, 21 January  2011, para. 398; 
Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 14556/89, 
31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, para. 34; Janis, Kay, and Bradley, European 
Human Rights Law , p. 834, w ith reference to Ireland v. United Kingdom  (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25.
6See on this principle Kudia v. Poland, ECtHR, no. 30210/96, 26 October 2000, 2000-XI, 
para. 152.
7Lambert, Les effets des arrets, p. 100.
8In some decisions, the Court made rem arks on the question of reparation in the form 
of obiter dicta. See Breuer, “Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfem aßnahm en durch
den EGMR”, EuGRZ (2004), p. 258 w ith  examples.
9See Zwach, Die Leistungsurteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs fü r  Menschenrechte, 
pp. 49f.; Breuer, “Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfem aßnahm en durch den EGMR”, 
EuGRZ (2004), p. 257.
10Irelandv.U nitedKingdom (M eritsandJustSatisfaction),EC tH R ,no.5310/71,18Jan- 
uary  1978, Series A no. 25, paras. 186f.
11 M arckx v. Belgium, ECtHR, no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, para. 58.
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of reparation such as the publication of the judgment in the con­
cerned state or certain measures that would be indicated to end a 
violation or prevent further violations.12
The Court’s longstanding restrictive attitude to the application of 
Article 41 of the ECHR may be explained by some historic particu­
larities of the European human rights protection system. During the 
drafting of the ECHR there were no plans to limit the Court’s com­
petence concerning reparation. On the contrary, the draft adopted 
at the Hague Congress of 1948, where the idea for a European hu­
man rights protection system was born, foresaw a Court “capable 
d’appliquer les sanctions necessaires pour faire respecter la Charte 
[des Droits de l’Homme preconisee par le Congres]”.13 Article 13 of 
a Draft Convention submitted to the Committee of Ministers by the 
European Movement in 1949 was even broader and more specific, 
containing a proposal according to which the Court, in case it found 
a violation, could
either prescribe measures of reparation or [...] require 
that the State concerned shall take penal or administra­
tive action in regard to the persons responsible for the 
infringement, or it may demand the repeal, cancellation 
or amendment of the act.14
At the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the CoE that 
same year, opinions on the powers of the Court to sanction human 
rights violations were divided, ranging from W inston Churchill’s 
point of view that the Court “of course would have no sanctions 
and would depend for the enforcement of their judgment on the in­
dividual decisions of the States [ .. .]” to Pierre-Henri Teitgen who 
advocated for a broader reparation practice including the capacity 
to annul state actions.15 The Draft Resolution prepared by the Legal 
Committee to the Consultative Assembly of 1949 nonetheless con­
tained an Article 24 that was as broad as the original proposal by the
12 Vocaturo v. Italy, ECtHR, no. 11891/85, 21 May 1991, Series A no. 206-C, para. 21; 
Philis v. Greece, ECtHR, nos. 12750/87 et al., 27 August 1991, Series A no. 209, 
para. 79. Further examples at Lambert, Les effets des arrets, p. 116.
13ECtHR, Preparatory work on Article 50 o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, 
p. 1.
14Ibid., p. 2.
15Ibid., p. 3.
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European Movement.16 Later, the Committee of Experts in its first 
session was presented w ith a new draft by the Italian representative 
concerning the competence to award reparation which was almost 
similar to today’s Article 41 of the ECHR.17 In the commentary to 
that draft it was made clear that the Court “will not have the power 
to declare null and void or amend Acts emanating from the pub­
lic bodies of the signatory states”.18 This formulation, in particular 
the restriction of the Court’s competence to award just satisfaction 
and the impossibility to annul or declare invalid a rule that violates 
the Convention rights, was strongly criticized by Teitgen, but his 
proposals for an amendment were rejected.19
Former Article 50 (today’s Article 41 of the ECHR) was inspired 
by an arbitral regulation that is supposed to reflect the expectation 
that the ECtHR would mainly decide inter-state applications.20 It 
has been argued that it was an error to take inspiration from the 
aforementioned agreement for an international human rights treaty 
because it mainly applied to aliens demanding a state’s international 
responsibility for a wrongdoing. It is easier acceptable for an alien 
to receive only compensation for a rights violation and no guaran­
tee of non-repetition, as they can simply leave the country where 
the violation occurred. On the contrary, the typical situation in hu­
man rights cases is that the rights of nationals are violated by their 
home country, so that the guarantee of non-repetition gains much 
more weight because leaving the country usually is not an option, 
a fact disregarded by the ECHR. Furthermore, in cases of ongoing 
violations such as illegal imprisonment, cessation is more important 
than compensation.21 The travaux preparatoires give quite clear ev­
idence that the states’ major concern was that the Court would not
16Ibid., p. 6.
17Ibid., p. 20.
18Ibid., p. 21.
19Ibid., pp. 27f., 29.
20 See Greer and Williams, “H um an Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU”, 4 EJL
15 (2009), p. 464; Vagrancy (Article 50), ECtHR, nos. 2832/66 et al., 10 March 1972, 
Series A no. 14, para. 16; Article 32 of the Pacific Settlem ent of International Dis­
putes, 26 September 1928, 93 LNTS 343. Critical: Shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law, ed. 2, pp. 191f.
21See ibid., pp. 191f.
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become a final court of appeals w ith the power to quash national 
judicial decisions and declare laws void.
In line w ith these considerations, the Court, having found a vi­
olation of the Convention, usually either states that the judgment 
in itself is sufficient reparation or awards monetary compensation 
as just satisfaction under Article 41 of the ECHR. To the latter ef­
fect, the applicant has to submit a corresponding claim according to 
Rule 60 of the Rules of the ECtHR. Otherwise the Court only exam­
ines the possibility to award just satisfaction for reasons of public
policy.22
According to the wording of Article 41 of the ECHR, the Court’s 
competence to award just satisfaction is subsidiary to reparation 
awards under national law. Despite this, the Court today immedi­
ately orders reparation where necessary, even when national law 
allows corresponding claims. It argues that it would be “incompat­
ible w ith the aim and the object of the Convention” if the victim, 
upon recognition of a violation by the ECtHR, would have to lodge 
another petition before the national organs in order to obtain repa- 
ration.23 These satisfaction orders though not necessarily resolve 
the question of reparation entirely. As long as other reparation mea­
sures are possible, the state remains obliged to provide full repara­
tion for all damages that have not been covered by the Court’s or- 
ders.24 Although there is no apparent pattern along which the Court 
decides to award satisfaction beyond the declaratory effects of the 
judgment, Shelton has found out that it is more likely to award mon­
etary relief the less the judges are divided about the merits of the
25case.
M onetary relief is awarded under the heads of “pecuniary dam­
age”, “non-pecuniary damage”, “costs and expenses”, and “default 
interest”. The Court however dedicates little effort to sustaining its
22König v. Germany (Article 50), ECtHR, no. 6232/73, 10 March 1980, Series A no. 36, 
para. 19; Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 2009, p. 545 w ith further examples.
23Neumeister v. Austria (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 1936/63, 7 May 1974, Se­
ries A no. 17, para. 30; Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satis­
faction), ECtHR, no. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, para. 40; 
Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 2009, pp. 540f.
24Ibid., p. 541; Ruedin, Execution des arrets, p. 193.
25Extensive: Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, pp. 258-263.
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decisions under Article 41 of the ECHR which makes it difficult to 
elaborate patterns of calculation of the amounts awarded.
Reparation for pecuniary loss has been awarded, among others, 
for financial loss, detriment to property, loss of earnings, salaries or 
interest, fines, or damages and costs awarded by national courts.26 In 
accordance w ith the general rules of law it comprehends lucrum ces­
sans and dam num  emergens.27 If pecuniary damages are claimed, the 
Court applies a rather strict standard of proof, requiring applicants 
to detail the heads under which they seek compensation and to sub­
mit supporting documentation.28 Applicants must also show the ca­
sual link between the violation and the damage claimed. Should the 
underlying situation be unclear, the Court however in some cases 
has calculated pecuniary damages on an equitable basis or has esti­
mated damages.29 Satisfaction for damages is awarded on an equi­
table basis insofar as the applicant has shown the existence of the 
damage and the casual link w ith the violation. Just satisfaction may 
also include inflationary compensation.30
Non-pecuniary loss has been claimed on account of stress, moral 
and physical pain and suffering, anguish and prolonged uncertainty 
directly caused by a violation of the Convention.31 Non-pecuniary 
damages may be compensated independently from the compen­
sation for pecuniary damages.32 They are compensated under the 
same conditions as pecuniary damages, i.e. the applicant has to 
show the existence of the damage and the casual link w ith the vi­
olation.33 If the Court recognizes this kind of damage -  in many 
cases it rejects claims for non-pecuniary damages despite recogniz­
ing the existence of the damage and the casual link, considering the
26Enrich Mas, “Right to Com pensation under Article 50”, p. 784.
27President o f the ECtHR, Practice Direction: Just Satisfaction Claims, 28 March 2007, 
u r l : h ttp : / / w w w . ech r. co e . int / docum ents / PD _ satisfaction _ claims _E N G . pdf, 
no. 10.
28Rule 60(2) of the Rules o f the ECtHR.
29Cf. President o f the ECtHR, Practice Direction: Just Satisfaction Claims, 28 March
2007, u r l : http://w ww.echr.coe.int/docum ents/PD_satisfaction_claim s_ENG.pdf, 
no. 12.
30A kkus v. Turkey, ECtHR, no. 19263/92, 9 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, paras. 35-39.
31 Enrich Mas, “Right to Com pensation under Article 50”, p. 786.
32Pellonpää, “Individual Reparation Claims under the ECHR”, p. 116.
33Ibid., p. 116.
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declaratory judgment to be sufficient reparation -  it takes the ap­
plicant’s submission as a guideline and decides the amount of just 
satisfaction on an equitable basis.34 In fact, the applicant should sub­
mit a well considered claim for reparation of non-pecuniary dam­
ages, given that the Court rejects excessive claims, claims for sym­
bolic sums or claims where no indication concerning the amount 
has been made.35 Compensation for non-pecuniary damages differs 
in each situation. The Court does not manage a table to determine 
compensation according to categories of violations, but makes an 
individual estimation based on equity for each case.36 It takes into 
account the type of violation, the circumstances of the case, the ob­
jective of the compensation, and relief obtained before national or- 
gans.37 Cases of excessive length of proceedings are special in so 
far as the Court manages the refutable assumption that the appli­
cant has suffered non-pecuniary damages, which results in a lower 
standard of proof. In civil law cases the Court takes into account the 
number of instances, the importance of the case (cases concerning 
labour rights, honour or right of access to children among others 
are considered as particularly important for the applicant and con­
sequently are considered to cause higher moral damages), and other
34President o f the ECtHR, Practice Direction: Just Satisfaction Claims, 28 March 2007, 
u r l : h ttp : / / w w w . e c h r . coe . in t / docum ents /P D _ satisfaction_ claim s_EN G . pdf, 
no. 14; Pellonpää, “Individual Reparation Claims under the ECHR”, p. 117.
35Enrich Mas, “Right to Com pensation under Article 50”, p. 787.
36Some authors suppose a  new  approach in the C ourt’s jurisprudence on damages. 
They have noticed an increased tendency o fth e  Court to detail the reasons that are 
underlying its decision on the am ount o fju st satisfaction and indicate that it seems 
to develop case law  fixing am ounts o f com pensation for specific types o f damages. 
See Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 2009, p. 565.
37Examples: Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Kommentar 2011, Artikel 41, no. 19. In its early 
cases, the Court had still held that it would have to base its decision on ju st satis­
faction not on the reparation actually awarded by the national organs, but on “the 
remedies provided by national law” (Vagrancy (Article 50), ECtHR, nos. 2832/66 et 
al., 10 March 1972, Series A no. 14, Separate opinion by Judge Mosler, para. 6). 
This jurisprudential line could have led to ineffective reparation claims, because 
the C ourt would have had to refrain from ordering just satisfaction as long as na­
tional law  provided for the basis o f a  reparation claim, no m atter if the claim could 
actually be made effective by the victim. The Court nowadays awards just satisfac­
tion taking into account the remedies that have actually been awarded. Example: 
Öneryildiz v. Turkey (Article 41) [GC], ECtHR, no. 48939/99, 30 November 2004, 
para. 171.
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factors such as the behaviour of the applicant during the national 
proceedings (if the applicant had hampered the domestic proceed­
ings the Court lowers their satisfaction).38
If well substantiated, the Court also awards indemnification for 
costs and expenses incurred by the applicant. Costs and expenses 
for proceedings before national tribunals and the ECtHR comprise 
expenses for lawyers, travel expenses or translations, as long as they 
were necessary and reasonable for the adjudication of the Conven­
tion breach.39 National laws and rules on lawyer fees are not binding 
for the Court but it tends to take such rules as guidelines for its de­
cisions. For the defence before the ECtHR itself the Court usually 
awards around EUR 1 500 to 4 000, while the amount may be higher 
in more difficult cases.40
The Court has until today awarded just satisfaction up to EUR 
180 000 in a case of arbitrary detention despite judicial acquittal of 
the applicant,41 although the average amount awarded tends to be 
considerably lower, hovering around EUR 42 000.42 It does not award 
punitive damages.43
5.2 Recent Developments
In its first years of existence, the Court dealt w ith few gross or 
massive human rights violations. But even in situations such as the 
N orthern Ireland conflict the respondent states were generally will­
38Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Kommentar 2011, Article 41, no. 21, w ith a table of am ounts 
awarded according to the num ber of instances and length o f proceedings.
39Iatridis v. Greece (Article 41) [GC], ECtHR, no. 31107/96, 19 October 2000, Re­
ports 2000-XI, para. 98.
40Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Kommentar 2011, Article 41, nos. 32ff.
41Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], ECtHR, no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, 
2004-VII, para. 489.
42See the lists at Meyer-Ladewig, EMRK-Kommentar 2011, Article 41, no. 20; Leach, 
Taking a Case to the European Court o f  Human Rights, pp. 409ff.; and Committee of 
Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2010, p. 54.
43See A kdivarv. Turkey (Article 50) [GC], ECtHR, no. 99/1995/605/693, 1 April 1998, 
Reports 1998-II, para. 38; Varnava et al. v. Turkey [GC], ECtHR, nos. 16064/90 et al., 
18 September 2009, para. 223. Judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Vucinic though de­
fend the position that certain orders by the Court had to be understood as punitive 
measures: Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, no. 25781/94, 12 May 
2014, concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vucinic.
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ing to implement ECtHR judgments quickly. This situation changed 
w ith the participation of the eastern European states in the Euro­
pean human rights system since the 1990s. A new quality of cases 
arose from these states, encompassing massive violations like in 
Russia’s Chechen Republic, the Turkish conflict w ith the Kurds or 
issues resulting from the occupation of northern Cyprus. Another 
group of new cases since the 1990s concern insufficiencies in the 
member states’ justice systems, leading to slow administration of 
justice or problems with the implementation of domestic judgments. 
These issues have led to large numbers of similar cases. Finally, mi­
nority groups more frequently seise the Court over alleged discrim- 
inations.44
The new circumstances led on the one hand to a discussion be­
tween the Court, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly over the improvement of execution of judgments and the 
prevention of recurrent applications, and on the other hand to devel­
opments in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning just satisfaction, 
in particular a slight shift of focus from the practice of declaring 
the breach of the Convention towards a more obligations oriented 
jurisprudence, either in specific cases, also called “Article 46 judg­
m ents” or “quasi-pilot judgm ents” (5.2.1), or for systemic violations 
in a group of similar cases caused by the same systemic problem, 
called “pilot judgm ents” (5.2.2).
5.2.1 Specific Reparation Measures
As has been seen, the traditional assumption was that the Court’s 
remedial powers were limited to awarding monetary satisfaction.45 
This assumption was based on the principle of subsidiarity, ex­
pressed in the travaux preparatoires and the reference to the pri­
ority of national law on reparation in Article 41 of the ECHR. Ac­
cordingly, the Court assumed that states have a broad freedom to 
choose reparation measures, which naturally limits the influence of
44H ereon A nagnostou and Millns, “Individuals from M inority and Marginalized 
Groups before the Strasbourg C ourt”, 3 EPL 16 (2010); in general on the changed 
scope of issues: OSJI, From Judgment to Justice, pp. 37f.
45Cf. Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 1996, p. 694; Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtun­
gen der Staaten, p. 188.
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the CoE organs in the reparation process and their possibility to 
impose specific means of reparation. The repartition of competence 
under the ECHR, specifically the Committee of Ministers’s compe­
tence for the supervision of judgments, which entails the definition 
of specific measures, is a further element that explains the absence 
of pronunciations on reparation by the Court in the vast majority 
of its judgments. Particularly this second reason explains why it is a 
Committee document -  the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for 
the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of 
friendly settlements of 2006 -  that contains the only guideline as to 
what can be expected of a state in terms of reparation and compli­
ance w ith a judgment according to Articles 41 and 46 of the ECHR. 
As these rules define the Committee’s competence in the process of 
execution of judgments, they will be explained infra in section 9.1.1.
Particularly in order to counter the growing caseload, the Court 
started changing its remedial jurisprudence w ith the 1995 judgment 
in the Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction) case 
where it indicated for the first time that restitution was the only ap­
propriate way to repair an illegal expropriation. Apparently both­
ered by the particularly longstanding disregard by Greek authori­
ties of national judgments ordering compensation or restitution, the 
Court, referring to the Factory at Chorzow  (Merits) decision by the 
PCIJ, directly ordered the restitution of illegally dispossessed land. 
It nevertheless left open the “backdoor” of payment of just satisfac­
tion in case the land was not going to be returned.46 In subsequent 
cases the Court extended this practice to other violated rights such 
as judicial guarantees under Article 6 of the ECHR.47 In particular 
the formula: “Lorsque la Cour conclut que la condamnation d’un re- 
querant a ete prononcee par un tribunal qui n ’etait pas independant 
et impartial au sens de l’article 6 § 1, elle estime qu’en principe le re­
dressement le plus approprie serait de faire rejuger le requerant en 
temps utile par un tribunal independant et impartial,” has become a 
recurring mantra in these cases.48
46Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 14556/89,
31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, paras. 38f.
47 See Colandrea, “On the Power of the European Court of Hum an Rights to Order 
Specific N on-m onetary M easures”, 2 HRLR 7 (2007), p. 399, w ith references.
48 Gengel v. Turkey, ECtHR, no. 53431/99, 23 October 2003, para. 27.
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The Court went one step further in the Scozzari and G iunta v. 
Ita ly  decision, where, for the first time, it made explicit reference 
to Article 46 in combination with Article 41 of the ECHR as the 
legal ground for the states’ obligation to provide restitutio in inte- 
grum .49 The significant difference to the earlier Papamichalopoulos 
and others v. Greece case lies in that w ith this new argumentation 
the state no longer had the “backdoor” of discharging its obligation 
by simply paying a sum of money. Nevertheless, the obligation to 
provide restitutio in integrum  did not yet make it into the operative 
paragraphs of the decision.
This last step was taken in the decision of Assanidze v. Georgia 
concerning the continuing detention of a Georgian citizen despite 
national court orders to release him .50 The Court not only reiterated 
the right of the state to choose the means it deemed appropriate to 
provide full restitution, but concluded that “[h]owever, by its very 
nature, the violation found in the instant case does not leave any real 
choice as to the measures required to remedy it”, and consequently 
ordered Georgia to release the victim at the earliest possible date. 
It did not allow the state to alternatively pay just satisfaction to the 
victim.51 In this decision the Court for the first time ordered a spe­
cific means of restitution to a state. As Judge Costa underlined in his 
concurring opinion, the Court upholds the general principle of sub­
sidiarity, but, he further explains, clear reparation orders may serve 
to ease the Committee of Ministers’s task of execution because they 
limit the margin of discussions over appropriate solutions w ith the 
states. Nevertheless, Costa also warned that the limitation of this 
margin of discussion might at the same time lead to greater diffi­
culties in finding political ways of implementing the Court’s judg-
m ents.52
The Court in subsequent decisions recurred to ordering specific 
measures of reparation such as passing a law to provide the legal ba­
sis for an applicant’s claim for compensations (or, in case of not do­
49Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, ECtHR, nos. 39221/98 et al., 3 July 2000, Reports 2000- 
VIII, para. 249.
50Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], ECtHR, no. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, 2004-II, oper. para. 
14(a).
51Ibid., paras. 198ff., in particular para. 202.
52Ibid., concurring opinion o f Judge Costa, paras. 6ff.
82
5 The ECtHR’s Reparation Practice
ing so, ordering the state to pay a certain sum as just satisfaction),53 
reopening procedures that were concluded in an unfair way,54 exe­
cuting a domestic judgment by transferring funds to a specific en- 
tity,55 limiting a sentence of life imprisonment to a maximum of 
thirty years,56 ordering the state to proceed to prompt examination 
of asylum cases that do not meet ECHR standards and eventually 
refrain from deportation,57 or ordering the implementation of le­
gal provisions to ensure prisoner voting rights.58 In the case of the 
dismissal of a judge of the Ukrainian supreme court, it even held 
that, considering the apparent flaws in Ukrainian law, reopening of 
the proceedings under which the applicant had been judged would 
not ensure an outcome that respected the principles of the ECHR. It 
therefore directly ordered the judge’s reinstatement into its former 
position, going for the first time beyond the Gengel form ula .59
In general terms, a set of factors were identified by Leach which 
influence w hether the Court makes specific orders or not. These fac­
tors comprise the possibility of adequate remedy by payment of just 
satisfaction, uniqueness of the measure to be taken, urgency to end a 
continuing violation, extent of the unlawfulness of the violation, ex­
tent of effectiveness of a particular measure, consequences for other 
parties, feasibility or practicability of the measure and the possibil­
ity that the situation will lead to repetitive cases.60
The judges’ opinions about w hether the practice of specific mea­
sures should be employed more extensively apparently differ. In 
Medova v. Russia, a case concerning a disappeared person in Chech­
nya, Judge Spielman dissented from his colleagues and favoured the 
inclusion of a specific order in the operative paragraphs for the state
53L. v. Lithuania, ECtHR, no. 27527/03, 11 September 2007, oper. paras. 5 and 6.
54M aksimov v. Azerbaijan, ECtHR, no. 38228/05, 8 October 2009, oper. para. 3.
55Karanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR, no. 39462/03, 20 November 2007, oper. 
para. 3(a).
56Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, oper. para. 
6(a).
57M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], ECtHR, no. 30696/09, 21 January  2011, para. 402.
58Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), ECtHR, no. 74025/01, 30 March 2004, para. 60. Also 
see the list for 2012 in ECtHR, Annual Report 2012, pp. 139ff.
59 Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, ECtHR, no. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, paras. 205ff.
60Leach, Beyond the Bug River.
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to investigate the disappearance of the victim.61 It remains to be seen 
whether in the future there will be more such dissenting opinions, 
leading in the end to more frequent specific orders by the Court. 
Until now, the Court is restrictive when it comes to specific orders 
in another sense, too: it has not yet ordered more than one specific 
reparation measure at a time in a judgment.
The Court’s possibilities end where its orders would directly af­
fect domestic acts. None of the two courts functions as a suprana­
tional appellate jurisdiction and may therefore not quash national 
decisions. They may nevertheless order states to re-examine cases 
or to take appropriate steps to bar national judicial decisions that 
violate the Convention of their effects, leaving the practical means 
to achieve this goal to the state.62 The ECtHR seems to apply this 
power preferably to states where legal dispositions to repair the 
damage already exist.63 This may be due to a narrow interpretation 
of Article 41 of the ECHR. It has been sustained that the referral 
to reparation under national law would limit the Court’s remedial 
jurisprudence to those damages that cannot be repaired under na­
tional law, thus establishing a “national law first” rule.64 This nar­
row interpretation though does not coincide w ith the wording of 
the norm. The state’s obligation to provide restitutio in integrum  is 
not limited to its capabilities under national law. If full reparation 
is prevented by the insufficiencies of national law, the Court’s judg­
ment entails an obligation for the state to amend its internal law and 
make it coincide w ith the requirements under the Convention.65 Ar­
61 Medova v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 25385/04, 15 January  2009, partly  dissenting opinion 
of Judge Spielman.
62Again, Article 2 of the ACHR provides a  much clearer legal basis for a  control of 
the conventionality o f national laws. Article 1 o f the ECHR nevertheless can, due 
to its open formulation, be construed in a  similar w ay and seems to be understood 
like this by the ECtHR.
63In all o f the above m entioned cases, except Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), in­
dividual m easures were ordered because the states had not applied existing legal 
dispositions in a  w ay tha t was consistent w ith their obligations under the ECHR.
64Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, p. 127; Ruedin, Execution des arrets, 
p. 161.
65This is clear from  Rule 6(b) of the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution 
o f Judgm ents w hich m entions legal am endm ents as a  type o f general m easure that 
have to be taken by the state if necessary. Also: Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommen- 
tar 2009, p. 541.
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ticle 41 of the ECHR is a fallback option to ensure that even in case 
of incomplete reparation the Court may, as a last resort, step in and 
award the payment of just satisfaction instead of other measures.66 
Thus, for example in case of a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR, 
the state has the obligation to eliminate the results of the process, 
be it by way of re-trial, reopening or other instruments. Should no 
such instrument be available in domestic law, the obligation of legal 
amendment is imposed onto the state by the judgment and could 
be ordered as such explicitly by the Court.67 Independent from this 
obligation the Court may order the state to pay the victim just sat- 
isfaction.68 The practice of the Court to oblige only those states to 
take specific measures that have the legal or administrative means 
in place or at least have shown their disposition to obey such orders, 
therefore has to be rejected because it creates an uneven treatment 
of the states that is not justified.69
The extent and the legal basis for specific reparation orders is 
disputed. Some authors argue that the Court has an annexed com­
petence to order measures beyond monetary satisfaction, and that 
it cannot base its decisions on Article 41 of the ECHR, which would 
limit the possibility to issue direct orders, whereat others assume 
that the ECtHR could only order specific measures as cessation of 
continuing violations which leave no choice of means.70 In fact, the 
words “just satisfaction”, or “satisfaction equitable” in the French 
version, whose common meaning serve as the basis for their inter­
pretation according to the rules of treaty interpretation in custom­
ary international law, do not require the restrictive approach chosen 
by the ECtHR. “Satisfaction” neither in English nor in French means 
m onetary reparation, but “[...] the fulfilment of an obligation or 
claim; the atoning for an injury, offence, or fault by reparation, com­
66Ibid., p. 541.
67Cf. the pilot judgm ent procedure described infra, p. 5.2.2.
68See Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, ECtHR, nos. 39221/98 et al., 3 July 2000, Re­
ports 2000-VIII, para. 249.
69Judges and personnel of the ECtHR argued in this sense in personal interviews in 
2011. See also Ruedin, Execution des arrets, p. 172.
70Cf. Breuer, “Zur A nordnung konkreter Abhilfem aßnahm en durch den EGMR”, Eu- 
GRZ (2004) and Colandrea, “On the Power o f the European C ourt of H um an Rights 
to Order Specific N on-m onetary M easures”, 2 HRLR 7 (2007), pp. 401f.
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pensation, or the endurance of punishm ent”71 or “Acte par lequel 
[quelqu’un] obtient la reparation d’une offense, acte par lequel on 
accorde a [quelqu’un] ce qu’il demande (en justice, dans une hierar­
chie, etc.)”.72 In other areas of public international law the concept 
of “satisfaction” does not have this restricted meaning either. In the 
ILC Draft Articles for instance, satisfaction comprises all damages 
that are not financially assessable and “may consist in an acknowl­
edgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology 
or another appropriate modality”.73 This catalogue is though not 
finite and the appropriate form of satisfaction depends on the cir­
cumstances of the case.74 The GA Basic Principles on Reparation 
provide an even broader list of measures in their no. 22 of what is 
to be understood as “satisfaction”. These measures again contem­
plate specific means aiming e.g. at ending a continuing violation, 
full investigation and disclosure of the truth, search of disappeared 
witnesses, public apologies etc. These rules, being the outcome of a 
long process of codification of obligations of states for human rights 
violations, reflect the current international consensus on the ques­
tion. It becomes clear that “satisfaction” is different from “compen­
sation”, which comprises financial reparation for monetary losses, 
whereat satisfaction shall make good damages that are not finan­
cially assessable. Similar differentiations can also be found among 
others in Article 24 of the ICPPED.75 The reparation jurisprudence 
of the IACtHR also construes “satisfaction” in line w ith the inter­
national understanding as comprising non-monetary measures to 
make good moral damages caused.76 The ECtHR’s legal basis thus 
directly provides it w ith the possibility to adopt specific reparation 
measures. While it drew on different norms to sustain its power to
71OED Online, Satisfaction, n. Septem ber 2011, u r l : h ttp ://w w w .o e d .c o m /v ie w / 
Entry/171223.
72Le Petit Robert, Satisfaction, 2011, u r l : http://pr.bvdep.com.
73Article 37(2) o f the ILC Draft Articles.
74See the examples at ILC, “Text of the draft articles w ith com m entaries thereto”, 
p. 106.
75International Convention for the Protection o f All Persons from Enforced Disap­
pearance (hereinafter “ICPPED”), A/Res/61/177, 21 March 2006.
76See M anuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
paras. 219ff., referring to Uson-Ramirez v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), IACtHR, 20 November 2009, Series C no. 207, para. 84.
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order such measures in early decisions, it now constantly refers to 
Article 46 of the ECHR as the legal ground. As this article defines 
the state’s obligation to comply w ith the Court’s judgments and is as 
such the legal ground for the principle of subsidiarity on the repara­
tion stage, the Court’s more specific orders of the states’ obligations 
must be considered a limitation of this principle.77
5.2.2 General Reparation Measures
Apart from specific measures in particular cases, the Court has also 
begun to order states to adopt general measures in cases where it 
could identify systemic problems underlying a huge number of sim­
ilar hum an rights violations. In a “pilot judgm ent” the Court iden­
tifies the systemic problem in one exemplary case that is given pri­
ority treatm ent over other pending cases and indicates to the state 
which general measures it shall adopt to resolve the situation.78
This new type of judgment originated in certain cases where 
states had openly disrespected judgments of the ECtHR, which led 
the Parliamentary Assembly to question the Committee of Minis­
ters over its state of affairs, expressing doubts about the member 
states’ continuing dedication to the European human rights protec­
tion system.79 In its exhaustive report from the year 2000 on the 
execution of judgments of the ECtHR, the rapporteurs of the Parlia­
mentary Assembly saw a shared responsibility between states, the 
Assembly, the Committee, and the Court to ensure swift execution 
of judgments. Regarding the Court they emphasized that it should 
create a stable jurisdiction giving guidelines to the states, but that it 
would also be essential that the Court
77Cf. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], ECtHR, no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, 
paras. 398ff.
78There are seven categories o f priority, the first one is reserved to cases w here life 
is at risk, the second one to pilot judgm ents. See Donald, “‘The m ost creative tool 
in 50 years’?”, EHRAC Bulletin 14 (2010), p. 13.
79See on the case Loizidou v. Turkey: Doc. 8964 -  Turkey and the European Court o f  
Human Rights, and other cases cited in Jurgens, Execution o f  Judgments o f  the Eu­
ropean Court o f  Human Rights, Explanatory M emorandum no. Details about the 
reforms of the Court procedures can be found at “The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ
26 (2005).
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take an interest in action on its judgments and give suf­
ficient reasons to make it clear to states w hat reforms 
are needed to avoid the violations the Court has found.
This is essential if states are to develop standards or ef­
fective remedies of their own to prevent any further vi- 
olations.80
In the following year, the Evaluation Group set up by the Commit­
tee gave its report on the ECtHR, which also encompassed the issue 
of execution of judgments. Notwithstanding its general reluctance 
towards certain measures for the improvement of the execution of 
judgments by the Court, such as implementing an interpretation 
procedure that could be triggered by the Committee or the possibil­
ity to impose financial penalties on recalcitrant states, it supported 
the practice of the Court to indicate more detailed measures of resti­
tution to the states, and generally welcomed a better communica­
tion between the CoE organs involved in the process of execution 
of judgments. It particularly underlined the necessity to find ways 
to deal w ith repetitive cases.81
The Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), installed by 
the Committee of Ministers to prepare decisions about the future of 
the Court, in 2003 examined the situation of execution of judgments 
under a different point of view. Due to the enlargement of the CoE 
after 1990, the workload of the Court had become almost unmanage­
able. The effective execution of judgments was consequently exam­
ined as one instrument to limit the number of applications, partic­
ularly the number of repetitive applications.82 The Steering Com­
80Jurgens, Execution o f  Judgments o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights, Explana­
to ry  M em orandum  no. 24
81Committee o f Ministers, Report o f  the Evaluation Group to the Committee o f  Minis­
ters on the European Court o f  Human Rights, EG (2001) 1, Committee o f Ministers,
27 September 2001, nos. 49-51.
82See Steering Committee for H um an Rights, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness 
o f  the control system o f  the European Convention on Human Rights: Addendum to 
the fina l report containing CDDH proposals, CM(2003)55 Addendum 2, Committee 
o f Ministers, 13 April 2003, no. C.1. W ith 60% of all applications received in 2003 
being attributable to the same underlying systemic national problem, the issue of 
repetitive applications remains one of the m ost crucial issues the Court is facing: 
“The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 5. M easures w ere also proposed 
concerning the national level and the Court procedures. See ibid., p. 4.
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mittee made three proposals on this issue, among them that the 
Committee of Ministers should invite the Court to identify in its 
judgments underlying systemic problems and the source of these 
problems. The CDDH however underlined that the Court should 
not indicate corrective measures in order not to interfere w ith the 
states’ freedom of choice.83 The Committee adopted this proposal 
and invited the Court in May 2004 to indicate general measures, 
particularly when issuing pilot judgm ents.84 It is important for the 
work of the Committee that the Court indicate the existence of a sys­
temic problem underlying a situation because the Committee does 
not have the necessary information to evaluate the overall situation 
in a specific state. Only the Court, on the basis of the number of 
similar applications it receives, can make such an evaluation. It has 
to indicate this fact to the Committee in the judgment so that this 
organ can give due importance to the case.85
The Court embraced CM Resolution Res(2004)3 immediately and 
issued the first pilot judgment in the case of Broniowski v. Poland 
on 22 June 2004. The case concerned indemnification for repatri­
ated inhabitants of areas “beyond the Bug River”, which belonged 
to Poland before the Second World War but were invaded by the 
USSR in 1939 and are today Belarusian and Lithuanian territory.86 
It is one of some 80 000 cases brought before the ECtHR by persons 
seeking indemnification under international treaties concluded be­
tween Poland and the USSR over the cessation of these areas and the 
indemnification of the former Polish inhabitants, as well as under 
subsequent Polish legislation. The Court, when considering the ap­
plication of Article 46 of the ECHR and making reference to CM Res­
83Steering Committee for H um an Rights, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness o f  
the control system o f  the European Convention on Human Rights: Addendum to the 
fina l report containing CDDH proposals, CM(2003)55 Addendum 2, Committee of 
Ministers, 13 April 2003, proposal C.1.
84Resolution Res(2004)3 (hereinafter “CM Resolution Res(2004)3”), adopted by the 
Committee o f Ministers a t its 114th Session, 12 May 2004, reprinted in: G uarantee­
ing the effectiveness of the European Convention on H um an Rights, pp. 80-81.
85Szklanna, “The Impact o f the Pilot Judgm ent Procedure”, EYHR (2010), p. 226.
86Broniowski v. Poland [GC], ECtHR, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, 2004-V, para. 190.
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olution Res(2004)3 and CM Resolution Res(2004)687, marking that 
the prospective of 80 000 similar claims in the future would rep­
resent “a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention ma­
chinery”, concluded that the cases rooted in a systemic problem. 
Therefore “[i]n this context the Court’s concern is to facilitate the 
most speedy and effective resolution of a dysfunction established in 
national human rights protection”.88 In order to resolve the under­
lying systemic problem, the Court alluded that it might proceed to 
the examination of the execution of domestic legislation and prac­
tically indicated that specific legislative or administrative measure 
were to be adopted by the Polish state.89 Both the recognition of 
the underlying systemic problem and the measures that were to be 
adopted by Poland were reflected also in the operative paragraphs 
of the judgment and thus became legally binding upon the state.90
In subsequent judgments the Court applied the pilot judgment 
procedure to cases concerning the right of people tried in absentia to 
have their cases reviewed, ordering that “the respondent state must, 
through appropriate measures, secure the right in question to the 
applicant and to other persons in a similar position”.91 Other cases
87Resolution Res(2004)6 (hereinafter “CM Resolution Res(2004)6”), adopted by the 
Committee o f Ministers at its 114th Session, 12 May 2004, reprinted in: G uarantee­
ing the effectiveness o f the European Convention on H um an Rights, pp. 69-70.
88Broniowski v. Poland [GC], ECtHR, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, 2004-V, para. 193. 
Judge Zupancic in his concurring opinion criticizes -  rightly in our opinion -  the 
impression that the Court w as motivated solely by the Com m ittee’s invitation and 
thus only by the aim to limit its growing caseload. On the contrary, it would have 
been appropriate for the Court to pu t forward the increased level o f justice these 
decisions cause and the C ourt’s autonom y to take them  based exclusively on the 
ECHR and its doctrine o f “living instrum ent” instead of restricting itself to the 
technocratic argum ent o f limiting its caseload.
89Ibid., para. 194.
90Ibid., oper. paras. 3 and 4.
91 Sejdovic v. Italy, ECtHR, no. 56581/00, 10 November 2004, oper. para. 3. Italy sub­
sequently adopted legislative m easures w hich led the Grand Chamber in the ap­
peals procedure to refrain from recognizing the continuing existence o f the sys­
temic problem: Sejdovic v. Italy  [GC], ECtHR, no. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, 2006-II, 
paras. 121ff.
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affected issues such as the excessive length of court proceedings,92 
non-execution of domestic judgm ents,93 violations of the freedom 
of expression,94 violations of the right to private possessions in a 
case where bonds for currency deposits at state banks of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were not issued by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,95 or excessive length of detention.96
Over time it became clear that the Court considered Article 46 of 
the ECHR the legal basis for its reparation decisions in pilot judg­
ments. It established a certain pattern of application, which can be 
seen e.g. from the case of Maria A tanasiu  and others v. Romania.97 
First, the parties submit their legal positions concerning the appli­
cation of Article 46 of the ECHR to the case and the measures they 
wish to be ordered by the Court (Romania in this case supported 
the claim for detailed indications of which measures it had to take 
in order to tackle the widespread human rights violations). Then 
the Court explains the circumstances under which Article 46 of the 
ECHR can be applied, mentioning the general obligation of the re­
spondent state to take general and individual measures to put an 
end to the violation and redress the effects, the freedom of the state 
to choose the measures by which to comply w ith the judgment, and 
explaining the fundamental rules of the pilot judgment procedure 
as developed in its jurisprudence. It then applies these fundamental
92Lukenda v. Slovenia, ECtHR, no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005, para. 98. Slovenia appar­
ently did n o t comply w ith the judgm ent, so that the Court subsequently decided 
some 400 similar cases in similar terms, making reference to the Lukeda judgment. 
R u m p f v. Germany, ECtHR, no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, oper. para. 4; Olaru and 
others v. Moldova, ECtHR, nos. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, oper. paras. 4-6.
93 Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, ECtHR, no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, oper. 
paras. 4-7.
94 Ürper and others v. Turkey, ECtHR, nos. 14526/07 et al., 20 October 2009, paras. 50­
52. The Court nevertheless did n o t include the obligation in the operative para­
graphs, but only invited the state to revise its domestic legislation.
95 Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR, no. 27912/02,11 March 2009, oper. para. 
4.
96 Kauczor v. Poland, ECtHR, no. 45219/06, 3 February 2009, paras. 55ff. The Court ap­
parently  welcomed steps already taken by the state to rem edy the systemic prob­
lem, but urged it to m aintain its efforts. This may be the reason w hy the obligation 
to take these measures w as no t included into the operative paragraphs but remains 
a general obligation under the supervision o f the Committee.
97Maria Atanasiu andothers v. Romania, ECtHR, nos. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, 
paras. 195-242.
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rules to the specific case, determining whether there is “a recurrent 
and large-scale problem”98 and that there is a large number of cases 
(usually running into the hundreds) caused by the same structural 
problem, “posing a threat to the future effectiveness of the Conven­
tion machinery”.99 In a third step it finally identifies the underlying 
systemic problem, “[suggests], on a purely indicative basis, the type 
of measures which the [state] authorities might take in order to put 
an end to the structural situation concerned”,100 and indicates how 
it is going to proceed in other cases pending until the deadline set 
to the state to introduce the suggested measures. Usually, the Court 
adjourns similar pending cases during the deadline set to the state, 
but exceptions may be made if a case “touches on the most funda­
mental rights of the person” or if the particular circumstances would 
make it unfair or unreasonable for the applicant to wait longer for 
a decision.101
The general measures expected by the Court to be taken by the 
respondent state usually appear in the operative paragraphs, mak­
ing them legally binding. Nevertheless, in some cases the Court indi­
cates measures according to Article 46 of the ECHR but for no appar­
ent reason does not include them into the operative paragraphs.102
Depending on the particularities of each case, the Court gives 
more or less detailed orders as to which measures the respondent 
state has to adopt to put an end to the violations. In most cases 
the Court indicates the necessity to adopt changes in the domes­
tic legal and/or administrative order w ithout going very much into 
the details. These changes have to be adopted w ithin a deadline 
of six months to one year.103 In certain situations, the Court gives 
more specific hints to the state how to adapt its national legislation 
and administrative or judicial practices so that they coincide w ith 
the requirements of the ECHR and the Court’s jurisprudence. In a 
case concerning delays in the execution of domestic judgments the
98Maria A tanasiu and others v. Romania, ECtHR, nos. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, 
para. 216.
99Ibid., para. 217.
100 Cf. ibid., para. 230.
101Registrar of the ECtHR, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure, nos. 5 and 7.
102Cf. Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], ECtHR, no. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 2006-V.
103Cf. Broniowski v.Poland [GC], ECtHR, no. 31443/96,22 June 2004, 2004-V, para. 194;
R u m p f v. Germany, ECtHR, no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 73, among others.
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Court for instance “invited” the respondent state to ensure the exe­
cution of domestic judgments w ithin six m onths.104 In another case 
concerning excessive length of proceedings before civil courts, the 
Court, while remarking that further reforms had to be undertaken 
to shorten the duration of proceedings, ordered the state to adopt 
legislation providing compensation for these situations. Referring 
to earlier judgments, it gave quite detailed guidelines the compen­
satory remedy had to comply with, particularly the respect for fair­
ness in procedures, that no excessive burden may be placed on lit­
igants where the claim was justified, that claims for compensation 
for excessive length of proceedings had to be heard w ithin reason­
able time, if necessary following special rules, that compensation 
had to be reasonable in comparison to similar cases and that there 
was a presumption that excessive length of proceedings caused non- 
pecuniary damages, and finally that compensation had to be paid 
promptly.105 If, on the other hand, the situation underlying the sys­
temic problem proves to be very complex, the Court has shown to 
be reluctant of taking a decision and refers the case to the Commit­
tee of Ministers which “is better placed and equipped to monitor the 
necessary reforms to be adopted”.106
Some of the most complex cases currently under the Court’s 
scrutiny concern the Chechen Conflict (1999-2009). The ECtHR has 
already decided more than 150 cases presenting human rights viola­
tions caused by Russian authorities during the conflict, concerning 
principally inhuman treatments, forced disappearances by Russian 
forces, violations of the right to life and inexistence of an effective 
domestic remedy.107 Although these cases show all elements to qual­
ify as pilot judgments, the Court had abstained from applying the 
instrument for a long time. It had first chosen to indicate, in a sort 
of obiter dictum, very specific guidelines for effective investigations 
in cases that imply the violation of Article 2 of the ECHR, which 
finally amount to a sort of general reparation measure for the pre­
104Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) [GC], ECtHR, no. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 2006-V, 
para. 240.
105Finger v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 130.
106Burdov v. Russia (No. 2), ECtHR, no. 33509/04, 15 January  2009, para. 137.
107See the list in the Committee o f M inisters’s docum ent CM/Del/OJ/ 
DH(2011)1120list21 o f 17 June 2011.
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vention of future violations.108 Despite these indications, Russia re­
mained reluctant to conduct effective investigations into the unlaw­
ful killings and forced disappearances. As the Committee of Minis­
ters’s efforts to make Russia comply w ith its obligations emanating 
from the judgments were to no avail, the Court finally decided to ap­
ply Article 46 of the ECHR to condemn the non-compliance w ith its 
judgments and the Committee’s measures by the Russian authorities 
and to underline that effective investigations were to be conducted 
by the Russian state.109 After another interim report prepared by 
the Execution Department, the Court finally recognized the sys­
temic character of several of the violations committed in relation 
to the Chechen Conflict.110 Given the complexity of the situation, it 
however chose a different approach than the one described in Maria 
Atanasiu  and others v. Romania . Combining its past judgments on 
this complex of cases as well as other reports by CoE organs and 
NGOs, it identified the situation of the victim’s families and the ef­
fectiveness of investigations as the most urgent problems.111 W ithin 
both complexes it identified more specific issues on which the state 
should concentrate its activities.112 Then, however, it did not order 
the state to take any specific action but held that
[g]iven their wide-ranging scope, the nature of the vi­
olations concerned and the pressing need to remedy 
them, it would appear necessary that a comprehensive 
and time-bound strategy to address the problems enu­
merated above [... ] is prepared by the Respondent State
10sBazorkina v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 69481/01, 27 July 2006, paras. 117-119; this pro­
cedure has been baptized “quasi-pilot judgm ent” and w as applied in several other 
cases, too. See further examples at Sitaropoulos, “Im plementation o f ECtHR judg­
m ents”, 1 ESIL-CPS 1 (2011), 20, fn. 45.
109Abuyevaeta l. v.Russia, ECtHR, no. 27065/05, 2 December 2010, paras. 235ff.;Leach, 
“Redress and im plem entation in the Chechen cases”, EHRAC Bulletin 15 (2011). 
The execution o f the Chechnya judgm ents will be detailed in section 9.1.1.2.2 infra.
110Aslakhanova et al. v. Russia, ECtHR, nos. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, 
para. 217.
m It becomes evident here that the ECtHR applies a  notion o f “victim ” that is dif­
ferent from that of the IACtHR. W hile in the IACtHR’s jurisprudence, relatives of 
disappeared persons are considered victims, the ECtHR treats them  as “the vic­
tims’ families”.
112Aslakhanova et al. v. Russia, ECtHR, nos. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, 
paras. 222ff.
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without delay and submitted to the Committee of Min­
isters for the supervision of its implementation.113
Given the gravity of the underlying violations, the Court, for the 
first time, did not adjourn similar other cases pending before it, thus 
maintaining additional pressure on the state.114
The pilot judgment procedure was finally formalized w ith the en­
try  into force of Rule 61 of the Rules of the ECtHR on 21 Febru­
ary 2011. According to this rule the pilot judgment procedure is not 
bound to a minimum number of similar cases pending before the 
Court but can be applied in any case of a “structural or systemic 
problem or a similar dysfunction which has given or may give rise 
to similar applications”. This means that the Court may hand down 
a pilot judgment even if no other similar cases are pending yet but 
it must be feared that such cases will occur. The Court furthermore 
does not decide alone if such a situation is given but takes into con­
sideration the points of view of the parties to the case on the ex­
istence of such a problem and on the suitability of the application 
in the specific case. The pilot judgment procedure may be triggered 
by the Court or by request of any one or both of the parties. Upon 
deciding the application of the pilot judgment procedure, the case is 
immediately given priority. As a result of the procedure, Rule 61(3) 
of the Rules of the ECtHR prescribes the identification of the nature 
of the problem and the remedial measures the state is required to 
take by virtue of the operative provisions of the judgment. There 
should hence no longer occur cases in which the Court identifies a 
systemic problem and a remedy but, for no evident reason, does not 
include this remedy into the operative paragraphs of the judgment. 
The remainder of the Rules coincides with the practice the Court has 
developed, in particular concerning the definition of a deadline in 
which the State has to adopt the measures, adjourning similar pend­
ing cases, and the fact that an eventual friendly-settlement agree­
ment must contain an obligation by the state to comply w ith the 
general measures ordered by the Court. Rule 61(8) of the Rules of the 
ECtHR concerns the consequences if a state does not implement the 
general measures ordered by the Court. This situation had already
113Ibid., para. 238.
114Ibid., para. 239.
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occurred in a decision of other “Bug River claimants”. In this deci­
sion, the Court had stated that in case of non-compliance it would 
have to resume the examination of the case.115 This has nowbecome 
the general procedure. Finally, the Rule states that other CoE organs 
shall be informed about the initiation of a pilot judgment procedure 
and that such procedures, the adoption of judgments and execution, 
and their closure shall be published on the website.
5.3 Conditions o f Com pliance
Traditionally the Court did not establish conditions for compliance 
by the state such as deadlines. Only since Moreira deAzevedo v. Por­
tugal in 1991 does the Court set a three months deadline for the 
state to pay the awarded sum of money to the applicant.116 This 
deadline is since then a constant part of the Court’s jurisprudence 
and has entered (without setting a specific number of months) into 
Rule 75(3) of the Rules of the ECtHR. After the deadline has expired, 
the state has to pay the applicant interests equal to the marginal 
lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default pe­
riod plus three percentage points.117 Just satisfaction usually has 
to be paid directly to the applicant. Nonetheless, in a recent judg­
ment concerning expelled migrants who had made their claims to 
the Court through lawyers in Italy while they were in refugee camps 
in Libya, the Court ordered payment to be made to the applicants’ 
lawyers who should act as fiduciaries. Although this solution seems 
attractive as a quick and uncomplicated way to pay compensation 
to unreachable applicants, the lawyers in the case faced serious dif­
ficulties to maintain contact w ith the victims due to the fact that 
they were returned to Libya and moved from there to other coun­
tries. At the moment of the judgment, the lawyers were in contact 
only w ith six of the originally 25 applicants (two had died in the
115E.G. v. Poland (dec.), ECtHR, no. 50425/99, 23 September 2008, para. 28.
116 Moreira deAzevedo v. Portugal (Article 50), ECtHR, no. 11296/84, 28 August 1991, 
Series A no. 208-C, oper. para. 1.
117See e.g. Broniowski v. Poland [GC], ECtHR, no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, 2004-V, 
oper. para. 6(c).
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meantime).118 Italy even challenged the validity of the powers of 
attorney on the basis that the difficulties to communicate w ith the 
applicants had made it impossible for their lawyers to establish their 
identities and obtain all the signatures required.119 In this case the 
Court transferred the responsibility of paying the satisfaction to the 
victims onto the lawyers while it would have been more consistent 
to order the state to deposit the money in a bank account ready for 
the victims to claim it (such as the IACtHR does), and order Italy, 
under the supervision of the Committee, to take all necessary steps 
to locate the victims and ensure that they can effectively claim the 
payment. Italy obviously is in a far better position than the lawyers 
to reach this goal.
In pilot judgment cases, the Court has set deadlines between six 
and twelve months for the state to implement the general mea­
sures required by the Court to prevent repetition of the violation. 
If more specific measures, such as issuing government bonds and 
payments, are to be achieved, the deadline was set to six m onths,120 
while more complex measures such as legal reforms were granted 
twelve months to be completed.121
Nevertheless, no punitive measures are ordered in the judgment 
if the state fails to comply w ith these general measures w ithin the 
stipulated deadline. The only consequence w ith respect of the Court 
is that adjourned similar cases will be reopened and the execution of 
each case put again into the hands of the Committee of Ministers.122
118Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy  [GC], ECtHR, no. 27765/09, 23 February 2012, 
paras. 15-17.
119Ibid., paras. 45ff.
120E.g. Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR, no. 27912/02, 11 March 2009, oper. 
para. 4.
121E.g. Finger v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, oper. para. 5; R u m p f v.
Germany, ECtHR, no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, oper. para. 5.
122Rule 61(8) o f the Rules of the ECtHR; E.G. v. Poland (dec.), ECtHR, no. 50425/99,
23 September 2008, para. 28.
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The ACHR provides the IACtHR w ith a much broader competence 
in terms of reparation than that given to the ECtHR. The IACtHR’s 
competence comprises ensuring the enjoyment of the victims’ right 
or freedom that was violated, remediation, and payment of fair com­
pensation. Unlike under the ECHR, the IACtHR’s compensatory 
competence is not subsidiary to the possibility to obtain reparation 
under domestic law.1
It is unclear why the states party adopted this broad approach 
to reparation in Article 63(1) of the ACHR, taking into account 
that deliberations on this norm were at first based on drafts by the 
Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Government of Chile and the 
Government of Uruguay, which had all been oriented by former 
Article 50 of the ECHR (current Article 41), and therefore limited 
the Court’s compensatory powers to just satisfaction.2 Neverthe­
less, the draft elaborated by the IACommHR, which was based on 
the three aforementioned drafts, contemplated a proper power for 
the IACtHR to award compensations.3 There is no indication as to 
why the Commission modified the original proposals.4 The Com­
mission’s draft was commented in particular by Guatemala which 
favoured further strengthening of the Court’s competence, includ­
ing the possibility to order remedies for the consequences of the 
violation and guarantees for the future enjoyment of the affected 
right or freedom.5 Committee II, the drafting committee, accepted
1 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Se­
ries C no. 7, para. 30. See also Garcia Ramirez, “Las Reparaciones en el sistema in­
teram ericano de protection  de los derechos hum anos”, p. 130.
2 OAS, “Antecedentes, Convocatoria, Sede y  Fecha de la Conferencia Especializada 
Interam ericana sobre Derechos H um anos”, p. 1.
3 OAS, “Resolucion aprobada por el Consejo de la OEA en la sesion celebrada el 2 de 
octubre de 1968”, p. 31.
4Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, p. 217.
5 OAS, “Enmiendas al Proyecto de Convencion Interam ericana sobre Proteccion de 
Derechos Humanos, Presentadas por la Delegacion de G uatem ala”, p. 119.
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the Guatemalan proposals and the Plenary adopted Article 63(1) of 
the ACHR in its current form.6
Despite its late start in comparison to the ECtHR, the IACtHR 
has developed a vivid practice of reparation, w ith a steep rise in the 
number of decisions rendered since 2001.7
Unlike the ECtHR, the IACtHR does not consider the principles 
of national law as the prim ary source of interpretation to determine 
the scope, characteristics and beneficiaries of compensations. The 
terms of Article 63(1) of the ACHR are entirely governed by inter­
national law.8 This manifests a generally more limited importance 
of national legal orders in the inter-American system.9 The Court 
leaves the determination of the amounts to national agencies under 
national procedures only in cases which entail restitution of salaries,
6Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, p. 217.
7Cassel, “The Expanding Scope and Impact o f Reparations Awarded by the Inter- 
American Court of H um an Rights”, p. 191. Compilations o f decisions and measures 
o f reparation can be consulted at Nash Rojas, Las Reparaciones ante la Corte In- 
teramericana de Derechos Humanos (1988-2007), pp. 95ff., Cassel, “The Expanding 
Scope and Im pact o f Reparations Awarded by the Inter-Am erican C ourt of H um an 
Rights”, pp. 217ff., and Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, 
pp. 468ff.
8Pinto, “La reparation dans le systeme interam ericain des droits de l’homme. A pro­
pos de l’arret Aloeboetoe”, A F D I42 (1996), p. 740; Pasqualucci, The Practice and Pro­
cedure o f  the IACtHR, p. 233; Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the 
Protection o f  Human Rights, p. 754; Caflisch and Cangado Trindade, “Les conventions 
americaine et europeenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international general”, 
RGDIP (2004), pp. 40f.; fundamental: Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Series C no. 7, paras. 25ff., referring to Factory at 
Chorzow (Jurisdiction), PCIJ, 26 July 1927, Series A no. 9, p. 21 and Reparation for  
Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the UnitedNations (Advisory Opinion), ICJ, 11 April 
1949, ICJReports 1949, p. 174, p. 184; furtherm ore Aloeboetoe etal. v. Suriname (Repa­
rations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, Series C no. 15, para. 44.
9See in more detail: Harris, “Regional Protection o f H um an Rights: The Inter- 
American Achievem ent”, pp. 11f. and Garcia Ramirez, “Conference: Advocacy be­
fore Regional H um an Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda”, Am. U. In t’l L. Rev.
59 (2009), p. 189.
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pensions, dividends or corporate earnings due under national law.10 
W hen the identity of a victim could not be established with the nec­
essary precision to award reparation to next of kin, the Court has 
likewise ordered the identification to be resolved under domestic 
law.11 It applied the same solution when identifying family relations 
according to indigenous customs.12 Nevertheless, as in all cases, the 
Court decides to monitor also the compliance w ith the procedures 
under domestic law and only closes the case when all of its orders 
have been fulfilled.13
Although Article 63(1) of the ACHR only names three of the five 
ways of reparation known under international law, namely ensuring 
the enjoyment of the violated right or freedom, remedies, and fair 
compensation, the Court makes broad use of its remedial powers.14 
Unlike the ECtHR, it has always shown to be open to new forms of 
reparation. Particularly since 1998 its remedial orders do not only 
oblige states to pay monetary damages to the victim but tend to en­
tail a wide array of practical measures to obtain, in the best possible 
way, restitutio in integrum. In fact, the Court today applies all forms 
of remedies mentioned in the GA Basic Principles on Reparation, 
as will be detailed in this section.15 It constantly holds that repa­
ration primarily consists of restitution to the status quo ante and
10Constitutional Court v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 31 January
2001, Series C no. 71, paras. 121 and 128; Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Mer­
its, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 2 February 2001, Series C no. 72, para. 214.6; 
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 6 February 2001, 
Series C no. 74, para. 191.8; Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
31 May 2001, Series C no. 78, para. 46; “Five Pensioners” v. Peru (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 28 February 2003, Series C no. 98, para. 187.5.
11 Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 January  1997, 
Series C no. 31, para. 45.
12Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 62.
13See the last operative paragraph of all the aforementioned cases.
14According to Garcia Ramirez, “Conference: Advocacy before Regional Hum an 
Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda”, Am. U. In t’l L. Rev. 59 (2009), p. 190, the 
IACtHR can order at least 30 kinds o f reparation.
15Cassel, “The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter- 
American Court o f H um an Rights”, p. 193 w ith  further references and Reisman, 
“Com pensation for H um an Rights V iolations” in more detail on the Court’s repa­
ration practice.
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only secondarily in compensation when restitution is impossible. A 
recurring phrase in almost all sentences is:
Reparation of harm brought about by the violation 
of an international obligation consists in full restitu­
tion (restitutio in integrum ), which includes the restora­
tion of the prior situation, the reparation of the conse­
quences of the violation, and indemnification for patri­
monial and non-patrimonial damages, including emo­
tional harm .16
In the Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname  (Reparations and Costs) decision, 
the Court nevertheless recognized that restitutio in integrum  may 
not always be “possible, sufficient or appropriate” as reparation.17 
In cases that include the disappearance or loss of life of a victim 
the state must therefore take other measures to repair, to the extent 
possible, the consequences of the violations and pay compensations.
Although the denomination of the different forms of reparation 
awarded is not consistent throughout the jurisprudential history 
of the Court, one can generally identify three topics under which 
reparation is granted: reparation for pecuniary damages, for non- 
pecuniary damages, and “other forms of reparation” which contain 
all measures that do not consist in compensation payable in money. 
Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages were originally named “pat­
rimonial and non-patrimonial damages”, but this concept met crit­
icism w ithin the Court. In particular Judges Cangado Trindade and 
Abreu-Burelli opposed to the application of reparation concepts de­
rived from civil law, which, in their words, were strongly deter­
mined by a patrimonial content and did not pay due respect to the 
particularity of human rights cases, whose foremost concern had 
to be the hum an person as a spiritual being. Consequently, repara­
tion in such cases must not be determined solely by the relation of 
the person to its patrimonial goods or its capacities to work and to 
produce income. Human rights law must moreover respect the inte­
16 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 26.
17Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 49.
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grality of the human person.18 Today, the Court no longer refers to 
“patrimonial and non-patrimonial” damages.19 W hen determining 
the kind of reparation to award, the Court takes into account the 
particularities of each case and each violation inflicted.20 Neverthe­
less, some measures ordered as reparation are not reparation in the 
pure sense, but can better be qualified as measures w ith “reparatory 
effects”, because strictly speaking they are aimed at the compliance 
of the State w ith its human rights obligations in more general terms. 
Such measures are e.g. the performance of proper investigations.21
6.1 En joym ent of the V io lated Right or Freedom
While Articles 41 and 46 of the ECHR, at least according to the 
current interpretation by the ECtHR, give restitutive powers to the 
Court only in exceptional cases, restitution is the foremost duty of 
the state in case of a breach of right and is ordered as such by the 
IACtHR under Article 63(1) of the ACHR. The Court, regardless of 
the discussion about w hether restitution is a reparatory measure or 
not, orders restitution as a form of reparation.22 Its restitutive power 
may be seen as a form of injunctive relief,23 that has to be applied in 
an obligatory way (“shall rule that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment [ . . .]” [emphasis by the author]). It is only limited by fea­
sibility, i.e. restitution cannot be awarded in cases of death or disap-
18Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 November 1998, Series 
C no. 42, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Cangado Trindade and Abreu-Burelli.
19See “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 2 September 2004, Series C no. 112, para. 261. 
Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 779.
20 Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina  (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 August
1998, Series C no. 39, para. 41.
21See hereon: Nash Rojas, Las Reparaciones ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos (1988-2007), pp. 87ff.
22See page 68. E.g. in Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 17 Septem ber 1997, 
Series C no. 33, paras. 84 and 85, the Court ordered the liberation of the victim  and 
then continued to deliberate on “other forms of reparation”.
23Reisman, “Com pensation for Hum an Rights Violations”, p. 73.
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pearance if the victim has most likely deceased.24 Restitution mainly 
consists of the cessation of a continuing hum an rights violation and 
the re-establishment of the victim to the status quo ante. It has been 
ordered in particular in the form of immediate liberation 25 or the 
right to appeal a judgment in cases of illegal detention or violation 
of the rules of due process.26 If judicial processes do not comply with 
the requirements of the ACHR they may not be executed, be it in the 
form of not executing convicted criminals,27 or not charging court 
costs and interests.28 In one case the Court even declared the nullity 
of a process and ordered its repetition, arguing that procedures that 
have “serious defects that strip them of the efficacy they must have 
under normal circumstances” cannot stand and a new judgment had 
to be handed down.29 Due to the nullity of the original process, the 
state had to organize a new process in reasonable time. In less grave 
cases, states were ordered to adopt, w ithin one year from the date 
of the judgment, all necessary judicial and administrative measures 
to leave the original criminal judgment w ithout effect and guaran­
tee that the victim would not be subject to another process of any 
kind for the same facts.30 In another constellation the Court has or­
24Oarcia Ramirez, “Las Reparaciones en el sistema interam ericano de p ro tection  de 
los derechos hum anos”, p. 143; Article 35 o f the ILC D raft Articles; see also for the 
case o f genocide Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
o f  the Crime o f  Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ, 
26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43, p. 164.
25Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 17 September 1997, Series C no. 33, 
para. 84; hereon: Acevedo, “La Decision de la Corte Interam ericana de Derechos 
H um anos sobre Enjuiciamiento Penal M ültiple (Non Bis in Idem) en el Caso Loayza 
Tamayo”.
26 Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 17 November
2009, Series C no. 206, paras. 128ff.
27 Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin etal. v. Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 21 June 2002, Series C no. 94, para. 214.
28 Cantos v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 28 November 2002, 
Series C no. 97, para. 70.1.
29 Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 30 May 1999, 
Series C no. 52, para. 219.
30 Suârez-Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 20 January  1999, Se­
ries C no. 44, para. 76; Uson-Ramirez v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 20 November 2009, Series C no. 207, para. 213.
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dered the execution of a judgment of habeas corpus in favour of the 
victim.31
Denial of justice for the victim is a violation of Articles 25(1) and 
8(1) of the ACHR, which is, in criminally relevant cases, repaired by 
the conduct of a proper investigation and prosecution of the per­
petrators, otherwise by granting the victim a due process before a 
competent judge. Although the Court calls the investigation of facts 
and judgment of perpetrators a “remedy”,32 it is technically a resti- 
tutive measure which also has remedial functions.
In other constellations restitution may take the form of reintegra­
tion of the victim into the former job and restitution for lost salaries 
and benefits,33 the adoption of all necessary steps so that an exiled 
victim can return to the home country,34 or the demarcation and 
titling of lands for indigenous communities.35
The right to restitution corresponds only to the victims person­
ally or their heirs. Thus, in the case of the assassination of a mem­
ber of the legislative branch, which occurred during an alleged plan 
of annihilation of party members and the destruction of a politi­
cal party, the victim’s representatives asked the Court to order the 
restoration of the victim’s seat in Parliament, to reactivate the polit­
ical party’s legal status and to include it among recognized minori­
ties granting it a special electoral circumscription. These demands 
were denied by the Court because, unlike in similar cases, the victim 
could not be reinstated and occupy the lost seat. Furthermore, the 
political party did not figure among the victims of the case so that 
no measures could be adopted on its or its members’ behalf.36
31 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 29 September 1999, Series C no. 56, para. 193.
32 “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
24 November 2009, Series C no. 211, para. 231.
33 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 31 January
2001, Series C no. 71, para. 120; Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 2 February 2001, Series C no. 72, para. 203.
3419 Merchants (Tradesmen) v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
5 July 2004, Series C no. 109, para. 279.
35Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Com m unity v. Nicaragua (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), IACtHR, 31 August 2001, Series C no. 79, para. 164.
36Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
paras. 239-241.
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6.2 Rem edial Measures
According to Article 63(1) of the ACHR, the Court “shall also rule, if 
appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that 
constituted the breach [...] shall be remedied”. Remedial measures 
take the second place to restitution and the Court is not obliged 
to order them. Nevertheless, the Court’s practice of reparation was 
initially focused neither on restitution nor on remedial justice but 
on compensations. In its first decisions it completely refrained from 
ordering the state to remedy the consequences of violations, recur­
ring exclusively to monetary compensation. In the Honduran cases 
it applied an argumentation more similar to that of the ECtHR, tu rn­
ing down demands by the IACommHR to order investigations of the 
facts related to the disappearance of a person or punishment of those 
responsible, because these measures were part of the reparation and 
not the indemnity in the sense of Article 63(1) of the ACHR. It re­
ferred to the judgment on the merits where respective duties of the 
Honduran government had already been mentioned and declared 
that these obligations continued until they were fully carried out.37 
Reparation going beyond monetary compensation were ordered for 
the first time in Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, where the Court held 
that Suriname had to reopen a school so that the children of the 
killed victims could receive education.38
Today, the Court construes its remedial power in a much broader 
way. Although it has repeatedly decided that the declaratory part of 
the judgment may per se constitute a form of reparation for moral 
damages,39 many decisions contain direct remedial orders. Besides 
awarding remedies for injuries suffered by the victim because of 
the violation, the Court orders states to grant access to justice, in­
vestigate the facts of the violation, bring perpetrators to court and 
take other remedial measures directed at preventing the repetition 
of similar cases, such as amendments of domestic laws or symbolic
37 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, paras. 32-35; Godinez Cruz v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Series C no. 8, paras. 30-33.
38Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 96.
39E.g. El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 14 September 1996, 
Series C no. 28, para. 35, referring in particular to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.
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measures. It is of particular interest to the Court that measures have 
public effects and “disseminate a message of official reproach for the 
violations of the human rights committed, as well as [...] prevent 
future violations as those dealt w ith in the instant case”.40
Based on Article 2 of the ACHR, the Court orders legal and judi­
cial measures to ensure non-repetition of similar violations.41 Fail­
ure to investigate the facts and identify, prosecute and punish the 
responsible persons is a recurring fault ofthe states whose responsi­
bility for human rights violations has been established by the Court. 
Beyond the restitutive effect, effective investigations also have a de­
terring effect on future violators.42
The case of M anuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia provides a good 
example of remedial measures ordered by the Court. In this case, 
the IACtHR established the state’s responsibility for the extraju­
dicial execution of a Colombian Senator and leader of the Colom­
bian Communist Party and Patriotic Union, brought before it by the 
IACommHR as an exemplary case in a series of politically moti­
vated murders against these political parties during the 1990s. The 
Court found that the state had not investigated the case w ith due 
diligence. It had failed to recognize the complexity of the extraju­
dicial executions under participation of state agents and paramili­
tary groups and had not investigated the threats taking into account 
an alleged extermination plan, resulting in the impunity of the vic­
tim ’s death. The state was consequently ordered to take all neces­
sary measures according to its domestic laws to efficiently continue 
ongoing investigations and open new ones where necessary. Ap­
parently unconvinced of the state’s ability or willingness to take 
the pertinent measures, the Court further indicated some criteria to 
be taken into account during the investigations, such as the deter­
mination of the “intellectual authors”, establishment of effective co­
operation between the investigating state organs and institutions, 
removal of obstacles such as amnesties or arguments such as non
40 Garcia-Asto and Ramirez-Rojas v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
25 November 2005, Series C no. 137, para. 276.
41Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, p. 245.
42Cassel, “The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter- 
American C ourt o f H um an Rights”, p. 203, “The Inter-American C ourt o f Hum an 
Rights”, pp. 153f.
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bis in idem  or res judicata , adoption of security measures for inves­
tigators and victims, and the guarantee that eventual extraditions of 
paramilitaries would not interfere w ith the investigations. Further­
more, the state was ordered to protect the victim’s relatives against 
threats.43
In other cases the Court ordered, among others, investigations 
to be conducted by ordinary criminal courts instead of military jus- 
tice44 or extradition procedures to be furthered.45 It also confirmed a 
rule of general international law according to which in case a crime 
was not penalized in domestic law at the moment of its commission 
but was recognized as a crime against humanity under international 
law, the state had a ius cogens obligation to investigate the crime and 
consequently cannot apply amnesty laws.46
Beyond the victim’s right to rehabilitation through the publica­
tion of investigation results, the Court had at first not acknowl­
edged a general right of the public to know the tru th .47 This position 
changed in the Caracazo v. Venezuela decision where the publication 
of the investigation results was ordered “for Venezuelan society to 
know the tru th”.48
Furthermore, as a means of guaranteeing non-repetition of sim­
ilar crimes, the Court has ordered in several cases since 1998 the 
adoption of laws or their reform if they constitute per se a viola­
tion ofConvention guarantees or facilitate their commission, among 
others the adoption of a law on the sanctioning of forced disap­
41Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213,
paras. 214-218; similar criteria for the investigations are commonly established in 
o ther cases, see e.g. “Cotton Field” v. Mexico (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IAC- 
tHR, 16 November 2009, Series C no. 205, para. 455. Cf. also the similar indications
by the ECtHR in Bazorkina v. Russia, paras. 117-119, supra p. 93.
4419 Merchants (Tradesmen) v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
5 July 2004, Series C no. 109, paras. 256, 263.
45 Goiburü et al. v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 22 September 
2006, Series C no. 153, para. 166.
46Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
26 Septem ber 2006, Series C no. 154, paras. 152f.
47 Bâmaca-Velâsquez v. Guatemala (Merits), IACtHR, 25 November 2000, Series C no. 
70, para. 201; Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 14 March 2001, Series C no. 75, 
operative para. 5; Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, p. 243.
48 Caracazo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 August 2002, Series 
C no. 95, para. 118.
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pearances ofpersons,49 children’s rights,50 indigenous land rights,51 
or the expedition of statements of absence or presumed death and 
the installation of genetic information systems in relation to disap­
peared persons.52 It indicated that
the general obligations of the State, established in Ar­
ticle 2 of the Convention, include the adoption of mea­
sures to suppress laws and practices of any kind that 
imply a violation of the guarantees established in the 
Convention, and also the adoption of laws and the im­
plementation of practices leading to the effective obser­
vance of the said guarantees.53
In former cases the Court had ordered legislative reforms based on 
Article 2 of the ACHR without establishing a violation of this article 
in the decision on the merits,54 a practice it no longer m aintains.55 
In cases of illegal detentions, the Court, based on Article 25 in re­
lation w ith Article 8(1) of the ACHR, has also ordered the adoption 
of proceedings that grant every person effective and prompt access 
to justice.56 More specifically, in the Cesti Hurtado v. Peru case, Peru 
was obliged “to ensure and make effect[sic] the recourses relating 
to judicial guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights and
49 Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 February 2002, Series 
C no. 92, para. 98.
50 “Street Children” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 26 May 2001, Se­
ries C no. 77, para. 98.
51Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Com m unity v. Nicaragua (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), IACtHR, 31 August 2001, Series C no. 79, para. 164.
52Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 3 July 2004, Series 
C no. 108, para. 91; see Cassel, “The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations 
Awarded by the Inter-American C ourt o f H um an Rights”, p. 205 for further exam­
ples.
53 “The Last Temptation o f  Christ” v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
5 February 2001, Series C no. 73, para. 85, cited by Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia (Repa­
rations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 February 2002, Series C no. 92, para. 96.
54E.g. “Street Children” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 26 May 2001, 
Series C no. 77, para. 98.
55 Chitay-Nech et al. v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 25 May
2010, Series C no. 212, para. 260.
56Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 November 1998, Series 
C no. 42, para. 169.
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freedoms, which include the procedures of habeas corpus and am-
paro”.57
The Court nevertheless does not order specific changes to laws, 
leaving the states leeway to adopt appropriate measures to obtain 
conformity w ith the ACHR in the terms of the judgm ent.58 Depend­
ing on the circumstances of the case, the Court may also refrain from 
ordering legislative reform, indicating that a law has to be construed 
in accordance w ith the ACHR.59
The IACtHR has also declared laws, in particular those estab­
lishing amnesties for human rights violations, w ithout legal effects. 
As these declarations have immediate effect, they are consequently 
not made as part of the reparation phase but in the judgment on 
the m erits.60 At first, and despite strong criticism by Judge Can- 
gado Trindade, the Court rejected to pronounce itself on the con­
formity of laws w ith the ACHR that were not applied in the case 
under examination.61 In a later case though it ruled that an arti­
cle of an Ecuadorian law violated Article 2 of the ACHR “whether 
or not it was enforced in the instant case”, but did not declare the 
law void.62 This step was taken in 2001, the first time ever an in­
ternational tribunal quashed a national law.63 As an effect of this 
declaration, in a later case against Peru, the Court decided that the
57 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 31 May 2001, Series C no. 
78, para. 67.
58 “Street Children” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 26 May 2001, Se­
ries C no. 77, para. 98.
59Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 23 November 
2009, Series C no. 209, paras. 340-341.
60Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 14 March 2001, Series C no. 75, para. 44; 
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
26 Septem ber 2006, Series C no. 154, para. 119.
61 El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 14 September 1996, Series 
C no. 28, paras. 59-60, citing International Responsibility fo r  Promulgation and En­
forcement o f  Laws, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, 9 December 1994, Series 
A no. 14, para. 49; and dissenting opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade to the same 
case.
62 Suârez-Rosero v. Ecuador (Merits), IACtHR, 12 November 1997, Series C no. 35, 
para. 98. The law  w as declared unconstitutional by the Ecuadorian Constitutional 
C ourt afterwards, so that no further m easures had to be ordered in the reparation 
decision: Suârez-Rosero v. Ecuador (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 20 January
1999, Series C no. 44, para. 83.
63Barrios Altos v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 14 March 2001, Series C no. 75, paras. 41ff.
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continuing application of the law had violated the Convention and 
awarded monetary reparation and psychological support to victims 
of acts of violence whose perpetrators had not been judged.64 Ju­
risprudence in this area has developed insofar as the Court in the 
Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile decision not only declared a decree 
establishing an amnesty void but also ordered, as a consequence of 
the voidness, in the reparation part of the judgment that Chile had to 
ensure that the decree would not continue to hinder investigations 
in the current and other similar cases.65 It remains unclear why the 
Court felt that it had to make this additional order, which in fact 
should be considered an evident consequence of the decree’s nullity. 
The Court reasons that amnesty laws shield perpetrators of crimes 
violating ius cogens rights and violate the survivors’ and their fami­
lies’ right to a fair trial and judicial protection.66 It derives its power 
to declare a law void from Article 2 of the ACHR and Article 27 of the 
Vienna Treaty Convention. However, none of these norms expressly 
authorizes the Court to directly interfere w ith the national legal or­
der. Article 2 of the ACHR orders the states to adopt “in accordance 
w ith their constitutional processes” the measures necessary to give 
effect to the rights and freedoms of the Convention. Only under a 
strict monist understanding could the inclusion of the IACtHR into 
the domestic constitutional order be supposed. This though depends 
on each state’s constitution. Article 27 of the Vienna Treaty Con­
vention states that a domestic law cannot justify non-compliance 
w ith an international obligation. This does not mean that the con­
travening law would be w ithout effects or could even be annulled 
by an international organ. The Court’s competence to declare do­
mestic laws w ithout legal effects must therefore be doubted. It has 
nevertheless been accepted by tribunals in different states party to 
the ACHR.67
64La Cantuta v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 November 2006, 
Series C no. 162, paras. 188f.
65Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
26 September 2006, Series C no. 154, para. 145.
66Binder, “The Prohibition o f Am nesties by the Inter-Am erican Court o f Hum an 
Rights”, 5 G.L.J. 12 (2011), p. 1211.
67Ibid., pp. 1222ff.
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Besides legal amendments the Court has ordered the adoption of 
administrative measures. In a case involving indigenous land rights 
detailed step-by-step indications were handed down to the state on 
how the community’s land was to be provided w ith basic services 
such as drinking water, medical and psycho-social care, care for 
pregnant women, food supply according to the community’s habits, 
sanitation, and supplies for the local school, including the proce­
dure to be adapted to determine the exact requirements, taking into 
account the community’s needs. Other measures included the im­
provement of prison conditions,68 implementation of a training pro­
gramme for physicians working in arrest centres and official foren­
sic institutes to provide them w ith technical and scientific know­
how according to international standards,69 human rights training 
for criminal court and law enforcement staff70 and security forces.71 
In one case, the state was also obliged to establish a surveillance 
programme for the reparation measures adopted.72
Symbolic actions are another recurring measure to remedy hu­
man rights violations and prevent recidivism.73 They have been or­
dered in a variety of ways, including public ceremonies where the 
state recognizes its responsibility or even apologizes for the facts, 
sometimes in presence of high representatives of the state,74 pro­
duction of a publication and a documentary on the life of the vic- 
tim ,75 establishment of a university scholarship bearing the name of
68 Yvon Neptune v. Haiti (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 6 May 2008, Series 
C no. 180, para. 183.
69 Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 12 September 
2005, Series C no. 132, para. 110.
70Ibid., para. 106.
71 Mapiripân Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
15 Septem ber 2005, Series C no. 134, paras. 316f.
72Ibid., para. 311.
73M yrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
25 November 2003, Series C no. 101, para. 285.
74 “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
24 November 2009, Series C no. 211, para. 262; Barrios Altos v. Peru (Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 30 November 2001, Series C no. 87, para. 50.5(e); et al.
15Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
paras. 228-229; et al.
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the victim,76 naming of schools,77 plazas, streets,78 memorials,79 or 
days80 after the victims.
In many cases states also had to publish all or parts of the Court’s 
judgment, including the operative part, in newspapers of national 
circulation, through official press releases,81 or lately also on Inter­
net sites,82 if necessary translated into the language of the commu­
nity the victims belonged to .83
W hen a victim had deceased, states have on several occasions 
been ordered to conduct a thorough search of their remains and pro­
cure for their burial at state expense,84 taking into account particular 
burial rites of indigenous groups.85 One state was even ordered to 
establish a national exhumations programme.86
In case of large-scale abductions of minors, states had to install 
internet sites where the contents of a database containing names, 
physical features and all other data relating to the children are pub­
lished in accordance w ith the parents’ agreement. Links to interna­
tional websites and networks for the search of abducted minors had
16Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
para. 233; et al.
77E.g. “Street Children” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 26 May 2001, 
Series C no. 77, para. 103.
78M yrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
25 November 2003, Series C no. 101, para. 286.
79Mapiripân Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
15 September 2005, Series C no. 134, para. 315.
80Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
1 March 2005, Series C no. 120, para. 196.
81 Mapiripân Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
15 September 2005, Series C no. 134, para. 318; Caracazo v. Venezuela (Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 29 August 2002, Series C no. 95, para. 128.
82Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
para. 220.
83Plan de Sânchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
19 November 2004, Series C no. 116, para. 102.
84Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 January  1997, 
Series C no. 31, para. 66.4; 19 Merchants (Tradesmen) v. Colombia (Merits, Repara­
tions and Costs), IACtHR, 5 July 2004, Series C no. 109, para. 295.6; et al.
85Bâmaca-Velâsquez v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 22 February
2002, Series C no. 91, para. 81.
86Ibid., para. 83.
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to be established to facilitate the reunification of families and the 
investigation of children’s identities.87
Rehabilitation of the victim or its next of kin, apart from the afore­
mentioned symbolic acts, may also take the form of free medical and 
psychological treatm ent,88 educational programmes,89 or a housing 
and development programme for members of a community whose 
village was destroyed during a massacre.90
6.3 Com pensation
M onetary indemnification is, in the general theory of international 
law, the epitome of reparation. Apart from symbolic measures hon­
oring the victim it is the most favourable way to grant the relatives 
of a deceased victim at least some kind of relieve for the loss suf­
fered. But also for any other kind of damage that cannot be undone, 
like pain, exclusion due to false accusations or dishonouring, com­
pensation can at least provide some satisfaction to victims and their 
relatives. As said Garcia Ramirez: “It allows to compensate w ith a 
useful, universally appreciated good -  money -  the loss of or dam­
age to a different good that cannot be replaced or recovered due 
to its own nature [our translation]”.91 Despite the vast measures 
awarded by the Court under the already discussed topics, compen­
sation is a major concern to the victims. Many cases submitted to the 
Court usually involve the death or forced disappearance of, or the 
infliction of grave bodily harm to the victims. These damages can at 
best be partially compensated by other means of reparation. Con­
sequently monetary compensation is essential. Economic loss adds
87 Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
1 March 2005, Series C no. 120, paras. 189ff.; “Las Dos Erres”Massacre v. Guatemala 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 24 November 2009, Series C no. 211, 
paras. 271f.
8819 Merchants (Tradesmen) v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
5 July 2004, Series C no. 109, para. 278.
89Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 3 December 2001, Se­
ries C no. 88, para. 80.
9°Plan de Sânchez Massacre v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
19 November 2004, Series C no. 116, paras. 105, 110.
91 Garcia Ramirez, “Las Reparaciones en el sistema interam ericano de p ro tection  de 
los derechos hum anos”, p. 144.
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to the grief and suffering caused by the disappearance of a provider 
for the family, missed opportunities due to torture or unjustified ar­
rest, or the negation of the use of land due to illegal expropriation 
or occupation.
The Court has observed that compensation, in order to provide 
“just satisfaction”, must be “in sufficiently broad terms in order to 
compensate, to the extent possible, for the loss suffered”.92 It must 
compensate indirect damages (dam num  emergens), loss of earning 
(lucrum cessans) and moral damages.93 The possibility to award 
punitive damages was ruled out from the scope of application of 
Article 63(1) of the ACHR given that this type of damage exceeds 
the mere function of reparation.94 It is insofar comparable to the 
notion of “just satisfaction” applied by the ECtHR.
Economic loss, which comprises the immediate reduction of eco­
nomic possessions and the future reduction of possessions or eco­
nomic possibilities, including lost salaries and other income, is 
awarded under the concept of pecuniary (also called material) dam­
ages, compensation for the moral consequences of the human rights 
violation as non-pecuniary (or immaterial) damages.95
Due to the complexity of the cases submitted to the Court, the 
exact determination of damages is almost impossible.96 The Court 
has therefore determined a set of criteria according to which dam­
92 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Interpretation), IACtHR, 17 August 1990, Series 
C no. 9, para. 27.
93Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 50.
94 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 38; Godinez Cruz v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
21 July 1989, Series C no. 8, para. 36.
95Oarcia Ramirez, “Las Reparaciones en el sistema interam ericano de p ro tection  de 
los derechos hum anos”, p. 145; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 10 September 1993, Series C no. 15, para. 50.
96A n illustrative description o f the difficulties to determ ine reparation for hum an 
rights violations has been given by Padilla for the case o f the m urdered bushne- 
groes in Suriname, w hich lived in conditions that differ considerably from Western 
societies. See Padilla, “Reparations in Aloeboetoe v. Surinam e”, 3 Human Rights 
Quarterly 17 (1995), pp. 545ff.
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ages may be calculated, but the fixation of the corresponding values 
may, if necessary, be based on equity.97
6.3.1 Pecuniary Damages
Pecuniary damages comprise, according to the IACtHR, “the loss or 
detriment to the victims’ income, the expenses incurred as a result 
of the facts, and the consequences of a monetary nature that have a 
causal connection to the facts of the case.”98 They can be claimed by 
the victims, their relatives and under certain circumstances also by 
other persons. While victims and their successors are prim a facie  
considered to have suffered damages, other persons must present 
specific proof sustaining their right to compensations.99 They must 
show that regular, periodic payments have been made by the vic­
tim in money or in kind, independent from the existence of legal 
obligations, that there is some basis for the assumption that such 
payments would have continued had the victim survived, and that 
they have experienced some financial need that was met by these 
contributions.100
The Court first examines the topic of lost income incurred by the 
victim. For surviving victims, this lucrum cessans comprehends the 
salaries and benefits the victim has not received due to the human 
rights violations, e.g. because they were unemployed, imprisoned 
or unable to w ork.101 If the victim has died, a “prudent estimate of 
the possible income of the victim for the rest of his probable life” 
has to be undertaken.102 Taking into account the last salary or, in 
case the victim had not been in stable employment conditions, a
97Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r the Protection o fH um an Rights, 
p. 775.
98Bâmaca-Velâsquez v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 22 February
2002, Series C no. 91, para. 43, cited in “Las Dos Erres”Massacre v. Guatemala (Mer­
its, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 24Novem ber 2009, Series C no. 211, para. 275, 
fn. 275.
99Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 54.
100Ibid., para. 68.
101 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 31 January 
2001, Series C no. 71, para. 120.
102 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 49.
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base salary corresponding to a basic food basket, which must not 
be lower than the average rural wage, the Court subtracts 25% for 
basic life expenses and adds interests for the time between the viola­
tion and the moment the judgment on reparation is pronounced.103 
Given the difficulties to prove the facts on which lucrum cessans and 
dam num  emergens are calculated, the Court admits the calculation 
based on equity.104 In recent complex cases the Court has referred 
cases to national authorities in order to determine the amount of 
lost salaries or income and to calculate the corresponding amount 
of indemnification.105
If necessary the ensuing topic under the Court’s scrutiny are con­
sequential damages. These damages comprehend any deterioration 
of patrim ony or belongings of the victim or their relatives or any 
other costs incurred in direct consequence of the violation. They 
cover expenses such as the investigation of the victim’s w here­
abouts undertaken by relatives, as long as they cannot be classi­
fied as legal costs and expenses, earnings lost due to investigative 
measures and the defence of the case before domestic and inter- 
American organs, medical and psychological treatments of the vic­
tim or its relatives, or costs for relocation due to harassment re­
sulting from the violation.106 These costs can be awarded based on 
equity.107
Apart from lost income and other direct consequences of the vio­
lation, pecuniary damages have also been awarded under two new 
concepts: damage caused to the victim’s life plan and social damage.
The concept of damages to the life plan (proyecto de vida) has 
been introduced to the Court’s jurisprudence in the Loayza Tamayo
103El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 14 September 1996, Series 
C no. 28, para. 28.
104Ibid., para. 21.
105Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 2 Febru­
ary 2001, Series C no. 72, para. 205; Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 6 February 2001, Series C no. 74, para. 181. See Pasqualucci, 
The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, pp. 259f.
106 Juan Humberto Sânchez v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
7 June 2003, Series C no. 99, paras. 166f.; Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (Merits, Repa­
rations and Costs), IACtHR, 23 November 2009, Series C no. 209, paras. 366ff.
107Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 23 November 
2009, Series C no. 209, para. 370.
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v. Peru (Reparations and Costs) decision. It is based on a doctrine de­
veloped by Carlos Fernandez Sessarego.108 Damage to the life plan, 
according to the Court, is different from the notions of pecuniary 
damages and loss of income. Loss of income, as has been seen, con­
sists in the calculation of probable future income of the victim by 
certain indicators, whereat the concept of life plan
deals w ith the full self-actualization of the person con­
cerned and takes account of her calling in life, her par­
ticular circumstances, her potentialities, and her ambi­
tions, thus permitting her to set for herself, in a reason­
able manner, specific goals, and to attain those goals.109
In other words the life plan are the goals in life a victim is desirous 
to achieve, as long as they are reasonable and attainable in prac­
tice. In order to be compensable the life plan must have been af­
fected in a way that renders it irreparable or reparable only with 
great difficulty.110 In the words of the Court: “The reparation is thus 
closer to w hat it should be in order to satisfy the exigencies of jus­
tice: complete redress of the wrongful injury. In other words, it more 
closely approximates the ideal of restitutio in integrum”111 Although 
the Court recognized this kind of damage in the aforementioned 
case, it stopped short of actually applying it, arguing that doctrine 
and case law had not yet developed quantification m ethods.112 This 
last conclusion, however, was contended by Judge de Roux Rengifo 
who argued in his partially dissenting opinion that another USD 
25 000 should have been awarded under the topic of life plan.113 
Judge Jackman generally doubted the need for the Court to intro­
duce a new heading under which to award reparation, given that 
financial compensation could already be ordered for a wide variety 
of reasons under the known concepts.114 The Court never elaborated
108Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 789; Sessarego, “El dano al proyecto de vida”, 50 Derecho PUC (1996).
109Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 November 1998, Series 
C no. 42, para. 147.
110Ibid., para. 150.
111Ibid., para. 151.
112Ibid., para. 153.
113Ibid., Partially D issenting Opinion ofJudge de Roux-Rengifo.
114Ibid., Separate Concurring Opinion ofJudge Jackman.
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the monetary side of the concept, but underlined that damage to the 
life plan was substantially different from monetary compensation. 
While lost future income is quantified under the heading of dam num  
emergens, the life plan could not be expressed in money but required 
other measures of reparation, mainly the recognition of the viola- 
tion.115 In following cases, the Court maintained this jurisprudence. 
It stated for example in one case that a victim had suffered severe 
torture by law enforcement agents which
caused irreparable damage to his life, forcing him to 
sever family ties and go abroad, in solitude, in financial 
distress, physically and emotionally broken down [..., 
which] not only left him physical scars, but has also 
permanently lowered his self-esteem, and his ability to 
have and enjoy intimate relations of affection. Consid­
ering all of the foregoing, the Court decides not to com­
pensate for said damage financially, since the Judgment 
awarding damages herein contributes to compensate 
Mr. W ilson Gutierrez-Soler for pecuniary and non pe­
cuniary damages. The complex and all-encompassing 
nature of damage to the “life project” calls for action 
securing satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition 
[... ] that go beyond the financial sphere.116
Similarly it ordered in the case of a university student that he be 
granted a fellowship for advanced university studies and that the 
costs for a degree of his choice and his living expenses be covered.117
The concept of damage to the family estate seeks reparation 
for damages caused in the victim’s social surroundings. The Court 
awards reparation to the victim’s next of kin for consequences such 
as lost jobs, lost possibility to conduct daily activities or medical ex-
115See hereon University o f Oslo, Faculty of Law, Interview o f  Judge Cangado Trinda- 
de, at 51 min.
116 Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 12 September 
2005, Series C no. 132, paras. 88, 89.
117Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 3 December 2001, 
Series C no. 88, para. 80.
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penses. Again, the amount is estimated by the Court on the grounds 
of fairness.118
6.3.2 Non-pecuniary Damages
Non-pecuniary or moral damages cover all consequences of human 
rights violations that do not have a commercial value. Such damages
may include both the suffering and distress caused to 
the direct victims and their next of kin, and the impair­
ment of values that are highly significant to them, as 
well as other sufferings, of a non-pecuniary nature, re­
lated to the conditions of existence of the victim or their 
family.119
They may result, among others, from frustration and other psycho­
logical and emotional harm caused by the lack of justice and contin­
ued impunity, particularly in massacre cases.120 In this respect the 
Court has recently extended its jurisprudence on immaterial dam­
ages to also entail moral damage suffered by groups.121
The Court has recognized the difficulty to prove moral damages. 
It has consequently eased the burden of proof, recurring mostly to 
the figure of prim a facie  evidence. In Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname 
(Reparations and Costs) it held that
it is clear that the victims suffered moral damages, for 
it is characteristic of human nature that anybody sub­
jected to the aggression and abuse described above will 
experience moral suffering. The Court considers that
118Bulacio v. Argentina (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 18 September 2003, 
Series C no. 100, para. 88; see also Baldeon-Garcia v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), IACtHR, 6 April 2006, Series C no. 147, para. 187. In more detail: Nash Rojas, 
Las Reparaciones ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (1988-2007), 
pp.50ff.
119 “Street Children” v. Guatemala (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 26 May 2001, Se­
ries C no. 77, para. 84, cited in “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 24 November 2009, Series C no. 211, para. 275, 
fn. 276.
120Ibid., para. 286.
121 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Com m unity v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 29 March 2006, Series C no. 146, paras. 207, 216-218.
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no evidence is required to arrive at this conclusion; the 
acknowledgement of responsibility by Suriname suf- 
fices.122
In case of death, the victim’s heirs inherit the right to compensation 
for the loss of life. Additionally, they may claim proper rights to 
compensation for moral damages suffered due to the assassination 
of a family member.123
Due to the particularity that moral damages do not have a com­
mercially determinable value, the IACtHR bases its decision on the 
principle of equity.124 Although it accepted that earlier cases may 
constitute precedent, it underlined that such precedent could not 
be universally applied but that each case needed to be examined 
individually.125 It further held that non-pecuniary damage could, 
according to the circumstances, be repaired by the judgment that 
recognizes the human rights violation itself. But the gravity of the 
damage inflicted might require pecuniary compensation besides the 
recognition of the violation in the judgm ent.126 The Court conse­
quently takes into account the gravity of the suffering endured by 
the victim and their relatives. For example in the Aloeboetoe et al. 
v. Suriname case, where six out of seven victims were assassinated 
by military forces while the lone survivor had to witness the death 
of his companions and see their bodies be devoured by vultures be­
fore he, too, died one m onth later, the Court awarded higher moral 
damages for the sufferings of the survivor than that of the other vic­
tim s.127 The death of minors also causes greater moral damages, ac­
cording to the Court, due to their particular vulnerability and need 
for protection.128
122 Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 52.
123Ibid., para. 54.
124 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 27.
125El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 14 September 1996, Series 
C no. 28, para. 34.
126Ibid., para. 35.
127Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 91.
128 Caracazo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 August 2002, Series 
C no. 95, para. 102.
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The Court nevertheless does not strictly assess moral damages on 
an individual level but tends to awards certain standard amounts for 
specific types of sufferings.129 In recent judgments the forced disap­
pearance of the victim was valued at USD 80 000 while the suffer­
ing of family members at about USD 50 0 00.130 Only in particularly 
grave cases do these values alter.131 It is unclear whether the Court 
honours the recognition of international responsibility by the state 
in terms of a reduction of moral damages because the recognition 
is partial reparation in itself. It did argue like that in one case,132 
but later awarded similar amounts for moral damages although the 
state had not recognized international responsibility.133
6.3.3 Litigation Expenses
Litigation expenses serve a double purpose. On the one hand they 
ensure that victims have realistic access to justice. If no such ex­
penses were paid, the possibilities for the victims to defend their 
rights would depend on their economic situation. On the other hand 
litigation expenses are costs that have occurred as a consequence of 
the human rights violation and as such are also part of the repara- 
tion.134 They are nevertheless not part of the compensation for the 
victims but “must be granted directly to the person or organization 
that represented the victim”.135 Although not directly mentioned in
129Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, p. 266.
130Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
paras. 251ff.; Chitay-Nech etal. v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IAC­
tHR, 25 May 2010, Series C no. 212, para. 278.
131 See e.g. the award of USD 100 000 per victim  in Rochela Massacre v. Colombia 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 11 May 2007, Series C no. 163, para. 273, 
while in Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IAC- 
tHR, 25 November 2006, Series C no. 160, para. 433 and Escue-Zapata v. Colombia 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 4 July 2007, Series C no. 165, para. 156 
the standard USD 50 000 for loss o f life a t that time were awarded.
132El Amparo v. Venezuela (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 14 September 1996, Series 
C no. 28, para. 34.
133Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 19 September 1996, 
Series C no. 29, para. 58.
134 Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 August 
1998, Series C no. 39, para. 79.
135 “Cotton Field” v. Mexico (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 16 November 
2009, Series C no. 205, para. 594.
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the ACHR, Article 65(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR 
contains the victims’ right to claim costs. Such costs were not rec­
ognized by the Court until 1997 due to the fact that before that date 
the only parties admitted to the trial were the IACommHR and the 
states. The Court ruled that even if the Commission recurred to ex­
ternal lawyers, which was a regular practice due to its overload of 
cases, all expenditures had to be borne from its budget.136 In 1997 
victims were allowed direct standing before the Court for the repa­
ration phase and from 2001 on for the entire case, so that from then 
on litigation costs were awarded to the victim.137 Together w ith the 
recognition of locus standi to the victim, the Court also acknowl­
edged that victims may claim honoraria paid for legal assistance, 
though limited to w hat is necessary and reasonable according to 
the specific circumstances of each case.138 According to the Court, 
litigation costs have to be awarded for all instances, domestic and 
supranational, victims have recurred to and have not been restituted 
their expenses.139
The amount of litigation expenses awarded is determined by the 
Court through a
prudent estimate [... ] taking into account any receipts 
and vouchers provided, the particular circumstances of 
the case, the nature of the jurisdiction for the protection 
of human rights, and the characteristics of the respec­
tive proceedings, which are unique and different from 
those of other proceedings, both at the domestic and 
international levels.140
Calculation of litigation costs as a percentage of the reparation due 
has been clearly rejected by the Court.141 Again, if no proof of the
136Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 10 September 1993, 
Series C no. 15, para. 114.
137 Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina  (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 August 
1998, Series C no. 39, para. 81; Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 27 November 1998, Series C no. 42, para. 178.
138Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 August 
1998, Series C no. 39, para. 80.
139Ibid., para. 81.
140Ibid., para. 82.
141 Ibid., para. 83.
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costs incurred can be produced by the victims, the Court awards 
litigation expenses based on equity.142
6.4 Conditions of Com pliance
The obligation of the state to comply w ith the Court’s judgments 
results from Article 68 of the ACHR. As the ACHR is an international 
treaty, the states are also bound by the dispositions of the Vienna 
Treaty Convention.143 Of particular importance for the execution of 
judgments are Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Treaty Convention, 
which stipulate that states must comply w ith international treaties 
in good faith and that they may not excuse failures to comply with 
norms of domestic law. Besides these general rules, the Court gives 
particular indications to the states as to how the reparation orders 
must be complied with.
The Court today fixes compensation in US Dollars and no longer 
in local currencies to prevent the risk of currency devaluation, al­
though the state may pay in both currencies.144 If the beneficiary is 
a minor, the compensation shall be placed in banking accounts, cer­
tificates ofdeposit or similar investments in solvent banking institu­
tions of recognized standing.145 The State is “duty-bound to take the 
necessary measures to protect the m inor’s interests against infla­
tion, insolvency, negligence or the incompetence of the trustee”.146 
Although no taxes or other surcharges may be levied on the com­
pensations, once they have become part of the beneficiary’s assets, 
regular tax rules apply.147 In recent judgments states were ordered
142Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 19 September 1996, 
Series C no. 29, para. 42.
143Caflisch and Cangado Trindade, “Les conventions americaine et europeenne des 
droits de l’homme et le droit international general”, RGDIP (2004), p. 6.
144Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
para. 261.
145Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 November 1998, Series 
C no. 42, para. 184; Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Reparations and Costs), 
IACtHR, 27 August 1998, Series C no. 39, para. 86.
146 Suârez-Rosero v. Ecuador (Interpretation), IACtHR, 29 May 1999, Series C no. 51, 
para. 32.
147Ibid., para. 29.
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to comply with payment orders w ithin one year.148 If, for causes at­
tributable to the beneficiaries, compensation cannot be paid within 
this time period, the state must deposit the money for ten years un­
der similar conditions as were established for payments due to mi­
nors. After ten years the money, including interests accrued, falls 
to the state.149 In case of untimely payment, interests according to 
national rates are owed.150
The determination of specific time periods to comply w ith other 
means of reparation, such as the duty to investigate, rehabilitate the 
victim etc., depends on the type of reparation in question. Measures 
that depend on more or less complex domestic proceedings, such 
as the effective investigation of the facts and eventual judgment of 
criminals or the adoption of domestic legislation on a subject, must 
therefore be accomplished w ithin “a reasonable period of time”.151 
Furthermore, as has been shown supra, the Court usually indicates 
specific conditions how the state has to execute effective investiga­
tions of the human rights violation at the national level.
Other measures, such as the publication of the judgment, acts of 
public recognition of guilt, excuses, or commemorations, have to be 
fulfilled w ithin time periods established by the Court, which have 
hovered between two months for the publication of the judgment 
and two years for the production of a film on the events underlying 
the judgm ent.152 Procurement for medical or psychological treat­
ment or similar measures must be complied w ith as soon as the 
judgment has been notified. States also have to report to the Court 
w ithin one year on the measures that were adopted in order to com­
ply w ith the judgm ent.153
148 “Cotton Field” v. Mexico (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 16 November 
2009, Series C no. 205, para. 597; Chitay-Nech et al. v. Guatemala (Merits, Repara­
tions and Costs), IACtHR, 25 May 2010, Series C no. 212, para. 290; M anuel Cepeda- 
Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, para. 260.
149Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
para. 262.
150Ibid., para. 264.
151 “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
24 November 2009, Series C no. 211, para. 242; Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, 
IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, para. 218.
152Manuel Cepeda-Vargas v. Colombia, IACtHR, 26 May 2010, Series C no. 213, 
paras. 220, 225, 229.
153Ibid., oper. para. 17.
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Remedial justice probably is the issue where both courts’ jurispru­
dence shows the most remarkable differences. While the IACtHR 
proceeds boldly and applies international standards in the broad­
est possible way, the ECtHR is bound by the principle of subsidiar­
ity and therefore cautious not to interfere w ith the member states’ 
sovereignty. This reflects a general difference in the approach both 
courts take to the interpretation of the respective Conventions. The 
IACtHR has clearly expressed that the ACHR (and other human 
rights treaties) shall be interpreted “pro homine”, i.e. in such a way 
that they render the broadest protection of the rights laid down 
therein to the benefit of the individual person or group. This com­
prehends the interpretation of the reparation clauses because, as has 
been seen supra, reparation is an integral part of hum an rights jus- 
tice.1
The ECtHR applies a much less clearly perceptible pro homine 
approach and acts in a more political fashion.2 This is mainly due 
to historical reasons. The CoE had originally been conceived as a 
project by war-torn Western European states that had a real inter­
est in improving their domestic hum an rights situations. The orig­
inal system was focused on inter-state applications and the states 
parties were convinced that there were no massive-scale human 
rights violations to be dealt w ith.3 Even politically charged cases 
such as Ireland v. United Kingdom  concerned grave but not massive 
human rights violations and were complied w ith out of the states’
1 This is a  fact that does not yet seem to have been realized entirely by international 
bodies in charge o fth e  adjudication ofhum an rights violations. See Antkowiak, “Re­
medial Approaches to H um an Rights Violations”, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 46 (2008), 
p. 354, referring to this as the “righ ts-rem edy  gap”.
2Lixinski, “T reaty Interpretation by the Inter-American C ourt o f H um an Rights: Ex­
pansionism  at the Service of the Unity o f International Law”, 3 EJIL 21 (2010), p. 588.
3Greer and Williams, “H um an Rights in the Council ofEurope and the EU”, 4 EJL 15 
(2009), pp. 463f.
125
II Reparation under the Conventions
own initiative.4 The ECtHR, following this tradition, has never seen 
the need to justify its limited approach to remedial justice entirely 
w ith the text of the ECHR but constantly refers to the travaux pre- 
paratoires in the first place. It has however relaxed its very restricted 
attitude to reparation since the end of the 1990s.
While the travaux preparatoires of both Conventions show that 
the member states’ intentions differed concerning the courts’ repa­
ration powers, the wording of the ECHR per se does not exclude 
specific forms of reparation. Although the Court still does not make 
full use of its generic reparation competence and mostly sticks to 
awarding just satisfaction in the form of monetary relief, its recent 
argumentation that specific measures can be ordered if “by its very 
nature, the violation found in the instant case does not leave any 
real choice as to the measures required to remedy it”5 is a first step 
towards a more specific definition of the states’ obligations result­
ing from a breach of the Convention. The Court adopted this new 
type of orders w ithout making any reference to its previous restric­
tive case law. This permits to conclude that the ECHR, and in par­
ticular the principle of subsidiarity, contrary to the Court’s earlier 
argumentation, can be construed in a broader fashion than it had 
done before. The coincidence of the new case law w ith discussions 
among the CoE member states about solutions to the Court’s ex­
cessive caseload, which culminated in an explicit invitation by the 
Committee of Ministers -  i.e. an underlying political decision by 
the member states -  to give more specific indications on the conse­
quences of a case to the states, may provide the Court w ith the nec­
essary support to venture further into the new territory of specific 
reparation orders. Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s case law on reparation 
continues to rely in the first place on the states’ disposition to adopt 
the necessary measures, under guidance of the Committee of Minis­
ters, to provide restitutio in integrum  and prevent similar violations 
in the future. Still, the question today no longer is w hether the EC- 
tHR may order specific reparation measures, but where the limits 
of this new jurisdiction lie and w hether it would be indicated that
4Ireland v. United Kingdom  (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 5310/71,18 Jan­
uary  1978, Series A no. 25; Ireland v. United Kingdom  (Res-54), CM, (78) 35, 27 June 
1978.
5Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], ECtHR, no. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, 2004-II, para. 202.
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the Court made even more intense use of its broad reparation pow ­
ers in order to facilitate the applicants’ claims to receive a remedy. 
This also calls for a reflection on the IACtHR’s reparation practice, 
which, while being grounded in the sound basis of Article 63 of the 
ACHR, has been met w ith criticism for having become too broad to 
be realistically implemented.
The ECtHR’s restrictive approach was understandable at the time. 
W hen the Court began its work human rights law was far less well 
codified than today and hum an rights justice was new. W ithout a 
clear reparation power the Court focused on the principle of sub­
sidiarity and followed the narrow interpretation of “satisfaction” 
that appeared in the travaux preparatoires. Since then concepts of 
state responsibility, human rights law and reparation have been de­
veloped and at least since the 1990s a large number of documents 
have been adopted that establish reparation concepts according to a 
different, more modern concept of “satisfaction”. Furthermore, the 
high number of repetitive applications indicates that the concept of 
subsidiarity does not work as desired.6
The quality of cases to be decided by both courts is another impor­
tant element to be taken into account when evaluating their repa­
ration practice. Cases brought before the IACtHR tend to be consid­
erably more severe than cases brought before the ECtHR. Cases of 
massacres, expulsion of entire communities from their living realms 
or other cases that originate in general or systemic shortcomings in 
the administration of a state are still the exception in Europe while 
they are a common ground for cases in the inter-American system. 
Effective adjudication of such systemic cases requires an entirely 
different set of measures than the remediation of more isolated hu­
man rights violations. This explains why judgments by the IACtHR 
contain broad sections on guarantees of non-repetition and social 
remedies. The necessity for broader remedies has been recognized 
recently by the European System, too, which tries to counter the 
nowadays more frequent systemic human rights violations more ef­
fectively by the indication of specific measures to be adopted by the 
states.
6Cf. Costa, Memorandum o f  the President o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights to 
the States w ith a View to Preparing the Interlaken Conference, p. 5.
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Applying its own interpretation of the ECHR as a “living instru- 
m ent”,7 the time hence seems to have come for the ECtHR to adapt 
its reparation practice to the developments in international law on 
state responsibility. This would however not mean that the ECtHR’s 
competence could reach as far as that of the IACtHR, due to the 
limitations imposed by Article 41 of the ECHR. Particularly the evi­
dent differentiation between “reparation” and “satisfaction” and the 
states’ recurrence to the principle of subsidiarity8 indicate that the 
Court’s competence to award “satisfaction” is different from the 
states’ obligation to repair the violation. In the context of a more 
up-to-date understanding of the concept of “satisfaction”, the Court 
should however take a step forward towards a more general use of 
detailed reparation orders.9 This would not only make the procedure 
after a Court judgment easier to follow by the victim, but might also 
relax the Court’s strained caseload.
Under the Court’s traditional reparation practice, which is still 
applied in the majority of cases, applicants learn that they have suf­
fered a human rights violation and sometimes even that they have a 
right to claim full restitution from the responding state. They would 
nevertheless not receive indications as to what this means in prac­
tice, i.e. what exactly it is they can request from the state in order 
to make good the violation. The Court even less provides them with 
a clear title ordering the state to do anything more than pay just 
satisfaction -  which in many cases is insufficient or plainly inap­
propriate to make good the harm done. Practical reparation mea­
sures are supposed to derive implicitly from the judgment, leaving 
the choice of how to discharge this responsibility to the discretion 
of the state. The state’s obligations get further specified only in the 
supervision procedure before the Committee of Ministers, where 
the applicant’s participation is limited to written submissions. Un­
like before the IACtHR, the reparation phase before the European
7 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, no. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, para. 31.
8Cf. Council o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court 
o f  Human Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : h ttp s ://h u b .c o e .in t/2 0 1 2 0 4 1 9 -b rig h to n -  
declaration, no. 12(a).
9See also: Breuer, “Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfem aßnahm en durch den EGMR”, 
EuGRZ (2004), pp. 260f. and for the particular case o f m inority protection Sitaropou- 
los, “Im plementation of ECtHR judgm ents”, 1 ESIL-CPS 1 (2011), pp. 23ff.
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human rights system is not contradictory and therefore cannot be 
labelled “fair”.
A system that relies on the states’ disposition to comply w ith the 
Court’s orders however can only work if all members are truly ded­
icated to the human rights ideals laid down in the Convention. As 
soon as opposition to the implementation of these rights grows in a 
state -  be it in an individual case or on a general level - ,  compliance 
will falter and the state will not do more than has been explicitly 
ordered, if it complies at all. In such cases of internal opposition the 
experience in the Inter-American System has shown that a detailed 
judgment by the Court can help to overcome obstacles, supporting 
sectors w ithin the states that support reparation. Clear reparation 
orders that appear as such in a judgment will also be reproduced in 
press reports on the case, so that it is obvious to the general public 
that each human rights violation ensues an obligation of action for 
the state. This may raise public pressure on the state authorities.
Indications by the Committee of Ministers cannot have the same 
effect. First, the procedure before the Committee happens largely 
behind closed doors and does not produce tangible effects to be cov­
ered by the press. Secondly, it lacks the impact of a Court order be­
cause it is susceptible of being politically motivated. Furthermore, 
the state cannot be sure that even if following these indications it 
will not be condemned again in a similar situation, i.e. if the Court 
considered insufficient the measures approved by the Committee.10 
This opens a margin for discussion w ith the Committee that may 
delay implementation.11 The Committee, on the other hand, has the 
difficult task to decide whether the measures taken by the state are 
sufficient to comply w ith a Court’s judgment and to eventually indi­
cate which further measures should be taken. It is, however, always 
exposed to possible rejections by the state concerned, arguing that 
the Committee’s demands exceed the requirements of full repara­
tion in the specific case or that the state would consider other means
10 VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, paras. 25ff.
11Cf. Sundberg, “Control o f Execution”, p. 584.
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of reparation more appropriate.12 There is consequently a natural 
conflict of interests between the responding state which may insist 
on its freedom under Article 1(1) of the ECHR to choose the means 
of reparation, and the Committee’s task to supervise the execution 
of judgments under Article 46(2) of the ECHR.
Finally, more detailed reparation orders by the Court may help to 
limit its growing caseload. W ithout indicating to the states how to 
respond to the often systemic human rights problems, it will con­
tinue to be flooded by repetitive applications. Faltering compliance 
by the states may also lead to less acceptance of the Court in the 
public opinion, making it seem to be a blunt instrument.
In order to procure effective protection, the Court has to ensure 
that effective reparation is offered to the victims. To achieve this, 
more specific reparation measures should be made an essential ele­
ment of the European human rights system. At least in grave cases 
judgments should include in the operative paragraphs specifications 
concerning the obligations resulting from a breach of the Conven­
tion, i.e. at least the obligation for the state to end a continuing vi- 
olation.13 Consequently, the Court would have to extend the prac­
tice of indicating specific measures to other cases than those where 
there is no real choice of means left to the state. Especially complex 
cases such as the politically motivated violations in countries like 
Turkey or Russia call much more urgently for specific indications 
by the Court to support the work of the Committee of Ministers 
and help the victims obtain restitutio in integrum. Here the Court 
should put its focus on measures similar to those applied by the 
IACtHR. The competence of an international court to rule such ef­
fects as a corollary of the competence to adjudicate violations of an 
international treaty has been recognized by several other courts un-
12See in more detail on the difficulties faced by the organs o f the CoE: European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Implementation o f  the 
Judgments o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights, in particular nos. 34ff.; and, as 
an intent to resolve the issue, the introduction in Protocol no. 14 of the right of 
the Committee to refer a  case for interpretation to the Court, if it considers tha t its 
execution is hindered by a problem  of interpretation, Article 46(3) o f the ECHR and 
Council o f Europe, Protocol No. 14 -  Explanatory Report, u r l : http ://conventions. 
coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm, No. 96.
13Cf. Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 2009, pp. 538f.
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der international law.14 Furthermore, under Article 46 of the ECHR 
the Court could make more detailed indications as to what a state 
has to achieve in order to provide restitutio in integrum, just as it has 
already begun to do under the pilot judgment procedure. Although 
this would further limit the principle of subsidiarity and restrict the 
freedom of the states to choose the means by which they discharge 
the obligations emanating from the Court’s rulings, it would finally 
serve the overall goal to improve hum an rights protection in Europe 
by helping the victims obtain reparation and adapt the historically 
motivated concept that the violating state is called upon in the first 
place to determine how to make good the damage caused by itself.15
It must be borne in mind that subsidiarity not only gives the states 
the right to choose the reparation measure they deem most appro­
priate, but also imposes on them the obligation to effectively im­
plement these measures. It should therefore not only be understood 
in the sense that the Court has to refrain from deciding reparation 
measures, but more in the sense that the less a state complies with 
its obligations emanating from a judgment, the more detailed orders 
have to be handed down by the Court in subsequent similar cases. In 
fact, clearer orders of the Court had been expected in several cases 
already. Thus, in one of the most publicly followed cases, Öcalan 
v. Turkey, the Court backed away from holding that a condemna­
tion following an unfair trial would have to be revoked, applying 
instead the Gengel form ula  which says that “a retrial or a reopening 
of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way 
of redressing the violation”.16 Although it may be ascertained that 
it would not be convenient to order the reopening of a case, such as 
the IACtHR would have done, as this would cut off the application 
of other measures to achieve reparation for the victim, there is no 
apparent reason w hy the Court should not at least hold that the re­
sults of an unfair trial have to be erased by the state, thus leaving
14See Factory at Chorzow (Merits), PCIJ, 13 September 1928, Series A no. 17, p. 27; 
Brasserie duPecheur andFactortame (Brasserie duPecheur v. Germany and The Queen 
v. Secretary o f  State fo r Transport), ECJ, C-46/93 and C-48/93, 5 March 1996, Euro­
pean Court Reports 1996, I-01029, para. 22.
15 Cf. Antkowiak, “Remedial Approaches to H um an Rights V iolations”, Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 46 (2008), p. 384.
16 Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], ECtHR, no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, 2005-IV, para. 210; Gengel 
v. Turkey, ECtHR, no. 53431/99, 23 October 2003, para. 27.
131
II Reparation under the Conventions
it the choice of means of how to achieve this goal.17 Warnings that 
specific Court orders to reopen proceedings might cause problems 
on the execution stage because not all states have the appropriate 
legislation to limit the res judicata  effects of domestic judgments can 
only be seen as counterproductive to the overall goal of improving 
the European human rights situation and to press states to bring 
their laws in line w ith the requirements of the ECHR.18 Examples 
such as the Tristân-Donoso v. Panama  or the Castillo-Petruzzi et al. 
v. Peru decisions show that different attitudes are possible if the na­
tional authorities are willing to really implement their international 
human rights obligations.19 Finally, determination of reparation is a 
fundamental judicial function and should be considered as such by 
the ECtHR.
Leaving the states leeway as to how they comply w ith their obli­
gation to provide full reparation however also has certain undeni­
able advantages. The most obvious one is that states and victims 
have almost absolute freedom to agree on individual reparation 
measures. This solution favours the idea of agreements between 
victim and state on reparation, an idea that is also expressed in 
Rule 75(4) of the Rules of the ECtHR. This though requires that 
victims have a possibility to effectively submit their claims to the 
state, which presupposes that the state recognizes its obligation to 
fully repair the consequences of the violation. If, however, state ac­
tors have decisively participated in a grave human rights violation 
or if the representatives of these actors occupy important positions 
in a state, its compromise w ith the reparation of victims may le­
gitimately be called into doubt. Unspecified reparation orders con­
sequently require a strong, independent and impartial supervisory
17Cf. Ress, “W irkung und Beachtung”, EuGRZ (1996), p. 352, criticising that the Com­
m ittee of Ministers had closed m onitoring in cases o f unfair trials as soon as the 
state had paid the just satisfaction awarded by the C ourt instead of supervising 
tha t new  proceedings w ere opened or the victims w ere liberated from prison un ­
der other legal dispositions.
18See in this sense Papier, “Execution and Effects o f the Judgm ents of the European 
C ourt of H um an Rights from the Perspective of German N ational C ourts”, 1-4 
HRLJ 27 (2006), p. 54.
19 Tristân-Donoso v. Panama (Monitoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 1 September 2010, 
paras. 12ff., Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (Compliance w ith  Judgment), IACtHR,
1 July 2011, paras. 26ff.; in detail p .103 supra.
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body that can mediate or verify agreements or, if required, effec­
tively define the state’s obligations towards the victim. W hen de­
termining the leeway left to the state, the ECtHR might therefore 
take into account the compliance record of the state and the effec- 
tivity of its domestic compliance organs.
Experience from the IACtHR has also shown that a detailed repa­
ration practice demands more time to be spent on each case as it 
requires the Court to understand not only the origins of the viola­
tion but also all of its consequences. The complexity of reparation 
orders affects the level of compliance and the requirements a super­
vision system has to fulfil. While a very detailed reparation order 
provides the parties of a process and the organs in charge of super­
vising execution with clear guidelines as to w hat has to be achieved 
by the state in order to make good the damage caused, such orders 
at the same time leave little flexibility to the supervising organ to 
react to changing circumstances, unforeseen difficulties, or eventual 
agreements between the state and the victim. Ordering broad and 
detailed reparation also entails that the supervising organ will have 
to spend more time on evaluating reports by the state, the victims, 
or external experts, thus limiting the number of cases it can deal 
with. Basically, for each reparation measure ordered, the supervis­
ing organ will have to check w hether the state has complied w ith all 
details or if there are consistent reasons hindering compliance. Judg­
ments demanding the investigation and sentencing of perpetrators 
of massacres or the localization of disappeared persons are of par­
ticular difficulty when the underlying events have either happened 
a long time ago or were actively facilitated or even committed by 
state representatives such as the police or military forces. Such or­
ders often require lengthy domestic procedures due to lost or poorly 
documented evidence or obstruction by parts of the public adminis­
tration.20 This results in an execution phase that often takes years to 
complete. Supervising orders like adapting the national prison sys­
tem and the underlying legislation to international standards, as can 
be found in IACtHR judgments, would also take years to implement 
and depend in large parts on elements the responding state cannot
20 Based on personal interview s w ith  judges, lawyers, victim  representatives and 
NGOs at the IACtHR and in Colombia in 2010.
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entirely control, such as the availability of funds for the training 
of staff and refurbishment of buildings. Furthermore, legislative or 
constitutional amendments may be stalled in national parliaments if 
decisive parts of the legislative do not want to comply w ith interna­
tional obligations the state has contracted. The ECtHR should hence 
have to find a good equilibrium between the negative and positive 
aspects of a more specific reparation practice. Here the experiences 
of the Committee of Ministers and of the IACtHR may be helpful.
Although the IACtHR complies w ith almost all of the aforemen­
tioned criteria of a good reparation practice under the standards of 
international law, its jurisprudence on reparation is not free from 
criticism either. Most commentators consider certain of the Court’s 
orders to be excessive and not practicable. In one of the crucial cases 
in this sense, Haiti was ordered “to ensure that prison conditions 
comply with international human rights norms; in particular, to al­
leviate the problems of overcrowding, shortcomings in the physi­
cal and sanitary infrastructure, deficient security systems and the 
lack of contingency plans”.21 Critics claim that this decision was 
not adapted to the realities of Haiti which, being one of the poorest 
countries in the world, would not be in a position to ever comply 
w ith these orders. Further issues could arise from the fact that the 
Court’s judgments tend to be excessively detailed, causing problems 
during the executions phase as its orders not necessarily coincide 
w ith the victims’ expectations,22 or because the measures ordered 
were too complex and took years to be implemented, extending the 
supervision almost ad in fin itum .23
The IACtHR, though, is aware of its limitations, particularly when 
it comes to ordering guarantees of non-repetition.24 Its decisions 
cannot be condemned per se as being excessive. Bearing in mind 
that the states are under the obligation to provide the victim with
21 Yvon Neptune v. Haiti (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 6 May 2008, Series 
C no. 180, para. 183.
22See Acosta Lopez and Bravo Rubio, “El cumplimiento de los fines de reparation  
integral de las medidas ordenadas por la Corte Interam ericana de Derechos Hu- 
m anos”, Rev. Colomb. DerechoInt. 13 (2008), pp. 346ff.
23See for such measures: Xâkm ok Kâsek Indigenous Com m unity v. Paraguay, 
paras. 300ff. and a  general critique at Antkowiak, “Remedial Approaches to H u­
m an Rights Violations”, Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 46 (2008), p. 394.
24See Beristain, Diâlogo sobre la reparacion, Vol. 2, pp. 463ff.
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restitutio in integrum, i.e. to wipe out the consequences of the vi­
olation as far as possible and to prevent similar violations in the 
future, and that the IACtHR’s reparation power is not subject to 
similar restraints as the ECtHR’s, it has to order all that is neces­
sary to repair the consequences of the violation suffered. Accord­
ing to the extent of the violation or the underlying shortcomings, 
such reparation may require costly measures that might even ex­
ceed the possibilities of the responsible state. Nevertheless, it would 
be wrong to take this into account during the reparation stage and 
to apply a principle similar to national civil procedures according to 
which nobody can be obliged to perform an obligation that is objec­
tively or subjectively impossible.25 Such considerations would leave 
out of the account in particular that the determination of the exact 
reparation due is important because human rights judgments shall 
have deterring effects on other possible human rights violators.26 
This effect can only be achieved if the Court clearly identifies the 
consequences of a human rights violation and thus points out the 
damages caused by the violation, but also the efforts a state would 
have to undertake in order to make good the damage done. Deals 
between the victim and the state concerning compliance w ith the 
reparation or unilateral motions for partial waivers of certain obli­
gations due to their objective or subjective impossibility can better 
be presented to the Court during the executions phase.
Overall, an excessive reparation practice seems to be useful for 
effective human rights protection, providing afterwards a sufficient 
amount of flexibility on the execution stage to react to particular 
developments or circumstances of each case.
25Article 275 o f the German Civil Code (hereinafter “BGB”), 2 January  2002, BGBl. I 
p. 42.
26See on the effects o f judgm ents on o ther states Cohen-Jonathan, “Quelques consid­
erations sur l’autorite des arrets de la Court europeenne des droits de l’hom m e”, 
pp. 53ff. and Buergenthal, “Im plementation o f the judgm ents of the C ourt”, 
pp.191ff.
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Part III
Execution of Judgments
Overview
The ECtHR’s and IACtHR’s supranational character makes them 
largely independent from direct influence by the states and their 
domestic politics. Nevertheless, this supranational character can at 
the same time turn into a major limitation of the courts’ powers and 
the protection they offer. The subjects of their jurisdiction are inde­
pendent states which, if necessary, can be forced only w ith difficulty 
to comply with the obligations arising from judgments.
All hum an rights Conventions contain a specific obligation for 
the states to comply w ith the judgm ents,1 built on the underlying 
principle of pacta sunt servanda as stated in Article 26 of the Vi­
enna Treaty Convention, completed by Article 27.2 If a state fails to 
comply w ith a judgment of a human rights court, it therefore com­
mits a breach of the respective Convention and as such a breach 
of international law. Therefore, judgments of human rights courts 
basically face the same implementation limits as other decisions of 
organs of international law. In order to improve this situation, the 
Conventions contain special compliance procedures. These proce­
dures rely on two tiers. On the international level there are political 
institutions of the CoE or the OAS that can take resolutions to en­
sure state compliance, whereat on the national level legislative and 
administrative measures such as laws on the enforceability of inter­
national judgments by national courts or special government offices 
to coordinate implementation measures exist. The domestic aspect 
though will only be of minor interest in this thesis, as it would re­
quire an investigation of the domestic legal systems of each member 
state of the Conventions.
1Article 46 o f the ECHR; Article 68 o f the ACHR; Article 30 o f the Protocol to the 
African Charter on H um an and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishm ent o f an African 
C ourt on H um an and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter “Protocol to the ACHPR”), 10 June 
1998 (entry into force: 25 January 2004), u r l : http ://w w w .achpr.o rg /instrum ents/ 
court-establishm ent/.
2Ramcharan, Contemporary human rights ideas, pp. 46ff.
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This work will also spare out the question of compliance w ith 
provisional measures. The legal quality of provisional measures, the 
obligations arising from them for the states, as well as the question 
of consequences for non-compliance are highly controversial and 
would exceed the scope of this research.3
Before dealing w ith the procedure of execution (9), it is neces­
sary to define which parts of a judgment are enforceable under the 
respective Convention (8). The last chapter will conclude w ith an 
assessment and outlook (10).
3See on this subject, among others, Rieter, Preventing irreparable harm: provisional 
measures in international human rights adjudication, pp. 144ff.; Burbano Herrera, 
Provisional Measures in the Case Law o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 
; Padilla, “FS Fix-Zamudio, vol. 2” ; Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System  
fo r  the Protection o fH um an Rights, pp. 483ff. for the IACtHR and Rieter, Preventing 
irreparable harm: provisional measures in international human rights adjudication, 
pp. 170ff. for the ECtHR.
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There is no autonomous concept ofbinding force offinaljudgm ents 
(res judicata) in international law. The effects of res judicata  are de­
rived from the national legal orders.1 Consequently, both human 
rights Conventions had to expressly define the binding effects of the 
courts’ judgments, including an obligation for the states to comply 
with them. For the member states of the CoE, Article 46(1) of the 
ECHR stipulates that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to 
abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties”. A similar rule is contained in Article 68(1) of the ACHR: 
“The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply w ith the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties”. Para­
graph 2 of the same norm further details: “That part of a judgment 
that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in the coun­
try concerned in accordance w ith domestic procedure governing the 
execution of judgments against the state”. As the Conventions are 
common international treaties, the rules on the execution of judg­
ments, just like the rest of the Conventions, are binding for the mem­
ber states according to the general rules of international law. These 
general rules are in particular the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
under customary international law, codified in Article 26 of the Vi­
enna Treaty Convention.2 The rule is completed by Article 27 of the 
Vienna Treaty Convention, also a codification of customary inter­
national law, laying down that no state may recur to rules of its in­
ternal law to excuse the failure to comply w ith international treaty 
obligations.3
1Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, p. 26.
2The Vienna T reaty Convention does not directly apply to the Conventions as they 
are prior to its en try  into force. The principles laid down therein nonetheless apply 
as custom ary rules o f international law.
3Cf. The Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, PCIJ, 31 July 1930, Series B no. 17, p. 32; The 
Free Zones o f  Upper Savoy and the District ofGex, PCIJ, 7 June 1932, Series AB no. 
46, p. 167.
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The states’ obligation to comply w ith international law also ex­
tends to Article 46 of the ECHR and Article 68 of the ACHR, which 
procure that the member states have to abide by the judgments the 
courts have handed down in their respect. This implies that mem­
ber states may not refer to rules of their internal law to excuse the 
failure to abide by a judgment.
Before turning to execution, it is necessary to establish to which 
extent states are obliged by the courts’judgments. Binding force can 
be subdivided into two categories: formal binding force and material 
binding force. Formal binding force means that there are no further 
ordinary appeals possible against a decision by a court.4 Material 
binding force on the other hand refers to the binding force of the 
content of a decision between the parties, i.e. the court’s decision 
becomes binding as to the matter of the decision and the case can­
not be brought before a court again.5 In the terms of this investiga­
tion, only the question of material binding force is of the essence, as 
this is the issue according to which the obligations of the states un­
der public international law are determined. Formal binding force 
is governed by Article 44 of the ECHR and Article 67 of the ACHR. 
The issue of material binding force has to be investigated under two 
aspects: its personal (8.1) and its material extent (8.2).
8.1 B ind ing  Force ratione personae
Judgments in contentious cases under both Conventions only oblige 
the parties to the case, i.e. their binding force is inter partes. This 
results from the wording of the Conventions themselves, which in 
Article 46(1) of the ECHR and Article 68(1) of the ACHR stipulate 
that the member states have to abide by final judgments “in any case 
to which they are parties”.
According to Articles 1 and 52 of the ECHR, all member states 
are under the obligation to maintain their domestic law and prac­
tice in accordance w ith the Convention as it is interpreted by the 
Court. This is, though, a general obligation that does not entail the
4See e.g. Article 705 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “ZPO”),
5 December 2005, BGBl. I p. 3202; Gottwald, “MüKo, §322”.
5Ibid., Lateral Num ber 1; Verzijl, “O bservations additionelles a l ’avis de M. le Dr. J. H.
W. Verzijl du 10 avril 1925”, p. 438.
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direct consequence for all member states to abide by judgments of 
the Court in cases to which they were not a party.6 Nevertheless, it 
is in the interest of all states to maintain their domestic legislation in 
line w ith the Court’s jurisprudence in order to prevent future cases 
on the same issue from being raised against them .7
Under the ACHR, in the terms of Article 68 of the ACHR, only the 
state party to the case that has been found responsible for a breach 
of the Convention has to comply w ith the orders on reparation.8 
It is, however, not evident w hether each judgment also creates an 
obligation for all other states parties to the ACHR to maintain their 
legislation in accordance w ith the IACtHR’s jurisprudence. The obli­
gation to adapt domestic legislation to the rights and freedoms of the 
Convention originates in Article 2 of the ACHR. Nevertheless, this 
does not necessarily entail an obligation for other states to abide 
by the jurisprudence of the Court, because the IACtHR, unlike the 
ECtHR, does not per se have jurisdiction over all states. Its jurisdic­
tion is only obligatory for the states under the Convention that have 
made a general declaration in terms of Article 62(1) of the ACHR or 
have entered into a special agreement for a particular case. It is only 
by those means, according to Article 62(1) of the ACHR, that a state 
“declare[s] that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, [...], the juris­
diction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or 
application of this Convention”. In consequence, as long as a state 
has not made the corresponding declaration, the IACtHR’s jurispru­
dence -  advisory or contentious -  does not have binding effect on it. 
Hence, the Court’s interpretation of the Convention rights and free­
doms is only effective for the states that have filed a declaration ac­
cording to Article 62(1) of the ACHR, but does not affect the way in 
which other states construe the Convention for the effects of inter­
nal application in terms of Article 2 of the ACHR. In states that have 
recognized the Court’s jurisdiction, domestic organs should though
6See Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, p. 33; M ahoney and Prebensen, 
“The European Court o f H um an Rights”, pp. 634, 636f.; Cohen-Jonathan, “Quelques 
considerations sur l’autorite des arrets de la Court europeenne des droits de 
l’hom m e”, pp. 41f.; Haß, Die Urteile, p. 61.
7Callewaert, “The Judgm ents o f the Court: Background and C ontent”, p. 792.
8Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Compliance w ith  Judgment), IACtHR, 17 November 1999, 
Series C no. 60, paras. 5-7.
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follow the interpretation the IACtHR gives to the ACHR, not only 
because the IACtHR has the final authority to interpret the Conven­
tion, but also because a domestic decision that does not respect this 
interpretation is susceptible of being accused of arbitrarily declining 
a person a Convention right.9 A direct binding effect of judgments 
on any other state though does not exist under the ACHR either.
8.2 B ind ing  Force ratione materiae
There is no unique jurisprudence on the question of which parts 
of an international tribunal’s judgments are binding. While accord­
ing to some courts binding force is limited to the operative part of 
the judgment, others include the underlying reasoning. Although 
the question usually surges in relation to the interpretation of judg­
ments by international courts, i.e. in order to know whether ques­
tions of interpretation may only refer to the operative part of the 
judgment or may extend to the court’s reasoning, it is of equal im­
portance for the determination of state responsibility for the execu­
tion of judgments under international law, in particular for the de­
termination if only the operative part is executable or if the court’s 
reasoning may contain obligatory provisions, too.
8.2.1 Binding Force ratione materiae in Public International 
Law
International tribunals, such as arbitral tribunals or the PCIJ, have 
never applied a strict separation between the operative part of a 
judgment and the reasoning. The tribunal in the Pious Fund Case 
for example held:
Considerant que toutes les parties d’un jugement ou 
d’un arret concernant les points debattus au litige 
s’eclairent et se completent mutuellement et qu’elles 
servent toutes a preciser le sens et la portee du disposi-
9Buergenthal, “Implementation o f the judgments o f the Court”, p. 192.
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tif, a determiner les points sur lesquels ily  a chosejugee 
et qui partant ne peuvent etre remis en question.10
This does not mean that the reasoning of a court necessarily has 
binding force, but it underlines the unity of the judgment so that 
the operative part cannot be read separately from the reasoning. The 
PCIJ in its 1925 Polish Postal Service in Danzig decision did not make 
clear if the reasoning could have binding force, limiting itself to note 
that “the reasons contained in a decision, at least in so far as they 
go beyond the scope of the operative part, have no binding force as 
between the Parties concerned”, thus leaving unanswered the ques­
tion if the reasoning as far as it does not exceed the operative part 
has binding force.11 It resolved this point in its 1927 decision on the 
Interpretation o f  Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow), hold­
ing that those parts of the reasoning have binding force that “con­
stitute a condition essential to the Court’s decision”.12 This finding 
was contested by Judge Anzilotti in his dissenting opinion, who ar­
gued that binding force is limited to the operative part of a judgment 
and not the statement of the reasons.13
The ICJ has pronounced itself on the issue in relation to Article 60 
of Statute of the ICJ and Article 98 of Rules of Court of the ICJ, which 
establish the possibility that states request an interpretation of the 
Court’s judgments in cases to which they are parties. The Court has 
held that interpretation is limited to the part of the judgment which 
is binding.14 In accordance with the PCIJ it has made clear that only 
the operative part of a judgment contains binding provisions, ex­
10 Pious Fund Case (United States o f  America v. Mexico), Arbitration Tribunal, 14 Oc­
tober 1902, RIAA, Volume IX, pp. 11-14, p. 12.
11 Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ, 16 May 1925, Series B no. 
11, pp. 29f.
12 Interpretation o f  Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow) (Interpretation), PCIJ,
16 December 1927, Series A no. 13, p. 20.
13Ibid., Dissenting Opinion by M. Anzilotti, p. 23f.; see in the same sense South West 
Africa (Liberia and Ethiopia v. South Africa) (Second Phase), ICJ, 18 July 1966, ICJ 
Reports 1966, p. 6, Separate Opinion o f Judge Morelli, p. 59.
14Request fo r  Interpretation o f  the Judgment o f  20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case 
(Colombia v. Peru), ICJ, 27 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 395, p. 402.
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cluding the considerations, as long as they are not inseparable from 
the operative part.15
The Court of Arbitration in the Delimitation o f  the Continental 
Shelf case decided in the same way. Making reference to the Inter­
pretation o f  Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow) decision of 
the PCIJ it found that
[t]he Court of Arbitration considers it to be well settled 
that in international proceedings the authority of res ju ­
dicata, that is the binding force of the decision, attaches 
in principle only to the provisions of its dispositif and 
not to its reasoning. In the opinion of the Court, it is 
equally clear that, having regard to the close links that 
exist between the reasoning of a decision and the provi­
sions of its dispositif, recourse may in principle be had 
to the reasoning in order to elucidate the meaning and 
scope of the dispositif. From this it follows that under 
certain conditions and within certain limits, the reason­
ing in a decision may properly be invoked as a ground 
for requesting an interpretation of provisions of its dis- 
positif [ .. .]  Furthermore, if findings in the reasoning 
constitute a condition essential to the decision given in 
the dispositif, these findings are to be considered as in­
cluded amongst the points settled with binding force in 
the decision.16
In the 1988 AMCO v. Republic o f  Indonesia case, the Tribunal of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC­
SID) did an extensive research on the issue of binding force under 
international law.17 In this case the Tribunal had to find which parts
15 Request fo r  Interpretation o f  the Judgment o f  11 June 1998 (Cameroon v. Nigeria), ICJ, 
25 March 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 31, p. 35; see also Affaire Junghans (Deuxieme 
Partie), Arbitration Tribunal, 21 October 1940, RIAA, Volume III, pp. 1883-1891, 
p. 1889, according to which a reasoning cannot have binding force as long as it 
has not been translated into an operative disposition; Schulte, Compliance with 
Decisions o f  the ICJ, p. 30; Mosler/Simma, “The Charter o f the UN, Article 94”, No. 1.
16Delimitation o f  the Continental Shelf, Arbitration Tribunal, 14 March 1978, 
RIAA, Volume XVIII, pp. 3-413, p. 295.
17AMCO v. Republic o f  Indonesia (Resubmitted Case), ICSID, 10 May 1988, 5 ILM 27, 
p. 1281.
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of an original judgment it had handed down earlier had been an­
nulled by a later judgment of an ad hoc Committee under ICSID 
rules. The question was raised because Indonesia alleged in this new 
case that not only the operative part (“ dispositif ”) but also certain 
parts of the annulment decision itself were binding upon the sub­
sequent Tribunal.18 Consulting different sources in doctrine and ju ­
risprudence, the Tribunal found that “[i]t is by no means clear that 
the basic trend in international law is to accept reasoning, prelim­
inary or incidental determinations as part of what constitutes res 
judicata”.19 The Tribunal nevertheless did not resolve the question 
either but determined its resolution only for the particular case of 
the ICSID Convention, maintaining that the full reasoning of the ad 
hoc Committee cannot have binding effect.20
We must therefore conclude that under international law the 
question of which parts of a judgment have binding force remains 
unsettled, although the majority of opinions and judgments tend 
towards limiting binding force to the operative parts of a judgment 
and those parts of the reasoning that specify the operative provi­
sions. There is definitely no rule, nor has it ever been alleged, that 
binding force would emanate indiscriminately from all parts of a 
judgment, i.e. from the operative part as well as from the entire rea­
soning.
8.2.2 Binding Force ratione materiae of IACtHR Judgments
The IACtHR, only one year after the ICSID Tribunal had handed 
down the decision in AMCO v. Republic o f  Indonesia, pronounced it­
self on the issue of binding force in one of its first judgments. In the 
Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs) decision, 
the Court had to decide reparation for several human rights viola­
tions in relation to the disappearance of a person by state forces. 
One of the IACommHR’s claims was to order the state to undertake 
investigations of the facts of the case and to punish those respon­
sible. The Court, referring to its deliberations in the sentence on 
the merits, stated that it had “already pointed out the Government’s
18Ibid., para. 22.
19Ibid., para. 32.
20Ibid., para. 44.
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continuing duty to investigate so long as the fate of a disappeared 
person is unknown” and that “[t]he duty to investigate is in addition 
to the duties to prevent involuntary disappearances and to punish 
those directly responsible”.21 It concluded, without mentioning the 
discussion in other international courts or motivating its point of 
view, that “[a]lthough these obligations were not expressly incor­
porated into the resolutory part of the judgment on the merits, it is 
a principle of procedural law that the bases of a judicial decision are 
a part of the same”.22 The responding state is thus under an obliga­
tion to comply with the Court’s direct orders emanating from the 
operative paragraphs or the deliberations.
It remains unresolved though whether the state’s responsibilities 
are limited to the express Court orders or if more far-reaching obli­
gations can emanate from a judgment, i.e. whether the Court’s judg­
ments are final also in terms of reparation due. Such situations can 
occur if, for instance, in a big massacre case more victims appear 
than had been known at the time of the judgment or if the situation 
emanating from a human rights violation determined by the Court 
shows to require other ways of reparation than the ones ordered, 
e.g. the application of other types of treatments for the victims.
In the Mapiripăn Massacre v. Colombia decision -  dealing with a 
massacre caused by Paramilitary groups that had invaded a small 
town and tortured, killed and made disappear several inhabitants -  
the Court resolved that the number of victims identified before it 
was incomplete due to shortcomings in the official investigation of 
the facts by the state authorities. Not knowing the particular situ­
ation of the unidentified victims and their next of kin, it excluded 
them from its orders on pecuniary damages, referring them to the 
national authorities where they could make the pertinent claims. 
The Court specifically underlined that these unidentified victims
21 Velăsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, para. 34; citing Velăsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), IACtHR,
29 July 1988, Series C no. 4, paras. 174 and 181.
22 Velăsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, Se­
ries C no. 7, para. 35. See also Gelman v. Uruguay (Supervision de Cumplimiento), 
IACtHR, 20 March 2013, paras. 102, 104, and ibid., paras. 35ff. o f the reasoned con­
curring vote o f Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, citing a decision by the Mexican 
Supreme Court o f Justice o f the Nation.
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were to be identified by the means ordered in its judgment.23 The 
judgment thus applies to these victims on two levels: the means 
ordered for the sake of identification are directly applicable to ev­
eryone who claims to be a victim and directly bind the state, while 
the compensatory orders find only indirect application through pro­
ceedings before national organs. Nevertheless, the state is legally 
bound not only in relation to the victims named in the Court’s judg­
ment but also to all other victims unknown at the time of the judg­
ment. This makes clear that the subject matter of the case, and the 
same goes for other large scale violations, were not the violations in­
flicted upon the particular victims appearing before the Court, but 
the situation underlying the specific violations -  in this case the 
Paramilitary attack as such. This is a significant conceptual differ­
ence to the way the ECtHR approaches large scale violations which 
are generally decided on an individual case-to-case basis.24
Why was it necessary then to specifically mention the unidenti­
fied victims in the original judgment? Apart from the sake of clar­
ifying their rights, this would not have been the case if it could be 
assumed that the state’s obligation to provide restitutio in integrum 
went beyond the specific reparation orders of the Court and com­
prised all measures that were necessary to obtain full reparation. 
The Court’s orders would then be mere punctual specifications of 
a general obligation deriving from the declaration of a breach of 
the Convention. The binding effect of the judgment would extend 
beyond these specific indications and comprise everything that is 
necessary to return the victims, as far as possible, to the situation 
before the violation had occurred. Thus, all measures necessary to 
attain this goal would be imposed on the state even if the Court had
23 Mapiripân Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR,
15 September 2005, Series C no. 134, para. 247. The means ordered were a genetic
information system and an official mechanism where unidentified victims or next
o f kin could file their claims that were to be treated according to the guidelines laid
down in the judgment.
24Even in the pilot judgment cases the Court does not adjudicate the situation under­
lying a large scale violation but identifies an underlying problem parting from an
individual case and afterwards, if  the state does not resolve the systemic problem, 
decides all other cases separately. See Lukenda v. Slovenia, ECtHR, no. 23032/02,
6 October 2005 and subsequent cases and E.G. v. Poland  (dec.), ECtHR, no. 50425/99,
23 September 2008, both presented in section 5.2.2.
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not specifically mentioned each one of them. Such an effect has been 
recognized by the ECtHR for its judgments. The ECtHR specifically 
mentioned the states’ obligation to provide restitutio in integrum de­
riving directly from the declaration of a breach of the ECHR. It has 
made clear that there may exist obligations for the state to choose 
general and individual measures that exceed the effects obtained 
of the payment of just satisfaction.25 Consequently, in Europe the 
award of just satisfaction does not replace the state’s obligation to 
award restitutio in integrum but, depending on the case, may only 
cover part of the state’s obligations.26 Would a similar practice ex­
ist under the ACHR, the necessary reparation means that were not 
mentioned in the IACtHR’s judgment could then -  similar to the 
proceeding before the Committee of Ministers in the European Sys­
tem -  be further specified by the Court in cooperation with the par­
ties during the reparation phase.
The concept of binding force under the ACHR though is different 
from that applied under the ECHR. The IACtHR’s decisions are not 
essentially of a declaratory nature: they declare the breach of the 
ACHR, but they also specify the state’s obligations deriving from 
that breach. The part on reparation is so detailed in comparison 
to ECtHR judgments because the underlying idea is that the Court 
specifies the states’ obligations deriving from the breach in their en­
tirety. Where the ECtHR leaves a broad margin of appreciation to 
the state, the IACtHR reduces it almost to zero, indicating a high 
number of specific measures to be taken. Finality of the Court’s 
reparation orders is implied by Article 63(1) read together with Arti­
cle 68 of the ACHR. The measures to be ordered by the Court under 
Article 63(1) of the ACHR accrue to full reparation. This negatively 
implies that where there are no such orders, no further obligations 
for the state exist under Article 68 of the ACHR.27 The determina­
tion of what is necessary to obtain full reparation in the specific case
25Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, ECtHR, nos. 39221/98 et al., 3 Ju ly  2000, Reports 2000-
VIII, para. 249.
26See Sundberg, “Control o f Execution”, p. 571; critical: Ruedin, Execution des arrets, 
pp. 180f.
27Cf. Baena-Ricardo y  otros Vs. Panama  (Competencia), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, 
Series C no. 104, para. 64 and Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Reparations and 
Costs), IACtHR, 29 January 1997, Series C no. 31, para. 13 o f the dissenting opinion 
o f Judge Canţado Trindade.
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is hence not laid into the hands of the state but is one of the Court’s 
own tasks. A principle of subsidiarity on the reparation stage is not 
known to the inter-American system. If the state shall determine 
the scope of reparation measures itself, the Court has to specifically 
order this. This is often the case for general measures to prevent 
the recurrence of similar violations, when the state shall “take the 
appropriate legal or administrative measures”. In the judgment on 
reparation the Court hence finally settles the question of repara­
tion. It has held: “Una vez determinada la responsabilidad interna- 
cional del Estado por la violation de la Convention Americana, la 
Corte procede a ordenar las medidas destinadas a reparar dicha vio­
lation [our emphasis] .”28 This finding is underlined by the fact that 
in the Court’s orders on monitoring of compliance with judgments 
the question of obligations reaching beyond the measures ordered 
has never been raised. This means that a state’s margin of appreci­
ation on how to discharge its obligation of reparation is reduced to 
the narrow framework set by the Court. The state may not provide 
reparation in other ways without the Court’s authorization.29
The binding force of the IACtHR’s judgments hence does not go 
beyond what has been expressly mandated in the judgment. How­
ever, even complex reparation orders in a specific case do not affect 
the state’s general obligation under Articles 1 and 2 of the ACHR 
to give full effect to the rights enshrined in the Convention. This 
obligation, as well as that of other states who were not a party to 
the original case, to respect the Court’s interpretation of the ACHR 
is however not enforceable as a consequence of a specific judgment 
but exists independently from it.30
28Baena-Ricardo y  otros Vs. Panama (Competencia), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, Se­
ries C no. 104, para. 72; the English translation reads “[ . . . ]  orders measures de­
signed to remedy this violation”, but the authentic Spanish version is clearer on 
the finality o f the reparation order, putting the definite article before “medidas”.
29Cf. Article 63 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
30Cf. Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 29 January 
1997, Series C no. 31, para. 10 o f the dissenting opinion o f Judge Cangado Trindade 
and Gelman v. Uruguay (Supervision de Cumplimiento), IACtHR, 20 March 2013, 
paras. 70f. Also ibid., paras. 43ff. o f the reasoned concurring vote o f Judge Ferrer 
Mac-Gregor Poisot. The obligation o f other states to respect the IACtHR’s interpre­
tation o f the ACHR and other human rights treaties is known as res interpretata.
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8.2.3 Binding Force ratione materiae of ECtHR Judgments
The parties to a case are bound by the operative part of the judg- 
ment.31 Due to the restrictive reparation practice of the Court, 
this part nevertheless usually only contains the determination of 
whether or not there has been a violation of a specific Conven­
tion norm, plus an eventual ruling on pecuniary just satisfaction or 
recently also other limited obligations to be complied with by the 
state. Specific orders in the operative part, like the payment ofjust 
satisfaction or more far-reaching orders in pilot judgments or in the 
cases the state has been ordered other specific measures, have to be 
complied with in the terms stipulated by the Court in the judgment.
Given its small explanatory value, it would make no sense to re­
duce the binding force of the Court’s judgments to the operative 
part.32 In fact, the Court itself has recognized that there are obli­
gations emanating directly from a judgment that go beyond those 
eventually named in the operative paragraphs, namely the obliga­
tion to provide restitutio in integrum for the damage caused.33 The 
scope of this obligation can only be determined taking into account 
the reasoning of the Court, because the operative part generally 
only provides minimal information about the details of the violation 
and how it may be remedied. Further necessary details are contained 
in the Court’s reasoning. It defines and limits the subject matter and 
with it the extent of the state’s obligations that derive from the de­
termination of the Convention violation in a particular situation.34 
Material binding force of the Court’s judgments consequently em­
anates from the operative paragraphs in line with the factual find­
ings and the judicial evaluation made in the reasoning.35 This rea­
soning is limited by the facts and the specific claim submitted by the
31Frowein/Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar 2009, Art. 46 no. 1; Ruedin, Execution des ar­
rets, p. 111.
32Also Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, p. 37.
33Cf. Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Just Satisfaction), ECtHR, no. 14556/89,
31 October 1995, Series A no. 330-B, para. 34; Ress, “Die Einzelfallbezogenheit”, 
p. 737; on the contrary: Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 41461/02, 24 June
2008, para. 4 o f the separate opinion o f Judges Spielman and Malinverni.
34Ruedin, Execution des arrets, p. 112.
35Okresek, “Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung: Probleme 
der Vollstreckung und der Behandlung von W iederholungsfällen”, EuGRZ (2003), 
p. 171; Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, p. 38.
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applicant, the Court being barred from examining a situation ultra 
petita, e.g. by performing an abstract control of a law beyond those 
articles that have caused the violation suffered by the victim in the 
specific case.36
This though does not mean that the binding force of the judgment 
would only affect the relation between the state and the victim in 
the particular case. As has been shown supra, ECtHR judgments not 
only imply that the responding state adopts individual reparation 
measures in relation to the victim, but that it provides restitutio in 
integrum. This includes general measures to prevent similar cases 
in the future.37 Almost all judgments of the Court are therefore not 
limited to the individual case under scrutiny but create, apart from 
the relation to the victim, a general binding effect on the responding 
state to bring its internal order in line with its international obli­
gations concerning cases similar to the one judged.38 The binding 
effect indirectly extends to the underlying legal or factual circum­
stances that have caused the specific violation.39
A Court judgment hence makes the general obligation under Ar­
ticle 1 of the ECHR to maintain the domestic laws and administra­
tive practices in line with the Convention, as it is construed by the 
Court, enforceable under Article 46(2) of the ECHR in the specific 
situation that gave rise to the judgment.40 For instance, a judgment 
in which the Court finds a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR due to 
excessive length of proceedings not only binds the state with respect 
to the elimination of the consequences of the specific proceeding in 
question, but also in terms of procuring that the victim -  and in
36Legal dispositions p er se may though be the subject matter o f a case and thus be di­
rectly evaluated by the Court. See among others Dudgeon v. United Kingdom  (Mer­
its), ECtHR, no. 7525/76, 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45. In such cases, the obli­
gation to modify the law is based on the state’s obligation to cease a continuing 
violation. See in more detail: Ruedin, Execution des arrets, pp. 139ff.
37Cf. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, ECtHR, nos. 39221/98 et al., 3 July 2000, Re­
ports 2000-VIII, para. 249; VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 32772/02,
30 June 2009, para. 85.
38Cf. Ruedin, Execution des arrets, pp. 118f. According to Lambert, Les effets des arrets, 
pp. 111f., this obligation originates not only in the text (Articles 1 and 53 o f the 
ECHR) but also in “the spirit” o f the ECHR.
39Ress, “Die Einzelfallbezogenheit”, p. 740.
40Cf. Lambert, Leseffetsdes arrets, 71p.;Ress, “The Effects ofJudgments and Decisions 
in Domestic Law”, p. 803.
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so far the general measure gets an individual component -  or any 
other person will not be exposed to similar shortcomings in the fu­
ture. This may require administrative measures such as contracting 
more judges or legal ones such as adopting rules for swifter proceed­
ings. The general assertion that binding force would only include 
the legal norm on which the specific act in question was based if 
the Court had expressly included this norm into its considerations 
is too restricted.41 The subject matter of a Court’s case is the specific 
violation described by the applicant. But, as has been seen supra, 
the obligation to provide restitutio in integrum incumbent on the re­
sponding state goes beyond the individual case and always compre­
hends the underlying legislative or regulatory circumstances that 
made the violation possible and may be the root for similar viola­
tions in the future.42 The wide understanding of the binding force is 
caused by the particular function of an ECtHR judgment, which is 
“moins d’un recours de responsabilite que de ‘conventionnalite’, ins- 
taure pour contraindre l’Etat a respecter l’engagement pris a l’article 
1 de la convention, a savoir la garantie des droits conventionnels aux 
individus residant sur son territoire”.43
The concept of broad binding force has indirectly been con­
firmed by the introduction of the pilot judgment procedure, which 
is based on this concept.44 In a pilot judgment, the Court, in terms of 
Rule 61(3) of the Rules of the ECtHR, indicates the general measures 
the responding state has to adopt in order to counter a systemic 
shortcoming that has given or may give rise to a large number of 
similar violations -  generally without specifying in its reasoning a 
specific legal norm as the cause of the systemic shortcoming. The 
fact that the Court specifies the consequence in the operative para­
graphs that the responding state has to modify its domestic order 
does not mean that the subject matter of a pilot judgment would
41This position has been formulated by Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten, 
pp. 44, 46.
42This becomes explicit in Rule 6(2)(b) o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the 
Execution o f Judgments.
43Lambert, Les effets des arrets, p. 71.
44Cf. CM Resolution Res(2004)3 and Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, ECtHR, no. 35014/97,
22 February 2005, para. 151.
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have changed in comparison to non-pilot judgments.45 On the con­
trary, the Court’s more specific indications shall only “assist states 
in finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers 
in supervising the execution of judgments”.46 The introduction of 
pilot judgments was hence a mere procedural modification that does 
not modify a judgment’s binding force -  which is why they could 
be adopted without modifications to the Court’s basic documents, a 
posterior regulation in the Rules of the ECtHR being sufficient. This 
was possible because already before the legal or administrative reg­
ulations underlying a violation were comprehended by a judgment’s 
binding force.
A judgment’s binding force is hence extensive independently 
from whether it was designated as a pilot judgment or not. Binding 
force includes the internal legal rules or administrative or judicial 
practices that have permitted the violation. Particularly in view of 
the Court’s frequent recurrence to the obligation to provide resti­
tutio in integrum in the last years, it is not justified to further as­
sume that judgments produce only a limited binding effect exclud­
ing causes for the violation that do not originiate in legal provisions 
or cases where the Court has not specifically mentioned the under­
lying systemic problem.47
This, however, may not lead to the conclusion that the Court’s 
judgments could have effects beyond the situation that was under 
scrutiny. If the Court does not proceed to examine parts of an appli­
cation, its judgments cannot bind the state with respect to this part 
of the facts submitted. The Court’s judgments have a horizontal ef­
fect, penetrating into the judicial or legal order beyond the situation 
decided, but there is no direct vertical effect in the sense of expan-
45Ruedin, Execution des arrets, pp. 114f., appears to suggest a difference but recognizes 
the practical insufficiency o f this view on p. 118f. o f the same book. See on the other 
hand Ress, “Die Einzelfallbezogenheit”, p. 740 and Department o f the Execution of 
Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights, The Committee o f  Ministers’ 
Supervision o f  Execution o f  the Judgments o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights, 
p. 4, pointing to the general obligation o f states to modify the situation underlying 
a specific violation already before the introduction o f the pilot judgment procedure.
46Cf. CM Resolution Res(2004)3.
47Defending this opinion: Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen derStaaten , pp. 44ff.; con­
sidering a broader conception o f binding force in the sense developed herein: 
Ruedin, Execution des arrets, pp. 118f.
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other states.48
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48Lambert, Les effets des arrets, p. 74. 
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9 Execution of Judgments under the 
Conventions
Despite the creation of regional organs to ensure human rights pro­
tection, together with the possibility to file individual complaints 
against states, participation in international human rights protec­
tion systems does not necessarily correlate with better human rights 
protection in the signatory states.1 Compliance may though be im­
proved by way of an effective system to adjudicate human rights 
violations and provide victims with just satisfaction. In particular 
in politically charged circumstances, international courts may pro­
vide a more objective of a situation. The possibilities of international 
courts though seem limited when it comes to implementing the do­
mestic consequences required by a judgment, i.e. the individual and 
general measures the responding state has to take. Given the ab­
sence of effective international judicial coercion, the execution of 
judgments depends on the political will of the states. Lack of will 
to execute will become a major obstacle in every regional human 
rights protection system. Execution of such judgments by interna­
tional organs hence has to follow other patterns.
Judgments of both human rights courts in principle have to be 
executed by the state without further intervention by any inter­
national organ.2 The systems rely insofar on the principle of good 
will, common to public international law.3 During the drafting of 
the ECHR, a significant role was also envisaged for public opinion
1 It is being questioned if  human rights treaties generally improve the human rights 
situation in the signatory states. See Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make 
a Difference?”, Yale L.J. 111 (2002), pp. 1935ff., suggesting that the human rights 
situation tends to worsen after the signature o f human rights treaties, and Goodman 
and Jinks, “Measuring the Effects o f Human Rights Treaties”, Eur J  Int Law  14(1) 
(2003), pp. 171ff., who contradict H athaway’s findings.
2Article 46(1) o f the ECHR and Article 68(1) o f the ACHR.
3Hereon Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
(Judgment), ICJ, 13 Ju ly 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 213, p. 267 indicating further 
sources.
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which should exert pressure on the national states to comply with 
ECtHR judgments.4 Among the American states the issue of execu­
tion was undisputed during the drafting of the ACHR, and the ques­
tion of a supervisory organ was not even discussed.5 The European 
states agreed to transfer the judgments of the Court to the Commit­
tee of Ministers, “which shall supervise its execution”,6 while the 
ACHR does not expressly provide supervision of execution at all. 
Consequently, the designation of powers in the phase of execution 
is much more ambiguous and has already been challenged in the 
Americas. The ACHR’s silence on supervision has resulted in the 
IACtHR occupying a predominant role in the post-judgment pro­
cess. The differences between the political execution system of the 
COE (9.1) and the judicial procedure under the ACHR (9.2) shall now 
be examined in detail.
9.1 Execution under the EC H R
Supervision of execution of ECtHR judgments, according to Arti­
cle 46(2) of the ECHR lies in the hands of the Committee of Minis­
ters, a political organ of the CoE (9.1.1). Nevertheless, other organs 
such as the Court itself (9.1.2) or the Parliamentary Assembly (9.1.3) 
are also interfering in the process of execution.
9.1.1 The Committee of Ministers
Execution of judgments is supervised principally by the Committee 
of Ministers. In its day to day business, the Committee is supported 
by the Execution Department of the Secretariat of the CoE, which 
prepares the meetings, accompanies the states during the execution 
phase and provides legal assessment to the Committee.7
The Committee was conceived by the authors of the ECHR as a 
collegiate organ in which the states sit together as peers. This prin­
4ECtHR, Preparatory work on Articles 53 and 54 o f  the European Convention on Human 
Rights, pp. 1ff.
5See OAS, “Antecedentes, Convocatoria, Sede y Fecha de la Conferencia Especial- 
izada Interam ericana sobre Derechos Humanos”.
6Article 46(2) o f the ECHR.
7 Von Staden, Shaping human rights policy in liberal democracies, p. 127.
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ciple also applies to the human rights meetings where the state that 
has failed to observe its obligations under the Convention partici­
pates as a full member even in the sessions concerning itself. The 
concept of peer review presupposes that, in the spirit of Article 1(a) 
of the Statute of the CoE, states are generally in a disposition to com­
ply with the Court's judgments.8 In these circumstances, the peer 
states' task is to help the failing member to implement the neces­
sary reparation measures and to resolve disputes on a solitary basis. 
Should a member be unwilling to implement a judgment, the others 
could mount political pressure to move it towards compliance with­
out having to recur to official means of force such as suspension 
from the Council.
In consequence of the enormous throughput of cases at the Court, 
the number of cases pending supervision before the Committee has 
reached new heights as well. At the end of 2013, 11 018 cases were 
pending supervision. This was the first year that a slight reduction 
in the number of pending cases could be achieved by the Committee, 
after a continuous increase from 706 cases in 1996 to apeak of 11 099 
in 2012.9 Out of these cases, 9 521 were classified as clone or isolated, 
whereat 1 496 were leading cases, i.e.
cases which have been identified as revealing a new 
structural/general problem in a respondent state and 
which thus require the adoption of new general mea­
sures [ .. .]  Leading cases include a fortiori pilot judg­
ments [ . . . ] .10
While the overall number of pending cases decreased slightly be­
tween 2012 and 2013, the number of leading cases continued to grow 
from 1 337 in 2011 to 1 496 by the end of 2013.11 In the same period, 
the Committee could close supervision of 1 398 cases, 1 216 of which 
were clone or isolated and 182 leading cases.
Due to the high overall number of cases pending execution, the 
Committee focuses its work on the leading cases in which the adop­
tion of general measures usually entails the execution of several
8Ruedin, Execution des arrets, p. 7.
9Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2013, p. 36.
10Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2010, p. 29.
11 Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2013, p. 37.
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other clone cases and thus significantly reduces the number of pend­
ing cases. Priority treatment of these cases has therefore been in­
troduced in 2006. In general, advances in the reform process of the 
treatment of cases by the European organs has been reflected in the 
continuous adoption of new working methods by the Committee 
for the supervision of execution of judgments.
A set of partly overlapping rules governs the execution process.
9.1.1.1 Procedure
Once a judgment of the Court has become final, it is transmitted to 
the Committee, which inscribes it in its agenda for special human 
rights meetings (DH/HR).12 Cases are then treated according to their 
pertinence. The highest pertinence is given to pilot judgments.13 On 
an equal level are treated “other important cases”, especially if grave 
injuries have been caused.14 All other judgments are of lesser perti­
nence.
9.1.1.1.1 2004 Working Methods Since the entry into force of 
Protocol no. 11 in 1998, the Committee of Ministers started to 
work intensely on the issue of effectiveness of the European human 
rights system, in particular regarding the new facility of individual 
complaints which caused a considerable rise in applications to the 
Court.15 During this process of reflection and reform, documents 
were adopted on several practical issues such as the reopening of 
cases before national jurisdictions,16 rules of procedure for the su­
12Article 46 o f the ECHR, Rule 3 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution 
o f Judgments.
13CM Resolution Res(2004)3.
14Rule 4(2) o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
15See a compendium of measures adopted in this process in Directorate General o f 
Human Rights, Guaranteeing the effectiveness. The Committee’s practice since the 
first contentious judgments has been reproduced in von Staden, Shaping human 
rights policy in liberal democracies, pp. 120ff.
16Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 o f the Committee o f Ministers to member states 
on the re-examination or reopening o f certain cases at domestic level following 
judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights (hereinafter “CM Recommen­
dation No. R (2000) 2”), adopted by the Committee o f Ministers at the 694th “Human 
Rights” Meeting, 19 January 2000.
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pervision of execution,17 the publication and dissemination of the 
text of the Convention and case-law by the Court,18 and the already 
mentioned resolution on cases identifying an underlying structural 
problem,19 among others. Additionally, in 2001 two working groups 
dedicated to the reform of the human rights protection system were 
established: an Evaluation Group set up by the Committee of Minis­
ters and a Reflection Group within the Steering Committee on Hu­
man Rights.20
During this process the Committee adopted new working meth­
ods for the execution of judgments by the Ministers’ Deputies.21 
These methods laid the basis for today’s procedure by introducing 
execution time tables that “will provide reference points that will 
structure the execution process and allow for the development of 
adequate responses in cases where there is a potential of delays in 
execution.”22 Furthermore, status sheets were implemented to make 
the supervision process better revisable, introducing a set of steps 
every case would take. Thus, the debate on standard, uncontrover- 
sial measures was to be prevented.23 Plenary debate should also not 
take place until a case fell into one out of a fixed set of categories, 
containing elements such as systemic cases, changes in case-law by 
the Court, cases presenting a particularly grave situation for the ap­
plicant or inter-state cases.24
17Rules Adopted by the Committee o f Ministers for the Application o f Article 46, 
Paragraph 2, o f the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the Minis­
ters’ Deputies at their 736th meeting, 10 January 2001, reprinted in: Guaranteeing 
the effectiveness o f the European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 82-84.
18Recommendation Rec (2002) 13, adopted by the M inisters’ Deputies at their 822nd 
meeting, 18 December 2002, reprinted in: Guaranteeing the effectiveness o f the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pp. 54-55.
19CM Resolution Res(2004)3.
20 Eaton and Schokkenbroek, “Reforming the Human Rights Protection System ”, 
HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 2.
21 CM/Inf(2004)8 Final -  Human rights working methods (hereinafter “CM/Inf(2004)8 
fin”), adopted by the Committee ofM inisters at the 879th “Human Rights” Meeting,
7 April 2004.
22No. 2.1 o f CM/Inf(2004)8 fin.
23Nos. 2.2ff. o f CM/Inf(2004)8 fin.
24Appendix I no.1.1 o f CM/Inf(2004)8 fin.
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9.1.1.1.2 2006 Rules The supervision process today follows the 
2006 CM Rules for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments. 
These rules remain the basic document, although an important re­
form package has been adopted in the aftermaths of the Interlaken 
Conference of 2010. The 2006 rules were inspired by the adoption 
of Protocol no. 14 and the Committee’s developing practice.25
The rules maintain the principle that states have to submit, upon 
inscription of a case in the Committee’s agenda, information on the 
measures they have adopted or are planning to adopt with respect 
to a judgment. They have to justify delays or shortcomings in the 
execution of judgments before their peer states. Furthermore, the 
Committee examines on its own accounts the payment of just satis­
faction and application of measures taken by the state to restore the 
victim to the enjoyment of the rights from the ECHR that were vio­
lated. Its powers also include the examination of general measures 
taken by the state to prevent future violations of the same kind and 
to end ongoing violations.26 Rule 6(2) of the CM Rules for the Su­
pervision of the Execution of Judgments distinguishes three types 
of reparation whose adoption the Committee shall supervise: just 
satisfaction, when awarded by the Court; individual measures “to 
ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured party is put, 
as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior 
to the violation of the Convention”; and general measures “prevent­
ing new violations similar to that or those found or putting an end 
to continuing violations”. Although two footnotes to this rule give 
examples for individual27 and general28 measures, the rules again 
underline the “discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned 
to choose the means necessary to comply with the judgment”.
25Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, p. 34.
26Rule 6(2) o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
27 “For instance, the striking out o f an unjustified criminal conviction from the crim­
inal records, the granting o f a residence permit or the reopening o f impugned do- 
m esticproceedings [ . . . ] ”.
28“For instance, legislative or regulatory amendments, changes o f case law or ad­
ministrative practice or publication o f the Court's judgment in the language o f the 
respondent state and its dissemination to the authorities concerned”.
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With the 2006 reform, prioritization of cases, in line with CM Res­
olution Res(2004)3, was included in the standard set of instruments 
available to the Committee.29
Interim resolutions are the main instrument of communication of 
the Committee. It may adopt them at any stage of the proceedings, 
notably “in order to provide information on the state of progress of 
the execution or, where appropriate, to express concern and/or to 
make suggestions with respect to the execution”.30 Only after just 
satisfaction has been paid or sufficient other individual measures 
have been taken, is the case deleted from the Committee’s agenda 
by way of a final resolution concluding that the Committee has ex­
ercised its functions under Article 46(2) of the ECHR. Otherwise the 
case will, in general, remain on the agenda for every future DH/HR 
meeting.31 Corresponding resolutions are adopted by a two-thirds 
majority of all members on the Committee, including the affected 
state.32
The injured party does not directly participate in the supervision 
process, but it may send communications of any kind during the 
supervision phase to the Committee in order to inform it about the 
state of execution of the judgment in its respect. NGOs or national 
institutions have a broader possibility to make submissions on ev­
ery aspect related to the execution of a judgment.33 Apart from this 
possibility, the injured party may not participate in the Committee’s 
sessions as the deliberations are held in private -  as long as nothing 
else was decided unanimously -  in line with Article 21 of the Statute 
of the CoE.
Certain documents, such as country information or information 
submitted to the Committee by the injured party or third-party in­
terveners such as NGOs, will though be made available to the public. 
After each session, the annotated agenda of the Committee’s super­
vision will be published. The Committee is furthermore publishing, 
since 2007, annual reports about its work. Nevertheless, any of the
29Rule 4 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
30 Rule 16 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
31 Rule 7 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
32 Article 20(c) o f the Statute o f the CoE.
33 Rule 9 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
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aforementioned publications may be suppressed upon a decision by 
the Committee.
9.1.1.1.3 2010 Reform The latest revision of the working meth­
ods ensued the action plan adopted at the Interlaken Conference of
2010, which underlined the importance of the principle of subsidiar­
ity and called the Committee to pay greater respect to the priorities 
each case requires.34 The Committee reacted swiftly and adopted 
a roadmap for the implementation of the Interlaken Action Plan.35 
Following proposals made particularly by France, it adopted a twin- 
track approach to supervision.36 While all unfinished cases continue 
to be considered technically on the agenda of each DH/HR meeting, 
they will now be dealt with according to a standard or an enhanced 
supervision procedure, depending on the importance of the case. 
Judgments requiring urgent individual measures, pilot judgments, 
judgments identifying major structural or complex problems, or in­
terstate cases shall be treated under the enhanced procedure. The 
enhanced procedure may also be proposed by member states or the 
Secretariat in other specific cases.37 The injured party has no influ­
ence on the procedure the Committee applies to a case.
The standard procedure implies little activity by the Committee. 
States are accompanied by the Secretariat during the process of im­
plementation and the Committee intervenes only to approve action 
plans or reports and to eventually adopt a final resolution when all 
individual and general measures have been implemented.38 Upon 
presentation of an action plan, the Execution Department of the
34“Interlaken Declaration”, in: High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European 
Court o f  Human Rights, ed. by Directorate General o f Human Rights and Legal 
Affairs, Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, 19 February 2010, pp. 119-125, no. F.11; 
on the Conference: Mowbray, “The Interlaken Declaration”, 3 HRLR 10 (2010); CM 
-  Extract o f decisions taken during 1100th CMDH meeting -  Item  e (hereinafter 
“Extract o f decisions taken during 1100th CMDH meeting - Item e”), adopted by 
the Committee o f Ministers at the 1100th “Human Rights” Meeting, 2 December 
2010, u r l : http://w w w .coe.int/t/dghl/m onitoring/execution/Source/D ocum ents/ 
Interlaken/Item_e1100th_EN.pdf.
35Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf(2010)28 rev.
36Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, no. 6.
37Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, nos. 8 and 9, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45, 
no. 10.
38Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf(2010)28 rev. No. 7, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, no. 12.
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Secretary will evaluate it and the measures proposed therein, be­
fore the Committee, at the next DH/HR meeting or no later than 
six months after submission of the plan, decides whether to accept 
the plan and invites the state to keep it updated on the measures 
adopted in conformity to the plan. Once the state considers to have 
adopted all measures it presents a final action report and solicits the 
closure of the case.39
Under the enhanced procedure cases are looked at with more 
scrutiny by the Committee in order “to arrive at effective, speedy 
and long-term solutions to problems that are the root cause of vi­
olations found by the Court”. The Execution Department is also 
working more closely with the state to adopt the measures required, 
and in particular provides assistance in the preparation and/or im­
plementation of action plans, expertise assistance as regards the 
type of measures envisaged, and bilateral/multilateral cooperation 
programmes (e.g. seminars, round-tables) in the case of complex 
and substantive issues.40 The Committee debates these cases only 
if the situation is apt to present developments or in order to outline 
shortcomings to the public. Such debates can be requested by any 
member of the Committee or the Secretariat.41 Otherwise, decisions 
without debate can be adopted to demonstrate the developments in 
the execution process.42
Both supervision methods are not supposed to be exclusive but 
shall rather be applied in a flexible way, depending on the progress 
in the specific case. Enhanced supervision should thus be envisaged 
in cases where the state does not comply with its obligations to sub­
mit actions plans (after three months of transfer of the case to the 
Committee) or if there are differences of opinion between the state 
and the Department of Execution of the Secretariat General. Plac­
ing a case under enhanced supervision might serve as a first signal 
that the Committee is considering the case with higher priority and 
might ensue discussion of the case, particularly if slow implemen­
tation of action plans persists.43
39Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, nos. 16f.
40Ibid., no. 20.
41 Ibid., nos. 21f.
42 Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45, no. 16.
43Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf(2010)28 rev. No. 11, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, nos. 24ff.
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Under either of the two supervision modalities, the Committee 
relies principally on the information provided by the state.44 This 
information is to be contained in two forms: action plans and ac­
tion reports. The Committee requires submission of such documents 
since 2009 within six months after a judgment has become final.45 
According to the official definition, an action plan is:
A plan setting out the measures the respondent State 
intends to take to implement a judgment of the Court, 
including an indicative timetable. The plan shall, if pos­
sible, set out all measures necessary to implement the 
judgment. Alternatively, where it is not possible to de­
termine all measures immediately, the plan shall set 
out the steps to be taken to determine the measures 
required, including an indicative timetable for such 
steps.46
Upon culmination of the state’s efforts it submits an action report, 
which has been defined as:
A report by the respondent State setting out all the mea­
sures taken to implement a judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights, and/or an explanation of why 
no measures, or no further measures, are necessary.47
The states are expected to submit an action plan or, if  they consider 
to have adopted all necessary measures, an action report as soon as 
possible, at latest within six months.
Supervision of payment of just satisfaction has also been modi­
fied, putting more responsibilities onto the applicant. Applicants are 
henceforth informed by the Court in letters accompanying the judg­
ment that it is their responsibility to contest information submitted 
by the state to the Committee concerning payment of just satisfac- 
tion.48 Once a payment has been effectuated, the state informs the 
Committee of this fact using a standard form. This information is
44Rule 6 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
45Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, no. 3.
46Ibid., Appendix I no. 5.
47Ibid., Appendix I no. 7.
48Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2010, p. 19.
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immediately published on the execution website of the CoE.49 It is 
up to the applicant to verify the information submitted by the state 
to the Committee, because the Execution Department’s activity is 
limited to registering and publishing payment notices. Once such 
a notice has been published, the applicant, within a term of two 
months, may contest the payment. Beyond this term they are sup­
posed to have accepted the payment and the issue will be closed.50
The new working methods also imply more standardized infor­
mation to be prepared for the delegates sitting on the Committee. 
They will receive a standard set of documents at least one month 
before each DH/HR meeting, containing information on all points 
mentioned above.51 In this documentation, the delegates are also in­
formed about the submissions made by the party to a case or NGOs 
according to Rule 9 of the CM Rules for the Supervision of the Exe­
cution of Judgments.
9.1.1.2 Implementation of Reparation
The Committee had been reluctant to seriously interfere with the 
states' domain when supervising implementation of judgments in 
the early years of the European system. It merely satisfied itself with 
information provided by the states that certain measures had been 
adopted, but it did not assess their effectiveness.52 Nowadays, the 
Committee takes a bolder stand on compliance, verifying e.g. that a 
change in case-law in fact remedies the situation.53 The Execution 
Department plays a crucial role in this task by assessing the states' 
reports for effectivity and alignment to the standards established by 
the ECourtHR in its overall jurisdiction.54
49http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Themes/Satisfaction_equitable/
SE_EN.asp.
50Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2010, p. 19; the Committee nev­
ertheless reserves the right to reopen cases “if  necessary”: Committee o f Ministers, 
CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, Appendix II no. 11.
51Ibid., nos. 31f.
52Von Staden, “Rational Choice within Normative Constraints: Compliance by Lib­
eral Democracies with the Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights”, 
SSRN eLibrary  (2012), p. 16.
53Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, pp. 37f.
54Eg. Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic (rev. 2), 
nos. 39ff.
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The Committee verifies implementation under three heads: just 
satisfaction, individual and general measures.
9.1.1.2.1 Just Satisfaction The ECHR does not contain a norm 
similar to Article 68(2) of the ACHR, which stipulates that compen­
satory damages are to be executed according to the countries’ na­
tional proceedings concerning judgments against the state. While 
compensatory orders by the IACtHR are thus treated like national 
judgments, their character under the ECHR is purely international 
and it is up to the states to determine the procedures of compliance. 
Victims in Europe do not necessarily have an established procedure 
to claim just satisfaction awarded by the Court from the state. Al­
though the state does not have a choice concerning the means of 
compliance with the obligation to pay compensatory damages, it 
may determine the internal claims procedure.
In its 2010 Working Methods the Committee has mostly relin­
quished control of the payment of just satisfaction and placed it into 
the hands of the applicants.55 Issues concerning the payment of just 
satisfaction hover mainly around claims for payment of interests 
and set-off for compensation payments. After some uncertainties 
about the time limits for the payment of sums awarded and the con­
sequences of untimely payments, the Court today establishes time 
limits for the payment (three months) plus interests determined by 
the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank.
Practice for monitoring payment of just satisfaction has been laid 
down in CM/Inf/DH(2008)7.56 This document details the modali­
ties of supervision in different situations such as the determination 
of the moment of payment, problems relating to the identification 
of the beneficiary or currency-related questions. According to this 
practice, the Committee considers the obligation of compensation 
to be satisfied when the state shows that it has put the money, “by 
any method whatsoever”, at the disposal of the applicant and that
55Committee o f Ministers, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45, nos. 21ff.
56CM/Inf/DH(2008)7 Final -  Monitoring o f the payment o f sums awarded by way 
o f ju st satisfaction: an overview o f the Committee o f M inisters’ present practice 
(hereinafter “CM/Inf/DH(2008)7”), adopted by the M inisters’ Deputies, 15 January
2009.
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the applicant has been informed thereof.57 Read together with Com­
mittee of Ministers (CM/Inf/DH(2010)45, nos. 21ff.), which make su­
pervision of payments depend on the intervention of the applicant 
within a specific period of time after the (unilateral) payment report 
by the state has been published on the Committee’s website, it has 
to be feared that in case of applicants without access to the Inter­
net, legal representation or knowledge of the languages in which 
the Committee’s website is available, the suspension of pro-active 
supervision by the Committee might prove fatal to the execution of 
their compensation claims against the state.58
Although payment of just satisfaction should be the easiest form 
of reparation to be complied with, the Committee’s Annual Report 
on Execution for 2010 indicates that payments were made on time 
only in 28% of all judgments pending execution (a decrease from 
37% in 2009) and in 13% of all judgments after the deadline. The 
number of cases pending execution for more than six months had 
increased by 20% from 29% in 2009 to 35% in 2010.59 It remains to 
be seen whether the new Committee procedure on supervision will 
improve or worsen these numbers.
Cases in which payment of just satisfaction was outrightly re­
jected by the state have been rare though. An exemplary one is 
Loizidou v. Turkey in which the Court had ordered the state to pay 
compensation to a Greek Cypriot applicant for the loss of peaceful 
enjoyment of her property after the Turkish invasion of the island 
in 1974.60 Turkey refused to pay arguing that a global solution for 
all property related cases in Cyprus had to be found -  the first time 
ever that a state refused to comply with a judgment.61 It was only af­
ter increased pressure by the Committee and the member states that 
Turkey finally paid the amount due on 2 December 2003 and super­
57No. 10 o f CM/Inf/DH(2008)7.
58Cf. the controversial payment orders in Hirsi Jam aa and others v. Italy, commented 
in section 5.3 supra.
59Committee o f Ministers, Supervision AnnualReport 2010, p. 49. In 2012 the Commit­
tee changed its statistics and now discriminates amoung the cases where a payment 
was received in the corresponding year. Information on the overall number ofcases 
where payments are overdue is hence no longer available.
60Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50) [GC], ECtHR, no. 15318/89, 28 July 1998, 1998-IV.
61 Loizidou v. Turkey, CM, 15318/89, 6 October 1999, DH (99) 680.
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vision on this issue was closed.62 The issue of individual measures, 
i.e. restitution of Ms Loizidou’s property or compensation for the 
loss thereof remained though unresolved. The Committee therefore 
decided on the same day that it would reopen supervision in 2005 
and, until today, continues to supervise the discussion on compensa­
tion. On 1 March 2010 the ECtHR approved a Turkish law on com­
pensation, exchange or restitution of immovable property.63 This 
law had been passed in 2005 in consequence of a pilot judgment on 
the question of restitution.64 The law contains an offer by Turkey 
to compensate for lands lost by Greek Cypriots. Ms Loizidou nev­
ertheless rejected this offer. Further decisions by the Committee are 
due, although they are unlikely to push the case any further, since 
the Court had held that, if the applicants chose not to make use of 
the Turkish law, they would have to await a political solution of the
issue.65
This case is exemplary for the European human rights organs' 
general attitude to back away from politically charged decisions and 
to return contradictory questions to be resolved unilaterally by the 
states, without giving directives or setting time limits for a satis­
factory resolution of at least the specific case before them, nor en­
suring the applicant's participation in the ensuing discussions. The 
case though not only had the Committee face a new reality of recal­
citrant states, it also caused the Parliamentary Assembly to take a 
direct interest in the supervision of execution of judgments, which 
will be discussed below.66
9.1.1.2.2 Individual Measures It would be false to suppose that 
cases before the European Human Rights System were generally 
less grave than cases before the Inter-American System and con­
sequently required less reparation measures, just because the Court 
does not pronounce itself on this question in the majority of its judg­
ments. While it is certain that most cases affect rather limited vio­
62Loizidou v. Turkey, CM, 15318/89, 2 December 2003, DH(2003)190.
63Demopoulos v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], ECtHR, nos. 46113/99 et al., 1 March 2010.
64Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, ECtHR, no. 46347/99, 22 December 2005.
65Demopoulos v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], ECtHR, nos. 46113/99 et al., 1 March 2010, 
para. 128.
66See Jurgens, Execution ofJudgm ents o fth e  European Court ofH um an Rights.
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lations that do not require broad individual answers, a considerable 
number of other cases originate from severe violations that have to 
be repaired by a variety of measures and consequently require more 
attention by the Committee.
The scope of measures that, depending on the circumstances of 
the individual case, may be necessary to obtain complete restitution 
for the individual in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, has already 
been shown. As, due to the principle of subsidiarity, the European 
human rights organs usually do not impose specific measures on 
the states, the Committee tends to act very cautiously on the super­
vising stage. Nevertheless, if the monetary compensation awarded 
is insufficient to remedy the violation, it insists that the state take 
further measures.67
The group of cases concerning human rights violations during 
the Chechen wars (managed by the Committee as the “Khashiyev 
group”) are a good example for the Committee’s procedure. In this 
group of cases the Court had found violations such as unjustified 
killings, forced disappearances, torture, failure to conduct an effec­
tive criminal investigation, lack of effective domestic remedies and 
unjustified destruction of properties. As could be expected for a sit­
uation concerning a considerable number of cases, the Committee’s 
work focused on general measures.68 It established three lines along 
which the general measures to prevent repetition of similar cases 
should be achieved: improvement of legal and regulatory frame­
work governing the security forces, awareness raising and training 
of security forces, and improvement of domestic remedies. On the 
individual side, effective investigations into deaths and disappear­
ances were required.69 Remarkably, several measures the IACtHR 
treats as individual measures are classified as general measures by 
the Committee, particularly guarantees of non-repetition that also 
have an individual reparatory effect, assuring the victim that in the
67 See examples o f measures adopted by different states at Directorate General of 
Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Practical impact, pp. 22ff.
68Since the first cases were resolved by the ECtHR in 2005, the Execution Department 
referred to individual measures only in its first memorandum o f 2006. All three 
subsequent memoranda were dedicated exclusively to general measures.
69Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic (rev. 2), 
nos. 7ff.
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future others will not suffer the same fate. The unclear distinction 
becomes more evident where the obligation to publish the Court’s 
judgments is concerned. While the Committee classifies this as a 
general preventive measure, the IACourtHR usually puts the indi­
vidual component of restitution of the victim’s honour into the fore­
ground.70 Improvement of criminal investigations, sanctions for re­
sponsible persons and redress for victims also concern both indi­
vidual redress and general prevention. Classified by the Committee 
as a general measure, individual victims also profit from such im­
provements as they also affect their cases.71
The Committee’s work during the DH/HR meetings on this group 
of cases was accompanied by memoranda from the Execution De­
partment, summarizing the state of execution and assessing the 
measures adopted by the state. Once the first case had been trans­
mitted by the Court, the Department invited the Russian author­
ities to “provide information on the measures envisaged or being 
taken to remedy the shortcomings in the investigations [ .. .] ,  and 
to ensure the availability of effective domestic remedies”.72 Con­
sequently, Russia ordered new investigations into the cases based 
on CM Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 and informed the Com­
mittee of this fact. The Department further “encouraged” the au­
thorities to make rapid and visible progress on the cases and “ur­
gently expected” information on the progress achieved to date since 
the authorities had not communicated themselves in more than a 
year.73 The Execution Department also pointed out prior similar 
cases against other states and the measures adopted by the Commit­
tee.74 By doing so, it not only secured continuity in its activities, but 
also applied a “good practice” approach. Russia subsequently sub­
mitted additional information on the progress of the investigations 
and the recognition of victim status to a number of people affected 
by the actions of the military that gave rise to the cases before the
70Cf. Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic (rev. 2), 
nos. 57ff.
71Cf. ibid., nos. 74ff.
72Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic.
73Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic (rev.)
74Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic (rev 2), 
no. 16.
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ECtHR, but refrained from disclosing the entire investigation file to 
the Committee.75 Further delays occurred, Russia established an “In­
vestigating Committee” consisting of a military and a civil branch in 
charge of the cases decided by the Court, until the CoE’s Secretariat 
finally met with representatives of the Russian authorities for bilat­
eral consultations in 2009 on the state of execution and linked the 
Russian investigating unit with a similar unit investigating cases 
in the UK that had emerged from the Northern Ireland conflict. 
Nonetheless, although there seems to be certain progress, the vic­
tims still complain of not being properly informed of the investiga­
tion measures undertaken.76 None of the perpetrators has hitherto 
been held responsible by Russia in any of the cases. This recalcitrant 
behaviour finally exasperated the Court which, in a 2010 decision on 
an aerial attack that had already been the subject of another case de­
cided in 2005,77 condemned Russia in rather bold language (“notes 
with great dismay”) and found that it could no longer apply the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity as “the respondent Government manifestly dis­
regarded the specific findings of a binding judgment”.78 Apart from 
underlining the Committee’s responsibility to address the issue of 
compliance, it ordered Russia for the first time directly to conduct a 
new, independent investigation into the issues.79 Again, though, it 
did not include this order into the operative paragraph of the judg­
ment but merely declared it as an obiter dictum, despite constant ef­
forts by the applicants to achieve a stronger order by the Court.80 In
2011, another visit by the Secretariat to the Chechen Republic took 
place. Thereupon, the Committee adopted its first interim resolution 
in the affair, assessing the progress made, outlining shortcomings 
in the implementation of measures and indicating which measures 
should be adopted most urgently. In accordance with the Court’s
75Ibid.
76Committee o f Ministers, Action o f  the security forces in the Chechen Republic o f  the 
Russian Federation, nos. 49ff. and communication DH - DD(2011)422, available at 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution; also see Human Rights Watch, 
“Who will tell me what happened to my son?”
77Isayeva v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 57950/00, 24 February 2005.
78Abuyeva et al. v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 27065/05, 2 December 2010, paras. 238-241.
79Ibid., para. 243.
80Leach, “Redress and implementation in the Chechen cases”, EHRAC Bulletin 15 
(2011), p. 3.
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recent decisions, it announced to focus its attention on individual 
measures, particularly the investigation into the deaths and disap­
pearances and criminal investigations against those responsible.81 It 
stepped up the monitoring intensity and adopted two further deci­
sions at its June and September 2012 DH/HR meetings, underlining 
in particular the urgency to make progress in the search for disap­
peared persons, investigations and prevention of destruction of ev­
idence.82 Finally, in December 2012, the Court recognized, against 
Russia’s opposing view, the systemic character of the human rights 
violations in the Chechen Republic.83
These cases show how the Court and the Committee interact, the 
latter adapting its focus to the Court's jurisprudence. Also, victims' 
desires to participate more closely in the investigations are taken 
into account. The major burden of accompanying the implementa­
tion of the decision by the Russian authorities, though, lies with the 
Execution Department.84
The determination of specific reparation measures by the Court 
shall facilitate the Committee's work by limiting the states' leeway 
to determine how to discharge their obligation to provide restitutio 
in integrum. The Committee's supervisory responsibilities are con­
sequently also reduced to only discussing measures that fall into the 
scope determined by the Court. Thus, in the first ever case where the 
Court ordered a specific individual reparation measure, Assanidze v. 
Georgia of 8 April 2004, concerning the illegal detention of a pris­
oner, the Committee only had to verify the prisoner's release. Dur­
ing the supervisory phase, the state informed it of the immediate 
execution of this measure.85
81154 cases against the Russian Federation (Interim Resolution), CM, 57942/00, 2 De­
cember 2011, ResDH(2011)292.
82154 cases against the Russian Federation (Decision), CM, 57942/00, 6 June 2012, 
CM/Del/Dec(2012)1144/19 and 154 cases against the Russian Federation (Decision), 
CM, 57942/00, 12 September 2012, CM /Del/Dec(2012)1150/19.
83Aslakhanova et al. v. Russia, ECtHR, nos. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, 
paras. 179ff., 216ff.; see supra section 5.2.2.
84A more detailed recount o f the implementation measures in the Chechen cases can 
be found at Human Rights Watch, “Who will tell me what happened to my son?", 
pp. 8ff.
85Assanidze v. Georgia, CM, 71503/01, 2 November 2006, DH(2006)53.
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Ordering direct individual measures however is not always a 
guarantee for compliance by the state. In Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova 
and Russia, another case of irregular detention in a territory not un­
der effective control of the state, two of the four applicants were 
still not released when the Committee adopted its first interim res­
olution eight months after the judgment had been published. The 
Committee reacted by mounting political pressure against the re­
calcitrant state. In its first resolution, adopted on 22 April 2005, the 
Committee
not[es] the fact that two of the applicants, [ .. .] ,  are still 
imprisoned in the territory of the “MRT” [Moldavian 
Republic of Transdniestria] [ .. .] ,  stress[es] that it is evi­
dent that the continuation of the unlawful and arbitrary 
detention of the applicants for more than 9 months af­
ter the Court’s judgment fails to satisfy the Court’s de­
mand for their immediate release [... and] urgently in­
vites [... ]
Russia, which had effective control in the MRT, to comply with the 
judgment.86 Three further interim resolutions by the Committee of 
13 July 2005, 1 March 2006 and 10 May 2006 were necessary un­
til the two remaining applicants were finally released on 2 and 4 
June 2007.87 In the course of the proceedings, the Committee had 
constantly sharpened the wording of its resolutions, until, in its in­
terim resolution of 10 May 2006 it went to the utmost, stressing “the 
Committee’s resolve to ensure, with all means available to the Or­
ganisation, the compliance by the Russian Federation with its obli­
gations under this judgment” and calling “upon the authorities of 
the member states to take such action as they deem appropriate to 
this end”.88 As a consequence of this call, the European Parliament
86Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, CM, 48787/99, 22 April 2005, 
ResDH(2005)42.
87Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, CM, 48787/99, 12 July 2007, 
CM/ResDH(2007)106.
88Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova andRussia, CM, 48787/99,10 May 2006, ResDH(2006)26.
173
III Execution o f  Judgments
adopted a resolution on human rights violations in Transnistira,89 
and several other states took action as well.90
Another particularly controversial individual reparation measure 
is the reopening of proceedings in cases that were concluded in vi­
olation of fundamental rights, particularly Article 6 of the ECHR. 
This measure has its limitations because the organs of the Euro­
pean human rights system, like their inter-American counterparts, 
do not have the function of a supranational appellations court and 
do not have the power to quash national legal or judicial acts. Nev­
ertheless, reopening judicial proceedings in certain cases maybe the 
only possibility to restitute the applicant to the position before the 
violation had occurred.91 States however cannot simply be ordered 
to reopen proceedings in all cases. Re-trying civil law suits may, for 
instance, prejudice the rights of other parties to the original pro­
cess. Here, monetary compensation may be a more appropriate so- 
lution.92 Criminal cases also depend on a diligent consideration of 
individual interests. On the one hand, reopening a procedure with 
several accused persons may affect the rights of those who, despite a 
possible violation of their rights, had decided not to take their case 
to Strasbourg. It is also imaginable that the applicants themselves 
do not want to be re-tried despite the violation, either because their 
sanction is already purged, because they feel that the judgment is 
favourable to them and a new trial might conclude with a stricter 
judgment, or out of other personal reasons to leave the subject that 
gave rise to the case closed.93 A further obstacle is that not all proce­
dural laws in the member states provide rules for the reopening of 
cases after ECtHR judgments, making it legally impossible to re-try 
applicants.94 The Committee became aware of this situation and is­
89European Parliament resolution o f 12 Ju ly 2007 on human rights violations 
in Transnistria (Republic o f Moldova), adopted by the European Parliament, 
P6_TA(2007)0358, 12 July 2007.
90See Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, CM, 48787/99, 12 July 2007, 
CM/ResDH(2007)106.
91Preambule o f CM Recommendation No. R (2000) 2.
92Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, p. 18.
93See Saunders v. The UnitedKingdom andI.J.L., G.M.R. andA.K.P. v. The UnitedKing- 
dom, CM, 19187/91 et al., 21 December 2004, DH(2004)88, where proceedings were 
not to be reopened due to the age and state o f health o f the applicants.
94Hulki GUneş v. Turkey, CM, 28490/95, 4 April 2007, DH(2007)26.
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sued CM Recommendation No. R (2000) 2, inviting the states to pro­
cure for a domestic remedy to reopen proceedings upon judgments 
by the Court. Most domestic laws now provide this possibility.95 In 
other cases the Committee has urged states to introduce legislation 
to allow the reopening of cases.96 States have also erased, by way of 
clemency, the consequences of convictions in criminal cases criti­
cised by the Court.97 As these acts do not entail the judicial declara­
tion that the victim in fact is not a criminal but merely levy the sanc­
tion imposed, they are inappropriate to eliminate all consequences 
of a criminal proceeding and procure restitutio in integrum.98
9.1.1.2.3 General Measures While individual measures ensure 
relief in the specific case, general measures are paramount to pre­
vent the recurrence of similar cases and are an important instrument 
in the European System’s fight against suffocation. It is therefore 
in this area that Court and Committee are most effectively exerting 
pressure on the states. Systemic problems are nowadays being tack­
led under the pilot judgment procedure, but also in other cases the 
adoption of general measures is of great concern to the Committee.
Typical general measures are legislative modifications, adapta­
tions in the domestic courts’ interpretation of the laws, allocation 
of funds to improve the functioning of the public or judicial admin­
istration, training of public servants, etc. Most of these measures re­
quire complex processes and political discussions, thus postponing 
their adoption and extending the Committee’s supervisory activi- 
ties.99
In most cases the addressee of general measures is the legisla­
ture, whose task it is to bring domestic laws in line with the Con­
vention. Improper interpretation of judgments, political quarrels or 
elections may however complicate legislative processes. This was 
the case when the UK had to modify its domestic laws following two 
Court judgments concerning prisoner voting rights. According to
95Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, p. 19.
96Dorigo Paolo v. Italy, CM, 33286/96, 12 October 2005, ResDH(2005)85.
97 Stefanov v. Bulgaria, CM, 32438/96, 15 June 2004, DH(2004)32.
98Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, pp. 24f.
99See more examples at Directorate General o f Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Prac­
tical impact, pp. 17ff.
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UK election laws, prisoners, independently from the length of their 
sentences or the type and gravity of the crime, are excluded from 
voting. This was held disproportionate by the ECtHR.100 Thereupon, 
the government launched a two-stage consultation process on the 
necessary legislative changes in 2006, which ended in 2009. As the 
next general elections in the UK were to take place in June 2010, 
the Committee strongly reproached the UK, expressing its “serious 
concerns” about the substantial delay in the implementation of the 
judgment in view of the imminent general elections, “urg[ing]” it to 
adopt the necessary measures.101 Following a judicial decision re­
jecting the registration of detainees in the voting register for Scot­
tish elections and the lack of progress in view of the imminent gen­
eral elections, the Committee, on 4 March 2010, warned that a failure 
to implement the judgment before the elections would result in the 
elections to be in violation of the Convention and, given the large 
number of persons affected by the general ban, give rise to a high 
number of similar cases before the Court.102 As all warnings were 
to no avail and the elections were held with the ban still in force, 
the Committee immediately after the elections, on 4 June 2010, re­
leased another decision “expressing confidence” that the govern­
ment would implement the measures before the next regional elec­
tions in 2011.103 The Court subsequently received, by September 
2010, 1 340 similar applications. Knowing that there were some 
70 000 convicted prisoners in the UK -  all potential applicants -  
had it apply the pilot judgment procedure in one exemplary case.104 
In the ensuing judgment, the Court considered “whether it is now 
appropriate for the Court to provide the respondent Government 
with some guidance as to what is required for the proper execu­
tion of the present judgment”.105 In respect of the wide margin in 
which the UK could resolve the situation of prisoner voting rights, 
it did not make any specific orders as to the content of the legislative
100Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 74025/01, 6 October 2005, 2005-
IX, para. 82.
101Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), CM, 74025/01, 3 December 2009, ResDH(2009)160.
102Available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
103Available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
104 Greens and M.T. v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, nos. 60041/08 et al., 23 November
2010, para. 114.
105Ibid., para. 112.
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proposal, but set a period of six months within which a correspond­
ing proposal had to be submitted. It furthermore made, for the first 
time ever, an indirect allusion to its new supervisory functions un­
der Article 46(4) of the ECHR, introduced by Protocol no. 14.106 This 
deadline was extended upon request by the UK to a date six months 
after the delivery of the judgment in the similar case of Scoppola v. 
Italy (No. 3), i.e. until 23 November 2012.107 In comparison to UK 
laws, Italian law does not impose a blanket ban of voting rights for 
all prisoners, but takes into account the particularities of the case 
under scrutiny, the gravity of the crime committed and the length 
of the sentence imposed. While in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) 
the Court had not given guidelines under which a ban on voting 
rights would be in accordance with the ECHR, the Scoppola v. Italy 
(No. 3) decision contained the corresponding details.108 At the end 
of the deadline, the government of the UK introduced correspond­
ing legislation to Parliament on 22 November 2012. It informed the 
Committee thereof in an Action Plan. The Committee took note of 
this fact and decided at its 1157th meeting to remain pending of the 
outcome of the legislative process and decided to resume the case 
at latest at its 1179th meeting in September 2013.109 On 26 March 
2013, the Court decided to adjourn 2 354 prisoner voting right cases 
brought before it from Great Britain until the expiry of the Commit­
tee’s deadline.110
The Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
evidences two things. First, that, despite a strong warning by the 
Court, the responding state could hold elections in violation of the 
ECHR again after the Court’s judgment. The organs of the European 
human rights protection system could not effectively impose the 
consequences from the Court’s judgment onto the state. Secondly, 
that Court and Committee have articulated their procedures so that 
one organ can effectively react to the work of the other.
106Ibid., para. 114.
107Decision o f 26 September 2012, adopted at the Committee o f M inisters’ 1150th 
meeting, available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution; Scoppola 
v. Italy (No. 3) [GC], ECtHR, no. 126/05, 22 May 2012.
108Ibid., paras. 103ff.
109Decision o f 4 December 2012, adopted at the Committee o f M inisters’ 1157th m eet­
ing, available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
110ECtHR, Press Release ECHR 091 (2013), 26 March 2013, u r l : www.echr.coe.int.
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More diverse general measures were required in the Chechen 
cases. Already before the Court’s pilot judgment of 2012 in Asla- 
khanova et al. v. Russia, the Committee had required Russia to adopt 
new legislation on the fight against terrorism that is in line with 
the Court's requirements. It furthermore requested the publication 
of the Court’s judgments in Russian for the members of the armed 
forces. Russia should also introduce the Court’s jurisprudence and 
domestic and international legislation concerning international hu­
manitarian law to the training of members of the armed services. 
These measures were monitored closely by the Committee, which 
required copies of publications and asked Russia to confirm that dis­
semination of the judgment was accompanied by explanatory docu­
ments. The authorities were particularly invited to align the profes­
sional training measures to Recommendation Rec (2004) 4.111 In ad­
dition to these orders, the Court had established the aforementioned 
measures concerning effective investigations and punishment ofre- 
sponsible persons, which, apart from bringing relief in the individ­
ual case, also have a general character as their application would 
prevent further cases from reaching the Court.112
9.1.1.3 Instruments
The Committee can apply a variety of formal (9.1.1.3.1-9.1.1.3.4) and 
informal (9.1.1.3.5) instruments during the phase of supervision of 
execution.
9.1.1.3.1 Resolutions The working methods of 2006 provide in­
terim and final resolutions as the Committee's means of communi­
cation. Interim resolutions shall be adopted, according to Rule 16 of 
the CM Rules for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments, 
“notably in order to provide information on the state of progress of 
the execution or, where appropriate, to express concern and/or to 
make suggestions with respect to the execution”, whereat final res­
olutions, according to Rule 17 of the CM Rules for the Supervision of
111Committee o f Ministers, Violations o f  the ECHR in the Chechen Republic: Rus­
sia ’s compliance with the European Court’s judgments, Memorandum CM/Inf/ 
DH(2006)32 revised 2, 12 June 2007.
112 Supra p. 169.
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the Execution of Judgments, formally finish the Committee’s moni­
toring. Interim resolutions were introduced in 1988.113 The Commit­
tee makes use of them to give public notice of advances and short­
comings in the execution of judgments, thus encouraging the state 
to continue its efforts on outstanding issues. In the case of recalci­
trant states, interim resolutions may also be used to threaten with 
further measures, particularly suspension from the Council accord­
ing to Article 8 of the Statute of the CoE. This threat usually comes 
accompanied by a call to the other members to take all measures 
against the state as they deem appropriate.114 By way of interim 
resolution the Committee, like the IACtHR, may close supervision 
on parts of a judgment if it considers all necessary measures to be
taken.115
9.1.1.3.2 Infringement Proceedings Protocol no. 14 has intro­
duced two new instruments for the Committee: a request for inter­
pretation and infringement proceedings in case of non-execution of 
a judgment.116 Both procedures shall have an extraordinary charac­
ter. Therefore, the Committee may launch them only if two-thirds 
of its members are in favour. This is logical given that the aim of 
Protocol no. 14 is to resolve the problem of the Court’s caseload, 
not to add new cases to it.
The Committee may, “if [it] considers that supervision is hin­
dered by a problem of interpretation, refer the case to the Court 
for a ruling on the question of interpretation”. The particularity of 
the request for interpretation is that, unlike the request for interpre­
tation a party to the case may lodge under Rule 79 of the Rules of 
the ECtHR, the Committee’s power is not subject to a temporal lim­
itation. Interpretation shall facilitate supervision by finally settling 
differences between the State and the Committee as to the obliga­
113Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, p. 40.
114Loizidou v. Turkey, CM, 15318/89, 26 June 2001, ResDH(2001)80; Ilaşcu and others 
v. Moldova and Russia, CM, 48787/99, 12 July 2007, CM/ResDH(2007)106.
115Cf. Cyprus v. Turkey, CM, 25781/94, 10 May 2001, ResDH(2005)44.
116 Article 46(3)-(5) o f the ECHR.
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tions arising from the judgment.117 It shall explicitly not be used to 
evaluate measures already taken by the state.118 The Court’s Rules 
exclude contradictory oral or written argumentation on the ques­
tion submitted, limiting interventions to the Committee’s right to 
give explanations. The decision on interpretation shall, whenever 
possible, be taken by the same organ that had taken the original de­
cision. In order to render the proceedings swifter, no separate opin­
ions are permitted.119
Under the infringement proceedings, upon serving the recalci­
trant state a formal notice as a last warning, the Committee may 
“refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil 
its obligation under paragraph 1”. This possibility was introduced as 
a reaction to the cases where states consistently refuse to implement 
a judgment and, hitherto, the only possibility available to the Com­
mittee was suspension or exclusion from the Council -  an undesired 
consequence given its exclusive character.120 The infringement pro­
ceedings, which are held before the Grand Chamber,121 shall cause 
additional publicity to the case and thus press the state to imple­
ment the judgment. The member states assumed that its mere ex­
istence and the threat of application should be sufficient to make 
states comply with their obligations.122 The infringement proceed­
ings are usually written, the Committee and the parties (state and 
original applicant) having the right to submit observations.123 The 
Court’s decision shall take the form of a judgment which is trans­
mitted to the Committee, the parties and the Human Rights Com­
missioner.
117Lack o f clarity had been identified as a  m ajor obstacle to effective execution: Coun­
cil o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  Human 
Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : h ttps://hu b.coe.in t/20120419-brighton-declaration , 
no. 23; Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, p. 54; cfr. also Staton 
and Romero, Clarity and Compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
p. 128.
118“The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 100.
119Rules 91 -93  o f the Rules o f the ECtHR.
120See infra p. 182.
121 Article 31(b) o f the ECHR.
122“The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 100; see also the Court’s allusion 
to its supervisory role in Greens and M.T. v. The United Kingdom, para. 114.
123Rule 97 o f the Rules o f the ECtHR.
180
9 Execution o f  Judgments under the Conventions
None of the two proceedings had been applied at the time of writ­
ing, so that their use remains to be seen. While there is little doubt 
about the fact that the interpretation of a judgment by the Court will 
improve execution, the use of the infringement proceedings will de­
pend on consistent parallel action by the member states, e.g. by oust­
ing the state, making the conclusion of economic treaties depend 
on execution or exertion of other means of political pressure.124 If 
state politics are less focused on European integration, as may be as­
sumed for Turkey or Russia, and if  the states had already before been 
subject to increased scrutiny by the Committee and eventually also 
in the Parliamentary Assembly, it may be doubted that a judgment 
on missing implementation will be the decisive element to change 
the state's opinion on the necessity to implement the original Court 
decision and obey its international human rights obligations. This 
will be even more so the more politically sensitive issues depend on 
the question, as is the case for Turkey in the Northern Cyprus ques­
tion or for Russia concerning the northern Caucasus, and probably 
even the UK in its general aversion against increased influence by 
the Court on its internal policy, as the prisoner voting rights ques­
tion has shown.
The effectiveness of the infringement proceedings is questionable 
for other reasons, too. Article 46(4) of the ECHR and the procedural 
specifications in Rules 94ff. of the Rules of the ECtHR are not clear 
as to whether the Committee may submit specific reparation mea­
sures to the Court or whether it must always submit the entire case, 
obliging it to interrupt its procedure even for measures the state is 
complying with.125 Another unknown factor is the outcome of the 
proceeding. Is the Court’s role limited to merely holding that a state 
has or has not complied with a judgment? Will it specify which repa­
ration measures have been complied with and which not? Or will it 
even make more specific indications to the state on the measures it 
has not complied with? The last option is the least likely to happen. 
The Court's powers in the infringement proceeding are limited in 
two ways. On the one hand the text of Article 46(4) of the ECHR does
124In the same sense Marmo, “The Execution o f Judgments o f the European Court of
Human Rights: A Political Battle”, 2 M J 15 (2008), pp. 248ff., particularly p. 249.
125This point was raised by Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008,
p. 58.
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not mention a power to alter or specify its original judgment. On 
the other hand, in the past it has strictly insisted on the separation 
of its judicial functions and the Committee’s more political moni­
toring procedure. Also, hovering above the entire European human 
rights procedure, the principle of subsidiarity continues to limit the 
Court’s influence on the reparation procedure. The rationale behind 
the introduction of the infringement proceedings was to resolve dif­
ferences between the Committee and a member state on whether 
this state had complied with a judgment or not. Compliance should 
be improved by the additional political pressure infringement pro­
ceedings will cause.126 However, experience from the infringement 
proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union sup­
ports the expectation that the mere existence of infringement pro­
ceedings may have an overall positive effect on state compliance.127 
Marmo, though, takes a more pessimistic position, concluding that
Protocol 14 has not been as persuasive and influential 
as the Explanatory Report may lead one to expect. Pro­
tocol 14, and specifically the modified Article 46, has be­
come partially outdated by other internal mechanisms, 
and, in the area of the control system, may have already 
exhausted its most positive function of eliciting a com­
prehensive debate on execution.128
9.1.1.3.3 Expulsion from the Council of Europe TheCommit- 
tee’s last remedy against states that constantly deny to execute judg­
ments is expulsion. In the terms of Article 8 of the Statute of the CoE, 
the Committee may suspend any member state that has seriously vi­
olated Article 3 of the Statute of the CoE from being represented on 
the Council and ask it to withdraw from the Council in the terms of 
Article 7 of the Statute of the CoE. Article 3 stipulates the obligation 
to “accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by 
all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental
126Eaton and Schokkenbroek, “Reforming the Human Rights Protection System ”, 
HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 15; Council o f Europe, Protocol No. 14 -  Explanatory Report, 
u r l : http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm, Nos. 99ff.
127Lambert Abdelgawad, The execution o f  judgments, 2008, pp. 58f.
128Marmo, “The Execution o f Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights: A 
Political Battle”, 2 MJ 15 (2008), pp. 252f.
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freedoms”. If the member state concerned does not withdraw by it­
self, the Committee may, as an ultima ratio, expel it from the Coun­
cil. Although the application of Article 46(3)-(5) of the ECHR has 
not been made a prerequisite for expulsion, the ratio behind these 
new rules expresses this idea. The Committee should therefore only 
recur to Article 8 of the ECHR when the state does not obey the in­
fringement judgment either. Under special circumstances, though, 
immediate expulsion or suspension remains possible.
Article 8 has never been applied, but was at issue within the con­
text of the Greek coup d’etat in 1967. After the European Commis­
sion of Human Rights had concluded that Greece was seriously vio­
lating several of the rights protected under the ECHR,129 the apply­
ing states prepared a draft decision for the Committee of Ministers 
on 28 November 1969 proposing the suspension of Greece’s rep­
resentation under Article 8 of the Statute of the CoE.130 The Greek 
Government preceded its exclusion from the Council by denouncing 
the Statute and the Convention and withdrew from the Council it- 
self.131 In another case, Loizidou v. Turkey, the Committee indirectly 
menaced Turkey with expulsion, declaring “the Committee’s resolve 
to ensure, with all means available to the Organisation, Turkey's 
compliance with its obligations under this judgment”.132
The practical use of Article 8 is doubtful. While expulsion surely 
puts a stain on the face of the state, it also means that the Coun­
cil loses an important lever of influence, as expulsion implies that 
the state, for the future, is no longer bound by its obligations un­
der the Convention according to Article 58(3) of the ECHR, and no 
longer participates in meetings of the Council's organs. Expulsion, 
therefore, always implies the confession that the concerned state is 
“lost” for the objectives of the Council of Europe and the Conven­
tion, i.e. that the member states of the Council no longer see any 
possibility to enforce the ideals of the Council. On the other hand,
129 The Greek Case (Report), ECommHR, nos. 3321/67 et al., 5 November 1969, YB 11, 
Vol. II, 690 and 730.
130See Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1969, pp. 1418f.
131Government o f Greece, “Note Verbale dated 12 December 1969 from the Govern­
ment o f Greece informing the Secretary General o f Greece’s denunciation o f the 
Statute and o f its withdrawal from the Council o f Europe”, 2 ILM 9 (1970).
132Loizidou v. Turkey, CM, 15318/89, 26 June 2001, ResDH(2001)80.
183
III Execution o f  Judgments
membership of a state that constantly violates its obligations under 
the Convention may become unbearable to the Council, as it affects 
its credibility for constantly being unable to enforce the basic prin­
ciples of the Council against that state.133
Nonetheless, the fact that the state is liberated from its obligations 
under the Convention would most probably not improve the situa­
tion of the persons affected by that state’s actions. It would therefore 
seem more appropriate not to go beyond suspension, as this mea­
sure takes the rights to participation from the member while main­
taining it bound to its obligations. Suspension could be extended or 
limited according to the state’s behaviour.134
On the other hand, expulsion might work if it had overwhelming 
negative effects on the state’s situation. These effects may concern 
its economic prospect, e.g. if its possibilities to enter into economic 
treaties or its participation in a free trade area end. Political isola­
tion is another element a state will consider: is it going to be po­
litically more isolated after the expulsion, thus running the danger 
to become a pariah?135 The isolating effect of an expulsion from the 
Council exists, as all European States, with the exception of Belarus, 
are members of the Council and a majority of them are also members 
of the European Union. In particular due to the EU’s human rights 
policy, which would become even stronger once it has become a 
member of the ECHR, expulsion from the Council would make it 
presumably more difficult for a state to make business with the EU 
members, arguably the economically strongest block in Europe. If 
an EU member state is affected by expulsion or the mere threat of 
expulsion from the Council, this might also result in additional EU 
measures against this state.
The consequences of the application of Article 8 of the Statute of 
the CoE therefore have to be very diligently measured in each par­
133 Cf. the argumentation in the League o f Nations in favour and against the expul­
sion o f the USSR following its attack on Finland: Sohn, “Expulsion or Forced W ith­
drawal from an International Organization”, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1964), pp. 1387f.
134Cf. the application o f suspension by the OAS against Cuba, infra 9.2.1.
135 The effectiveness o f expulsion from the League o f Nations was doubted as the 
state did not become isolated but joined a large group o f states that had never been 
members o f the League like for instance the United States. See Sohn, “Expulsion or 
Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization”, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1964), 
p. 1397.
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ticular case, bearing in mind that the probability that the advantages 
excel the disadvantages is very limited.136
9.1.1.3.4 Recommendations On a general level the Committee 
can issue recommendations to the member states on better imple­
mentation of the Court’s judgments.137 These recommendations do 
not have binding force, nonetheless the Committee frequently refers 
to them in resolutions concerning specific cases. Recommendations 
have hitherto been issued on some of the most pressing shortcom­
ings that gave rise to large numbers of cases before the Court, in 
particular on subjects such as effective remedies for excessive length 
of proceedings, efficient domestic capacity for rapid execution of 
ECtHR judgments, improvement of domestic remedies, verification 
of the compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative 
practice with standards laid down in the ECHR, university educa­
tion and professional training, publication and dissemination in the 
member states of the text of the ECHR and the case-law of the EC- 
tHR, and re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domes­
tic level. According to the Committee, these recommendations may 
have positive effects on the development of the issue they address 
in the states and serve as a basis for bilateral relations maintained 
between the Department of Execution and the states.138
9.1.1.3.5 Non-formalized Measures On a lower scale, the 
Committee has also acted through non-official means such as com­
munications by its President to the respondent state. This has the ad­
vantage that issues can be addressed informally on a bilateral level 
without raising public attention, so that the ground for viable solu­
tions can be probed or the particular determination of the Commit­
tee be stressed.139 Applying other means than resolutions also has 
the advantage that the Committee can react quickly and very selec­
tively to specific problems or positive aspects in the execution pro­
136Cf. “The 2004 Reform Package”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 100.
137Article 15(b) o f the Statute o f the CoE. Recommendations are available at https: 
//www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Documents/CMRec_en.asp.
138Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, p. 28.
139Cf. Loizidou v. Turkey, CM, 15318/89, 24 July 2000, DH (2000) 105.
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cess. In such cases, a simple decision can be adopted in the DH/HR 
meeting, accompanied by a subsequent press release.140
The presentation of the status of pending cases on the website 
of the Department of Execution is another way to make the execu­
tion process more transparent.141 The website was set up following 
the adoption of the 2006 CM Rules for the Supervision of the Ex­
ecution of Judgments, which introduced the principle of public ac­
cess to data concerning execution. The publication of the DH/HR 
meetings’ annotated agendas, which contain information not cast 
into resolutions, information received by the state (action plans, ac­
tion reports) and by the party, reports elaborated by the Department 
of Execution, as well as summaries of the current status of execu­
tion for each case, make it easy for the interested public, press and 
the party to quickly get an overview of the progress of each case 
or group of cases. Additionally, each year in April the Committee 
publishes an Annual Report, providing statistical information about 
the development of its workload, summaries of the most important 
events and a very condensed version of the individual and general 
measures required for each pending case, ordered by types of viola­
tions.
9.1.2 The ECtHR
Apart from the aforementioned applications by the Committee un­
der Article 46(3)-(5) of the ECHR, the Court does not have an orig­
inal power to review cases on the execution stage for failure to ex­
ecute them.142
The question though persists whether in cases where the viola­
tion continues after a judgment has been handed down because no 
or insufficient individual measures have been adopted, the situa­
tion may be brought before the Court again in a new application 
or whether it has to be rejected for being repetitive. According to 
Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, an application is inadmissible if  it “is
140Information Document CM/Inf(2006)9 revised 3, no. III.2.
141 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
142See VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2), ECtHR, no. 32772/02, 4 October 2007, para. 43; Bur- 
dov v. Russia (No. 2), ECtHR, no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, para. 121 concerning 
delayed payment o f ju st satisfaction.
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substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined 
by the Court [ . . . ] ”.
The Court had to answer this question in VgT Verein gegen Tier­
fabriken v. Switzerland. In this case, the applicant organization had 
complained about a refusal by public Swiss television to air a com­
mercial against industrial meat production.143 Despite the Court’s 
judgment finding a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR, the Swiss 
Federal Court upheld its decision that the commercial should not 
be aired, arguing that the organization had not shown how redress 
would be possible through reopening of proceedings and in what 
originated its continuing interest to have the original commercial 
aired.144 A rather delicate particularity of the case was that the Com­
mittee, while supervising the execution of the first judgment, had 
satisfied itself with the mere reopening of proceedings by the Swiss 
authorities as restitutio in integrum, instead of awaiting their out- 
come.145 As with that decision the Committee had officially termi­
nated its supervision of the case, the Court had two options when 
receiving the renewed application: either to conclude that the ap­
plication was inadmissible for being repetitive according to Arti­
cle 35(2)(b) of the ECHR and to invite the Committee to reopen su­
pervision,146 or to admit the case itself, finding that the matter was 
sufficiently different from the original case. It voted for the second 
option, holding that a case was sufficiently different if it originated 
in facts that had occurred after the Committee had adopted a fi­
nal resolution, because otherwise there would be no opportunity 
to scrutinize such facts under the Convention.147 Although this so­
lution certainly is not ideal, taking into account the repartition of 
powers under the Convention, it is correct insofar as a primordial
143 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, ECtHR, no. 24699/94, 28 July 2001, 
2001-VI.
144 VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2), ECtHR, no. 32772/02, 4 October 2007, para. 14.
145 VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, CM, 24699/94, 22 June 2003, 
ResDH(2003)125.
146Judge Malinverni considered this the correct solution, denying the Court’s com­
petence ratione materiae when a case is already on the execution stage: VgT v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, dissenting opinion of 
Judge Malinverni, para. 7.
147Ibid., para. 67.
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closure of supervision by the Committee must not result in a gap of 
control in execution.148
The question, however, is when a piece of information is consid­
ered to be new in the sense of Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR in the 
context of supervision. The Court appears to follow a two-track ap­
proach to this issue: either the domestic authorities take action to 
change the applicant’s situation following a judgment or they re­
main inactive. In the first case, the modification of the applicant’s 
situation may constitute new information to justify a new case be­
fore the Court, while in the second case there may only be a failure 
to execute the judgment, which in strict application of the princi­
ple of subsidiarity and respect for the repartition of tasks within the 
Council is an issue exclusively for the Committee.149 This led to the 
absurd situation that a state would be better off if it did not take any 
action at all than if it took insufficient or the wrong action, because 
only in the second situation would it be exposed to the risk of being 
sued again before the Court.150
The Court’s approach in VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) no longer fol­
lows this pattern of admissibility of applications concerning cases 
where execution was still pending or had even already been closed 
by the Committee. It confirmed this reasoning in Ivanţoc et al. v. 
Moldova and Russia, which concerns two of the applicants of the 
former case of Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, who despite 
the Court finding that their detention violated the Convention and 
continuing efforts by the Committee to procure their liberation were 
not liberated from detention.151 This case is insofar comparable to 
VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) as the responding state had not taken any 
action at all towards the termination of the violation. The Court un­
derlined that its assessment of a new application presenting new in­
formation would not “encroach” the Committee’s authority on the
148The Swiss Government had claimed ju st this, assuming that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction ratione materiae after the Committee had adopted a final resolution: 
VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2) [GC], ECtHR, no. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 66.
149See in more detail ibid., dissenting opinion ofJudge Malinverni, para. 12; also Her- 
tig Randall and Ruedin, “Execution des arrets de la CourEDH”, AJP/PJA 6 (2008), 
pp. 654ff.
150See in detail on the Court’s approach to these cases: ibid., pp. 655f.
151Ivanţoc et al. v. Moldova and Russia, ECtHR, no. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, 
para. 84.
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execution phase. It furthermore confirmed that in case of contin­
uing violations the part of the violation that occurred after a first 
judgment had been handed down, gives rise to new applications.152 
It consequently held that, although it had no jurisdiction to review 
measures taken by the state in response to a judgment, its pow­
ers extended to the continuing effects of an ongoing violation.153 It 
may hence be concluded that the Court assumes competence ratione 
materiae for cases presenting continuing violations. Such situations 
may stem from the failure to reopen domestic proceedings, thus 
maintaining a prohibition to enjoy a right protected by the Conven­
tion, or other state acts that have the same effects. A differentiation 
according to whether the state has taken (probably insufficient) ac­
tion or has not acted at all, as it existed before VgT v. Switzerland 
(No. 2), is apparently no longer applied, although persistence of this 
new jurisprudence will have to be evaluated at a later moment.
It would require a detailed analysis of reception of renewed ap­
plications in the CoE member states in order to know whether they 
have a particularly positive effect on state compliance or whether 
they are just taken as any other case. This task would exceed the 
scope of this investigation. At least in VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2), 
the Swiss Federal Court accepted a renewed application by the ap­
plicant association, quashed its previous decisions and granted the 
broadcasting of the commercial spot in question.154
The situation is different when a state does not implement gen­
eral measures. These situations may give rise to high numbers of 
parallel similar applications by different applicants in the same situ­
ation as the original applicant. As these situations are never exactly 
the same, they do not fall under Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, but 
must be treated by the Court in any case. The measure of choice 
introduced for these cases is the pilot judgment procedure that has 
already been explained supra.
152Ibid., paras. 86-87.
153Ibid., paras. 91-92.
154 VgT v. Switzerland (No. 2), CM, 32772/02, 15 September 2010.
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9.1.3 The Parliamentary Assembly
The Parliamentary Assembly is a relatively new player in the field of 
supervision ofcompliance. While not being mentioned in the ECHR, 
its role under Article 23(1) of the Statute of the CoE embraces “any 
matter within the aim and scope of the Council of Europe” plus “any 
matter referred to it by the Committee of Ministers”. As the protec­
tion of human rights is an instrument for the achievement of the 
general aims of the Council as they were defined in Article 1 of the 
Statute of the CoE, it has the authority to occupy itself with any 
issue concerning the European human rights protection system.
The Assembly entered the monitoring stage in 1993, when, in the 
scope of accession of the new member states from Eastern Europe, 
it instructed the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
(AS/Jur) “to report to it when problems arise on the situation of hu­
man rights in member States, including their compliance with judg­
ments by the European Court of Human Rights”.155 Monitoring of 
execution by the Assembly was further developed due to a group of 
cases in which states did not execute judgments, causing the Assem­
bly to direct written questions to the Committee of Ministers. This 
new activism by the Assembly coincided with the general overhaul 
of the Human Rights System following the entry into force of Pro­
tocol no. 11 in 19 9 8.156 In 2000, Rapporteur Erik Jurgens submitted 
his first report on the execution of judgments of the Court to AS/Jur, 
proposing that the Assembly and national delegations should play a 
bigger role in this context. He saw the Assembly’s function mainly 
as a link between the Council and the states. Its members could, 
for example, exert pressure in their national parliaments if there are 
problems with the execution of judgments concerning their coun­
try. He therefore proposed that the Directorate of Human Rights 
should inform the Assembly of such cases.157 Another instrument 
proposed was the invitation of the respective state’s minister of jus­
tice before the Assembly to raise public awareness to the case.158
155Order no. 485, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, 1993.
156Jurgens, Execution o f  Judgments o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights, Explana­
tory Memorandum no. 8.
157Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum no. 79.
158Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum no. 91.
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It could eventually also sanction a state according to its own rules 
of participation.159 These proposals were cast into a resolution in 
the same year.160 PACE also established its own record of execution 
of judgments,161 holds regular debates on the cases in the database, 
and adopts recommendations to the Committee and through it to 
the relevant states if they “abnormal[ly]” delay, neglect or deliber­
ately refrain from execution. It can, if necessary, organize an urgent 
debate, take further measures according to its own rules or propose 
the application of Article 8 of the ECHR to the Committee. In 2002, 
AS/Jur was given a permanent authorization162 to monitor the im­
plementation of judgments and report to the Assembly when con­
sidered appropriate.163
AS/Jur’s activity has resulted in a number of reports, resolutions 
and recommendations, which focus on specific states where the 
most serious execution-related problems persist.164 Its means of ac­
159Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum no. 92.
160Execution o f judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights (hereinafter 
“PACE Resolution 1226 (2000)”), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, PACE 
Resolution 1226 (2000), 2000.
161 Cases are chosen by time elapsed since the judgment was rendered and importance 
attached to execution: Lambert Abdelgawad, “The Execution o f Judgments o f the 
European Court o f Human Rights”, 3 ZaöRV 69 (2009), p. 484.
162According to Rule 25(3) o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the Assembly, committees 
are usually occupied with a subject not longer than two years. The open-ended 
monitoring task is therefore seen as underlining the particular importance o f the 
subject. Drzemczewski, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s Involvement”, 2 NQHR 28 
(2010), p. 170.
163Resolution 1268 (2002), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1268 
(2002), 2002.
164See Drzemczewski, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s Involvement”, 2 NQHR 28 
(2010), p. 170 and PACE’s homepage at http://assembly.coe.int. The problems that 
were identified are deaths and ill-treatments caused by law enforcement personnel 
and excessive length o f proceedings in Bulgaria, excessive length o f proceedings 
in Greece and Italy, execution o f court judgments and avoiding o f ill-treatment in 
custody in Moldova, excessive court and administrative proceedings and detention 
on remand in Poland, restitution for nationalized property, length and execution of 
domestic judgments and misuse o f information by intelligence agencies in Roma­
nia, ill-treatment and inhumane conditions in detention facilities and the Chechen 
situation in Russia, reopening o f court proceedings and detention for conscien­
tious objection in Turkey, enforcement o f domestic judgments and independence 
of judicial personnel in Ukraine, and implementation o f politically sensitive judg­
ments (prisoner voting rights) in the UK. No. 7 ofResolution 1787 (2011), adopted 
by the Parliamentary Assembly, 26 January 2011.
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tion, in addition to those mentioned supra, are in situ visits by the 
chairperson of AS/Jur to states with particularly grave problems 
and a continuing dialogue with the parliaments there on the prob­
lems encountered, cooperation with national parliaments through 
the national delegations to install the legal conditions for an effec­
tive implementation of Court judgments, and eventual sanctioning 
of the state.165 Furthermore, it can pose oral or written questions to 
the Committee either on specific cases or in relation to more general 
matters such as the execution of judgments in a certain country or 
area or the state of compliance with certain measures such as the 
payment of just satisfaction.166
Particularly the practice of state visits appears to be a promis­
ing approach. The Committee or the Directorate General, which are 
bound to a more formalized procedure, cannot easily conduct such 
visits without exposing themselves to the risk of unjust treatment 
of the states, particularly if  they visit only certain states. Neverthe­
less, the Directorate General has held discussions with representa­
tives of national governments in some capitals.167 As the Assembly 
is not bound by such rules but is acting principally out of its own 
motion, it can act much more freely. Discussions with deputies in 
certain countries may raise awareness in national parliaments to the 
problems posed by the domestic situation and provide entry points 
for discussions on how a stronger inclusion of national delegations 
might render the execution process swifter.168
Although PACE’s intervention in the monitoring process was not 
taken serious by the states at the beginning and was met with rejec­
tion by the Committee as an interference with its dominion, a viable 
practice of support for monitoring has since evolved.169 It is based 
on the one hand on the fact that the Assembly is tackling the issue of
165No. 10 o f Resolution 1787 (2011) and Jurgens, Execution o f  Judgments o f  the Euro­
pean Court o f  Human Rights, Explanatory Memorandum no. 18ff.
166Cf. Doc. 7457, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, 17 November 1995 and 
Lambert Abdelgawad, “The Execution ofJudgments o fth e  European Court ofH u- 
man Rights”, 3 ZaöRV 69 (2009), pp. 483f.
167Drzemczewski, “The Parliamentary Assembly’s Involvement”, 2 NQHR 28 (2010), 
p. 171.
168Ibid., pp. 171f.
169See the vivid description o f his first years as rapporteur o f AS/Jur: Jurgens, “De 
rol van de parlementaire assemblee”, 7 NTM/NJCM-Bulletin 35 (2010), pp. 844f.
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non-execution on the parliamentary level, while the Committee is 
working on the governmental level, and that the deputies in the As­
sembly, due to their liberties as members of parliament, can act with 
less restrictions. Thus, an essential axis of the Assembly’s work is 
“naming and shaming”, a practice unthinkable for the diplomats on 
the Committee of Ministers.170 But also the rapporteur’s influence 
on the national parliaments either directly or through the national 
delegation in PACE may (and has) taken execution in several cases 
decisive steps forward.171
9.1.4 The Commissioner for Human Rights
The Group of Wise Persons in its 2006 report on the improvement 
of the ECHR mechanisms proposed a more active participation for 
the Commissioner for Human Rights in the ECHR’s control sys- 
tem.172 Commenting on this proposal, the Commissioner laid out 
his possible participation in the execution process as offering his 
good offices to the member states upon being informed of a general 
problem underlying a case (either pilot judgments or other cases), 
using his relation to the national human rights institutions and om­
budsmen, interacting between the Court, the Committee of Min­
isters and these national organs to suggest and validate the means 
required to comply with a judgment.173 In 2006 the Committee initi­
ated annual tripartite meetings with the Commissioner and PACE to 
“promote stronger interaction with regard to the execution of judg- 
ments”.174 As a result the Commissioner started consultations with 
national human rights institutions, established contact points and 
launched a peer to peer project on implementation.175 In 2008, in 
the framework of the peer to peer project, the Commissioner pro­
170Ibid., p. 843.
171See examples at ibid., pp. 847ff.
172Group o f W ise Persons, Interim report o f  the Group o f  Wise Persons to the Committee 
o f  Ministers, Committee o f Ministers at its 116th Session, 18 May 2006, no. 43.
173Commissioner for Human Rights, Comments by Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, Com­
missioner fo r  Human Rights, on the interim report o f  the Group o f  Wise Persons to 
the Committee o f  Ministers, 12 June 2006, nos. 13-14.
174Committee o f Ministers, Reform o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, 
CM(2006)65, Committee o f Ministers at its 116th Session, 18 May 2006, no. X(c).
175Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH(2006)18 revDH(2008)10REV, para. 2.
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vided ten national human rights institutions with information on 
cases decided by the Court against their countries in order for them 
to discuss effective participation in the Committee of Ministers’ ex­
ecution process.176 Subsequently, the Commissioner continued his 
work, cooperating during his field visits with national human rights 
institutions to elaborate their role in the prevention of human rights 
violations, but has not elaborated further activity in this field.
9.1.5 The Secretary General
Another often overlooked participant in the supervision of execu­
tion of judgments is the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
He is appointed, according to Article 36(b) of the Statute of the CoE, 
by PACE on recommendation of the Committee of Ministers.
Article 52 of the ECHR provides the Secretary General with a 
generic monitoring power, allowing him to request each Council 
state to “furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal 
law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions 
of the Convention.” He has made use of this power only a few times 
until now, requesting on six occasions (1964, 1970, 1975, 1983, 1988 
and 2005) information from all member states on the implemen­
tation. On two occasions, though, did he request specific member 
states on current issues: in December 1999 he invited Russia to “fur­
nish, in the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, explanations concerning the manner in which the Conven­
tion is currently being implemented in Chechnya, and the risks of 
violation which may result therefrom”. In February 2002, Moldova 
was asked to report on the implementation of the Convention in the 
light of certain recent developments, particularly the suspension of 
the activities of an opposition party for one month and the lift of 
the parliamentary immunity of three of its leaders.177
The Secretary General is exercising his monitoring power in a 
discretionary way, a practice that has never been contested by the 
states.178 His discretionary power is not complete, though, but lim­
176Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH(2009)12, para. 2.4.
177Schokkenbroek, “The Supervisory Function o f the Secretary General o f the Coun­
cil o f Europe”, p. 326.
178Ibid., p. 327.
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ited by certain elements: the choice of the state has to be based on 
sound arguments, the request must be specific, the procedure must 
be objective, the answers have to be adequate and sufficient, chan­
nels for dialogue must be open and conclusions must be drawn from 
the outcome of the procedure.179
Results of the Secretary’s inquiry are published and sent, inter 
alia, to PACE, all member states and the Court.180 This is the only 
“sanction” at his disposal. While publication might expose the state 
to criticism from the peer states and public opinion, the effect in 
cases where the Court has already been active may be limited. A 
judgment by the Court will always cause more public attention than 
any instrument at the disposal of the Committee or any other organ. 
The Secretary’s action can therefore only be seen as an additional 
screw to fasten in order to multiply pressure on a recalcitrant state. 
Given its limited impact compared to Court decisions, the Secre­
tary should reserve his facility in these circumstances to exceptional 
cases so as to underline the outstanding gravity of the situation that 
made him interfere.
9.1.6 The Human Rights Trust Fund
The Human Rights Trust Fund was set up in 2008 following a 
Norwegian initiative. It was initially supported by the Council of 
Europe and the European Development Bank, Norway, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Finland and Switzerland making contributions. Its 
main task lies in the support of cooperation in areas that were iden­
tified by the Committee in its recommendations on better national 
execution of judgments. Projects started in 2009, dealing with the 
issues of non-execution of domestic court decisions (HRTF 1) and 
actions by security forces (HRTF 2). Each project focuses on specific 
areas: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine participate in HRTF 1, while HRTF 2 
aims at alleviating the problems resulting from the actions of Rus­
sian armed forces in Chechnya. The Fund subsequently started two 
new projects, HRTF 22 with Turkey on freedom of expression, par­
179Ban, Sudre, and van Dijk, Report on Art. 52 Procedure, para. 7.
180Schokkenbroek, “The Supervisory Function o f the Secretary General o f the Coun­
cil o f Europe”, p. 330.
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ticularly to bring domestic jurisdiction in line with the Convention, 
and HRTF 18 concerning remand and effective remedies to chal­
lenge detention conditions.181 All projects were still ongoing at the 
time of writing.
9.2 Execution under the A C H R
In the inter-American system the principle of subsidiarity does not 
apply on the reparation stage. Consequently, the IACtHR can re­
solve, already during the judicial phase, some of the issues the Com­
mittee of Ministers has to deal with in cooperation with the states 
during the monitoring process in Europe. This principally concerns 
the determination of reparation modalities and beneficiaries. Fur­
thermore, the absence of subsidiarity on the reparation stage and the 
IACtHR’s detailed reparation practice leave almost no margin of ap­
preciation to the states when executing judgments. Despite this ap­
parent facilitation, monitoring in the inter-American system tends 
to be a long and controversial process. At the end of 2014 there were 
158 cases pending full compliance by the state, the most ancient one 
dating back to 1996.182 Questions hover mainly around issues like 
at which moment all measures can be considered to be fully com­
plied with or impossibilities to comply with specific measures for a 
variety of reasons put forward by the states.
Interestingly, the broad power to order reparation the ACHR puts 
into the hands of the IACtHR does not correlate with a dedicated 
monitoring system. Article 65 of the ACHR is the only rule that 
makes an allusion to non-compliance, stipulating that the Court, 
in its annual reports to the regular sessions of the General Assem­
bly, shall specify “the cases in which a state has not complied with 
its judgments, making pertinent recommendations” (9.2.1). The As­
sembly though has on several occasions failed to draw consequences 
from the Court’s reports. This induced the latter to derive from the 
ACHR a proper monitoring power that, despite having been chal­
lenged by Panama, is nowadays a generally accepted practice and
181 Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, pp. 28f.
182IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, pp. 72ff., 
including the case o f Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
19 September 1996, Series C no. 29.
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has even been introduced into the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR 
(9.2.2).
It should not remain unmentioned that, unlike in Europe, the 
judgments of the IACtHR are notified to all states parties to the 
ACHR. They could then exercise a peer control of implementation 
and even sue resilient states again before the Court.183 The Court’s 
authority to hear such cases results from Articles 61 and 62 of the 
ACHR. Article 61 of the ACHR makes clear that inter-state applica­
tions may be lodged, and Article 62(3) of the ACHR authorizes the 
Court to decide the interpretation and application of “the provisions 
of this Convention” that are submitted to it, without any further re­
striction. In consequence, this includes alleged violations by a state 
of its obligation to comply with the judgments under Article 68 of 
the ACHR.184 But as the states are not even taking steps within the 
General Assembly to urge their peers to comply with their obliga­
tions, a multilateral influence outside of this forum or even before 
the Court has never even been considered until now.
9.2.1 The General Assembly
There is no dedicated monitoring mechanism for the implementa­
tion of reparation decisions by the Court. Particularly, Article 65 of 
the ACHR does not entail an obligation of action by the General 
Assembly upon having been informed by the Court of cases of non- 
compliance.185 Although the execution of judgments was discussed 
during the drafting of the Convention, it was never envisaged to 
introduce a formalized mechanism comparable to that of the Coun­
cil of Europe. Proposals hovered around the formulation that judg­
ments should be transmitted to the deliberative organ of the OAS 
which, by the time the ACHR was adopted, had become the General 
Assembly of the OAS.186
In practice, though, it is not the Assembly itself but the Permanent 
Council that takes notice of the reports and submits a proposal reso­
183See Article 69 o f the ACHR.
184Buergenthal, “Implementation o f the judgments o f the Court”, p. 187. The same 
faculty exists according to Article 33 o f the ECHR in Europe.
185 Ventura Robles, “Supervision del cumplimiento”, p. 6.
186Ibid., p. 8.
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lution to the Assembly at its following session. The Court submits its 
annual reports to the Permanent Council according to Article 91(f) 
of the Charter of the OAS. The Council passes the report on and dis­
cussions thereon take place before its Committee of Judicial and Po­
litical Affairs (CJPA), including an oral presentation by the President 
of the Court. To this end, the President, Vice-President and Secretary 
of the Court travel to the seat of the OAS once a year.187 The states 
subsequently submit their comments on the report188 and the CJPA 
adopts a draft resolution.189 The draft resolution, together with the 
comments by the states, is presented to the annual General Assem­
bly. At the General Assembly, the President of the Court presents the 
annual report again, usually pointing out the most pressing issues 
for the Court’s work.190 The Assembly then adopts the resolution 
proposed by the CJPA.191
Although Article 65 of the ACHR mentions only “regular ses­
sions” of the Assembly to which the Court shall submit its reports, 
it could also, in cases of particular emergency, submit a case to the 
Permanent Council outside of the regular schedule. Each member 
state could then summon a special General Assembly to discuss the 
case.192 However, the expenses to summon a General Assembly and 
the states’ attitude to enforcing compliance make this a rather un­
likely scenario.
187Cf. IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, 
pp. 91f.
188W ritten interventions are available at http://www.oas.org/consejo/sp/CAJP/ 
informes%20anuales.asp, while the comments o f the member states on the an­
nual report for 2011 were published in document OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-3077/12 o f 
19 April 2012, available at http://scm.oas.org/IDMS/Redirectpage.aspx?class=CP/ 
CAJP&classNum=3077&lang=s.
189For 2012 see OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-3070/12 rev. 4 o f 24 May 2012, available at http:// 
scm.oas.org/IDMS/Redirectpage.aspx?class=CP/CAJP&classNum=3070&lang=s.
190 Cf. IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2011, p. 78.
191Cf. AG/RES. 2759 (XLII-O/12); Ventura Robles, “Supervision del cumplimiento”, 
p. 15. The General Assembly is not bound by the CJPA’s proposal.Nevertheless, 
during its yearly three-day session it adopts around 80 resolutions on all types 
o f matters. This schedule leaves no time for discussions, so that in practice the 
CJPA’s proposal has always been adopted without modifications.
192Buergenthal, “The Inter-American Court o f Human Rights”, 2 AJIL 76 (April 1982), 
pp. 241f.
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The powers of the General Assembly regarding recalcitrant states 
are not clearly defined in the ACHR, and there is no correspond­
ing practice either. This had scholars assume that political organs 
could not exercise powers that are not clearly founded in the Char­
ter, in particular in an organ that adheres to the principle of non­
intervention as a cornerstone. The OAS has though watered down 
the strict concept of non-intervention, allowing its political organs 
to take action in response to the internal situation of states.193 The 
General Assembly executed this power in the Cuban affair in 1962, 
well before the possibility to suspend a member was introduced into 
Article 9 of the Charter of the OAS in 19 9 2.194 It can therefore be as­
sumed that, being the supreme political body of the OAS, the Gen­
eral Assembly’s political appreciation of a case is wide and, under 
its power to authoritatively interpret the Charter of the OAS, it may 
take the decision it deems appropriate in a specific case. Thus, the 
suspension, similar to the case of Cuba, or even the rejection of a 
state that persistently does not comply with its obligations from 
IACtHR judgments could be envisaged, taking into account that law 
and good faith are basic principles of the relations of the American 
states (Article 3 of the Charter of the OAS) and that each state shall 
respect the individual rights of the person (Article 17 of the Char­
ter of the OAS).195 Nevertheless, the Assembly hitherto only once 
requested a state to inform the Court of actions taken in pursuance 
to a judgment, so that the question of the limits of the Assembly’s 
powers has never been at issue.
The Court’s first submission under Article 65 of the ACHR con­
cerned two cases against Suriname. In its annual report for 1994 it 
complained that it had not received any information from the state 
since the adoption of the decisions on reparation in September 1993 
and January 1994 respectively and requested the Assembly to “urge”
193 Gomez, “The Interaction between the Political Actors o f the OAS, the Commission 
and the Court”, p. 191.
194Resolution VI: “Exclusion o f the Present Government o f Cuba from Participation in 
the Inter-American System ” (hereinafter “Resolution VI”), adopted by the Eighth 
Meeting o f Consultation o f Ministers o f Foreign Affairs, OEA Official Documents 
OEA/Ser. C/II.8, 31 January 1962; Jimenez, “Organization o f American States”, 4 
ILM 33 (1994), p. 983.
195Faündez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the Protection o f  Human Rights, 
p. 856.
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the state to submit the required information.196 The Assembly did 
as requested and included a respective passage into its resolution on 
the Court’s annual report.197 Suriname reacted and the cases could 
be closed in 1997 (Aloeboetoe) and 1998 (Gangaram Panday).
In the following years, much to the distress of the Court, though, 
even in severe situations that put its authority under threat, the Gen­
eral Assembly did not react when the Court reported cases of non­
compliance. The first such situation was caused by Trinidad and To­
bago. On 22 May 1998, the IACommHR had requested the Court to 
order provisional measures in the cases of several persons who had 
been sentenced to death in proceedings that were considered to vio­
late several guarantees of the ACHR.198 As a consequence, Trinidad 
denounced the ACHR on 26 May 1998, the denunciation becoming 
effective one year later according to Article 78(1) of the ACHR.199 
On 27 May 1998, the President of the Court ordered provisional 
measures in the case of James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, extend­
ing them in the following months to several other persons in simi­
lar circumstances. When the Court summoned the IACommHR and 
Trinidad for an audience on the measures, the state declared that 
it would not respect the Court’s orders and would not refer to the 
Court on this as well as any other case. Nonetheless, it did not refer 
to its denunciation (which did not cover the cases in question), but 
relied on supposed procedural errors by the IACommHR.200 There­
upon the Court informed the General Assembly in its annual report 
for 1998 under Article 65 of the ACHR of Trinidad’s attitude and ex­
pressed its serious concerns about the repercussions of the denunci­
ation for the protection of human rights and called the Assembly to 
exert influence on Trinidad to reconsider its decision.201 Despite the 
clear advices from the Court, the CAJP did not include any reference 
to the issue in its resolution on the Court’s annual report. The Court 
consequently sent notes to the Secretary of the Permanent Council
196 IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1994, pp. 17f.
197IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1995, p. 15.
198IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1998, pp. 33ff.
199Hereon: Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago (Preliminary Objections), IACtHR, 
1 September 2001, Series C no. 80, para. 28.
200IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court ofH um an Rights 1998, p. 34.
201 Ibid., pp. 34f.
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and, as he neither showed any willingness to include the issue in the 
proposal resolution for the General Assembly, also urged the Secre­
tary General of the OAS to refer the issue to the General Assembly, 
again to no avail.202 In the summer of 1999, in flagrant disrespect 
of the provisional measures ordered by the Court to protect the life 
of the presumed victims, Trinidad executed two of them without 
causing any reaction by the other American states.203
In the same year the Court found severe violations in several cases 
related to the internal conflict between the Government of Peru and 
a guerrilla group called Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru 
and, in particular, had declared the trials of civilians before military 
tribunals a violation of the Convention and required Peru to annul 
the decisions.204 Peru’s reaction -  probably influenced by the OAS’s 
absolute silence on Trinidad’s denunciation -  was to withdraw its 
recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction with immediate 
effect on 9 July 1999 for all cases in which Peru had not yet replied 
to the application.205 On 16 July 1999, the Ambassador of Peru ap­
peared at the Court’s premises in San Jose and returned the applica­
tion in the Constitutional Court v. Peru case.206 The Court, perform­
ing a thorough interpretation of the ACHR, resolved that the denun­
ciation of the recognition of competence was not possible and that 
a state could only denounce the Convention as a whole in the terms 
of Article 78 of the ACHR, giving one year prior notice and thus 
decided to remain seised of the case.207 Furthermore, in the already 
resolved cases of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru and Loayza Tamayo 
v. Peru, the Peruvian Supreme Court decided that those were “un­
executable” and returned them to the Court on 25 June 1999. The
202IACtHR, Annual Report o fth e  Inter-American Court ofH um an Rights 1999, pp. 46f.
203Ibid., pp. 39f.
204Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Merits), IACtHR, 17 September 1997, Series C no. 33 and 
subsequently Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 Novem­
ber 1998, Series C no. 42 and Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 30 May 1999, Series C no. 52.
205 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Competence), IACtHR, 24 September 1999, Series 
C no. 55, para. 23; the denunciation would also affect the case ofIvch er Bronstein.
206 On the reasons for the withdrawal: Cassel, “Pern se retira del SIDH”, Revista IIDH 
29 (1999), pp. 73ff.
207 Constitutional Court v. Peru (Competence), IACtHR, 24 September 1999, Series 
C no. 55, paras. 38ff.and 54.
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Court stressed Peru’s continuing obligation to fulfil the decisions 
in November 19 9 9.208 Again, it reported these incidents under Arti­
cle 65 of the ACHR to the General Assembly.209
The Assembly, with respect to both situations, did not take any 
concise decision to urge either state to comply with its obligations 
under the ACHR. The only reference in its resolution on the Court’s 
annual report to its session in 2000 was to reiterate that the Court’s 
judgments were final and not subject to appeal, and to call upon 
the states that had denounced the ACHR to reconsider their deci- 
sions.210 After the destitution of the Fujimori government, Peru re­
assumed the Court’s jurisdiction in 2001 and the Minister of Justice 
and later president of the Court, Diego Garcia-Sayân, visited the 
Court in order to personally hand over a note to the Court’s presi­
dent in which the state “expressly acknowledged the responsibility 
that corresponds [to i t . . .]  for the violation of the rights”.211
While that year’s General Assembly recognized Peru’s return to 
the inter-American human rights system, it had apparently consid­
ered Trinidad a lost state and did not refer to the issue ever after.212 
It nevertheless, in a resolution on the perfection and strengthening 
of the inter-American system, invited the Court to continue to in­
clude information on compliance in its annual reports, which would 
be analysed by the Assembly.213
The Court once more brought several cases and decisions on pro­
visional measures, which the respective states had either not com­
plied with or had not informed the Court correspondingly, to the 
Assembly’s knowledge and asked it to urge the responding states to 
comply with their obligations.214 Again, despite the general reitera­
tion
that the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Hu­
man Rights are final and may not be appealed and that
208 Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 17 November 
1999, paras. 1ff.
209IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1999, pp. 42ff.
210Nos. 3 and 4 o f AG/RES. 1716 (XXX-O/00), 5 June 2000.
211IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2001, p. 52.
212AG/RES. 1827 (XXXI-O/01), 4 June 2001.
213No. 5(a) o f AG/RES. 1828 (XXXI-O/01), 4 June 2001.
214IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2003, pp. 42f.
202
9 Execution o f  Judgments under the Conventions
the States Parties to the Convention undertake to com­
ply with the rulings of the Court in all cases to which 
they are party,
no specific reference to these situations was included in the Assem­
bly’s resolution.215
The Court, under the Presidency of Judge Cangado Trindade, in 
reaction to the negative effects the failing political support by the 
member states in the General Assembly had caused in the early 
2000s, developed a proposal for an amendment of the ACHR in order 
to ensure better supervision of compliance. The proposal focused on 
the introduction of a permanent political monitoring body, namely 
a working group within the CJPA.216 To this end, Article 65 of the 
ACHR should be amended by an additional sentence, stating:
La Asamblea General [ ...]  remitirâ [los casos donde un 
Estado no ha cumplido con sus obligaciones] al Con- 
sejo Permanente, para estudiar la materia y rendir un 
informe, para que la Asamblea General delibere al res-
pecto.217
The OAS though did not adopt this solution but maintained the way 
in which it dealt with the Court’s reports unchanged.
Given the improbability to solve the systemic problem of super­
vision, Judge Ventura Robles made another proposal in his separate 
opinion to the case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago. In his view, 
immediate improvement could be obtained by establishing a per­
manent working group in the CJPA to properly discuss the Court’s 
reports, instead of having the states file their observations and then 
propose a resolution that is then passed up to the General Assem­
215No. 3 o f AG/RES. 1913 (XXXIII-O/03), 10 June 2003.
216Cangado Trindade, “Presentation ante CAJP, 19 de abril de 2002”, p. 795.
217 “The General Assembly [... ] will submit [the cases where a State has not complied 
with its obligations] to the Permanent Council in order to study the matter and 
render a report for the General Assembly to deliberate thereon [our translation]”. 
Cangado Trindade, “Informe: Bases para un Proyecto”, pp. 369f.; a complete re­
count o f the development o f these proposals can be found at Caesar v. Trinidad 
and Tobago (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 11 March 2005, Series C no. 
123, Separate opinion ofJudge Manuel E. Ventura Robles, para 19.
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bly.218 This solution would not have required an amendment to the 
ACHR.
Again, the OAS did not make any modification whatsoever to its 
organs or their functioning with respect to the Court. The Court 
thus finally gave up and began to find solutions within its own mar­
gin of powers. In 2005 it adopted a resolution wherein it decided -  
and to this end informed the General Assembly and the Secretary 
General of the OAS -  to relinquish its monitoring activities for cases 
submitted to the Assembly under Article 65 of the ACHR. In the fu­
ture it would only receive notifications of compliance from the state 
and, in the opposite case, continue to include the case in each annual 
report.219 Thus, the Court drew a clear line between its monitoring 
competence, which is limited to the preparation of reports to the 
General Assembly, and the transfer to the Assembly as an “ultima 
ratio” in cases of recalcitrant states.
The Court could indeed successfully push compliance forward 
in many cases.220 However, towards the end of the decade of the 
2010s, tensions rose between Venezuela and the organs of the inter- 
American human rights protection system. Venezuela accused the 
OAS and its organs of being agents of the United States against 
the government of Hugo Chavez. As a consequence, the state did 
not implement the measures ordered in several IACtHR judgments. 
When the Venezulean Supreme Court had declared that the imple­
mentation of measures benefitting several judges who had been re­
moved from office out of political reasons could not be executed, and 
Venezuela denounced the ACHR, the Court, for the first time since 
2003, decided to submit the case of Apitz-Barbera et al. v. Venezuela 
under Article 65 of the ACHR to the General Assembly.221 Before 
this politically charged background, neither in the General Assem­
bly nor in any of the preceding debates in the CJPA or the Permanent
218 Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 11 March 
2005, Series C no. 123, Separate opinion o f Judge Manuel E. Ventura Robles, para 
32ff.
219Supervision de cumplimiento de sentencias (Aplicabilidad del articulo 65 de la Con- 
vencion Americana sobre Derechos Humanos) (Resolution de la Corte), IACtHR, 
29 June 2005.
220See infra section 9.2.2.
221IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2012, p. 62. 
See on the Venezuelan situation infra p. 220.
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Council, any mention whatsoever was made to the issue of compli­
ance with the Venezuelan cases before the Court.222
9.2.2 The IACtHR
The Court currently bears the main burden of supervising compli­
ance with its own judgments. It has developed a specific procedure 
(9.2.2.1), but its possibilities are nevertheless limited (9.2.2.2). The 
development of the Court’s supervision procedures will be evalu­
ated at the end of this section (9.2.2.3).
9.2.2.1 The Procedure of Monitoring Compliance
The IACtHR had assumed the power to monitor compliance with its 
orders already in the first cases it closed with a sentence on repa- 
ration.223 In the original judgment in Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Hon­
duras it had ordered Honduras to pay monetary compensation to 
the victims and had settled the amount in Lempiras. As Honduras 
did not effectuate the payment within the time limit established 
and the Lempira had been severely devaluated since the day of the 
judgment, the Court, recurring to its power to supervise compli­
ance, ruled that the state had to compensate the victim for the loss 
caused by the devaluation since the moment the original payment
was due.224
Originally, the monitoring procedure was not formalized in the 
Court’s rules but was developed from practice. It relies on the sub­
mission of reports by all parties on compliance with the measures 
ordered. The Court usually orders the states to submit every six
222Consejo Permanente de la Organizacion de los Estados Americanos - Comision 
de Asuntos Juridicos y  Politicos, Informe de la Comision de Asuntos Juridicos y 
Politicos sobre las Observaciones y  Recomendaciones de los Estados Miembros al In­
form e Anual de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Correspondiente al 
Ano 2012, OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-3181/13, 20 May 2013 and AG/RES. 2797 (XLIII­
O/13), adopted by the General Assembly o f the OAS, 5 June 2013.
223 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 21 July 1989, 
Series C no. 7, oper. para. 5.
224 Velâsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Interpretation), IACtHR, 17 August 1990, Series 
C no. 9, oper. para. 4.
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months a report on measures taken to comply with the judgment.225 
Upon submission, it evaluates these reports and issues, when the 
situation so requires, orders on compliance. In these orders it re­
peats the operative paragraphs of the original judgment, recounts 
the events that were reported by the parties concerning compliance, 
points out advances and demands further steps to be taken in case 
of non-compliance.226
While most Court orders on compliance merely recognize the ad­
vances and repeat the state’s obligation to comply with the open 
points, the Court has also assumed that it can further specify repa­
ration orders on the monitoring stage without recurring to the in­
terpretation procedure. Thus, in the case of Caballero Delgado v. 
Colombia, it decided in an order on compliance that the state should 
deposit the compensatory reparation for the victims, who were mi­
nors at the time of judgment, in certificates of deposit instead of the 
originally ordered trust fund, whenever the first option was more 
favourable for them.227 In Barrios Altos v. Peru, upon an inquiry by 
the state about whether the administrative and financial expenses 
for the trust fund set up as payment of reparation to minor vic­
tims could be deducted from the value of the reparation, the Court 
held, on the monitoring stage, that no deductions from the repara­
tion were permissible.228
The Court’s monitoring competence was challenged once in 2003. 
It had handed down its sentence in Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama on 
2 February 2001. The state, as well as the Commission and the vic­
tims, subsequently submitted various briefs on compliance and even 
participated in meetings held at the seat of the Court.229 Despite this, 
on 27 February 2003 Panama submitted a brief alleging “that the
225Eg. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), IACtHR, 31 August 2001, Series C no. 79, oper. para. 8.
226In general: Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence), IACtHR, 28 November 
2003, Series C no. 104, para. 105, and in practice: Loayza Tamayo v. Peru (Compli­
ance with Judgment), IACtHR, 17 November 1999, Series C no. 60.
227 Caballero Delgado v. Colombia (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 27 Novem­
ber 2002, para. 14.
228Barrios Altos v. Peru (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, 
paras. 11ff.
229Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, Series 
C no. 104, paras. 5 -26.
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stage of monitoring compliance with judgment is a ‘post-judgment’ 
stage that ‘is not included in the norms that regulate the jurisdic­
tion and the procedure of the Court’”.230 Nevertheless, it continued 
to participate in the proceedings and announced to the Court on 11 
July 2003 that it “would soon make the pending payment”,231 only to 
reiterate on 30 July 2003 that it considered the monitoring activity 
of the Court to be ultra vires.232 It argued that monitoring execu­
tion was not a judicial but a political task and, as such, exclusive to 
the General Assembly. This would also result from Article 65 of the 
ACHR. The Court could not extend its competence assuming that 
it had a competence de competence. Panama also made reference to 
the situation under the UN Charter, which assigned the monitoring 
of execution of ICJ judgments to the UN Security Council. The EC- 
tHR neither had a monitoring competence but only the Committee 
of Ministers. Furthermore, the then 14 years old monitoring prac­
tice of the Court could not be considered jurisprudential practice. 
Any submission by the states had hence been made on a voluntary 
basis. Finally it accused the Court of having exceeded its powers 
also because it had interpreted its judgment outside of the official 
interpretation procedure.
This challenged the Court to adopt a fundamental decision on its 
monitoring competence, proceeding to a rigorous interpretation of 
the Convention. Its reasoning principally relied on the question of 
effectivity of its decisions. It argued that monitoring compliance was 
part of its judicial functions because otherwise its decisions would 
not be effective but merely of a declaratory nature.233 This would not 
coincide with the right to a fair trial and that of an effective remedy 
stipulated in Articles 8 and 25 of the ACHR. Both the IACtHR and 
the ECtHR had decided in several cases that an effective remedy 
presupposed that judicial decisions were effectively implemented 
by the state.234 The Court elaborated the specific role and function 
of the European Committee of Ministers and pointed out that the 
OAS member states had not set up a similar organ, stating that
230Ibid., para. 26.
231Ibid., para. 39.
232Ibid., para. 54.
233Ibid., para. 72.
234Ibid., paras. 77-82.
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it is clear that, when regulating monitoring compliance 
with the judgments of the Inter-American Court, it was 
not envisaged that the OAS General Assembly or the 
OAS Permanent Council would carry out a similar func­
tion to the Committee of Ministers in the European sys- 
tem.235
Then it interpreted the travaux preparatoires, finding that the states 
intended to endow it with a veritable monitoring competence, by 
not only establishing in Article 65 of the ACHR that the Court 
should submit a report to the General Assembly, but also by intro­
ducing the concept that it must indicate the cases of non-compliance 
and make pertinent recommendations.236 If it did not monitor com­
pliance it could not know in which cases states did not comply and 
thus select these cases to present them to the General Assembly 
and make the pertinent recommendations.237 The same would result 
from Article 62(1) of the ACHR, which extended the Court’s jurisdic­
tion to “all matters relating to the interpretation or application of the 
Convention.” Also, Article 29(a) of the ACHR provided that the Con­
vention should not be interpreted in such a way that the rights and 
freedoms could be “restricted to a greater extent than is provided 
for therein”. Should none of the OAS bodies be enabled to monitor 
compliance with the Court’s judgments, this principle would remain 
void.238 Finally it made reference to the tacit agreement of the states 
which had accepted the Court’s monitoring in all previous cases, 
revealing an opinio juris communis.239 It repealed the Panamanian 
argument that such an opinio juris could only be assumed after a 
lapse of time of more than 14 years. Lastly it made reference to the 
General Assembly’s attitude towards the monitoring practice, stat­
ing that the Assembly was informed about the Court’s monitoring 
practice since the first cases it had decided and that it had never ob­
jected to it. On the contrary, on several occasions the Assembly had 
requested states to submit the information required by the Court on
235Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, Series 
C no. 104, para. 88.
236Ibid., paras. 89f.
237Ibid., para. 134.
238Ibid., para. 95.
239Ibid., para. 102.
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the monitoring stage.240 It finally rejected Panama’s claim, pointing 
out, among others, that the state had provided the Court with infor­
mation on compliance even while putting into doubt its monitoring 
competence.241
This decision by the Court received support by the General As­
sembly, which nowadays in its resolutions expressly welcomes the 
progress made by the Court concerning its monitoring procedure, 
thus expressing the states’ agreement with it. Afterwards, states 
have never again challenged this part of the Court’s functions and 
have generally submitted the required reports.
The decision is in line with the Court’s general wide interpre­
tation of the ACHR and its own competences. It takes the broadest 
possible approach to Article 65 of the ACHR, reading it not only as a 
mere obligation to report to the General Assembly when the parties 
to a case complain about non-compliance, but as endowing it with a 
proper right to enquire about the state of compliance. This is consis­
tent as Article 65 of the ACHR not only requires the Court to report 
cases ofnon-compliance to the Assembly, but to also make pertinent 
recommendations. To this end the Court has to gather knowledge 
on the state of execution and the obstacles to full compliance.
In Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence) the Court con­
firmed that its monitoring serves the final aim of reporting cases 
of non-compliance to the General Assembly together with the per­
tinent recommendations. It may therefore be doubted whether it 
was the intention of the states that the Court conducts year long 
monitoring procedures without producing a corresponding report. 
Through their subsequent participation in cases before the Court 
as well as through the resolutions of the General Assembly on the 
Court’s annual reports and the modifications introduced to its Rules 
of Procedure, which gradually solidified and amplified the monitor­
ing procedure, the states though showed their agreement with this 
practice.
This became evident in particular in relation to another impor­
tant development of the procedure the Court had mentioned for the 
first time in 2000: the introduction of hearings on compliance. In the
240Ibid., paras. 110ff.
241 Ibid., para. 126.
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ElAmparo v. Venezuela case, the Court noticed that the party and the 
state disagreed about the modalities of compliance, in particular the 
exchange rate to be applied for monetary satisfaction, validity of the 
final discharge, interests on arrears, and the implication of the judg­
ment for the jurisdiction of the national courts.242 The Court urged 
the parties to settle their dispute and announced that it would eval­
uate the general compliance once it had received information on 
the measures to be taken. If it should consider it necessary, it would 
summon the parties to a public audience on compliance.243 It re­
peated this announcement in Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Com­
petence).244 The reason behind this movement purportedly lies in 
the Court’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the cases it had sub­
mitted to the General Assembly, which had the Court adopt a more 
prominent role in the execution process itself.245 The first private 
hearings on compliance were conducted in 2007 in order to obtain 
the information required to assess whether the state had complied 
with its obligations.246
In 2009 the Court formalized its monitoring procedure in a new 
Article 63 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR. This measure 
was preceded by a modification of the Rules of Procedure in the 
same year, which implemented a new Article 63 on the process of 
monitoring compliance.247 According to this new article, monitor­
ing principally relies on the submission of written reports by the 
state and observations by the victims and their legal representatives. 
The IACommHR may make observations on both documents. Fur­
thermore, the Court may require information from any other source 
including expert witnesses and reports. The written procedure may 
be accompanied by hearings on monitoring compliance. There is no
242El Amparo v. Venezuela (Cumplimiento de Sentencia), IACtHR, 20 November 2000, 
considerando para. 1.
243Ibid., considerando paras. 2 and 5.
244Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama (Competence), IACtHR, 28 November 2003, Series 
C no. 104, para. 106.
245These reasons were expressed by lawyers at the Court’s registry during personal 
interviews conducted in September 2010.
246 Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina (Monitoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 
27 November 2007, para. 11 and IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court 
o f  Human Rights 2007, p. 23.
247Today A rticle 69 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACtHR.
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restriction as to the type of hearing, so that private as well as public 
hearings may be convened. There is no escalation either, i.e. a public 
hearing does not necessarily have to be preceded by a private one, 
although this is generally the case in practice.
In the same year, the Court convened the first public hearing on 
compliance in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
because, even after a private hearing, the state had not progressed 
on several crucial reparation measures concerning an indigenous 
community that was living in conditions that affected the lifes of its 
members due to an eviction from their traditional lands. The Court 
had ordered the state to title determined areas for the community. 
As several members of the community had died due to the failing 
support by the state and education for children was not possible, the 
Court decided to summon the parties to a public hearing in which 
the state should inform about the measures it planned to adopt.248
Nowadays, private and public hearings take place regularly. The 
Court has even further developed the system of hearings by group­
ing cases from one country that suffer from the same problem of 
compliance, e.g. medical and psychological assistance to massacre 
victims in several Colombian cases.249 This new practice, introduced 
on the basis of the also newly introduced Article 30(5) of the Rules 
of Procedure of the IACtHR on joinder of proceedings for the moni­
toring of compliance, may serve as the foundation for grouping the 
information on compliance to the General Assembly by systemic 
problems as described infra in section 10.2. It would be essential, 
however, that the Commission provided the Court with additional 
information on similar cases that have been submitted to it in order 
to complement the big picture of the situation concerning a specific 
set of situations in one state.
Another, more controversial, modification by the Court on the 
monitoring stage was the partial closure of cases according to the 
state of compliance. Instead of merely recognizing in the delibera­
tive part of the judgment which measures had been complied with, 
in 2009 it began to expressly maintain cases open for supervision
248Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay  (Monitoring o f Compliance), 
IACtHR, 20 May 2009.
249IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2010, p. 10.
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only for the parts that have not been complied with.250 It stresses in 
its annual reports that, despite the huge number of cases under su­
pervision of compliance, in most of them the majority of measures 
had been complied with.251 This differentiation makes sense given 
the variety of measures ordered by the Court. Payment of repara­
tion or symbolic measures and restitution are usually easier to be 
achieved than complicated investigations into the whereabouts of 
massacre victims, legislative changes or large-scale modernization 
measures of parts of public administration.252 Nonetheless, partial 
closure of cases met objection by former President of the Court Can­
gado Trindade, who argues that partial closing was misleading as it 
concealed the fact that parts of a judgment remain unfulfilled.253 Fol­
lowing this discussion, the Court modified its orders on compliance, 
mentioning the parts of the judgment that have been fulfilled as well 
as the parts in which monitoring remains open, thus preventing to 
give a false picture of the situation in the case.254
The developments in the monitoring procedure coincide with a 
generally elevated activity and presence of the Court since 2005. 
This was made possible mainly by agreements on financial support 
with the European Union in 2004 over USD 800 000 and in 2006 with 
Norway over USD 3 319 390.25. These additional financial resources 
permitted the employment of more lawyers in the Court’s secretary 
and an increase in the number of sessions. The Court could thus also 
begin to hold sessions away from its seat.255 In 2007, the agreement
250See e.g. Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (Monitoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 
18 November 2010, oper. paras. and Ventura Robles, “Conference: Advocacy before 
Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda”, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 59 
(2009), p. 192.
251IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2011, pp. 13f.
252See also ibid., p. 14 and EFE, “Solo el 12% de las sentencias de la Corte Interame­
ricana se ha cumplido”, in: El Mundo (3 April 2009), u r l : http://www.elmundo.es/ 
accesible/elmundo/2009/03/31/solidaridad/1238495954.html.
253Tanner, “Interview with Judge Antonio A. Cangado Trindade, Inter-American 
Court o f Human Rights”, 4 HRQ 31 (2009), p. 994.
254See e.g. Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (Monitoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 
18 November 2010.
255IACtHR, Annual Report o fth e  Inter-American Court ofH um an Rights 2005, pp. 12f. 
The itinerant sessions in 2007 and 2008 were financed from funds provided by 
Spain: IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2007, 
p. 58.
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with Norway was expanded by an additional USD 12 0 0 0 0.256 The 
increased number of lawyers working in the Court’s secretary and 
the higher frequency of sessions allowed the Court to dedicate more 
time to the treatment of cases and finally permitted the introduction 
of audiences on monitoring since 2007, beginning with the most 
ancient cases that had shown none or only little progress.
9.2.2.2 The Scope of the Court’s Monitoring Competence
The Court sees its function on the monitoring stage as going beyond 
the strict supervision of compliance but defines its aim as to “ensure 
that the reparations ordered by the Court in each specific case are 
implemented and fulfilled”.257 Consistent with the observation that 
implementation in many cases fails due to internal obstacles such 
as missing legal prerequisites to reopen cases, political conflicts be­
tween different interest groups or funding issues, the Court may 
give “very clear and detailed” directions to the states on how com­
pliance may the obtained, driven by an “intention to support the 
states to effectuate compliance”.258 Hearings play a special role ac­
cording to this understanding. The oral presentation and in partic­
ular the contradictory nature of the hearings allow the Court to get 
a better idea of why implementation is not progressing. The Court 
underlines its conciliatory approach in these sessions, which
does not limit itself to take note of the information 
presented by the parties, but, under the principles to 
which it is adhered as a human rights court, among 
other aspects, suggests some alternatives to solve the 
case, calls the attention towards non-compliances that 
are defined by lack of willingness, promotes the prepa­
ration of compliance schedules for the parties involved 
and even, offers its premises for the parties to hold con­
versations, which, on many occasions, are very difficult 
to arrange with the State involved.259
256Ibid., p. 57.
257IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2011, p. 13.
258IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2010, pp. 4f., 
our translation.
259Ibid., p. 5.
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The Court construes its monitoring competences widely. It does 
not limit itself to merely collecting information on the status of 
execution and eventually other facts it requires to make pertinent 
recommendations to the General Assembly. The states in the Gen­
eral Assembly have nonetheless welcomed this development in their
2009 resolution on the Court’s annual report.260 Although their in­
tentions are not made evident, it is well imaginable that the states, 
who have never shown big interest in the Court’s issues, consider 
the monitoring practice a good way to achieve better execution re­
sults without having to deal with the cases themselves. The parties 
and the Court also recognized hearings as a good way to evaluate 
the state’s willingness to comply with the Court’s orders.261
Despite these developments and their positive reception by the 
states, the limits of the monitoring proceedings remain unclear. This 
concerns the question of when monitoring of compliance becomes 
a revision of the judgment. This question surged in the Mapiripân 
Massacre v. Colombia case, where new evidence, which had become 
known during state investigations ordered by the Court in its judg­
ment on merits and reparation, revealed that several of the origi­
nally recognized victims in fact had not been victims of the mas­
sacre at issue. Colombia therefore asked the Court to hand down a 
judgment that substituted the original one, replacing the considera­
tions, declarations and condemnations that rooted in the fraudulent 
evidence.262 This posed for the first time the question of admissi­
bility of requests for revision of the reparation related parts of a 
judgment. The Court however evaded the issue, holding that the 
question of the victims’ condition did not “touch the merits of what 
was resolved in the sentence”. Therefore, it argued, its resolution on 
Colombia’s request could not be a revision of the sentence, which 
would remain final and without appeal according to Article 67 of 
the ACHR. It continued that it would merely evaluate the infor­
mation submitted by the state concerning some persons who had
260No. 5(d) o f AG/RES. 2500 (XXXIX-O/09), adopted by the General Assembly o f the 
OAS at the fourth plenary session, 4 June 2012.
261 Blake v. Guatemala (Monitoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 27 November 2007, 
para. 12.
262Masacre de Mapiripân v. Colombia (Supervision de Cumplimiento), IACtHR, 
23 November 2012, Considerando para. 2.
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been declared victims.263 As the state had been ordered to investi­
gate and identify all victims of the massacre, “new facts could have 
come up when the internal investigations were activated that were 
not known to the parties or the Court at the moment of the delibera­
tion”. It argued that its judgment had neither terminated nor closed 
the determination of all circumstances of the facts of the massacre. 
Thus, the new findings or doubts about the victims who were exe­
cuted or made disappear would not imply a variation in the occur­
rence or magnitude of the facts of the massacre nor in the scope of 
the state’s responsibility. It would therefore be possible that during 
the execution of the obligation to investigate the state could raise 
doubts about the condition of victim of some persons who had been 
identified as such in the judgment. This issue could be resolved on 
the stage of monitoring compliance.264
This contradicts the former position of the Court adopted in 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Monitor­
ing of Compliance) of 7 May 2008. In this case, the victims’ rep­
resentatives had requested the Court to order new reparation for 
damages caused by the state’s failure to implement the decision on 
merits and reparation. The Court rejected this request, stating that 
its monitoring competence was limited to “giv[ing] instructions at 
the request of a party or motu proprio relating to compliance with or 
implementation of the measures of reparation ordered”, but that it 
could not “order measures of reparation that differ from those it has 
already ordered so as to modify the Judgment”. The limit of its mon­
itoring competence were “new facts and claims that are not part of 
the measures of reparation that have already been ordered”.265 This 
was reconfirmed in the later introduced Article 69(4) of the Rules 
of Procedure of the IACtHR, which states that the Court’s decisions 
on the monitoring stage shall be only on “the state of compliance”. 
This means that its competence ends when a decision not only af­
fects the status of execution of a reparation measure that had been 
defined in the judgment, but the quality of the measure itself.
263Ibid., Considerando para. 7, our translation.
264Ibid., Considerando para. 11, our translation.
265Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Monitoring o f Compli­
ance), IACtHR, 7 May 2008, para. 46.
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The Court’s order of 2012 on compliance in Mapiripăn Massacre 
v. Colombia exceeded this limit. The five persons, whose condition 
as victim was called into doubt on the basis of new facts, had been 
specifically determined and named in the judgment on merits and 
reparation, based on the evidence presented to the Court.266 They 
were not part of the group of unidentified persons who had also 
suffered damages in the massacre at issue. A modification of their 
condition as victim thus not affected the mere status of compliance, 
but the reparation measure in itself. The issue should therefore not 
have been corrected in an order on monitoring compliance.
This nevertheless does not mean that a manifestly wrong deci­
sion on reparation must inevitably prevail. Although neither the 
ACHR nor the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR provide a revi­
sion procedure, it is a general rule of law that a judgment cannot 
prevail if posterior new evidence shows that it is manifestly incor­
rect and therefore unjust. This fact has been recognized in the rules 
of other major international tribunals.267 Furthermore, already in 
1997, based on this circumstance, the Court had admitted a motion 
for revision by the IACommHR in Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua. In this 
decision it established the foundations for judicial review of judg­
ments in the inter-American system. The Court held that a motion 
for revision had to be submitted within a reasonable time and was 
not to be based on merely formal considerations. Citing the corre­
sponding rules of the Statute of the ICJ and the Rules of the ECtHR, 
it found that judicial review was not incompatible with the decisive 
and unappealable character of a judgment.268 Only decisions having 
acquired the effect of res judicata would be susceptible of review, i.e. 
judgments of a decisive nature or interlocutory judgments that are 
passed and put an end to the proceedings.269 It further specified the 
cases in which motions for judicial review could be admissible:
266Mapiripăn Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
15 September 2005, Series C no. 134, para. 253.
267Rule 80 o f the Rules o f the ECtHR; Article 61 o f Statute o f the ICJ; Article 44 o f the 
Statute o f the Court o f Justice o f the European Union.
268Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua (Application for Judicial Review o f the Judgment o f 
Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 13 September 1997, Series C no. 45, 
paras. 6ff.
269Ibid., para. 11.
216
9 Execution o f  Judgments under the Conventions
The applications for judicial review must be based on 
important facts or situations that were unknown at the 
time the judgment was delivered. The judgment may 
therefore be impugned for exceptional reasons, such as 
those involving documents the existence of which was 
unknown at the time the judgment was delivered; doc­
umentary or testimonial evidence or confessions in a 
judgment that has acquired the effect of a final judg­
ment and is later found to be false; when there has been 
prevarication, bribery, violence or fraud, and facts sub­
sequently proven to be false, such as a person having 
been declared missing and found to be alive.270
According to Article 65 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR, 
the decision on reparation and costs is part of the judgment. The 
unity of the Court’s decisions on the merits and on reparation also 
results from Article 68(2) of the ACHR, which presupposes that the 
stipulation of compensatory damages is part of the judgment and 
not contained in a different type of decision to which other rules 
apply than to the judgment on the merits. Res judicata therefore 
extends to the orders on reparation. They can hence be subject to
271revision.
Applying the revision procedure to the Mapiripân Massacre v. 
Colombia case the Court would have had to ask whether the new 
facts concerning the condition of victim of the five persons men­
tioned fell into any of the categories established in Genie-Lacayo v. 
Nicaragua (Application for Judicial Review of the Judgment of Mer­
its, Reparations and Costs). Taking into account the rules of other 
international tribunals cited by the IACtHR as the basis for the re­
vision procedure it would also have been appropriate to evaluate 
whether the interested party, in this case the state, could not reason­
ably have known the new fact at the time of the original judgment. 
This would have been of particular interest given that the state had
270Ibid., para. 12. See also Faundez Ledesma, The Inter-American System fo r  the Pro­
tection ofH um an Rights, pp. 879f. and Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  
the IACtHR, pp. 218f.
271 See on res judicata supra 8.2.2.
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been found responsible, among other things, for not having applied 
due diligence in the investigation of the facts of the case.
9.2.2.3 Evaluation
The expansion of the Court’s monitoring instruments has shown 
positive effects. In the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua case, for example, the state, despite repeated declarations 
of commitment, had not adopted coherent measures to title lands for 
the affected community in six years after the judgment.272 The Court 
therefore decided to convene a private hearing in 2008 during which 
it recommended the parties to hold a meeting to reach an agree­
ment on the outstanding issues in the case. The parties came to­
gether immediately after the session and reached the recommended 
agreement, establishing a precise timetable to resolve the issue of 
the titling of lands.273 In the hearing, the state also had the opportu­
nity to explain the causes of the delays, in particular that a judicial 
process had been launched before domestic courts by ten other in­
digenous communities.274 Nicaragua in the end complied with its 
commitments so that the case could be finally closed in 2009.275
Private, and even more so public audiences on compliance are 
a double-edged sword, though. Apart from improving the Court’s 
resolutions because it can gather better knowledge of the circum­
stances of the case, they may be advantageous for the victims be­
cause they put the case back on the table and usually raise public 
interest, increasing domestic pressure on the state. For the govern­
ment they may have advantages, too, particularly when there are 
quarrels between different branches of public power about the im­
plementation of the reparation measures ordered. Hearings may, for 
instance, allow the government to explain why titling of land is not 
possible due to opposition by the legislature. In such cases hearings
272Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Monitoring o f Compli­
ance), IACtHR, 14 March 2008, Considering paras. 7 and 9.
273Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Monitoring o f Compli­
ance), IACtHR, 7 May 2008, para. 28.
274Ibid., para. 30.
275Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Monitoring o f Compli­
ance), IACtHR, 3 April 2009, considering paras. 14ff.
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may become instruments of domestic policy-making and therefore 
be required even by the state itself.276
These examples show that the Court has to pay close attention 
that the new procedural instruments will really serve their intended 
aim of improving its knowledge on the status of compliance, and 
that they are not turned into a stage for the states to fight internal 
struggles or discredit the inter-American human rights system or 
the victims. This task requires well pondered acting by the president 
of the Court when deciding in which cases and on which subjects 
to convoke audiences.
An exhaustive monitoring procedure binds a significant part of 
the Court’s already sparse funds. Although there are no statistics 
on the workload of the Court’s registry, lawyers there estimated in
2010 that about half of their working time was dedicated to moni­
toring compliance and to the adoption of provisional measures. In 
each session the Court had to monitor compliance in 15 to 20 cases, 
holding five to six sessions thereon, while only two to three ses­
sions were dedicated to the -  more extensive -  deliberations on the 
merits.277 The Court’s dilemma is that it has to choose whether to 
ensure, as good as possible, compliance with its decisions, which 
limits the throughput of cases and probably leaves situations that 
would merit to be judged out of its reach, or to limit its monitoring 
activity, thus risking that its decisions will not be effectively com­
276In the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay case, the titling o f land 
for the indigenous community was opposed by the German big landowner who 
possesses the land in dispute. Landowners had the support o f the conservative ma­
jority  in the Paraguayan Senate and Parliament. Left-leaning President Lugo, al­
though his government was sustained by a coalition with the liberal party, started 
to promote a  land reform. The government explained the conflictive situation with 
the legislative branch in a private hearing before the Court, thus giving evidence 
o f its good intentions: Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Mon­
itoring o f Compliance), IACtHR, 8 February 2008, considering para. 9. On this: 
Fabio Ghelli, “Deutschlands unrühmliche Rolle in Paraguay”, in: Die Zeit (6 July 
2012), u r l : w w w .diezeit.de. A t the time o f writing the problem continued and 
the Court, on 21 May 2014, held another public hearing on three cases against 
Paraguay concerning indigenous communities, among them the aforementioned 
one, all suffering from similar implementation defects: IACtHR, Annual Report o f  
the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, p. 35. See further examples at Parra 
Vera, “El impacto de las decisiones interamericanas”.
277Statements gathered in personal conversations in September 2010.
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plied with and that it will become a “toothless tiger”. This dilemma 
cannot be solved by the Court itself but requires dedication of the 
member states, who will have to act in correspondence with their 
obligations under the ACHR and consistently within the General 
Assembly when discussing the Court’s report. This, however, also 
presupposes that the Court no longer evades the Assembly and re­
spects the shared responsibilities established by the ACHR.
The need for more political solutions to problems of implementa­
tion resurged with the rising opposition to the inter-American sys­
tem in the early 2010s, in particular by Venezuela. The Court had 
handed down several judgments concerning the country’s domes­
tic political order, in particular the independence of justice and the 
conditions of detention of a convicted terrorist.278 The first case af­
fected judges of an administrative tribunal who were accused by 
the government of being members of the political opposition plan­
ning a coup d’etat against President Chavez. After a constitutional 
reform at the beginning of the 2000s, most Venezuelan judges were 
appointed temporally and could be removed easily. This had hap­
pened to the affected judges who had been appointed to the tribunal 
in charge of judicial control of most political decisions by the gov­
ernment. After the IACtHR had handed down its decision ordering 
Venezuela to reinstate these judges, the Venezuelan Supreme Court 
held that the sentence could not be executed as this would result in 
the violation of the Venezuelan constitution and called the govern­
ment to denounce the ACHR.279 Although the government did not 
react immediately to this request, the Uson-Ramfrez v. Venezuela de­
cision, in which the Court found that a convicted terrorist had been 
detained under inhuman conditions, gave President Chavez the rea­
son to announce Venezuela’s retreat from the Convention.280
278Apitz-Barbera et al. v. Venezuela, IACtHR, 5 August 2008, Series C no. 182 and 
Uson-Ramirez v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 20 November 
2009, Series C no. 207.
279Expediente No. 08-1572 [Sala Constitutional], Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, 18 De­
cember 2008, punto resolutivo 2.
280Minister o f Popular Power for Foreign Affairs o f the Bolivarian Republic o f 
Venezuela, Letter to the Secretary General o f  the OAS, 6 September 2012, u r l : http: 
//w w w .oas.org/D IL/N ota_R ep% C 3% BA blica_Bolivariana_V enezuela_to_SG . 
English.pdf.
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This renewed episode of objection by a state to politically incon­
venient decisions by the Court gives a clear example of the polit­
ically sensitive environment among the Latin-American states the 
IACtHR is acting in. Although its proactive jurisprudence of broad 
interpretation of the Convention rights has brought huge advances 
in the field of human rights protection in the affected countries and 
influenced other international courts, the IACtHR must bear in mind 
the unstable support it receives from several states in the region 
and be aware that missing support by influential domestic actors 
may render implementation of its judgments impossible. Only close 
respect of the limitations set by the ACHR can prevent too easy re­
jection of its judgments by the states. On the monitoring stage, this 
implies the application of Article 65 of the ACHR. Therefore, it may 
only be welcomed that in 2011 the judges began to discuss again the 
conditions under which to apply Article 65 of the ACHR to specific 
cases.
In Blanco Romero et al. v. Venezuela, a forced disappearance case, 
the Court had ordered in 2005 a set of measures to be adopted by the 
state. Nevertheless, even after a private hearing on compliance in 
2009 in which the state and the victims had agreed to adopt a sched­
ule for the implementation of measures, the state had again taken 
hardly any steps to comply with its obligations, including simple 
ones like the publication of the judgment or payment of compen­
sation, which remained unfulfilled six years after the original judg­
ment. Despite this apparent unwillingness by the state, the Court, on 
22 November 2011, adopted another order on compliance in which 
it stressed the state’s obligation to comply with the reparation or­
ders. However, concurring opinions by Judges Garcia Sayan and Vio 
Grossi to this and two other cases decided during the same session 
show that the question of Article 65 of the ACHR was discussed by 
the judges.281
Garcia Sayan’s opinion deals with the question of when the Court 
has to submit a case to the General Assembly. He repeats the Court’s 
constant jurisprudence according to which its competence to mon­
itor resulted from the fact that it first had to identify the cases in
281 Servellon Garcia v. Honduras (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 22 November
2011 and Saramaka People v. Suriname (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR,
23 November 2011, all with the same wording.
221
III Execution o f  Judgments
which states were persistently not complying in order to then re­
port these cases to the Assembly. He concludes that the Court had 
to single out “exceptional cases in which a real reticence or refusal of 
the State concerned to comply with the provisions of the judgment 
has been verified”. Reticence had to amount to the state “expressly 
indicat[ing] that it will not comply totally or partially with the de­
cisions, added to the failure of all possible monitoring measures”.282 
None of the cases had amounted to this level yet in his opinion.
Vio Grossi, for his part, underlines that Article 65 of the ACHR 
would not create an option but an obligation for the Court to sub­
mit cases to the General Assembly. Merely enumerating decisions 
on compliance in its annual report would not be sufficient, because 
it was not for the Assembly to pick cases from this list but for the 
Court to specify them. The Court could not sustain its own moni­
toring competence arguing that the General Assembly was not com­
plying with its tasks under the Convention. He recognizes that the 
Court could not extend monitoring procedures into an uncertain fu­
ture without setting the state specific deadlines to comply with its 
obligations. Otherwise, the Court would end up being in the situa­
tion of having to apply political pressure to induce states to compli­
ance. He also opposes the argument that if the Court submitted one 
case to the Assembly, it would subsequently have to submit many 
more cases, which would amount to recognizing the inefficiency 
of the inter-American human rights system. Vio Grossi explicitly 
rules out that the respect for human rights or the pro homine prin­
ciple could justify that the Court deviated from its legal basis and 
autonomously created procedures outside of the Convention. He 
opines that the best protection for human rights could be provided 
if the Court sticked closely to the rules, in particular the ACHR. 
Nonetheless, he underlines that his intention was not to undermine 
the Court’s monitoring practice but that he wanted to make clear 
that the execution of this function should not eliminate the applica­
tion of Article 65 of the ACHR. The Court’s role on this stage of the 
proceedings was limited to supervision and did not entail imposing 
new obligations onto the states. If a state did not show progress in
282 Blanco Romero etal. v. Venezuela (Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 22Novem- 
ber 2011, Separate opinion o f Judge Garcia Sayan, para. 8.
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compliance, it corresponded to the General Assembly to draw the 
pertinent conclusions from this behaviour.283
Apart from a purely judicial role when deciding cases, the Court 
also has a political role to play when it supervises execution. 
Nonetheless, its possibilities in this area are limited. Besides offer­
ing a forum to the parties to discuss their opinions, make proposals 
and bring the case back to public awareness by organizing public 
or private hearings, it cannot apply any type of pressure. Therefore 
the rigid ultima ratio approach adopted by Garcia Sayan appears to 
be too narrow. The Court has to accept its limitations and the Gen­
eral Assembly’s primordial political role. It would be preferable for 
the Court not to select cases to submit to the Assembly according to 
formalistic criteria, but rather to make decisions on a case-to-case 
basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case. 
Insofar Vio Grossi is right when he points out the Assembly’s role 
under the ACHR. Given the Court’s limited possibilities to effec­
tively exercise pressure on the states, the Assembly, despite its ap­
parent shortcomings, should not be completely excluded from the 
execution process.
Vio Grossi’s critics that the Court had created its monitoring com­
petence outside of the ACHR, however, do not meet the point. The 
Court’s competences in this area derive from Article 65 of the ACHR 
as described in Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama. This broad inter­
pretation of the Convention has, apart from this case, never been 
doubted by any state as being ultra vires, but was explicitly accepted 
by the General Assembly which even invited the Court to maintain 
this practice. States have followed Court summonses and some have 
even solicited hearings on compliance themselves, evidencing sup­
port of these measures.
Concerning the aforementioned Venzeuelan cases though, the 
Judges coincided that the decision by the Venezuelan Supreme 
Court, which had held that the IACtHR’s decision could not be fully 
executed as this would require measures that violated the Venezue­
lan domestic constitutional order,284 had amounted to an absolute
283 Ibid., concurring opinion o f Judge Vio Grossi.
284 Apitz-Barbera et al. v. Venezuela (Monitoring Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR,
23 November 2012, para. 43. The central parts o f the Venezuelan Court’s decision
are reproduced in para. 13 o f the order.
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negation by the state to comply with the reparation ordered. The 
Court therefore decided to submit the case of Apitz-Barbera et al. 
v. Venezuela to the General Assembly.285 In its order on monitor­
ing compliance, it reiterates the basic concepts of compliance, in 
particular that a state may not invoke domestic law to justify non- 
compliance.286 In addition, it refers to decisions of several constitu­
tional courts from other member states that had held that the ACHR 
and its interpretation by the IACtHR had to be taken into account 
by domestic actors even beyond a specific case.287 This would be 
inevitable, in its words, when a member state’s highest court had 
“issued a ruling indicating the frank intention of not meeting the 
obligation to comply with a judgment of the Court”. In such a situa­
tion, “the States Parties must make every effort to ensure that there 
is no evident failure to comply with the Court’s judgments”.288 This 
obligation derived from the special character of the ACHR, which 
established a “real regional public order, the maintenance of which 
is in the interest of each and every State Party”. Opposition by a 
state party to comply with a Court judgment would violate “the un­
dertaking to comply with the Court’s judgments made towards the 
other States”. The Court concluded that
[t]herefore, the task of the General Assembly of the Or­
ganization of American States, in the case of manifest 
noncompliance with a judgment delivered by the Inter- 
American Court by one of the States, is precisely that 
of protecting the practical effects of the American Con­
vention and preventing inter-American justice from be­
coming illusory by being at the discretion of the inter­
nal decisions of a State.289
285 Apitz-Barbera et al. v. Venezuela (Monitoring Compliance with Judgment), IACtHR, 
23 November 2012. See on the result before the General Assembly supra section 
9.2.1.
286Ibid., para. 22.
287Ibid., paras. 26ff.
288Ibid., para. 45.
289Ibid., para. 47.
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9.2.2.4 Excursus: Provisional Measures on the Monitoring 
Stage
The IACtHR applies another instrument on the monitoring stage: 
the ordering of provisional measures according to Article 63(2) of 
the ACHR. This norm gives the Court the competence to issue pro­
visional measures in order to avoid irreparable damage to persons 
in cases of gravity and urgency “in matters it has under its consid­
eration”. Article 27(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR more 
specifically defines that this refers to “any stage of the proceedings”. 
As the Court considers the stage of monitoring compliance a stage 
of the proceedings, it is frequently adopting provisional measures at 
this stage, typically ordering states to immediately protect human 
rights defenders, victims or their families while its reparation orders 
in the underlying case have not been complied with.290 This practice 
had not been questioned neither by the states nor the parties until 
2011, when Judge Vio Grossi discussed the practice in his dissent­
ing opinion to the decision on provisional measures adopted by the 
IACtHR in Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia. This, at first, caused a fero­
cious rebuttal by his colleagues. The unusually harsh tone in which 
the remaining judges’ answer was written evidenced deep ruptures 
among the judges and therefore merits to be mentioned here.
Judge Vio Grossi objected to the adoption of provisional mea­
sures on the monitoring stage out of formal reasons. He argued that 
the Court’s contentious jurisdiction ended with the adoption of the 
judgment on reparation which replaced the provisional measures 
ordered during the contentious proceedings.291 Provisional mea­
sures would specifically serve to maintain a juridical situation so 
that the Court was able to issue a judgment that adopted, in part, the 
protective character of the provisional measures.292 The judgment 
“resolves [the case] in its entirety or completely and in the only and 
last instance”.293 With the adoption of the judgment the Court would 
terminate its consideration of the case, which was the precondition
290Cf. Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Medidas Provisionales), IACtHR, 30 June 2011, 
Considerando 5.
291 Ibid., dissenting opinion Judge Vio Grossi, p 5.
292 Ibid., dissenting opinion Judge Vio Grossi, p 6.
293 Original: “resuelve en su totalidad o completamente y en ün icay ültima instancia”, 
our translation.
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for its competence to adopt provisional measures. The adoption of 
provisional measures after the adoption of the final judgment would 
therefore not be “provisional” and could even lead to a violation of 
the principle of res judicata . The only two actions at the Court’s 
disposal after the adoption of the judgment were the interpretation 
according to Article 67 of the ACHR and the submission of the case 
to the General Assembly according to Article 65 of the ACHR.294 
The theory of implied powers would not provide the Court with the 
competence to order provisional measures on the monitoring stage 
either, as this was not absolutely necessary to comply with its func- 
tions.295 The same consideration applied to the pro homine principle, 
which referred only to the rights laid down in the ACHR but not to 
the powers of the organs of the protection system. Finally, the mere 
fact that the states had accepted provisional measures ordered by 
the Court after the adoption of the final judgment in the past could 
not be interpreted as an expression of their will to create a new norm 
of soft law but would simply be an act of compliance with a judi­
cial order. Other theories of international law such as estoppel, acto 
proprio or preclusion would not apply either.296
The other judges responded to this argumentation in a common 
concurring opinion to the same case.297 They argued that the Court 
had, since the beginning of its work, adopted provisional measures 
and had constantly interpreted Article 62(2) of the ACHR as com­
prising all stages ofthe proceedings, including the monitoring stage. 
No state, and even less a judge of the Court, had ever doubted the 
Court’s jurisdiction to do so. The fact that it was a judge of the 
very Court who was questioning its competence would be particu­
larly grave and weakened the tribunal. They reproached Vio Grossi 
specifically for questioning the Court’s competence in such a cru­
cial area as the prevention of irreparable harm.298 They constructed 
their reaffirmation of the Court’s jurisprudence in four parts: com­
294 Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Medidas Provisionales), IACtHR, 30 June 2011, dis­
senting opinion Judge Vio Grossi, p. 7.
295Ibid., dissenting opinion Judge Vio Grossi, p. 8.
296Ibid., dissenting opinion Judge Vio Grossi, p. 9f.
297Judge Alberto Perez Perez did not participate in the adoption o f the decision and 
therefore did not give an opinion.
298Ibid., concurring vote o f several Judges, para. 2.
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parison with at the ECtHR, the IACtHR’s competence to order pro­
visional measures in general, at the stage of supervision in particular 
and finally an explication of the particular importance of such mea­
sures at this stage of the proceedings. Their comparative analysis 
was, however, limited to a general overview of the development of 
the ECtHR’s competence to adopt provisional (or interim, as they 
are called in Rule 39 of the Rules of the ECtHR) measures. The is­
sue of whether the ECtHR could also adopt provisional measures 
at the stage of execution was spared out. This question is, nonethe­
less, of interest, as supervision of compliance in the European and 
the Inter-American System differs. In fact, the ECtHR closes cases 
with the adoption of the judgment, so that a competence to order 
interim measures at this stage is doubtful given the fact that the case 
is no longer open before the Court but has been transferred to the 
Committee of Ministers.
The judges based their argumentation on recounting the jurisdic­
tional history of the adoption of provisional measures, underlining 
that in a number of cases the IACtHR had maintained or even or­
dered such measures after the decisions on merits and reparation 
had been handed down.299 Their fundamental argument though was 
that the monitoring stage was a part of the Court’s jurisdiction, i.e. 
the consideration of a case in the terms of the ACHR did not end 
with the adoption of the decision on reparation. Therefore, the re­
current resolution in all judgments was that the Court monitors 
full compliance with the judgment and “shall consider the instant 
case closed upon full compliance by the State with the provisions 
therein.”300 As even at this stage situations could occur that put the 
rights concerned in peril and threatened compliance with the judg­
ment, the need for immediate protection persisted and the Court 
consequently had to order provisional measures at this stage, too. In 
one case such measures had even been solicited not only by the vic­
tims, but also by the state itself.301 The judges pointed out that since
299Ibid., concurring vote o f several judges, para. 25.
300Ibid., concurring vote o f several judges, para. 26; eg.: Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 12 September 2005, Series C no. 132, 
oper. para. 11.
301 Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Medidas Provisionales), IACtHR, 30 June 2011, con­
curring vote o f several judges, para. 27.
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the first adoption of provisional measures in 2000, the Court had 
adopted such measures in 26 cases until the decision at issue, with­
out any state and even less a judge questioning its competence to do 
so.302 Finally, the judges made reference to the Court’s competence 
to determine its own competence, which would give it the compe­
tence to interpret the rules on its own jurisdiction in the ACHR.303 
It is noteworthy that the Court’s practice to order provisional mea­
sures during the monitoring of compliance had not been questioned 
by doctrine either.304
Following this confrontation, Judge Vio Grossi proposed ways out 
of the impasse. First, he suggested that the Court should include the 
obligation to comply with the provisional measures ordered into the 
operative paragraphs of the judgment on the merits.305 Then he ar­
gued that the provisional measures ordered before the adoption of 
the judgment on the merits had to be understood as having become 
part of the judgment and that the obligation to comply with them 
had become part of the state’s general obligation to comply with the 
judgment (maintaining that they should have been expressly men­
tioned in the operative paragraphs). Compliance with these mea­
sures therefore had to be supervised as part of the monitoring pro­
cedure. Should the circumstances requiring these measures, i.e. the 
extreme gravity and urgency and the risk of irreparable harm to 
persons, have ended, the measures should be considered as com­
plied with. In case of non-compliance, the Court had to submit the 
situation to the General Assembly under Article 65 of the ACHR.306
Finally, the Court accepted Vio Grossi’s point in part and held 
that, in a case where the victims recognized in the judgment on mer­
its and reparation were the same as the beneficiaries of the provi­
sional measures, “the obligations of the State under the provisional 
measures will be replaced by what is ordered in the Judgment and, 
consequently, their execution and observance will be an object of
302 Gutierrez-Soler v. Colombia (Medidas Provisionales), IACtHR, 30 June 2011, con­
curring vote o f several judges, para. 30.
303Ibid., concurring vote o f several judges, paras. 31f.
304Cf. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure o f  the IACtHR, pp. 315f.
305 Barrios Fam ily v. Venezuela (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 24 November
2011, Series C no. 237, concurring opinion o f Judge Vio Grossi.
306Fernăndez Ortega et al. v. Mexico (Provisional Measures), IACtHR, 20 February
2012, concurring vote ofJudge Vio Grossi.
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the supervision of compliance of the Judgment and no longer of 
the provisional measures”.307 For the time being, it remained open 
whether it would apply this jurisprudence also in cases where it 
had ordered provisional measures in favour of third persons such 
as lawyers. It should be expected, though, that these measures must 
also be lifted, as in the decision on the merits the beneficiaries were 
not recognized as victims and thus can no longer be subject to pro­
tection by the Court in the specific case.
This development has to be welcomed. After the adoption of the 
judgment on merits and reparation, a provisional protection of in­
terests is no longer possible and necessary. With the judgment on 
merits and reparation, the responding state is immediately under 
the obligation to procure to the victims the protection ordered. The 
protection that had been ordered through provisional measures is 
no longer provisional but final and as such covered by the judg­
ment. While the implementation of protective reparation measures 
may take some time, the state in the meantime has to adopt all nec­
essary measures to safeguard the victim from the infliction of fur­
ther harm. This obligation can be supervised by the Court just as 
it supervised the implementation of protective measures before. It 
may specifically decide, in its decisions on the merits, that the state 
has to implement or maintain certain short-term protective mea­
sures immediately, until more far-reaching protection has been put 
into action. Thus, provisional measures may continue in the judg­
ment on the merits.308 Furthermore, when grave threats to the rights 
whose violation had been adjudicated in the final judgment become 
known only after the adoption of this judgment, the Court could 
call the state’s attention to this situation in its decisions on moni­
toring compliance, for instance by underlining the state’s obligation 
to ensure effective implementation of the reparation orders. Other-
307 Our translation. Original: “[ . ..]  las obligaciones del Estado en el marco de las me- 
didas provisionales quedan reemplazadas por lo ordenado en Sentencia y, conse- 
cuentemente, su ejecucion y  observancia sera objeto de supervision del cumplim- 
iento de la misma y  no ya de medidas provisionales”. Pueblo Indigena Kichwa de 
Sarayaku  v. Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 27 June 2012, Series 
C no. 245, para. 340.
308Cf. Pacheco-Teruel et al. v. Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 
27 April 2012, Series C no. 241, para. 97.
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10 Assessment and Outlook
The typical scope of reparation orders for human rights violations 
as well as the instruments and procedures under the Conventions 
or developed otherwise to secure execution ofthese orders has been 
demonstrated. This leaves one last but central question: How effec­
tive are these undertakings? And how could they be further devel­
oped?
Measuring effectivity of both execution systems is not easy. The 
European system is particularly difficult due to the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity at the reparation and execution stages. The 
ECtHR mostly only finds whether a violation has happened, leaving 
the conclusions to be drawn from that fact to the appreciation of the 
states. Even the Committee of Ministers’s task is generally limited 
to assessing the appropriateness of measures adopted by the state in 
response to a Court’s judgment. Unlike in the inter-American hu­
man rights system, judgments do not contain a catalogue of mea­
sures the state has to work through and whose compliance can eas­
ily be ticked off. Furthermore, the sheer number of cases decided by 
the ECtHR means that an enormous amount of data has to be pro­
cessed. Fortunately, this task has already been undertaken in one 
investigation which will be drawn on in section 10.1.
A common problem to both systems is the lack of data prepara­
tion.1 Although the IACtHR and the Committee of Ministers publish 
annual reports containing their monitoring activities, data on com­
pliance with different types of measures is not readily available. As 
measures are pre-classified by the IACtHR, it is easier to organize 
compliance according to categories of measures. Here, too, quanti­
tative research on the IACtHR’s orders done by others will be taken 
as a basis in section 10.2.
1Hillebrecht, “Rethinking Compliance”, 3 JHRP 1 (2009) criticizes the bad data situa­
tion and proposes standardised indicators to make compliance comparable.
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10.1 The European M on ito ring  System
As part of its efforts to increase transparency of its procedure, in 
2007 the Committee of Ministers began to issue annual reports on its 
supervision activities, including numbers on cases that have become 
final at the Court for each year, the number of pending cases and 
the cases that were technically complied with,2 and final resolutions 
adopted by the Committee.3 These reports, however, concentrate on 
leading cases that require general measures and give no information 
on compliance with individual measures, except just satisfaction, at
all.4
The report for the year 2014 indicated that, by 31 December 2014, 
10 904 cases were pending before the Committee, including 1 389 
cases that had become final at the Court during that year. While the 
number of cases that become final at the ECtHR each year has de­
creased since 2010, it was only in 2013 that the Committee could, 
for the first time in several years, close slightly more cases than the 
number of new cases that reached it from the Court.5 Of the pend­
ing cases, 1 513 were classified as leading.6 In a former report, the 
Committee had clarified that leading cases mainly concern actions 
of security forces (16%), poor detention conditions (16%), and exces­
sive length of judicial proceedings (12%).7 While the number of new 
cases had been more or less stable over the past six years, the num­
ber of cases for which a final resolution could be adopted, i.e. which 
could be closed by the Committee, has been constantly increasing 
from a mere 240 in 2009 to 1 502 in 2014. Of these final resolutions, 
about 208 concerned leading cases.8
2 These are cases where the Committee assumes that no further monitoring is neces­
sary but for which nonetheless, mainly for reasons o f time, a final resolution is still 
pending.
3Cf. Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2007, p. 9.
4The state o f execution o f individual measures can be consulted for each case on 
the Execution Department’s homepage at https://www.coe.int/t7dghl/monitoring/ 
execution. Generalized information, for instance on the average duration for indi­
vidual measures to be implemented, is, however, unavailable.
5Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2014, pp. 26f.
6Ibid., p. 29.
7Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, p. 61.
8Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2014, pp. 27, 30.
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The vast majority of pending cases however are repetitive ones 
that are attached to one leading case, i.e. they stem from the same 
systemic or general domestic problem in a state. Finalization of the 
leading case should therefore resolve the depending repetitive cases, 
too.9 This is confirmed by other statistics finding that the number 
of interim resolutions has severely diminished since the beginning 
of the 2000s, a fact that is to be explained by the increased number 
of closed leading cases.10 Consequently, the Committee’s work is 
concentrating on the resolution of these cases.
The Committee’s statistics further reveal that a considerable 
number of cases take several years to be closed. Of the 1 337 leading 
cases that were pending at the end of 2011, roughly 20% were on the 
Committee’s agenda for more than five years already. Around 40% 
were pending between two and five years, and only another 40% 
were pending for less than 2 years. Consistent with the overall dis­
tribution of issues under consideration, most old leading cases con­
cern excessive length of judicial proceedings in several states, but 
also ineffective investigations into inhuman and degrading treat­
ment or torture by the police in Bulgaria, pre-trial detention con­
ditions in Russia, the Chechen conflict and freedom of expression 
in Turkey.11 Even the supposedly simplest measure to be complied 
with -  payment of just satisfaction -  is often complied with only 
after the deadline set by the Court has expired. In 1 616 of the pend­
ing cases, payment remained due although the deadline had expired, 
while in 249 cases applicants had received the sums allocated by the 
Court in 2011, still after the deadline had expired. Only in 861 cases 
was payment made on time.12
9Cf. Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, pp. 31f.
10Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”, p. 38.
11See the list at Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, pp. 40ff. and 
at Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2013, pp. 42ff.
12Committee ofM inisters, Supervision AnnualReport 2011, p. 48; since 2012 the Com­
mittee no longer issues information on the cases for which payments deadlines 
have expired during the year, but bases its statistics on all payments made in the 
respective year. According to these numbers, 930 payments were made on time in 
2014, while 164 had exceeded the deadline. In 1141 cases information on payment 
was still pending at 31 December 2014, in 765 it was overdue for more than six 
months: Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2014, p. 45.
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Von Staden’s quantitative investigation on compliance with EC- 
tHR judgments provides a more complete picture, as he takes into 
consideration all cases requiring some type of execution measure 
that were rendered by the Court from the moment it was estab­
lished until 2010, counting 12 263 executable judgments in total.13 
According to this data, the ECtHR had a perfect compliance rate of 
100% for all 343 judgments rendered until 1995 that required some 
type of execution measure.14 Since 1996, when the hitherto not re­
solved issue of Italian length of procedure cases was first decided 
by the Court,15 the quota of cases that could be closed by the Com­
mittee has been steadily declining, having dropped to well below 
10% on 2 December 2011 for judgments rendered in 2010.16 Despite 
this circumstance, in its first annual report of 2007 the Committee 
still claimed that full execution had always been achieved, admitting 
however that compliance in some cases took considerable time, in­
cluding total standstill for some periods.17 The skyrocketing num­
bers of cases decided by the Court following the entry into force 
of Protocol no. 11 put additional strains on the Committee. Since 
2005, the Court issued more than 1 000 judgments requiring some 
type of execution measure each year, i.e. judgments ending up on 
the Committee’s agenda.18 The Committee’s statistics also reveal 
another fact: 75% of judgments rendered between 1996 and 2005 
which were still pending execution in 2010 were rendered against 
Italy, Turkey, Poland and Ukraine, while Germany and Switzerland, 
with also relatively high numbers of cases, had complied with all of
13Von Staden, “Rational Choice within Normative Constraints: Compliance by Lib­
eral Democracies with the Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights”, 
SSRN eLibrary  (2012), pp. 14f.
14Von Staden, Shaping human rights policy in liberal democracies, p. 132.
15Ceteroni v. Italy  [GC], ECtHR, nos. 22461/93 et al., 15 November 1996, Reports 1996­
V.
16Von Staden, “Rational Choice within Normative Constraints: Compliance by Lib­
eral Democracies with the Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights”, 
SSRN eLibrary  (2012), p. 17.
17Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2007, pp. 9f. The limited in­
terpretation o f partial or non-compliance as a m atter o f timing was criticised by 
Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”, p. 7.
18Von Staden, “Rational Choice within Normative Constraints: Compliance by Lib­
eral Democracies with the Judgments o f the European Court o f Human Rights”, 
SSRN eLibrary  (2012), p. 17.
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their judgments. There is thus apparently no correlation between 
the number of judgments and execution results.19
Still today, it is a relatively small group of states that is responsible 
for the majority of the Committee’s workload. The largest number 
of pending cases, 2 067 as of 2014, concern Italy’s defective judicial 
system. This, however, is an isolated fact in a country that in general 
respects the Convention rights.20 Other states require more atten­
tion. Turkey and Russia for example, with 1 500 and 1 474 cases re­
spectively, present a variety and amount of Convention violations 
that evidences that fundamental standards of liberal democracies 
are not met.21 These states have to resolve a variety of different 
problems, thus demanding much more attention by the Commit­
tee and the Execution Department. This is also reflected by the fact 
that specific projects financed by the Human Rights Trust Fund have 
been implemented in relation to these countries.22 Still, in particular 
Russia continues to implement judgments only very slowly, having 
even had the ECtHR openly critizise this circumstance in relation to 
the Chechen cases.23
All this paints an ambivalent picture of the Committee’s balance. 
The Committee, together with the Court, is consistently tackling 
the issue of the rising number of applications and has developed 
a variety of activities to improve the states’ capacity to domesti­
cally resolve situations. The increase in cases that could be resolved 
and the decrease in new repetitive cases are also signs of progress. 
The Committee accredits this to its new working methods and to 
the effect of the pilot judgment procedure, which allow it to send 
many cases back to the domestic level.24 Thus, in particular indi­
vidual reparation measures can be closed, seen that most pending 
cases concern defective judicial proceedings. These cases can be re­
dressed on the individual level by reopening domestic proceedings 
or, alternatively, compensation awarded by the ECtHR or domestic
19Von Staden, Shaping human rights policy in liberal democracies, p. 137.
20Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2014, p. 66.
21 Cfr.: ibid., pp. 54f.
22See supra, 9.1.6, and ibid., pp. 22f.
23See hereon supra p. 169.
24Committee ofM inisters, Supervision Annual Report 2011, p. 10.
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instances. Other situations also offer the possibility to obtain redress 
through domestic review.25
Implementation time, like in the inter-American system, is the 
other big problem of the Committee’s procedure. It is not only a 
concern to the Committee in terms of workload,26 but also to the 
applicants who, depending on the gravity of the situation, not only 
expect individual redress, but are also looking for general measures 
that guarantee non-repetition.27 Execution time is linked to the phe­
nomenon of partial compliance. The majority of pending cases do 
not suffer from complete inactivity by the responding state, but are 
complied with in part, while only certain measures remain unful­
filled. The Committee can react to such situations with interim res­
olutions to welcome progress but also to express concern or to make 
suggestions.28 One such resolution often affects several cases, as it 
is issued on the corresponding leading case, naming all depending 
cases. The number of these resolutions thus indicates at least the 
level of partial compliance. As of 2008 2 675 interim resolutions had 
been issued concerning 6 022 pending cases.29 Under the reformed 
working methods interim resolutions were mainly replaced by in­
terim decisions and the Committee now principally recurs to them 
to present shortcomings or advances. It applied the reformed work­
ing methods for the first time in 2011. In that year it adopted 89 
decisions concerning 4 219 cases.30 Partial compliance thus remains 
a widespread issue.
The Committee’s amended working methods, adopted after the 
Interlaken Conference, alleviated but did not resolve the problem 
of slow execution and the overload of cases. Therefore, at the 2012
25Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, p. 51.
26Ibid., p. 11.
27This issue has been investigated particularly in the inter-American system: Salvi- 
oli, “Que veulent les victimes de violations graves des droits de l’homme?” and 
Beristain, Diâlogo sobre la reparacion, Vol. 1, pp. 87ff.
28Rule 16 o f the CM Rules for the Supervision o f the Execution o f Judgments.
29Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”, pp. 36f.
30D ata collected from the records o f DH/HR meetings, available on the Execu­
tion o f Judgments homepage at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/ 
WCD/DHMeetings_en.asp. Cases that were object o f more than one decision were 
counted only once. As new cases were grouped under already existing leading 
cases, the number o fcases affected represents the time when the last decision on a 
leading case was adopted.
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Brighton Conference, the CoE member states adopted further pro­
posals to tackle these issues in the medium term. The Brighton Dec­
laration concentrates on further prioritization of systemic cases and 
enforcement of the application of the principle of subsidiarity to 
other cases. To this end, the states were called upon to improve 
their domestic capacity to implement judgments. Also, interaction 
between national authorities and the Court should be strengthened 
by the introduction of an optional advisory procedure that could 
be triggered concerning specific domestic cases.31 New instruments 
shall be added to the Committee’s toolbox so that it can take effec­
tive measures against states that fail to comply with their obliga­
tions, in particular in pilot cases and other cases revealing systemic 
shortcomings.32 Concerning the long-term future of the execution 
system, the Committee was called to initiate a process of revision of 
the supervision procedure in general and its role therein in partic-
ular.33
In the scope of this process, further improvement of the European 
human rights system’s monitoring capacity could be envisaged. On 
the one hand, the eventual accession of the European Union to the 
ECHR will offer possibilites to increase cooperation between CoE 
and EU organs in the process of execution of judgments. Finland’s 
motion in the European Parliament in the Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov 
v. Ukraine case has already demonstrated how this could work.
For serious unexcused delays in the implementation of measures 
required to comply with a judgment, the possibility of financial re­
sponsibility might also be considered an option.34 Judgments cause 
obligations for the responding state not only towards the applicant
31Council o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  
Human Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : https://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declarati 
on, no. 12(d); see also Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts”, 3 CILJ 44 (2011), p. 132, 
referring to the European Court o f Justice’s capacity to be seized in order to obtain 
a preliminary ruling.
32Council o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  
Human Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : https://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declarati 
on, no. 29.
33Council o f Europe, High Level Conference on the Future o f  the European Court o f  
Human Rights, 19 April 2012, u r l : https://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-declarati 
on, no. 35(f).
34See already no. 11(A)(ii) o f PACE Resolution 1226 (2000).
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but also in relation to all other member states. While the applicant is 
principally interested in the execution of individual reparation mea­
sures, the other member states’ concern focuses on the execution of 
general measures to relieve the European human rights system of 
the still increasing pressure caused by repetitive cases. Delays in the 
execution of both individual and general measures are economically 
calculable. Therefore, in case of delays in the execution of individual 
measures, the Committee should be enabled to award the applicant 
additional financial reparation for the delay similar to the interests 
that accrue in case of delayed payment of just satisfaction. In mas­
sive cases, this additional burden might, as a collateral effect, en­
courage the state to better implement individual measures. In case of 
delayed adoption of general measures, the introduction of financial 
compensation for the additional implementation workload of the 
Committee could be envisaged. When systemic shortcomings are 
revealed, or in pilot cases, the ECHR could be amended to include 
the capacity of the Court to award compensation payable to the CoE 
for the additional workload caused by subsequent cases raising from 
the same systemic problem. Also, the procedure under Article 46(4) 
of the ECHR could cause an obligation by the respondent state to 
pay court costs. In these particular circumstances, punitive damages 
should also be reconsidered to make the state comply with its hu­
man rights obligations.35
On the structural level, the Committee should enforce its role as 
a supranational body that confronts the state as a multi-faceted en- 
tity.36 Hitherto it has principally addressed organs from the execu­
tive, legislative and judiciary branches when discussing execution. 
The applicant and civil society are, apart from the limited possi­
bilities of written submissions, excluded from the execution pro- 
cess.37 The Committee should recognise that state politics are not
35Cf. Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) [GC], ECtHR, no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, 
concurring opinion o f Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vucinic.
36See hereon Helfer and Slaughter, “Toward a Theory o f Effective Supranational Ad­
judication”, 2 YaleL.J. 107 (1997), pp. 287ff. andHuneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts”,
3 CILJ 44 (2011), pp. 132ff., the latter focusing on domestic judges as “compliance 
partners”.
37Tackling the issue from the other side, proposing better training for representatives 
and applicants to communicate effectively with the Committee o f Ministers: OSJI, 
From Judgment to Justice, p. 18.
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only made by governments but also by civil society.38 The IACtHR’s 
experience of cooperation with the victims and civil society in coun­
tries with less rule of law, treating grave and systemic violations 
of the ACHR, is a promising example for such an approach. Also, 
domestic interest groups are often better acquainted with the sit­
uation in a country than the Execution Department’s experts, and 
state agents may not always give the complete picture to the CoE 
organs.39 Again, the IACtHR’s practice to hold sessions away from 
its seat in San Jose has produced good results in bringing the hu­
man rights system closer to the people in the American states. The 
Execution Department and Committee representatives have already 
undertaken visits, among others, to the Chechen Republic in Rus­
sia to hold talks with victim representatives and state officials and 
have recognized the importance of these missions for the supervi­
sion of execution of judgments.40 This option should be further ex­
panded to increment the CoE’s presence in countries affected by 
systemic problems, organizing hearings and probably even public 
workshops or presentations on the state of execution of a specific 
group of cases. Making further use of the National Human Rights 
Institutions network built under the auspices of the Commissioner 
of Human Rights might be another approach to further implemen­
tation of the execution procedure on the national level.
This would also offer a framework to improve the unsatisfactory 
participation of victims in the execution process. While the state 
can expose in writing as well as orally before its peers, victims are 
restricted to submitting written observations on the state of exe­
cution. The principle of equality of arms should not only apply to 
Court proceedings, but also to the Committee’s monitoring. The 
positive effects of the victims’ increased participation on the moni­
toring stage have become evident in the IACtHR’s hearings on com­
pliance. While it seems unrealistic to hear all victims in Strasbourg 
due to the huge amount of cases pending before the Court and the
38Helfer and Slaughter, “Toward a Theory o f Effective Supranational Adjudication”, 
2 Yale L.J. 107 (1997), p. 333.
39 On the importance o f individual groups on the implementation stage also Keohane, 
Moravcsik, and Slaughter, “Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transna­
tional”, 3 Int’l Org 54 (2000), p. 467.
40Committee o f Ministers, Supervision Annual Report 2011, pp. 12f.
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Committee, the Execution Department could, at least in grave cases, 
organize more hearings in the respective state.
Finally, cooperation between the organs involved in the execution 
of judgments can be improved. Each of these organs has its specific 
advantages in the execution process as they often act in relation to 
different domestic organs. Thus, the Committee’s main interlocutor 
on the state level are the governments and administration, while the 
Parliamentary Assembly preferably communicates with the legisla­
tive power, and the Commissioner of Human Rights is linking the 
CoE to civil society. The Court maintains contacts to the member 
states’ supreme judicial organs. It would be essential for all these 
organs to pull states into the same direction.41 Better interaction 
would also help prevent situations like the VgT v. Switzerland (No. 
2) case, where the Court had to decide a case because an implemen­
tation measure had been considered sufficient by the Committee but 
not by the Court.
The Parliamentary Assembly’s role as an organ less strictly bound 
to official government politics and with direct access to national 
parliaments, i.e. the organs that in most cases will have to adopt 
or at least check the general measures required to counter systemic 
shortcomings, should be particularly enforced in the execution pro- 
cess.42 Cooperation among PACE and the Committee should be fur­
ther intensified instead of maintaining the idea of competence that 
is still largely persistant in both organs.43 The Committee should 
ensure that PACE is better notified of cases where implementation 
fails because required legislation is not passed or of cases where, 
out of other reasons, parliamentary action might seem more fruit­
ful than diplomatic action on the level of government representa­
tives. To this end a stable link between the Committee of Ministers 
and PACE’s judicial committee would be desirable. PACE could also 
enforce its role as a sanctioning organ, as it did in 2000 when it sus­
41See examples for good cooperation: Lambert Abdelgawad, “The Execution o f Judg­
ments o f the European Court o f Human Rights”, 3 ZaöRV  69 (2009), pp. 488ff.
42Also: OSJI, From Judgment to Justice, p. 18.
43The impression that such a competence exists was confirmed in interviews con­
ducted in Strasbourg in November 2011 with Committee as well as AS/Jur staff.
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pended Russia’s voting rights following an experts’ report on the 
situation in the Chechen Republic.44
10.2 The Inter-American M on ito ring  System
According to the numbers, execution of judgments under the inter- 
American system is in an even worse state than in Europe. By the 
end of 2014, the IACtHR had 158 cases pending compliance, i.e. cases 
that had not or only partially been complied with. Given that until 
then it had only handed down 216 judgments in total, full compli­
ance had only been achieved in a mere 26.85%.45
The IACtHR’s practice of detailed reparation orders that leave no 
margin of appreciation to the states though allows to further de­
tail compliance numbers. When supervising execution, the Court 
treats judgments by reparation order, literally ticking off each spe­
cific order that has been complied with. Compliance can there­
fore be measured not only by case but even by reparation order. 
This task has been undertaken by Hawkins and Jacoby covering 
the years between the Court’s first judgment of 1989 and 2006, by 
Gonzalez-Salzberg for the period between 1998 and 2006, and by 
the Argentina-based Asociacion de los Derechos Civiles (ADC) for 
cases between 2001 and 2006.46
Hawkins and Jacoby’s analysis shows that states complied with 
28% of all measures that were ordered. Compliance is best with 
monetary compensation, either for moral (47% of orders complied) 
or material (42% of orders complied) damages. Court costs and ex­
penses were paid in 38% of cases. Compliance with other forms of 
reparation is lower. Apologies were complied with in 31% of cases, 
punishment of those responsible or restoration of rights were com­
plied with between 13% and 19%, while legislative changes were in­
44See the verbatim report o f the Assembly’s session o f 6 April 2000,15 p.m., available 
at http://assembly.coe.int.
45 IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2014, pp. 69, 
72ff.
46Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”; Gonzalez-Salzberg, “The Effectiveness 
o f the Inter-American Human Rights System ”, Rev. Colomb. Derecho Int. 16 (2010); 
ADC, Efectividad del SIDH.
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troduced in only 2 out of 43 instances (5%).47 The authors conclude 
that compliance depends not so much on the financial consequences 
for the state but on the political cost.48
While no relation can be established between the year of the judg­
ment and the compliance rate, compliance improved considerably 
after the Court had decided that it could monitor compliance in the 
Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama case in 2003. Before that date, states 
had complied with three out of 98 actions that were required, while 
after the decision the rate stabilized at around 30 to 40 percent per
49year.
Gonzâlez-Salzberg’s and the ADC’s analyses confirm the positive 
trends described by Hawkins and Jacoby. While their datasets do 
not match (the ADC takes into account IACommHR decisions, too), 
they at least serve to identify trends in compliance. According to the 
ADC, between 2001 and 2006 states complied in total with 36% of all 
measures ordered.50 Both studies coincide in that pecuniary repara­
tion is best complied with at 58%,51 while the rate for costs and ex­
penses jumped to 70%.52 Symbolic reparation measures also rose to a 
compliance rate of 52% between 2001 and 2006 or, more specifically, 
70% for public acknowledgments.53 More complex forms of repa­
ration, such as prosecution and eventual punishment (compliance 
rate 23% according to the ADC, 0% according to Gonzâlez-Salzberg) 
and legal amendments (compliance rate 14% according to the ADC 
and 23% according to Gonzâlez-Salzberg) remain at the lower end of 
the scale. In another study the Open Society Justice Initiative found
47Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”, p. 26. The authors count investigations 
as completed when the Court acknowledged that a perpetrator had been found. 
The Court has, however, never accepted that the obligation to investigate has been 
fully complied with, as even in the cases where perpetrators had been found the 
disappeared victims were not localized: see Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts”, 3 
CIl J  44 (2011), p. 122, fn. 80.
48Hawkins and Jacoby, “Partial Compliance”, p. 27.
49Ibid., table 2.
50ADC, Efectividad del SIDH, p. 14.
51 Gonzâlez-Salzberg, “The Effectiveness o f the Inter-American Human Rights Sys­
tem ”, Rev. Colomb. Derecho Int. 16 (2010), p. 129; ADC, Efectividad del SIDH, p. 14.
52Gonzâlez-Salzberg, “The Effectiveness o f the Inter-American Human Rights Sys­
tem ”, Rev. Colomb. Derecho Int. 16 (2010), p. 129.
53ADC, Efectividad del SIDH, p. 14; Gonzâlez-Salzberg, “The Effectiveness o f the In­
ter-American Human Rights System ”, Rev. Colomb. Derecho Int. 16 (2010), p. 129.
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out that around 50% of symbolic measures are being complied with, 
while immediate remedies such as the release of prisoners, reversal 
of arbitrary lay-offs or granting security measures were fulfilled in 
40% of cases.54
The Court itself undertook an internal study on compliance with 
monetary reparation in 2008, updated in 2009, which showed that 
81% of costs and expenses ordered and 83% of indemnifications 
ordered were totally or partially complied with.55 It remains un­
clear, though, what the Court identifies as “partial compliance”, i.e. 
whether partial compliance exists when specific, but not all, heads 
of reparation have been fully complied with or also when only part 
of an amount ordered under a specific head has been paid to the 
victim. In the latter case, the statistic would be of little use because 
even upon paying only one symbolic dollar a case would have to be 
counted in the statistics.
There is no systematic way in which the Court documents which 
cases have been finally complied with. While its annual reports con­
tain lists of cases that were under supervision in the respective year, 
no such list is available for cases where supervision has been closed. 
Such a list would be of interest because the fact that a case no longer 
appears in the list of cases under supervision does not necessar­
ily mean that the Court has closed supervision. In Salvador Chiri- 
boga v. Ecuador for example, the Court handed down the judgment 
on the merits and reparation in 2008 and included the case in the 
list of cases on the stage of monitoring compliance in its 2008 an­
nual report. The amount of reparation should be determined by mu­
tual agreement between the parties. As no such agreement could be 
reached, the Court reopened the reparation stage and listed the case 
in its 2009 report again under the section “Contentious cases pend­
ing judgments” and no longer under “Contentious cases at the stage 
of monitoring compliance with judgment”.
The cases in which supervision could be closed by the Court until 
now confirm the findings by the aforementioned studies that com­
plex reparation measures are less likely to be complied with.56 None 
of these cases required complex reparation measures from the re­
54OSJI, From Judgment to Justice, p. 20.
55IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2009, p. 12.
56See appendix, p. 258.
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sponding states. Reparation in the Court’s early cases was limited 
to monetary reparation or administrative measures such as the ti­
tling of land, which, as long as the lands in question are not oc­
cupied by others, as is the case in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Com­
munity v. Paraguay, is not a complicated issue. The most complex 
issues that were hitherto fully complied with were ordered in the 
case of Lori Berenson-Mejia v. Peru. In this case, though, the victim 
was a US national and the USA exerted pressure on Peru to comply 
with the Court’s judgment and improve the victim’s conditions of 
detention.57
While the Court is certainly right when reiterating in its annual 
reports that the huge number of cases pending compliance does not 
correlate with an overall low number of compliance with specific 
measures,58 it is undeniable that implementation of judgments is a 
weak point in its balance that demands particular attention. As was 
already said supra concerning the European system, implementa­
tion corresponds to the states. Their domestic organs, the execu­
tive, the legislative and the judiciary are the primordial addressees 
of the Court’s reparation orders. As regional integration of states 
is much less developed in the Americas than in Europe, coopera­
tion and strengthening of these domestic organs in a similar fash­
ion as the CoE and EU organs do is a much more difficult task. 
There is, for instance, no parliamentary representation on the inter- 
American level, and a regular exchange of the judiciary has not been 
implemented either. The European system’s diversified set of instru­
ments, whose combined powers have proven to be quite successful, 
does hence not find its counterpart in the Americas. It is therefore 
all the more valuable that the Court is undertaking considerable ef­
forts to organize exchanges with all sorts of domestic actors, from 
civil society to parliaments, governments and the judiciary, when 
holding sessions away from its seat, as these offer a rare space to 
share execution experiences across borders.
57Associated Press, Clinton Urges Peru in Berenson Case, 17 January 2001, u r l : http: 
//www .latinam ericanstudies.org/peru/clinton-berenson.htm; Los Angeles Times, 
Bush Cites Case o f  U.S. Woman in Peru Meeting, 27 June 2001, u r l : http ://articles. 
latim es.com /print/2001/jun/27/new s/m n-15032.
58IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 2011, p. 14.
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Apart from these efforts by the Court, the OAS’s internal pro­
cedures should be improved to ensure better compliance with the 
Court’s judgments.59 All proposals must presuppose that the IAC­
tHR’s role as an organ of the judiciary is not to exert political pres­
sure on states to make them comply with judgments. Its role is lim­
ited to requesting state reports on the status of compliance.60 This 
limitation was also recognized by several judges of the Court, who 
have made proposals to create the institutional framework for an ef­
fective execution monitoring.61 Furthermore, the discussion within 
the Court about whether to again submit cases to the General As­
sembly in which no progress was made in a long period, implies the 
recognition that its competence on the execution stage is limited. 
On the other hand it has become evident in the Americas, too, that 
pressure by other states can catalise state efforts to achieve results in 
executing Court judgment.62 Also, the influence of domestic stake­
holders, be they part of the state administration or of civil society, 
can be favourable to compliance.63 Efforts to improve the fulfillment 
rate with IACtHR judgments should therefore take these stakehold­
ers into account, too.
Participation of civil society in the procedure before the inter- 
American human rights system is already more advanced than in 
Europe. Victims are usually defended by NGOs and not by private 
practitioners and, due to the contradictory monitoring procedure 
established by the Court, are also present in the phase after the judg­
ment has been adopted. Should the General Assembly take a more 
active role in the implementation of judgments or should another 
procedure be established, participation of the victims should be se­
59The following has partially been published in Schneider, “Implementation o f Judg­
m ents”, 1 -2  IAEHRJ 5 (2012).
60 Cf. Londono Lâzaro, “El cumplimiento de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana: 
dilemas y retos”, p. 119.
61See supra, section 9.2.1.
62See the Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname and Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname cases: IAC­
tHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1995, p. 15 and 
IACtHR, Annual Report o f  the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights 1998, p. 30. On 
experiences in Europe see the Loizidou  case described supra in section 9.1.1.2.1.
63 The role o f domestic civil society and the effects o f human rights treaties on its 
activity is described by the “liberal theory” ofcom pliance with international human 
rights law: see Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, Yale L.J. 
111 (2002), pp. 1952ff.
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cured there, too, in order not to repeat the closed-doors policy of 
the CoE’s Committee of Ministers, in particular seen that the Com­
mittee has been gradually improving the applicants’ position in the 
execution process. Inclusion of civil society into the IACtHR’s exe­
cution procedure is furthermore facilitated by the Court’s practice 
to hold sessions in the member states. These sessions take place in 
surroundings that enable the general public to participate. Further­
more, the Court organizes other activities in the visited state that 
involve civil society.
Cooperation between the Court and the OAS’s political organs 
should be improved, too. In order for the General Assembly, the Per­
manent Council or the CJPA to fulfil their tasks, the Court has to 
provide them with the necessary information on the state of com­
pliance in each case. It would, however, not be sufficient for the 
Court to simply submit cases of non-compliance to the General As­
sembly again. To really comply with the requirement in Article 65 
of the ACHR to make pertinent recommendations in cases of non­
compliance, the Court should modify its annual reports. Such mod­
ification could rely on the experiences made with supervision un­
der the ECHR, in particular the pilot judgment procedure, where 
the ECtHR points the Committee of Ministers to situations of sys­
temic shortcomings in a state. Both situations are insofar compara­
ble as IACtHR and IACommHR have an advantage of information 
with regard to the General Assembly. The Court is often well ac­
quainted with the situation in a particular state due to its intense 
occupation with a case or several cases from that state. Thus, it can 
determine systemic problems that are underlying execution prob- 
lems.64 The Court’s analysis should be completed with information 
from the IACommHR, which knows the human rights situation in 
the American states even better as it receives all applications that 
enter the inter-American human rights protection system and pre­
pares general or specific reports on the human rights situation in the
64For instance, several massacre cases concerning Colombia all suffered from simi­
lar problems in relation to investigation and judgment o f those responsible or the 
procurement o f psychological treatments for the victims. See on the last issue Moni­
toring Compliance with the Measures o f  Reparation Concerning the Medical and Psy­
chological Attention Ordered in Nine Colombian Cases (Monitoring o f Compliance), 
IACtHR, 8 February 2012.
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OAS member states.65 Court and Commission should consequently 
consider to combine their insight to improve the annual report on 
supervision the Court has to submit to the General Assembly. Thus, 
when the Court reports a case to the General Assembly, it might, in 
the future, describe more specifically the reasons why a state does 
not comply with certain measures, further sustaining it with the 
IACommHR’s knowledge on other similar situations. This would 
allow the General Assembly to adopt more appropriate resolutions.
Beyond these considerations, it must be asked in a more gen­
eral way whether the General Assembly is the appropriate organ 
to deal with cases of non-compliance. This may be doubted out of 
two reasons: first, the lack of specification of the General Assem­
bly’s powers with regard to states failing to comply with judgments. 
Whichever measure the Assembly adopts will suffer from the lack 
of clear legal support in the OAS Charter and the ACHR. In addition 
to that, given the lack of a catalogue of measures, the OAS member 
states will not only have to agree upon the adoption of measures 
against a state, but they will also have to overcome the additional 
hurdle of first having to determine which specific measure would be 
appropriate and politically viable. This adds another layer of inse­
curity to the Assembly’s ability to react to cases of non-compliance 
submitted by the IACtHR. Secondly, the General Assembly sits only 
once per year during three days. In each of these sessions it adopts 
around 60 resolutions on all kinds of issues concerning the OAS. The 
Court is only being dealt with in a short formal presentation of the 
annual report by its president. Proper discussions take place earlier 
in the CJPA, where the president of the Court presents the annual 
report some three months before the General Assembly’s session. 
It has already been mentioned that, despite the technical possibil­
ity of majority decisions, the CJPA and the Permanent Council in 
fact take their decisions unanimously, which in practice gives the 
state concerned a veto right. Furthermore, the resolution prepared 
and adopted by the aforementioned organs always concerns the en­
tire annual report instead of treating the cases of non-compliance
65 Articles 57(1)(h) and 58 o f the Rules o f Procedure o f the IACommHR.
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apart.66 Any state that wants to oppose the adoption of a measure 
thus has to block the adoption of the resolution on the entire report, 
which implies that the Court’s work during the past year cannot be 
approved. This constellation makes the adoption of any measure 
against a state that is not complying with its obligations from Court 
judgments very unlikely.
Another element to be taken into account when assessing the ef­
fectiveness of the proceedings before the General Assembly is the 
situation underlying the cases the IACtHR submitted to it. Stalemate 
in most of these cases was caused by macropolitical issues. Thus, 
in the Peruvian cases the authoritarian Fujimori government justi­
fied human rights violations with the overarching aim of fighting 
the communist guerrillas in the country, a circumstance in which 
it received support from the neighbouring countries.67 The Peru­
vian blockade could only be overcome when Fujimori lost elections 
and Peru returned to cooperate with the IACtHR. Venezuela, for its 
part, is confronting the institutions of the inter-American human 
rights system accusing them to be vehicles for US imperialism in 
the region. It denounced the ACHR at a moment when several South 
American states had adopted or at least were favourable to a new 
“Bolivarian” socialism which led to frictions with conservative gov­
ernments in the region. In this setting Venezuela did not become a 
pariah when denouncing the ACHR. It is hence improbable to ex­
pect public exposure of a state in the General Assembly for non­
compliance when it opposes a human rights protection system that, 
in the view of a number of its members, hinders the effective reso­
lution of a macropolitical issue. Only in the absence of such overar­
ching circumstances, the General Assembly has shown to be able to 
take measures when it adopted a resolution that enabled the Court 
to close two cases against Suriname. It might therefore be worth for 
the Court to consider submitting cases to the Assembly in which 
stalemate is not caused by political but rather by practical issues. 
This might enable the Assembly to actually adopt a resolution on 
a situation and thus open a space for the states to enter into more
66Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACtHR, 11 March 
2005, Series C no. 123, separate opinion o f Judge Manuel E. Ventura Robles, 
para. 26ff.
67Cassel, “Perü se retira del SIDH”, Revista IIDH 29 (1999), pp. 69ff.
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substantive discussions on the execution process of IACtHR judg­
ments.
The execution process under the ACHR can be considered un­
satisfactory for yet another reason. The General Assembly of the 
OAS unites all member states, independent from whether they have 
ratified the ACHR or not. Even states that have denounced the Con­
vention, such as Trinidad and Tobago or Venezuela, continue to vote 
on other states’ compromise with the protection of the Convention 
rights. But also states like Canada, which has never signed the Con­
vention, or the United States, which have signed but never ratified, 
may judge the human rights record of their fellow American states 
under the ACHR. Political monitoring of compliance would how­
ever be more credible and potentially less conflictive if  decisions 
were taken by a body conformed only of states that are subject to 
the IACtHR’s jurisdiction, or that have at least ratified the Conven­
tion. Such a body of like-minded states could conduct peer-review 
in a way the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe does. 
This organ should be equipped to hold several meetings per year 
and have a permanent secretariat that constantly monitors cases and 
procures assessment to the states. The IACtHR and the IACommHR 
should constantly maintain this body informed about situations un­
der their scrutiny so that it can identify systemic problems and de­
fine its course of action. Ideally, this organ would be located close 
to the IACtHR to facilitate cooperation.
Seen that the member states of the OAS did not adopt any of the 
proposals submitted by the former President of the IACtHR, Judge 
Cangado Trindade, and afterwards by Judge Ventura Robles to mod­
ify the execution procedure, it appears appropriate to consider mod­
ifications that do not require adaptations of the basic texts of the 
OAS. A body like the one described above could be implemented 
in different ways that would not require modifications to the OAS 
Charter or the ACHR. It could either be created as an independent 
body under the ACHR, consisting for instance of the states’ am­
bassadors to Costa Rica, as these already maintain relations with 
the IACtHR. The legal basis could be a protocol to the ACHR. Ide­
ally, signature would be made obligatory for all states parties hav­
ing recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. States that only recognize 
the Court’s jurisdiction on a case-to-case basis according to Article
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62(2) ACHR should be admitted to sessions on cases that concern 
them.68
The supervisory body could also be formed as working groups 
of the states subject to the Court’s jurisdiction within the General 
Assembly of the OAS. Fragmentation is not unknown to the Assem­
bly. Thus, the seat of the Court or the nomination of its judges is to 
be determined within the General Assembly only by the states par­
ties to the Convention according to Articles 53(1) and 58(1) of the 
ACHR. Similarly, permanent working groups of the states subject to 
the Court’s jurisdiction could be established in all organs currently 
concerned with the Court’s annual reports. These working groups 
would, similar to Cangado Trindade’s and Ventura Roble’s propos­
als, constantly monitor compliance by the states. This solution how­
ever has the disadvantage of keeping supervision within the organs 
of the OAS in Washington, D.C., which have already shown to be 
unwilling to modify their procedures. At least the establishment of 
these working groups would require the vote of all member states 
to the Organization. Therefore, a solution within the ACHR would 
be preferable.
68An amendment to the ACHR to introduce a permanent observation mechanism 
had been proposed already in 2007 by Uruguay. Cf. Corasantini, “Implementacion 
de las sentencias y  resoluciones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, 
Revista IIDH 49 (2009), p. 16.
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The Inter-American and the European Court of Human Rights 
share many organisational features, principally concerning their 
construction and proceedings. It becomes palpable in these areas 
that the authors of the ACHR took inspiration from the “old”, pre- 
1998 European human rights protection system, that also consisted 
of a court and a commission. Judgments of both courts and their ex­
ecution, though, evidence remarkable differences on the final stages 
of the proceedings. These differences can largely be retraced to the 
prominent role of the principle of subsidiarity in Europe, which af­
fects the CoE’s human rights protection work on all levels.
Human rights protection in Europe is based on the assumption 
that the states are generally willing and able to procure effective 
remedies. Under this assumption the ECtHR’s role would be reduced 
to that of a background player that resolves uncertainties about the 
interpretation of the ECHR and ensures that it is applied in the same 
way in all member states. Even in cases of gross human rights vi­
olations the state is supposed to be in the best position to award 
effective and complete reparation, so that the ECtHR usually does 
not make any orders on this issue. At the same time, the authors of 
the ECHR considered that human rights violations could generally 
be repaired by monetary reparation if the responding state did not 
take other practical measures of individual reparation.
The inter-American system, on the other hand, puts less con­
fidence in its member states’ capacity to effectively prevent and 
remedy human rights violations. Considerations of subsidiarity 
only concern the question of admissibility of a case before the IA- 
CommHR. Once the hurdle of the local remedies rule has been over­
come, the IACtHR is no longer bound by concerns about the capac­
ity of domestic organs to repair the consequences of violations. It 
makes broad use of its capacity under Article 63(1) of the ACHR 
to award reparation, handing down very detailed decisions that are 
motivated by the concept of certainty of justice, generally leaving 
no margin of appreciation to the state.
Apart from confidence in the states’ willingness and capacity 
to protect human rights, the restrictive European solution can be 
retraced also to the ECHR’s authors’ assumption that the ECtHR 
would mainly decide inter-state cases. Therefore, despite other pro­
posals, they took inspiration for the Court’s reparation competence
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from treaties concerning state responsibility towards other states in 
cases of violations of individual rights.
It is unclear why the American states, when discussing the ACHR, 
went exactly in the opposite direction, starting with restrictive pro­
posals for reparation rules that were oriented by the ECHR, and 
finally adopting a much wider competence for the Court.1 It may 
be suspected that developments in international law on reparation 
for human rights violations and state responsibility have influenced 
this decision. Inter-American cooperation had already before been 
geared towards preventing interventions that were justified with 
the argument of diplomatic protection. This circumstance may have 
caused in particular the Latin American states to vote for a stricter 
reparation regime as an argument for effective protection of indi­
vidual rights in those states.2
Reparation measures considered sufficient by the Committee of 
Ministers tend to be less strict than those ordered in similar situa­
tions by the IACtHR. Thus, for example, the entire complex of psy­
chological or medical treatment has hitherto been resolved through 
monetary compensation in Europe, leaving untouched the question 
whether qualified psychologists are actually available in the region 
the affected persons live.3 In such situations, the IACtHR’s prac­
tice to order the state to effectively provide psychological assistance, 
rather than leaving the practical task of obtaining such help to the 
victims, may better meet the needs of victims in less developed re­
gions. On the other hand, states with an effective administration 
may indeed be in a better position than international courts to iden­
tify the needs of the victims rendering too detailed orders counter­
productive in the worst case. It is therefore essential for the courts 
to take into account the actual conditions in each responding state 
when deciding reparation orders.
More responsibility for the states concerning the determination 
of reparation requires different monitoring procedures. If, like in the 
Americas, the states’ margin of appreciation on how to comply with 
Court orders is reduced to almost zero, monitoring of compliance is
1Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, ed. 2, pp. 189ff. and 216ff.
2See: Kokott, Das interamerikanische System zum Schutz der Menschenrechte, pp. 8f.
3Cf. the considerations on reparation in Abuyeva et al. v. Russia, ECtHR, no. 27065/05, 
2 December 2010, paras. 247ff.
253
IV  Conclusions
limited to merely assessing whether a measure has been complied 
with or not. In a regime governed by subsidiarity of the international 
control mechanism, like in Europe, the monitoring mechanism has 
to be much more elaborate as it also has to comply the task of iden­
tifying which measures are required in each specific situation to re­
pair a violation on the individual and general level and eventually 
convince the responding state of its views.4
Based on the findings of this investigation, two principal areas for 
reform could be identified, which were exposed in detail at the end 
of parts 2 and 3 respectively. In Europe, the ECtHR’s involvement 
in the matter of reparation should become stronger. Developments 
such as the “Article 46 judgments” or “pilot judgments” that con­
tain more specific indications to the states might be applied more 
frequently to situations where states have shown their inability or 
unwillingness to adopt measures. The principle of subsidiarity puts 
an obligation of result onto the states. If they do not comply with this 
obligation, the ECtHR should increase the specificity of its orders in 
following cases stemming from the same fundamental problem, re­
ducing the state’s margin of appreciation with each new similar case 
that is reaching it. Also, the state’s compliance record in other cases 
and its level of development may be taken into account as factors to 
determine the level of detail of the ECtHR’s reparation orders.
The inter-American system, on the other hand, is missing a ded­
icated and functioning system to monitor compliance. Monitoring 
compliance is not so much a juridical but a political task and should 
be treated as such by the corresponding organs. Supervision should 
therefore be attached to the OAS’s political structure. Given that the 
IACtHR is already defining the reparation measures to be adopted, 
such an organ’s tasks would be reduced to verifying compliance in 
the strict sense. Therefore such a mechanism could be smaller than 
the European monitoring organs. It should, however, be enabled 
to provide training and advice to the states to draw the pertinent 
conclusions from the IACtHR’s judgments. In general, cooperation 
among the organs of the OAS and those of the inter-American hu­
4The possible contradictory nature o f these procedures has been the reason for the 
introduction o f Article 46(4) o f the ECHR: Eaton and Schokkenbroek, “Reforming 
the Human Rights Protection System ”, HRLJ 26 (2005), p. 15.
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man rights system should be improved to foster better implementa­
tion of judgments.
At the time of writing, both systems were undergoing reform 
processes that also affect the monitoring systems. The European 
system’s capacity to ensure more effective implementation of judg­
ments had been identified by the member states as one of the central 
issues to revise in the aftermaths of the Brighton Conference of 2012. 
The Committee of Ministers has begun to evaluate its supervision 
tools. In a first step, the Ministers’ Deputies concentrated on tools 
available in case a state did not comply in a timely manner, sparing 
out the question of persistent failure to comply with the judgments. 
They concluded that more use should be made of press releases on 
individual cases and grouping cases from different states sharing 
similar problems to enable an exchange of experiences. Civil soci­
ety should be better included into the monitoring process and other 
tools of public dissemination of positive execution results, such as 
press conferences, should be applied. Further evaluation should take 
place on the idea of setting deadlines for specific execution mea­
sures, to increase assistance to states and to publish the list of cases 
under discussion at each meeting. Other subjects to be treated will 
particularly include measures to be taken in respect of states that 
fail to implement judgments in a timely manner.5
The reform proposals so far expressly reject the proposal to stig­
matise states or take punitive measures against them. The results of 
this investigation however indicate that in cases of intense opposi­
tion to execution or very serious delays the states should be imposed 
costs of the ongoing monitoring procedure before the Commission 
and eventually the Court. This would not amount to stigmatization 
or punishment, but would simply impose the costs of the delay onto 
the responsible state. While these costs will remain relatively low, 
they may be an additional reason for the state to increase its com­
pliance efforts. Also, the Committee continues to confront the state 
as a closed entity instead of directing its efforts more specifically to 
the different interest groups such as the judiciary or the parliament.
5Steering Committee for Human Rights, Measures to improve the execution o f  the judg­
ments o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights, CDDH(2013)002, Committee o f Min­
isters, 24 January 2013, no. 8.
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A more holistic approach would require to include those organs’ 
respective counterparts within the CoE, like PACE or the ECtHR.
The American states have also identified the need for reform of 
the inter-American human rights protection system. They installed 
a working group within the Permanent Council in 2011 to evaluate 
the areas of reform in a process that includes different stakeholders 
such as OAS organs, the states and civil society. This working group 
identified the implementation of orders and decisions of the inter- 
American organs as one of the issues to be treated in the middle 
and long-term and recommended that the states elaborate a guide 
or document of reference on successful experiences and good prac­
tices concerning domestic institutional or legislative mechanisms 
that cooperate in the implementation of the recommendations of 
the IACommHR and the compliance with the decisions of the IAC- 
tHR.6
The fact that both reform processes include the issue of execu­
tion of judgments shows the continuing importance of this subject, 
which is inseparably linked to that of reparation. This work can 
therefore only be a stocktaking of the status quo. Its analysis would 
have to be updated after the implementation of the coming reform 
steps. The proposals developed herein may serve as an inspiration 
to further improve these procedural steps, so that the effectiveness 
of both human rights systems may be further enhanced for the sake 
of better protection of the victims and prevention of future human 
rights violations.
Both courts have developed their own rich case law and procedu­
ral traditions. Therefore, cooperation between the European and the 
inter-American human rights organs is worthwhile to be improved 
in many ways. The establishment of an official link between both 
human rights courts is an important first step to this end. The IAC- 
tHR has shown that it is a serious peer to the ECtHR, that, in certain 
areas, is more modern than its European counterpart. Its efforts to 
translate its orders into English have eliminated the language bar­
6Consejo Permanente de la Organization de los Estados Americanos, Informe del 
grupo de trabajo especial de reflexion sobre el funcionamiento de la Comision In- 
teramericana de Derechos Humanos para el fortalecimiento del Sistema Interameri­
cano de Derechos Humanos para la consideracion del Consejo Permanente, OEA/Ser. 
G GT/SIDH-13/11 rev. 2, 13 December 2011, p. 10.
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rier and make its judgments available to scholars and practitioners 
all over the world. Meetings on different levels, between judges, reg­
istry staff and hopefully even lawyers and NGOs, will produce syn­
ergies and enable discussions about solutions to similar problems on 
both continents. The value of a comparative approach also becomes 
evident in the growing number of scholarly works that take this 
approach. All these steps and experiences combined will hopefully 
pave the way towards a continuously improving protection of indi­
viduals from human rights violations and more effective reparation 
in case such violations have occurred.
With the development of an African human rights protection sys­
tem it is to be expected that in the future a bilateral comparison will 
not be sufficient, but that there will be three effective systems whose 
experiences are worthwhile to be looked at. But until then there may 
still be a rather long way to go. It is, however, noteworthy that the 
rules for the new African Court of Justice have closed a competence 
gap we could identify for the European and the inter-American sys­
tems in the area of execution of judgments, by expressly authorizing 
the Assembly of the African Union to impose sanctions on a state 
that does not comply with its obligations from a Court judgment.7
7 Article 46(4) o f the Protocol on the Statute o f the African Court o f Justice and Human 
Rights.
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Appendix: Fully Implemented Cases of 
the IACtHR
Name Measures Jdgmnt Closed
Velâsquez- 
Rodriguez v. 
Honduras
Godinez-Cruz v. 
Honduras
Aloeboetoe v. 
Suriname
Gangaram-Panday 
v. Suriname
Genie Lacayo v. 
Nicaragua
Last Temptation of 
Christ v. Chile
Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tigni v. 
Nicaragua
Ricardo Canese v. 
Paraguay
payment 1989 1996
payment 1989 1996
payment, trust 1993 1998
fund, opening of
school
payment 1994 1998
payment 1997 1998
amend laws, 2001 2003
payment
legal basis for 2001 2008
demarcation of
indigenous
properties, delimit
and title lands,
payment
payment, 2004 2008
publication
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Name
Acosta Calderon v. 
Ecuador
Claude Reyes et al. 
v. Chile
Herrera Ulloa v. 
Costa Rica
Tristân Donoso v. 
Panama
Lori
Berenson-Mejia v. 
Peru
Escher v. Brazil
Measures
publication, 
eliminate name 
from registers, 
payment
submit information 
to victims, 
publication, 
measures to permit 
access to 
information, 
formation of 
officials, payment
nullification of 
judgment, adjust 
domestic legal 
system, payment
payment, 
nullification of 
conviction, 
publication
adapt legislation, 
publication, 
medical care, 
condone debt for 
civil reparation, 
adapt detention 
conditions in one 
prison
payment, 
publication, 
investigation of 
facts (phone 
tapping during 4 
months)
Jdgmnt Closed
2005 2008
2006 2008
2004 2010
2009 2010
2004 2012
2009 2012
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Name Measures Jdgmnt Closed
Mejia Idrovo v. 
Ecuador
publication,
payment
2011 2012
Kimel v. Argentina payment, 
nullification of 
conviction, 
eliminate victim’s 
name from 
criminal records, 
publication, public 
act of recognition, 
adapt domestic law
2008 2013
Abrill Alosilla et al. 
v. Peru
payment,
publication
2011 2013
Castaneda Gutman 
v. Mexico
payment,
publication
2009 2013
Familia Pacheco 
Tineo v. Bolivia
payment, 
publication, 
implementation of 
training 
programme
2013 2015
Suarez Perala v. 
Ecuador
payment, 
publication, 
payment to fund 
for legal assistance
2013 2015
Alban Cornejo et 
al. v. Ecuador
payment, 
publication, 
distribution of 
knowledge on 
patient rights, 
training of public 
officials
2007 2015
Fully implemented cases of the IACtHR as of 31 October 2015.
260
